Adaptation Finance: 10 Key Questions, Answered sarah.parsons@… Mon, 05/19/2025 - 06:00

People around the world are feeling the effects of climate change in the form of severe floods, long-term droughts, worsening forest fires, intensifying storms, extreme heat and more. It's essential that communities invest in reducing and avoiding these impacts. For example, improved building methods can be the difference between a house withstanding a storm or crumbling to rubble.

The critical question is: How do we pay for it?

This is where adaptation finance comes in.

Particularly in low-income countries, adaptation finance is sorely needed to help make people — and the infrastructure and ecosystems they rely on — more resilient to the impacts of climate change. Yet with each passing year the gap between the adaptation finance needed and what is available grows.

Closing this gap is essential as climate change continues to escalate. But there are varying definitions about what counts as adaptation finance, as well as different means of providing and tracking funds. Here, we answer key questions:

1) What Is Adaptation Finance?

Adaptation finance is aimed at helping communities reduce the risks they face and harm they might suffer from climate hazards like storms or droughts. It pays for things like strengthening housing and infrastructure to withstand extreme weather; developing drought-tolerant crops; creating social safety nets (like cash, food or insurance to help with recovery from climate-related disasters); or improving access to climate information for better management of climate-related risks.

Adaptation finance includes funds flowing from developed to developing countries as well as finance that governments — in both developing and developed countries — invest to build resilience to climate impacts within their own borders. Adaptation finance can also come from private sources, such as philanthropies, corporations and financial institutions. Businesses are increasingly investing in adaptation to protect their operations, supply chains and markets from exposure to climate-related risks.

Adaptation finance often overlaps with development finance, as investments aimed at reducing communities' economic or social vulnerability often also enhance resilience to climate change, in addition to other benefits. However, for funding to be classified as adaptation finance, it must be explicitly intended to enhance resilience to actual or expected climate risks.

For example, funding a new road may boost a community's resilience by making it easier for people to access markets, hospitals and assistance during extreme weather. To count as adaptation finance, however, the road needs to be deliberately built with climate impacts and the needs of vulnerable people in mind. A vulnerability analysis could reveal the need for a more durable road so people living in informal settlements can safely evacuate ahead of severe storms. And the road would need to be situated where it will not be directly exposed to storm surges and erosion, or elevated so that it remains passable when flooding occurs.

A partially submerged highway in Thailand's Chiang Rai province following Typhoon Yagi in 2024. Adaptation finance pays for activities that enhance resilience to climate impacts, such as building elevated or more durable roads that can better withstand floods and storms. Photo by Boyloso/iStock 2) How Much Adaptation Finance Is Needed?

Several studies give a general sense of how much finance developing countries will need to adapt to climate change. For example, the UNEP Adaptation Finance GAP Report estimates that developing countries need between $215 and $387 billion per year by 2030. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that adaptation costs exceed 1% of GDP per year in about 50 low-income and developing economies. This rises up to 20% of GDP for small island nations exposed to acute climate hazards such as tropical cyclones and rising seas.

However, these are only broad estimates. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact amount of adaptation finance needed, as this requires assessing context-specific risks, clearly distinguishing adaptation from general development, and more accurate data collection. Uncertainties about future climate trajectories also complicate estimates, as adaptation finance needs depend in part on how successful we are at curbing global temperature rise.

3) How Much Adaptation Finance Is Available?

Even with fairly limited data, it's clear there's not enough adaptation finance available to meet countries' needs.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that $68 billion was spent around the world on adaptation on average between 2021 and 2022. Much of this was international finance: According to OECD, developed countries delivered $32.4 billion in adaptation finance to developing nations in 2022.

These funding levels are many times less than what's needed — and the gap is set to increase as climate change impacts intensify. In total, the gap between current adaptation finance and what's needed in developing countries is estimated at $187-$359 billion per year.

4) Who Is — and Is not — Receiving Adaptation Finance?

Evidence shows that available finance is not reaching those most vulnerable to climate impacts, who often have the fewest resources with which to adapt. According to OECD, low-income countries received less than 10% of all climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries between 2016 and 2022. Data from the four major multilateral climate funds — Adaptation Fund, Climate Investment Fund, Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility — also indicates that fragile and highly vulnerable countries are receiving less finance than other nations.

One potential reason for this is that accessing adaptation finance often requires significant institutional capacity. While funding requirements vary based on the type of finance involved, they are often complex, requiring the staff, data and know-how to structure bankable adaptation initiatives. Least developed countries often lack these resources, despite having the highest need for adaptation finance. High costs of capital, driven by factors like currency and political risks, further limit access to finance.

5) Why Does Climate Mitigation Receive More Funding than Adaptation?

While adaptation finance has increased in recent years, it still represents less than 10% of global climate investments. The majority goes to climate change mitigation: efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and halt rising temperatures.

There are several reasons why mitigation receives more finance than adaptation. Mitigation's focus on GHG emissions not only makes it easier to define, it also makes it easier to invest in. Activities like installing solar panels or manufacturing electric vehicles bring a more immediate and certain financial return than many adaptation initiatives, which focus on building long-term resilience to extreme events that may happen further in the future. Nations may also be more inclined to invest in mitigation internationally given the contribution to global emissions reductions.

6) Why Is Adaptation Finance Difficult to Track?

Adaptation finance can be tricky to define and track, in large part because adaptation is highly context specific. Unlike mitigation finance, which targets a narrower set of solutions to reduce GHG emissions, adaptation requires a broad array of activities tailored to particular climate risks faced by specific locations.

There are also varying methods for tracking adaptation finance. Two of the most widely used approaches — OECD DAC Rio Markers and MDB Joint Methodology for Tracking Adaptation Finance — offer guidance to financial institutions and countries providing adaptation finance. While their methodologies differ somewhat, both focus on identifying whether an investment has supported climate resilience, and if so, to what degree.

Some countries have developed their own approaches to tracking adaptation finance and budget expenditures. These often draw from the two methodologies mentioned above but make modifications to suit national circumstances. As a result, adaptation finance provided or received by countries is not always easily comparable.

Even with methodologies in place, tracking adaptation finance is complicated. It requires funding and capacity to execute, which organizations aren't always resourced for. Moreover, spending on adaptation may occur across different units of the organization, creating a cross-cutting challenge requiring additional coordination.

Adaptation finance from the private sector is even more difficult to track because, unlike public funding, governments do not maintain centralized accounting systems for private investments. As a result, virtually no country systematically monitors how much private funding is spent on adaptation within or outside its borders.

7) Are Developing Countries Receiving Financial Support for Adaptation?

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) governs the process by which countries come together to cooperate on climate action. Under the UNFCCC, developed countries committed to help developing countries — which contributed least to the climate crisis but often suffer the worst impacts — finance their adaptation efforts.

This commitment has led to the adoption of key climate funds (such as the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund) to channel international finance to developing countries. Developed countries also agreed under the UNFCCC to double adaptation finance from 2019 levels to roughly $40 billion by 2025. As of 2022 (the latest data available), they had reached $32.4 billion, putting them on track to realize this goal.

In Gambia, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) helps farmers develop methods that are more resilient to climate impacts like rising temperatures and erratic rainfall. International support is an important source of funding for developing nations to pursue climate adaptation. Photo by UNEP/Flickr

Most recently, at the 2024 UN climate summit (COP29), countries agreed to a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance. Parties committed to deliver $300 billion — with efforts to reach $1.3 trillion — for climate action in developing countries by 2035, aiming for a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance. The NCQG also acknowledges the need to improve the quality of adaptation finance, particularly the need for grant-based resources and highly concessional (affordable) finance that does not exacerbate existing debt burdens.

8) How Much Adaptation Finance Comes from the Private Sector?

While private sector finance for adaptation is especially difficult to track, the data that is available shows it's particularly limited. For example, of the climate finance that the CPI has been able to track, approximately 90% of adaptation finance was provided through public actors.

There are several reasons for this. Adaptation projects often bring broad social benefits, but clear financial returns for private investors may be difficult to discern. Many vulnerable communities are also located in areas perceived as too risky for private investment, including areas suffering from conflict or other forms of instability. Other times, private investments in resilience are not made simply due to uncertainty about which adaptation options to invest in or a lack of long-term planning, technical capacity and data.

Private investment in adaptation needs to be scaled up, as public funding alone will not be enough to close the adaptation finance gap and meet the large and growing need for climate resilience. Private companies finance, build and maintain vital infrastructure, supply chains and markets. It is essential that they integrate climate resilience into their investment decisions and explore innovative financial instruments to expand collaboration with the public sector. Governments can help by creating incentives and risk-sharing mechanisms to accelerate private investments in adaptation-related activities.

9) How Is Adaptation Finance Being Provided?

The majority — around 76% — of adaptation finance to emerging market and developing economies (excluding least developed countries) is provided in the form of non-concessional finance. Least developed countries, for their part, tend to receive a majority of their funding in the form of grants. Some countries have opted to turn down loans for climate-related activities to avoid adding further debt to their balance sheets. Any efforts to scale up adaptation finance should also aim to ensure that the right type of funding is matched with the right types of projects.

10) What Is the Relationship between Adaptation Finance and Finance for Loss and Damage?

Funding for "loss and damage" — climate impacts that go beyond what people can adapt to — is an important discussion point in climate negotiations. Finance for loss and damage and for adaptation are closely related, as both aim to help communities deal with the costs associated with climate impacts. The main difference between the two is that adaptation finance is intended to help communities prepare for and reduce potential impacts, while loss and damage finance primarily pays for losses that occur despite investments in resilience. Investing in climate adaptation can help reduce loss and damage costs down the line.

Next Steps for Scaling Adaptation Finance

Growing adaptation finance will require stronger political commitments and more institutional capacity in both the public and private sectors. Better data on the economic and social risks posed by climate change, as well as on the financial and economic returns of adaptation projects, is also essential to increasing investments. This information would help countries, donors and the private sector agree on adaptation priorities, track adaptation finance and integrate adaptation priorities into national planning.

The 2025 UN climate summit (COP30) in Belém, Brazil presents a crucial opportunity to elevate the case for adaptation finance, building on recent momentum to secure stronger commitments and bridge the global finance gap. In Belém, the current and previous COP hosts will present a roadmap for reaching the NCQG's $1.3 trillion target, which parties hope will provide clear guidance on scaling up adaptation finance. Negotiators will also decide on a set of indicators to track progress on the Paris Agreement's Global Goal on Adaptation. Including credible finance-related indicators will be essential for holding parties accountable to their adaptation goals and driving real change for those on the front lines of the climate crisis.

At COP30 and beyond, countries must scale up adaptation finance to support those already affected by climate change and prepare for the impacts yet to come. Doing so is a strategic investment that, via broad social, economic and environmental benefits, will contribute to global stability and prosperity.

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7 Things to Know About Carbon Capture, Utilization and Sequestration alicia.cypress… Fri, 05/16/2025 - 12:00

The past few years have seen increased global attention and investment in carbon capture technology as a way to capture the emissions causing climate change before they enter the atmosphere. Policies like the EU's Net Zero Industry Act, the 45Q tax credit in the U.S. and Denmark's CCUS Fund, as well as emerging regulation in Indonesia, are all helping to accelerate the deployment of carbon capture, utilization and sequestration (CCUS).

Yet even as the pipeline of CCUS projects grows year over year, progress remains far below what climate models indicate is needed due to stubbornly high costs, regulatory challenges, and insufficient policy and financial support.

Today CCUS captures around 0.1% of global emissions — around 50 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). Climate scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), show CCUS capturing around 1 billion metric tons of CO2 by 2030 and several billions of tons by 2050.

But not everyone sees CCUS as part of the climate solution. While certain countries are moving ahead with CCUS deployment, others are skeptical of its use. Some NGOs and other stakeholders oppose CCUS, arguing that it creates a moral hazard and that it's only a band-aid over what they see as the real problem: ending use of fossil fuels. They point to a mixed record of success, high costs, and the potential for disproportionate impacts on vulnerable communities among reasons to not rely on the technology.

This article addresses key questions around the role of CCUS, including where the technology is today, in which sectors it will be most useful, and how much of the total mitigation need it can provide to help meet global climate targets.

1) What is Carbon Capture, Utilization and Sequestration (CCUS)?

Carbon capture technology combined with utilization (sometimes referenced as "use") or sequestration (sometimes referenced as "storage") is a way to reduce CO2 from emissions sources (such as power plants or industrial facilities) using different technologies that separate CO2 from the other gases coming out of a facility. The CO2 is thus captured before entering the atmosphere. Then it is either permanently stored underground or incorporated into certain types of products, such as concrete or chemicals.

2) Is Carbon Capture the Same as Carbon Removal?

No, CCUS is not the same as carbon removal. While CCUS captures carbon emissions at their source, carbon dioxide removal (or just "carbon removal") removes CO2 that is already in the atmosphere.

Carbon removal includes a range of approaches, from familiar things like tree restoration to newer technological approaches, like direct air capture and carbon mineralization. Another type of carbon removal is bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration, where biomass is combusted and carbon capture technology is used to capture those emissions before they enter the atmosphere. Even though this process involves carbon capture at an emissions source, it can result in carbon removal, because the captured CO2 originally came from the air via photosynthesis in the biomass that was combusted.

While CCUS and carbon removal differ on where CO2 is collected, both CCUS and some types of carbon removal require somewhere to sequester the captured CO2.

Captured CO2 — either from emission sources or from the air — can be pumped underground into certain geological formations where it is permanently sequestered. Or, or it can be used in products ranging from concrete to chemicals to synthetic fuels. If used this way, the duration of sequestration depends on the product: For example, if CO2 is used to produce synthetic fuel, it would be re-emitted when the fuel is combusted. But CO2 used in concrete would be sequestered permanently.

CCUS is one of many ways to reduce emissions and plays a different role from carbon removal in long-term and net-zero climate plans developed by countries or companies. Emissions reductions — including CCUS and many other options — should make up the vast majority of mitigation in those plans. But carbon removal can be used to counterbalance a much smaller portion of emissions (both CO2 and other greenhouse gases) that are too hard to abate with other means. In the longer term, carbon removal is also needed to achieve and sustain net-negative emissions to reduce the excess CO2 in the atmosphere that is causing harmful climate impacts.

Notably, the term "carbon management" can be used to include both CCUS and carbon removal. This can be misleading, because along with playing different roles in reaching net-zero, CCUS and carbon removal have different risks, benefits and social and environmental impacts.

3) Which Sectors Could Use CCUS? Which Sectors Need CCUS the Most to Decarbonize?

The two sectors where CCUS could be deployed are power and industry, which represent large "point sources" of emissions. Whether it makes sense to use CCUS in those sectors will depend on costs, the feasibility of other decarbonization options, and other project- and location-specific factors.

In the industrial sector, production of materials such as cement, steel and chemicals will likely need CCUS to fully decarbonize in the near term. This is because other decarbonization approaches do not exist or are in earlier stages of development. Current production methods for these industrial products include chemical reactions that inherently release CO2, leading to "process emissions," as well as fuel combustion for high temperatures that causes "thermal emissions." CCUS can be used to abate both process emissions and thermal emissions, making it a particularly impactful decarbonization option for industry if scaled.

While a number of CCUS projects are being announced in the industrial sector, the application is still nascent. Heidelberg's cement CCUS project in Brevik, Norway reached mechanical completion in late 2024 and will become the world's first commercial-scale carbon capture cement plant when commissioned.

Heidelberg's Brevik Norway CCUS cement plant. Photo by NGR Kartheek/WRI

CCUS can also be used in oil and gas refining (another part of the industrial sector) to reduce emissions associated with the production of fuels used in heavy industries, transportation and power. However, the current rates of oil and gas use are incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C, the target set by the Paris Agreement to ensure the world avoids the worst impacts of climate change — and using CCUS on refineries should not be a reason for that to continue. Lowering emissions associated with production does not reduce the emissions from these fuels when they're ultimately combusted.

Within the power sector, the IPCC and other credible modeling by IEA and BloombergNEF indicate that power plants retrofitted with CCUS are one option for the clean, firm power which can complement solar and wind that are likely to predominantly supply the grid. (Other options for clean, firm power include hydropower, geothermal, hydrogen, nuclear and long-duration storage.) The actual deployment of CCUS will depend in part on its costs when fully commercialized, along with individual country resources and circumstances.

In these sectors, it's crucial to note that the use of CCUS should not be seen as a license to perpetuate the use of fossil fuels — particularly in the power sector, where many other options are commercially available today. CCUS could play an indispensable role in the industrial sector but isn't a silver bullet. Overall, the use of CCUS will need to be accompanied by a steep decline in the production and use of fossil fuels, along with other decarbonization options to address remaining emissions.

4) How Much Carbon Dioxide is CCUS Currently Capturing?

According to recent reports — and depending on the source — there are around 50 operational CCUS projects globally, with about 44 under construction and more than 500 in some stage of planning. Operational projects are capturing about 50 million metric tons of CO2 per year (MtCO2/yr). If all projects in development were complete, estimated total CCUS capacity would be between 416 and 520 MtCO2/yr, which is around 0.9%-1.1% of today's global greenhouse gas emissions.

Currently, North America leads in operational projects. Most of these applications are in the natural gas processing and ethanol industries, where capturing CO2 is relatively less expensive than in other subsectors. Other regions, such as Europe and the Middle East, also have a handful of operational projects. And a growing number of new projects have been announced in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Oceania/Australia.

Projects in the development pipeline are increasingly focused on blue hydrogen (where natural gas is used to produce hydrogen and then CO2 emissions are captured), as well as applications in industrial sectors like steel, cement, bioenergy, ammonia and refining.

5) How Much CCUS is Needed to Reach Net Zero, and What Portion of the Total Mitigation Need Is This?

The IPCC, IEA and others find that CCUS can play a critical but limited role in addressing the climate crisis. Their analyses show that CCUS can be a complementary tool to reduce emissions where eliminating fossil fuel use or other emissions are not feasible.

The 2023 IEA Roadmap to Net Zero estimates that in order to reach net-zero in the energy sector by 2050, CCUS would need to contribute about 8% of the total CO2 mitigation of energy sector emissions. This includes around 1 gigaton of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2030 (out of a total of 15 GtCO2 abated by that date) and 5 GtCO2 in 2050 at net zero. Notably, this roadmap only considers energy-related CO2 emissions — total GHG emissions across all sectors are around 59 GtCO2e and need to be roughly halved by 2030 to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C. Considering this fuller picture, the role of CCUS would likely be a smaller percentage of total mitigation.

The IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report, which examined over 200 mitigation scenarios that could limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, found that there are no scenarios in which CCUS would allow continued use of fossil fuels at current levels, let alone expanded oil and gas production. IPCC scenarios show a wide range of potential deployment of carbon capture technology: CCUS applied to fossil fuels reduces CO2 emissions by 0-5 GtCO2 by 2030 with a median of 1 GtCO2. By 2050, that range is 0-13 GtCO2 with a median of 2-3 GtCO2. This means that by 2050, roughly 6% of the mitigation needed to reach net zero could come from CCUS.

The IPCC recognizes that CCUS faces "technological, economic, institutional, ecological-environmental and socio-cultural barriers" such that current rates of CCUS deployment are far below those in most scenarios that limit global warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees C. At the same time, the number of CCUS projects in the pipeline has increased by several hundred each year. If all of the announced projects come online, capture levels could increase 8 to 10 times over.

6) What Are the Risks and Concerns Associated with CCUS?

Two key concerns around scaling up CCUS technology are: (1) slow adoption of CCUS technology, and (2) a fear that using CCUS will perpetuate the use of fossil fuels and continue negative health and social impacts of emitting facilities.

Technological challenges

While carbon capture has been in use since the 1970s in the U.S. (almost entirely for natural gas processing and for using CO2 for enhanced oil recovery), its adoption has been slow. There are not many examples to date of its successful application, and several high-profile projects have been abandoned or shuttered. Unlike many other clean technologies (such as solar photovoltaic), CCUS systems can't be mass produced because they are specifically designed to match the facility that's capturing the CO2. CCUS projects are also complex to coordinate because each step of the process — capture, transport and sequestration — is often owned and operated by a different company.

Additionally, each CCUS system has high upfront costs (often upwards of $1 billion) that can be prohibitive for project developers, combined with a riskier revenue structure compared to other clean technologies. However, costs are expected to decline as more projects come online, the technology improves and financing costs fall.

Furthermore, today's carbon capture systems do not capture 100% of emissions. Most are designed to capture 90%, but reported capture rates are lower in some cases. Additional energy is also required to power the capture system — depending on the application it can be 13%-44% more. Access to suitable geologic sequestration sites may also be needed, and in some cases, these can be far from capture sites, requiring CO2 transport.

Transport and geologic sequestration of CO2 present their own risks — mainly of CO2 leakage. While CO2 in high concentrations from a pipeline leak could cause asphyxiation risk under certain circumstances, CO2 is not flammable like leaks from oil and gas pipelines. The environmental and health impacts of potential CO2 leakage are site specific and merit further research and testing to minimize them. Strong regulatory policy is also needed to set high standards for site characterization, monitoring, transparency and emergency response.

Concerns about perpetuating fossil fuel use

For some groups, a major concern associated with CCUS is its potential to lock in fossil power production and other fossil-dependent processes. Associated with this, CCUS can be seen to perpetuate the negative health and environmental impacts caused by emissions intensive facilities — and act as a band-aid over these polluting industries, which disproportionately harm vulnerable communities that have historically borne higher levels of air pollution and toxic emissions.

Recent research shows that carbon capture systems can reduce (but not eliminate) harmful pollutants. But in many cases, community-based organizations and other advocates would prefer a facility to be shut down and investment to focus instead on cleaner production processes, such as renewables in the power sector.

In the U.S., where CCUS has recently received billions of dollars in government funding, the types of facilities that could be retrofitted with CCUS are often located in communities that have already borne the negative environmental and health impacts of living near power or industrial facilities. While there is evidence that CCUS can help reduce non-CO2 pollutants along with capturing CO2, many environmental justice groups are concerned that CCUS is being pushed on them without consultation, and that CCUS will be used as a way to prolong a facility's lifetime and continue the local harms it causes.

7) What Are Some Ways to Deploy CCUS Responsibly?

Responsible deployment of CCUS technology must focus not only on ensuring that the technology is effective at reducing emissions, but also that its application minimizes harm to people and the environment and maximizes benefits to them.

Robust governance and regulatory frameworks are needed to facilitate safe and effective deployment of CCUS where it is needed to reach climate goals. Regulatory frameworks should address issues such as permitting, liability and long-term monitoring as well as supportive infrastructure, such as pipelines and pore space ownership, for geologic sequestration sites. Regulatory frameworks should also require strategies to quantify, transparently share and minimize negative environmental and social impacts, such as emission of air pollutants. Some of this work is already underway in the U.S., including guidance to promote responsible development and permitting of CCUS projects and state-level regulatory frameworks, starting with California. In Europe, the European Commission has developed a CCS Directive that establishes a legal framework for safe and effective geologic sequestration of CO2.

Any plan to implement CCUS must involve meaningful engagement with and buy-in from the local communities around existing facilities where project developers plan to add CCUS. A critical early step in any community engagement process is understanding community perspectives on the project and sharing information on expected local environmental and health impacts.

One outcome of this engagement process can be development of a legally binding community benefits agreement. These agreements lay out specific benefits the community will receive in exchange for supporting a project — such as local jobs or other types of investment. Community benefits plans, which can lead to community benefits agreements, are required in the vast majority of U.S. government funding for carbon capture and carbon removal projects.

Retrofitting a facility with CCUS does not always make sense as the first decarbonization option for technical and financial reasons. But some CO2 emission sources, particularly those in heavy industry (such as cement process emissions), have few other options. Generally, from an economic standpoint, it makes sense to focus CCUS technology on facilities that are younger, efficient, and located near suitable options for CO2 sequestration or use. The ability to acquire the relevant permits and coordinate across different owners of CO2 transport and sequestration infrastructure are also critical to consider.

Companies using or planning to use CCUS at their facilities should adhere to relevant regulatory frameworks; monitor and report the environmental impacts of the technology; engage with local communities; and commit to project agreements, including community benefits agreements. These companies should also demonstrate their commitments towards responsible decarbonization by implementing other decarbonization technologies and practices in addition to CCUS. Along with verifying carbon removal, third party auditors could also be used to evaluate the health and environmental impacts of CCUS projects to provide greater transparency and accountability.

What's Next for CCUS?

CCUS will likely need to play some role in helping meet net-zero goals. The ultimate level of scale-up required is uncertain and will depend on many factors, including how quickly other decarbonization options are developed and commercialized in different sectors, the level of policy and financial support provided, and how public perceptions shift in the coming years.

At the same time, it is important to separate the technological feasibility from the policies, regulations and incentives that drive where and how CCUS is applied. Ensuring that the needed applications of CCUS do not perpetuate fossil fuels, or local harms related to power or industrial facilities, will be critical to making it a viable option to support reaching net zero.

While there have been mixed signals about continued U.S. federal support for CCUS, other countries continue to move forward with policy support and project development. Regional hubs in the Middle East and Northern Europe are consolidating CCUS infrastructure within high emitting regions and spurring cross-border collaboration. As CCUS advances, these leaders must ensure that it is not used to avoid or slow down the process of phasing out fossil fuels, which is imperative to meeting our collective climate goals.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in November 2023. It was updated in May 2025 to reflect recent developments in CCUS policy and project development.

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To Compete in International Low-Carbon Markets, Chemical Companies Need Transparent Emissions Accounting alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/15/2025 - 15:50

The U.S. chemical industry produces over 70,000 different types of plastics, fabrics, personal care, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, rubber and other products. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that, combined with oil refining, chemical production is responsible for about 8% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product. Of that output, 28% is exported at an estimated projected value of $175 billion throughout 2025.

Chemical production’s large role in the U.S. economy and the exports that sustain it make it a vital industry. Yet, it must adapt to growing pressure internationally for goods that are produced with zero or few emissions despite expectations that both U.S. chemical demand and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are expected to grow approximately 35% in a business-as-usual scenario.

For the U.S. to remain competitive, retain access to important foreign markets and reduce its trade deficit in line with the Trump Administration’s goals, its chemical manufacturers must modernize and reduce emissions. A standardized carbon accounting framework is fundamental to maximizing investments in innovative, low-carbon technologies.

Carbon-Based Trade Policy

International action to reduce greenhouse gases is increasingly including emissions-intensive industrial products like cement, steel and chemicals. Carbon tariffs on imports are a tool that can monetize a country’s industrial innovation and carbon advantage while inducing other countries to reduce their emissions. Fundamentally, the various forms of carbon tariffs work by levying fees on imports that exceed a set emissions-intensity threshold, such as tons of CO2 per ton of steel.

The most prominent such measure is the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which would levy a fee on carbon intensive imports based on the EU’s carbon price. Other countries have carbon policies that could be expanded to include imports. Examples include China’s Emissions Trading System and Vietnam’s carbon market — which will soon cover domestic cement, steel and aluminum — and 27 additional countries that have carbon prices or taxes.

If the EU’s pioneering carbon market serves as a model for other countries, incorporating relatively simpler commodities like steel and cement open the door for chemicals’ inclusion later, given the sector’s emissions. Globally, chemical production emits 1.3 billion to 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)  per year, or up to 2.5% of all emissions; it comprises about 15% of industrial emissions, after steel and cement. As one of the largest chemical producers in the world, the U.S. share in chemical trade and emissions is substantial, as is its need to modernize.

Chemical Sector Emissions in the U.S.

A recent estimate suggests that the production life cycle of petrochemicals—chemicals derived from fossil fuels— emit 306 million to 343 million metric tons of CO2e  in the U.S. Multiple pathways have emerged to reduce emissions from petrochemicals. However, reducing emissions from chemical production is expensive and can add an estimated 55% “green premium” or additional cost for foundational precursor chemicals. To meet international pressure for low emission chemicals and maintain its prominence as the global innovation center, the U.S. must work with producers to reduce emissions.

A range of supportive policies, including grants and incentives, were passed during the Biden Administration to derisk and encourage investment in low-emission industrial technologies and processes. A keystone policy is the Industrial Demonstrations Program (IDP), which awarded seven projects up to $500 million to manufacture low-emission chemicals. For example, a project is under negotiation for $200 million to recycle CO2 from chemical production to make new chemicals.

These policies to spur innovative industry — many of which were created through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law — are also creating tens of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in investments across the country, particularly in areas that have been harmed by deindustrialization. However, their economic gains are being lost or are uncertain due to federal cutting of vital industrial programs.

Satisfying Growing Demand for Low-Emission Chemicals

Notwithstanding the demand for low-emission products from countries with current or future carbon tariffs, there is growing voluntary demand from producers to make more sustainable products and from companies to purchase those products. For example, the Science Based Targets Initiative (SBTi) enables and collects corporate commitments to reduce emissions. Over half of its 11,000 members are targeting supply chain emissions, all of which nearly guaranteed to contain chemical products.

However, these companies must understand the emission intensity of chemicals (i.e. GHG emissions per unit of product), including emissions along the value chain.  But due to the fragmented nature of the industry this foundational information is often inaccessible and makes tracing emissions of 70,000 different end-use products notoriously complex.

To assist businesses and consumers intent on purchasing less carbon-intensive chemical products and design effective policy to reduce emissions, the U.S. needs globally aligned robust frameworks to monitor, report and verify data.  This includes standardized frameworks to measure emissions across the value chain, develop industry average and low-emissions benchmarks for chemical production and report the emissions intensity of primary and end-use chemical products.

Scoping out the Problem

To reduce their products’ emission intensity, companies must know and eliminate the emissions from the facility making the product (Scope 1), the electricity they purchased (Scope 2) and all purchased goods and services up the supply chain and from use and disposal (Scope 3). And if down-stream suppliers want to sell low-emissions products, they must account for the emissions from the value chain of that product.

Current U.S. federal law only requires facilities that emit more than 25 kilotons CO2e to report their Scope 1 emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding determined that GHGs like CO2 fall under the agency’s regulatory purview, and challenges to this have been rejected by the Supreme Court several times. However, the Trump administration has ordered the EPA to reconsider this rule, which would effectively eliminate the requirement for nearly all facilities to collect and report this data. Additionally, certain public companies were required to disclose their total Scope 2 emissions in their Security and Exchange Commission filings until the Trump administration struck the rule. There are no existing or previous requirements for companies to measure and disclose Scope 3 emissions.

This does not mean Scope 2 and Scope 3 data or efforts to collect it do not exist. Accounting frameworks designed by the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHGP) and International Standards Organization (ISO) guide multi-sector efforts like the Carbon Disclosure Project and Global Reporting Initiative, through which companies can voluntarily reduce their direct (Scope 1) and indirect emissions (Scopes 2 and 3).

GHGP and ISO also underly sector-specific emission measurement frameworks and benchmarking. Together For Sustainability, a coalition of chemical companies, published carbon intensity accounting recommendations that align with the GHGP and ISO rules. Similarly, the Science Based Targets Initiative has developed draft guidance for chemical companies to set emission reduction targets.

Additionally, there are databases for product life cycle assessments (LCA) and also the Federal LCA Commons, which is a repository of LCA methodologies that includes chemicals and petrochemicals. But these data are often secondary, used when data directly provided by an emitter are unavailable and produced using unharmonized standards and methodologies.

Emissions Accounting and Complex Value Chains

Measuring and accounting for greenhouse gas emissions can be done at the company-, facility- and, ideally, the product-level. Currently, the Clean Air Act requires high emitting facilities to collect and report their emissions to the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP). Companies aggregate facility-level (Scope 1) and Scopes 2 and 3 emissions, where possible, to estimate their corporate emissions.

Companies or third parties use life cycle assessments to estimate a product’s carbon intensity by measuring emissions along its manufacturing process. For product-level data in the industrial sector this is typically “cradle-to-gate” emissions (A1 to A3 of a life cycle), which includes extracting and processing raw materials, transportation of the feedstock and fuels, and processing of the feedstock including direct or indirect emissions (from purchased electricity, for instance). 

For chemical products, carrying out LCAs often requires making difficult determinations about how to account for and attribute emissions among numerous products created through multiple manufacturing processes. In addition, life cycle assessments require establishing boundaries to determine a product’s emissions.

An even more complete picture than cradle-to-gate is cradle-to-grave (feedstock to disposal) or cradle-to-cradle (feedstock to recycling) emissions accounting approaches, which include many other emissions and accounting variables typically out of the producer’s control.

Including the disposal or recycling stages requires more considerations, some of which are heavily debated. Tracing the carbon intensity of a single product grows in difficulty with the number of processing stages, coproducts and disaggregation in the supply chain; this is further obfuscated by a lack of transparency and inconsistency in accounting methods.

Each production stage typically occurs in separate, specialized facilities that can produce a diverse number of goods depending on demand fluctuations. Ideally, each facility would use standardized measurement systems and securely transmit primary data across the supply chain. Realistically, uncertainty likely dominates as each facility could use different standards to measure Scope 1 (e.g. direct metering, mass balance, stoichiometry) and Scope 2 emissions and allocate co-products (mass, economic or energy balances).

If facilities do not publicize product-level emissions or disclose their production technologies, secondary data such as public LCAs or aggregated data can be used. However, this introduces uncertainty. Secondary data resources may vary and there is no strong incentive to use systems with greater granularity, such as ClimateTRACE and other initiatives. Emissions from feedstocks are an additional complicating factor, as fugitive methane emissions are frequently underestimated or ignored. Additionally, lower-carbon alternative feedstocks like biomass and captured CO2 have complex emissions profiles that can range from negative to positive emissions depending on many factors.   

Shorter, simpler supply chains reduce the number of Scope 3 variables. For example, one study examining carbon accounting uncertainty for primary chemicals assessed 19 different ammonia production pathways with four feedstocks. In contrast, they assessed 63 pathways for ethylene with 14 feedstocks and a larger range of carbon intensities. Ammonia requires fewer processing facilities than ethylene, reducing the number of stages where carbon intensity data must be calculated. And most ammonia goes toward a single use.

As a result, setting emission standards for ammonia is more straightforward than most primary chemicals. This shorter, more integrated supply chain is conducive to policy that relies on life cycle assessments and emission benchmarks. For example, Japan has enacted a low-carbon ammonia standard and the European Union includes ammonia as the first primary chemical included in its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

Case Study: Ammonia and Ethylene

Ammonia

Synthetic ammonia fertilizer is the foundation for the modern agricultural system. Its supply chain is relatively straightforward, as is measuring its carbon intensity. Natural gas is extracted and transported to an ammonia plant where it is processed into hydrogen and combined with nitrogen to make ammonia. That ammonia is then transported to customers to be used directly (most common) or is processed once more at the same plant or another facility into a different fertilizer. While ammonia can be used for other products like explosives, plastics or fuel (a potential decarbonization tool) in the U.S., 88% of it goes toward agriculture.

Nearly all ammonia goes toward a single use and is produced in integrated facilities meant to only produce ammonia (or possibly fertilizer derivatives), enabling consumers to more easily identify their product’s source and emissions.

Ethylene

Ethylene is the most produced primary chemical in the U.S. and is the precursor to common plastics and products such as bags, detergents and pharmaceuticals. It starts with natural gas, which is processed into ethane (among other natural gas liquids). Ethane is sent to a chemical plant where it is broken down in a steam cracker into ethylene and other primary chemicals. The ethylene is then converted into a multitude of polymers (intermediate chemicals), before being turned into thousands of different chemical end products.

Unlike ammonia, each step of ethylene’s supply chain can branch off into a multitude of different products, sometimes made in the same reactor. In turn, those products follow their own supply chains. For example, ethane, a chemical feedstock, is produced alongside other natural gas liquids like butane and propane. Ethylene is produced in the same reactor as other primary chemicals, the ratios of which depend on the facility design and daily market fluctuations. The branching paths continue through polymerization and final plastic conversion.  

Existing and Proposed Standards Frameworks

Ethylene and other primary chemicals that face similar accounting difficulties lack harmonized standards, making it difficult to set decarbonization policies. However, some organizations have worked to design harmonized approaches that could be incorporated into policy.

The “general standards” are foundational frameworks that sector-specific organizations use to develop standards for their industries. The chemical sector-specific standards propose methods to estimate, track and communicate product carbon intensity and emission reductions. Most, if not all sector-specific standards, will indicate that their proposals comply with general frameworks set by, for example, ISO and GHG Protocol.

The Industrial Transition Accelerator developed a similar summary of standards for ammonia and methanol that have broad uptake in policies across multiple countries and regions. 

Emissions Accounting Frameworks GuidanceDescriptionKey Guidance Contribution for ChemicalsGeneral Standards Frameworks (Economywide)ISO 14064 and 14067Overarching principles frameworks that guide how companies, projects and third parties manage emissions and data.ISO standards series sets the overarching frameworks for accounting and verifying GHG emissions and product carbon intensity.GHG ProtocolProvides precise measurement and calculation methodologies that comply with ISO principles.Scope measurement guidance is applicable to the chemical sector. Scope 3 guidance is particularly useful for assessing product carbon intensity.PACT Pathfinder FrameworkEstablishes a framework for companies to convey product carbon intensity data across the value chain.Framework for primary data conveyance is applicable to specific sectors.ISCC Carbon Footprint CertificationEnables the certification of product intensity for products and value chains.ISCC’s foundational certification system that is furthered tailored for specific sectors and products (see below).Chemical Sector-Specific FrameworksSBTi Chemical Sector GuidanceSets sector-specific guidance for companies to reduce their emissions to achieve global net zero by 2050.Draft guidance for the chemical companies to calculate and set emission targets for specific products. Provides calculation tools for reducing process and heat emissions using accepted reduction tools.TfS Product Carbon Footprint Guidelines for ChemicalsGuidance developed by industry to estimate product carbon intensity, aligning with ISO and GHG Protocol principles.Establishes standard, comparable accounting and reporting standards that companies can use to measure cradle-to-gate emissions, with an emphasis on Scope 3 measurements.Dow Product Carbon Footprint CalculationMethodology developed by Dow to estimate life cycle emissions through standardized carbon intensity calculations.Adds on to existing frameworks supply chain methodology that uses a consistent calculation system (mass-balance) across suppliers to estimate a chemical product’s final carbon intensity.SCSS Certification Standard for Product Carbon Intensity and Reduction for Chemicals and Co-ProductsEstablishes the requirements for producers to achieve third-party certification of a product’s estimated carbon intensity and how it has been reduced.Adds the specific requirements a chemical producer needs to achieve certification by a third party in addition to methodologies (e.g. TfS, Dow) they may have used to estimate product carbon intensity.Plastics EuropeMethodology for emission allocations in steam crackers.Establishes “Main Products” and “Co-Products” from steam crackers. Emission factors should only apply to Main Products, prioritizing Mass Basis allocation.RMI Plastics GHG Reporting GuidanceEstablishes carbon accounting guidance for the plastic processing and molding sectorFocuses on how plastic producers, rather than just chemical producers, can measure and report their own emissions to increase Scope 3 transparency and drive informed purchasing decisions.How to Improve Data Transparency

Other industrial subsectors such as cement and steel are leading the charge in setting product-level reporting standards and carbon labels to kickstart private, state , federal and international green procurement initiatives. This is partially due to the relative simplicity of their supply chains which produce far fewer different products for which emissions must be accounted than the chemical sector. This, in combination with the public sector’s outsized share of demand for cement and steel, facilitates development of emissions reporting frameworks alongside green procurement programs.

There’s an opportunity for policymakers and companies to work together to codify proposed or similarly interoperable and harmonized standards for the chemical sector. Although the Trump administration abolished the Buy Clean program, a pivotal purchasing program to drive clean cement and steel production, some states have passed their own Buy Clean programs and U.S. producers will still face international pressure to reduce emissions for exports.

Maintain and Amend Reporting Requirements

It would disadvantage U.S. competitiveness for the Trump administration to follow through on its efforts to eliminate or hamper emissions reporting. This data is the bedrock for future action and should be collected for U.S. chemical companies to innovate ahead of competitors.

Assuming the databases are maintained, some of the information that polluting facilities report to the EPA — emission volumes, process units and fuel use — are publicly available, while other data — feedstock types and volumes and amount of product — are classified as Confidential Business Information (CBI). While CBI rules protect producers by keeping vital information away from competitors, these rules also complicate attempts by third partis to calculate Scope 3 emissions or estimate product carbon intensity.

GHGRP’s public interface could add reasonable measures of transparency that enable third parties to estimate or verify production emissions while also protecting producers’ confidentiality. One simple way to do this would be to list the main products manufactured in a chemical facility.

Currently, facilities are not required to list their products, but some can be inferred. For example, chemical plants may list an ethane cracker or ethylene processing unit among its emission sources. This reveals that the plant produces ethylene, but these typically produce other chemicals as well that should also be listed — without accompanying production volumes — to improve clarity within the chemical supply chain.

Codify National Emissions Averages for Primary and Key Intermediary Chemicals and Plastics

Congress recently introduced several bills, some with bipartisan support, that would similarly address industry’s exposure to climate-based trade measures. Fundamental to these bills is the need to compare the carbon intensity of industrial commodities produced in the U.S. to that of other countries. The PROVE IT Act, most explicitly, would require the U.S. to study and publish average emission intensities for key commodities, including petrochemicals and plastics.

While averages are subject to uncertainty and could differ substantially by facility, they could provide a workable benchmark for policy that protects domestic producers and reduces emissions. U.S. chemicals have been estimated to hold a carbon advantage over many of its competitors. These national average emission intensities for primary products would serve as placeholder values to help downstream producers in estimating their products’ emissions intensities in the absence of specific product data. To reduce errors from remaining uncertainty, the benchmark could be set slightly above the estimated average.

Over time, policy could work to incorporate more specificity in their design, ideally with frameworks that align with international systems. Part of that work includes increasing transparency in how existing emissions are currently reported at facilities.

Establish a Framework for Assessing and Communicating Chemical Product Carbon Intensity for Demand-Side Policy

National averages and improving GHGRP’s reporting transparency are important first steps to developing and improving carbon intensity’s data accuracy. These should be foundational to enshrining standards for carbon accounting, tracking and reporting through product category rules (PCRs) and environmental product declarations (EPDs) for chemical products.

EPDs are akin to nutrition labels for commodities and materials, disclosing a product’s global warming potential and other environmental impacts. PCRs are the rules that producers must follow when creating an EPD, outlining methodologies, definitions and scopes for covered products. In concert, EPDs and PCRs harmonize and standardize how producers measure and disclose their emissions, which unlocks policy opportunities (e.g. public procurement, advance market commitments) that benefit compliant and high-performing manufacturers.  

The Inflation Reduction Act authorized $250 million for the EPA’s EPD Assistance Program, which sought to develop EPDs and PCRs for construction materials and to feed into the now defunct federal Buy Clean Program. A similar program could develop a Digital Product Passports for chemical products, whereby an agency works with industry or a coalition like Together for Sustainability (TfS) to adopt proposed rules on scope, methodologies and metrics. Oregon’s rule on Extended Producer Responsibility uses cradle-to-gate LCAs on packaging and could serve as a model.

An ambitious version of this could be geared toward specific products like the most highly-produced plastics. But given the heterogeneity of final products and their hundreds of minute additives, initial efforts could be more effective by defining the scope around primary chemical production — putting a carbon label on chemicals like ammonia, ethylene or benzene, toluene and xylenes (BTX) based on consistent emissions accounting principles. This reduces the number of upstream factors to incorporate while the system matures, emphasizes the production stage where the highest percentage of emissions are concentrated and involves some of the largest companies that are more likely to be able to afford, finance or incorporate emission reduction technologies in the near-term.

Downstream purchasers can cite the percentage of reduced emissions that came from their less carbon-intensive primary chemicals. Over time, more downstream facilities and products can be included in the EPD’s scope, such tools like the MiQ-Highwood index for methane emissions.

How the U.S. Can Become Global Data Champions

U.S. dominance in innovative manufacturing relies as deeply on data as it does on the people putting steel in the ground to build new, advanced facilities. Manufacturers developing cutting-edge technology to compete with new international carbon tariffs and satisfy demand for cleaner, reliable materials must be able to agree on how to measure the carbon in their supply chains. By working with industry, policymakers can champion data infrastructure, leading the charge to enact frameworks that will guide manufacturing and trade and avoid being left behind by foreign competitors.

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• Industrial Decarbonization

Authors Zach Byrum Caroline Melo Ribeiro

Students Take the Wheel in Push for More Electric School Buses alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/15/2025 - 08:25

Upset with adults for not taking the climate crisis seriously and inspired by youth climate strikes around the globe, students in Arizona found a way to get grown-ups to listen.

In 2019, they founded the Arizona Youth Climate Coalition (AZYCC) and over the years successfully convinced the city of Tucson to adopt a climate emergency declaration and an EV Readiness Roadmap. By 2023, the city, county and state all had climate plans and were getting to work. But the team didn’t want to stop — where else could they make a change?

As they assessed their options, Ojas Sanghi, a member of the coalition, attended a national conference full of like-minded student activists. Many of them were working on school district climate action plans. A light bulb went off.  

Sanghi came back to Tucson and together with a team from the AZYCC (ages 13 to 20) worked with their school board to write and pass a comprehensive climate action resolution covering topics from a greenhouse gas inventory to plant-based meals.

“A critical component of this resolution is electric school buses,” Sanghi highlighted in a video posted to YouTube. “They’re quieter, healthier, saves districts money and release no tail pipe emissions and are proven to work everywhere from the winters in Michigan to right here in the desert heat of Arizona.”

The team in Arizona is part of a growing wave of U.S. students calling for climate action at the school district level. While they may not be old enough to vote, their voices can make a big difference.

Schools are a key site for climate action. The U.S. Department of Education found that school districts emit around 72 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from their energy use alone. School districts also own the largest public transportation fleet in the country with roughly 480,000 buses. Today 76% of those school buses run on diesel and another 19% run on gasoline.

Diesel-, gasoline-, propane- and compressed natural gas-burning school buses all produce a number of dangerous air pollutants, which contribute to respiratory and heart diseases and climate change. The good news? Electrifying the full U.S. school bus fleet would not only improve student health but also reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 9 million metric tons per year, the equivalent of taking 2 million cars off the road.

Students see that pushing for school bus electrification gives them an opportunity to make a difference in their own communities. From Arizona to Ohio, students are becoming an impactful voice in the effort to electrify fleets.

Student Advocacy Leads to More Buses

In Montgomery County, Maryland, which currently leads all U.S. school districts in electric school bus adoption, students played a key role in the county’s plan to purchase 326 electric school buses.  

Emily Lee, a junior at Montgomery Blair High School, got involved with climate advocacy through the BIPOC MOCO Green New Deal Program three years ago after dealing with anxiety around climate change and feeling powerless while sitting on fossil-fuel emitting diesel buses.

“Everybody kind of assumes, 'well it's not my problem it' s someone else's problem',” she said. “But the issue is if everybody has that same idea that ‘it's not my problem, someone else will take care of it,’ [then] nobody's ever going to take care of it, so it needs to start somewhere.”

More Student Voices

Across the country, students have been searching for ways to fight climate change. Many of them found that opportunity in school bus electrification. Find more of their stories in the Electric School Bus Initiative’s Student Voices Series.

She continued: “So what we do is we advocate for electric school buses; we advocate for clean energy. Montgomery County Public School System Board of Education committed to only buying electric school buses, and we’ve also attempted to eliminate carbon emissions by 2030. By advocating for electric school buses here in Montgomery County, it persuades and encourages other students in other places around the U.S. to want the same.” Even today, student advocates continue to engage the county in the critical deployment phase.

In Cincinnati, Ohio, Audrey Symon, a senior at Walnut Hill High School, is part of an advocacy group that includes students and parents. Their efforts first helped the Cincinnati Public School System (CPS) secure a $3.95 million grant from the EPA’s Clean School Bus program.

“It was because we showed the district that we cared about electrification, for the health and safety of the students and their futures,” she said. “It was because we were persistent in advocating for the future we wanted to create.”

Additional efforts by Symon and the Electrify CPS Campaign resulted in even more grant money from the EPA and deeper commitments from the school system.

“In less than a year, our campaign — a small but mighty collection of CPS parents, students and teachers — [was] able to unanimously pass our Renewable Energy and Electrification Resolution, which outlines a plan for our school district to transition away from fossil fuels, including diesel buses, into an era of sustainable energy use,” Symon said. “Now, our school district is continuing to tackle the goals outlined in our resolution, recently acquiring an additional $8.6 million from the EPA to fund electric school buses, with 35 already added to the fleet.”

Electric School Bus Benefits Go Beyond Climate

While many students got involved in advocating for electric school buses due to their climate benefits, the students who experience the impacts of dirty diesel buses every day also understand their negative impact on physical and mental health. These burdens are particularly potent for students with disabilities who experience sensory overstimulation from diesel buses, difficulty boarding the bus due to unreliable school bus ramps, and trouble breathing from extended time in and around bus exhaust.

“School buses can be super noisy, which can create overstimulation and stress for those who have sound sensitivity. Even the sheer amount of diesel fumes that are emitted from school buses can cause headaches and dizziness for students,” said Sahana Chauduri, a senior at Eleanor Roosevelt High School in Greenbelt, Md. “One of my friends who uses a trach tube especially faces trouble with breathing while on the school bus. For a system designed to be universal, there are many issues with my current public school bus system.”

Today roughly 15% of K-12 students have a disability and, for many of them, school buses are the only way they can get to school. Despite laws guaranteeing  accommodations, recent research found that school buses often remain inaccessible due to issues with designs and bus operations. Research also found that students with disabilities , low-income students and Black students, are more likely to ride on school buses than white and nondisabled students. Extended commute times not only increase the amount of time kids spend in uncomfortable riding conditions but also increases their exposure to diesel pollution that can cause asthma, cancer and other respiratory illnesses.

Students with disabilities like Chauduri are calling on school districts and policymakers to think about these disparate health impacts as they consider making the transition to electric: “Electric school buses have the opportunity to serve as a major solution for the pitfalls of diesel school buses,” she said. “They are also up to 20 decibels quieter than diesel school buses, which would be helpful for those with sound sensitivity. With the addition of a heating unit, electric school buses can also have the option to allow students to self-regulate the heating of their seats. This is something I could see myself benefiting from, since my muscles tend to cramp up and stiffen during cold temperatures.”

Electric school buses, like these in Montgomery County, Md., not only bring climate benefits from no tailpipe emissions, but also benefit the mental and physical health of students who ride the bus to school. Photo by Katherine Roboff / Electric School Bus Initiative.   Student Advocates Need Adult Allies

Despite best efforts, some students are facing challenges convincing their school districts to invest in electric school buses. In New York, three students worked on a project to create an analytical model that would help schools envision the process of decarbonizing their bus fleets but ran into challenges obtaining responses or data from the school system.

 “Working on the [electric school bus] project was disheartening at times,” said Annabella Pathania, a recent graduate from Kingston High School in Mid-Hudson Valley, New York. “New York State has a mandate requiring that all school transportation be zero-emission by 2035, but the administration in my school district didn’t seem at all interested in the work I was doing. My emails to them would often go unanswered and I would only make progress due to the intervention of a few supportive teachers.”

And school districts sometimes face challenges to electrification that students cannot overcome alone. New research surveying school districts across the country found the main barriers include cost, infrastructure, technological readiness, maintenance, route length and transition fatigue. At the same time, recent research finds that school districts, parents and students alike are excited about the health and air quality benefits that electric school buses can bring to their communities, pointing to an effective starting place for student advocacy.  

While students continue to get their districts excited about electrification, policymakers, practitioners and advocates can help schools electrify by investing in regional technical assistance such as grid infrastructure, funding and financing, and capacity building for school districts and regional practitioners. Regional technical assistance providers are also well-placed to address region-specific infrastructure barriers, local community and political perceptions of electric school buses, and community engagement and partnership approaches.

Despite the challenges, Pathania still found advocating for electric school buses rewarding. “This project revealed to me how it doesn’t matter how monumental your work is, how big of a difference you make in the short term — it matters that you are doing it.”

What Comes Next

While the past decade has seen a lot of momentum and millions of dollars of government funding become available for electric school buses, the Trump Administration is now rolling back climate initiatives. In particular, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean School Bus Program is under threat which has already funded 67% of all committed electric school buses in the U.S.  

In the absence of federal leadership, it's essential that action continue at the state and local level. Now is the time for action at the state and local level. Many states already have their own funding programs and continue to support electrification.

As examples above show, students have the power to be leaders in this transition. 

Sanghi, with the AYCC, summed it up simply: “We made this change, and you can too. Fighting the good fight will take all of us. Embody radical hope and take action.”

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• Electric School Bus Initiative

Authors Eleanor Jackson Sophie Young

STATEMENT: US Congressmembers Introduce Bipartisan Carbon Tax Legislation nate.shelter@wri.org Wed, 05/14/2025 - 16:44

WASHINGTON (May 14, 2025) — Today, Representatives Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) and Salud Carbajal (D-CA) introduced the MARKET CHOICE Act, a bipartisan proposal aiming to replace the federal gasoline tax with a broader carbon tax targeting CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and large industrial sources.

The bill also includes a border tax adjustment to tackle carbon intensity and competitiveness issues, joining efforts from both Republicans and Democrats to address trade and climate concerns.

The majority of revenue generated would be allocated to infrastructure investments, replenishing the Highway Trust Fund, which is currently funded by the federal gas tax. Additional funds will enhance U.S. resilience efforts, prioritizing flood mitigation; support for displaced energy workers; assistance to low-income households; and research, development and deployment for carbon removal, carbon capture and storage and advanced energy technologies.

Following is a statement from Christina DeConcini, Director of Government Affairs, World Resources Institute:

“This bipartisan bill recognizes that climate change is an urgent threat to U.S. communities and puts forward a pragmatic approach to address it. This legislation would harness market mechanisms to cut planet-warming emissions, benefiting Americans. As climate impacts intensify across the U.S., it is imperative that Congress adopt effective solutions like the Market Choice Act.

“We are particularly pleased to see the bipartisan support for climate solutions in this moment. The scientific consensus is unequivocal: urgent action is required to both slash emissions and help communities adapt. This legislation exemplifies how smart policy can improve Americans’ lives. We hope to see additional legislation from both Republicans and Democrats to address climate change.”

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Latest Lessons from Electric School Bus Vehicle-to-Grid Programs margaret.overh… Tue, 05/13/2025 - 06:00

The field of electric school bus (ESB) vehicle to grid (V2G) programs is rapidly evolving. The number of V2G programs across the U.S. continues to grow: At least 11 utilities and five states have enacted programs since we first examined the space two years ago, bringing the totals to 26 utilities and 19 states. This still-evolving technology is helping increase the adoption of and excitement around ESBs. And it is proving their potential as grid assets at a time when increased storms, wildfires and extreme heat, as well as increased load, are adding stress to the current power system.

However, various financial, technological and operational hurdles will need to be addressed for this progress to continue. Based on interviews with utilities, school districts and ESB operators that are making V2G happen across the country, this article offers updates, lessons learned and examples from the field.

Map of Utility V2G Electric School Bus Pilot Programs

See a full table of ESB V2G programs across the United States here.

Key Takeaways

• ESB V2G is working in several locations, helping support community resilience and lower energy costs for schools. But real-world experience is still limited.
• Utilities are testing the limits of V2G options and finding ESBs can consistently provide V2G services on demand at their full power output over several hours.
• Deploying technology at scale requires interoperability and cooperation between ESB operators, utilities and equipment manufacturers.
• Utilities can support more V2G adoption by leading with supportive rates, policies and education.
• V2G can be a resource for rural co-ops, municipal utilities and other actors outside of deregulated markets and investor-owned utilities who want to be proactive in managing their system demand.
• Beyond V2G, ESBs can provide additional services to their communities, such as dispatchable power for emergency facilities.

How Electric School Bus Vehicle-to-Grid Projects Work

ESBs are a predictable and mobile source of energy demand and supply. During regular operation, they are reliably plugged in and charging in the middle of the day and overnight. In the summer when ESBs are less active, or in cases where their routes are short enough to have energy leftover, they can then be called on to push energy back onto the grid. Deploying ESBs as a clean and flexible energy source is one way to help reduce reliance on fossil fuels and lower overall electricity costs, as well as reduce dangerous diesel pollution. In addition, in an outage or disaster situation, ESBs could be deployed where needed to provide backup power to the community.

That said, there are two crucial things to keep in mind when approaching any ESB V2G project:

ESBs are, first and foremost, school buses. While they offer opportunities for grid-connected and site-powering electricity storage, we must ensure that these vehicles are available for their primary purpose of student transportation.

ESBs do not act in the same way as stationary storage. Depending on the manufacturer's specifications, distance traveled, route topography and weather, an ESB might not have enough power remaining to discharge energy back to the grid in the afternoon and evening on days it is in service. Instead, school bus operators can be sure to keep their charging off peak to reduce their demand on the local system.

Ongoing Challenges for ESB V2G

While ESBs are already providing V2G services across the country, there are several impediments to widespread adoption. From our interviews and outreach, some of these barriers include:

• Concern over ESB battery life and warranty when providing V2G services.
• Compensation mechanisms for the energy provided to the utility.
• The increased cost of V2G-capable infrastructure compared to other electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE).
• Technology issues with interoperability between different ESBs and EVSE.

Addressing these issues requires continued collaboration between utilities, equipment manufacturers, technology companies, transportation providers and school districts to build a stronger and more sustainable V2G ecosystem.

Program Highlights

ESB V2G can work in any area, with any combination of school transportation models (public or private) and utility environment (investor-owned, municipal or cooperative). Successful ESB deployments have been characterized by their clear intent to participate in V2G from the outset; specific localized goals for their development; and robust value frameworks and financial incentives to guide their structures.

The examples below explore how some stakeholders are beginning to address common challenges and scale up local V2G efforts. A few of these leaders are showing how ESBs can engage in V2G services at a larger scale to support local grid stability, reduce operations costs for school districts and utilities, and provide emergency resilience for communities.

Program LocationProgram SummaryKey ComponentsEl Cajon, Calif.Six buses and chargers exporting power to the California grid in emergenciesCompensation under demand response programDurango, Colo.Bus and bidirectional charger helping manage distribution demand on local gridUtility dispatchable load from ESBNortheast U.S.Buses participating in demand response programs in New York, Vermont and MassachusettsStatewide demand response programs for compensationWest Linn, Ore.Bus and bidirectional charger with dispatch under utility controlUtility pilot program fundingOakland, Calif.74 buses and bidirectional chargers participating in demand response events and daily energy dispatchDemand response compensation, daily dynamic export rate, ISO 15118 certification on buses and chargersHood River, Ore.Buses integrated into school microgrid for emergency preparednessLocal solar, stationary batteries, microgrid controller and bidirectional EVSEElectric school buses in action: El Cajon, Calif.

As we covered in a recent case study, the Cajon Valley Union School District (CVUSD) is on the leading edge of ESB V2G. The school district has been working on the project in partnership with its local utility, San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E), for more than three years. Today, its electric school buses regularly provide power back into the local grid when requested.

This has primarily been done through California's Emergency Load Reduction Program (ELRP), which aims to avoid outages by paying electricity customers to reduce consumption or increase supply during peak demand times. Under the program, CVUSD can provide demand reduction and energy dispatch for one to five hours at a time when events are called, which happens around 10 times per year. They are compensated $2 per kWh for their energy dispatch. The process uses six bidirectional chargers rated to 60kW, and ESBs with batteries containing around 180kWh.

Through this program, the Cajon Valley school district has been able to help support the local power grid and lower the district's energy costs - while the ESBs continue to serve students' needs.

Local utility control: Durango, Colo.

Municipal utilities and rural co-ops do not have the same market structures to incentivize ESB V2G as investor-owned utilities. Nevertheless, they are also forging ahead with projects focused on their biggest need: peak demand shaving.

Many municipal and co-op utilities purchase power from transmission operators rather than generating their own power. V2G projects allow them to lower the maximum amount of energy required to operate their system and space out the amount of energy they provide over time. This means lower costs for energy, increased ability to utilize renewables like solar, and less reliance on expensive and polluting fossil fuel generation.

One such utility is La Plata Electric Association (LPEA) which has partnered with Durango School District 9-R in Colorado to deploy ESB V2G. After initial failures with its technology platform, LPEA worked with other technology providers to build out a software system giving it better control over the power dispatch from the ESBs. This has allowed LPEA to better integrate the V2G project into its distribution system, making it easier for the utility to accept energy discharged by the buses.

LPEA's challenges highlight continued technology hurdles and the need to focus on building a robust, generalized ESB V2G system that can integrate well with electrical utilities.

Developing compensation: Northeast US

As ESB V2G projects expand beyond the pilot stage toward wider deployment, the question has arisen of how to compensate operators for electricity they deploy. Projects across the Northeast United States offer examples of how supportive rates and policies, or lack thereof, can make or break a V2G project.

In Beverly, Mass., Highland Electric Fleets can take advantage of National Grid's Connected Solutions program. This compensates the bus operator for power provided over the summer months at $200 per kW delivered during peak demand events, averaged over the summer. While this is valuable compensation (around $6,000 per vehicle per year), being confined to a few events over the summer means it will not always cover the cost of the more expensive equipment required for V2G.

South Burlington, Vt. and White Plains, N.Y. take advantage of year-round incentives through Green Mountain Power's Flexible Load Management program (around $9,000 per vehicle per year) and ConEd's Value of Distributed Energy Resources program (compensated at the reported actual cost to the utility), respectively. These programs offer consistent compensation based on the condition of their local grid, giving them stable value to help provide additional support to their projects.

Meanwhile, the Wells-Ogunquit School District in Maine has put its V2G pilot on hold while it establishes a compensation scheme with the local utility and its regulator, demonstrating the need to have clarity on compensation.

Passing the test: West Linn, Ore.

While V2G continues to develop, utilities are working to understand its value for their local grids and see how it might complement existing demand response programs. Portland General Electric has been an early leader in the field and is working with First Student to test the potential of their ESBs to feed power onto the grid during peak times. Portland General Electric has been conducting a demonstration with a 60kW bidirectional charger and a 155kWh bus. Over the summer of 2024, the bus was put through tests to deliver stable power output over three-hour events. Having collected valuable learnings from its demonstration, Portland General Electric is optimistic about expanding its demonstrations to include additional bus and charger combinations.

Deploying at scale: Oakland, Calif.

Moving to more numerous ESB deployments requires far more coordination than just a handful of buses, especially when V2G is involved. One such deployment that made headlines has been Zum's partnership with Oakland Unified School District and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), which has deployed a large-scale V2G enabled school bus yard. With more than 70 ESBs with 150kWh batteries hooked up to 30kW charging equipment, Zum can deploy more than 2MW in response to the same ELRP events as Cajon Valley described above.

The key to this deployment, beyond extensive coordination with the local utility, was ensuring that the district's chargers and vehicles were ISO 15118 compliant. The focus of this technical standard seeks to ease the deployment of vehicles and chargers that are interoperable. Rather than needing to test specific vehicles and chargers, standardization ameliorates common issues from V2G project deployment and has allowed Zum to achieve scale with its rollout.

Boosting resilience: Hood River, Ore.

ESBs also have a role to play providing energy benefits to their communities beyond V2G. As part of the MOVER project (Microgrid Opportunities: Vehicles Enhancing Resiliency), the Hood River County School District in Oregon has partnered with the New Buildings Institute to utilize its ESBs as emergency resources. Rather than feeding into the grid, these buses will be used to provide power directly to Wy'East Middle School in emergency situations as part of a local microgrid that can still be powered and operational if there is a grid outage.

What We've Learned from National ESB V2G Programs

ESBs are on the road delivering clean rides for students while supporting their local grids with V2G. Electrifying fleets can offer megawatts of on-demand power to communities and the utility grids that serve them. But to fully realize this potential, we need more collaboration and communication around ESBs and V2G to work through existing issues of technology, cost and compensation. By learning from each other's challenges and successes, we can not only lower energy costs and carbon emissions, but also help build safer communities and pave the way to a clean ride for kids.

esb-charging-port.jpg Electric Mobility United States electric mobility electric grid school bus Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Electric School Bus Initiative

Authors Robert Stafford

The Tariff Fix: Wasting Less Food Could Make the World More Resilient alicia.cypress… Mon, 05/12/2025 - 11:30

Is your head spinning yet from the tariff and global politics tug-o-war? Mine is. Unfortunately for consumers, the pain could get worse. A tit-for-tat in trade tariffs between the United States and countries around the world combined with tensions involving China, Canada, Mexico and Brazil — could reshape global trade, eventually driving up grocery store and restaurant prices.

Recent tariffs on U.S. soy, destined for the EU’s agricultural sector, for example, are likely to drive up meat and dairy prices for Europeans. In the U.S., it is estimated that half of all grocery store items are likely to rise because of the tariffs.

Resilience Begins with Reducing Waste

As political leaders understandably focus on resiliency to stay competitive and future-proof their nations from shocks, one overlooked ingredient for resilience is sitting on the world’s plate. With rising prices, there are opportunities for governments to help households and businesses waste less food so that more food ends up on the table.

Globally, 40% of all food produced is wasted. In just the European Union today, nearly 60 million metric tons of food — or 132 kilograms (357 pounds) per resident — is wasted every year. That’s food that could be feeding people, not left rotting in fields and landfills where it emits greenhouse gases and costs enormous sums.

Less waste means more food reaches the market and food distribution becomes more efficient. That translates to a more cost-effective supply chain and, ultimately, lower prices at the checkout.  It's a win-win for everyone — and the sooner countries take action, the quicker they will reap the rewards.

Scaling Smart, Proven Solutions

There are many straightforward things that all countries can do. In the immediate term, governments should encourage businesses to better inform their customers — for instance, by clarifying date labels and offering tips to reduce food waste at home. Public awareness campaigns can promote simple yet effective household strategies: planning meals, writing shopping lists, storing food to maximize useful life, and making best use of their freezer.

In the longer term, governments must measure how much food is currently being wasted within their borders (and publicly report it) to have a baseline to measure future progress against. They should also require companies to report food loss and waste publicly, and work with their supply chains to do the same.

For example, in Japan, legislation mandating reporting has already helped push large food companies to meet reduction targets. In response to the reporting mandate, Japanese grocery chain FamilyMart trialed a sobbing discount sticker to help customers identify food that was close to the expiration date to prevent food waste.

Meanwhile in France, a law requires grocery stores to donate edible food, which has led to a 20% increase in donations to food banks. Similar policies could be expanded across Europe. Businesses’ reporting on food loss creates a big opportunity to better understand key areas where waste happens and create innovative solutions.

Countries also have policy examples for how to engage consumers directly. They could, for example, replicate South Korea’s policy requiring households to pay per weight of trash they throw out, which has helped reduce household waste intensity by over one-third.

In Seoul, South Korea, recycling bins are set up along a street. The country's pay-as-you-throw policy charges residents for food and other trash that are taken to landfills. Photo by VittoriaChe/iStock.

And now, for the first time, the EU has made tackling food waste a legal priority. In a historic move, the European Parliament and Council recently agreed to binding targets — the first anywhere in the world — requiring member states to reduce food waste at the retail and consumer levels by 30%, and food losses from production and manufacturing by 10% by 2030. While many experts advocated for higher targets, this is a welcome development that should result in tangible benefits — saving people money, bolstering food security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Every EU country must work to turn this target into a reality.  An important part of this will be engaging all parts of the food system to ensure everyone contributes — retailers, manufacturers, transportation and storage providers, farmers and all of us as individual consumers.

The solutions aren’t rocket science. We have lots of evidence of what works and the many benefits of curbing food waste. In uncertain times, it’s smart to rely on what you know. If global leaders want a resilient future, one thing is certain: Cutting food waste is a smart place to start.

food-loss-waste.jpg Food Food Loss and Waste food security Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Food and Land Use Coalition

Authors Liz Goodwin

What Is the Just Transition and Why Is it Crucial for Colombia? sarah.brown@wri.org Wed, 05/07/2025 - 14:42

Español

In 2021, two major coal mines in Colombia’s northern Cesar Department — Calenturitas and La Jagua — shut down due to the low prices of thermal coal in global markets. The closures cost about 14,000 jobs and considerably reduced tax revenues in the municipalities of La Jagua de Ibirico, El Paso and Becerril, where the mines operated. The loss of royalty income affected the financing of future local development projects and the provision of public services.

The closure of mining operations in Cesar exposed the heavy reliance of some Colombian regions on the coal industry — and the profound impacts that can result from moving away from an extractivist model. This event prompted the government to consider and develop strategies to reduce this dependence and build a more resilient economy, ensuring that this shift does not deepen existing inequalities and that the most vulnerable communities are included in the transition process. 

In February 2025, the Colombian Constitutional Court issued a landmark ruling in response to the coal mine closures in Cesar. The decision established the obligation to guarantee due process and ensure the effective participation of communities and workers affected by large-scale mine closures. It also held companies and the State responsible for ensuring transparent dialogue to mitigate the environmental, social and economic impacts of such closures. 

The example of Cesar concretely demonstrates the far-reaching consequences that can arise when a major local industry is shut down without a clear and inclusive plan to transition the economy. It also reinforces the importance of engaging with affected communities to ensure they are supported as Colombia moves forward with its just transition agenda.  

The Role of Cross-Sectoral Dialogues in Colombia’s Just Transition 

The just transition is a cornerstone of Colombia's transformation toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy that seeks to ensure all people benefit equitably. Without adequate planning, policies to address climate change could exacerbate existing inequalities, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable sectors of society. A just transition recognizes these risks and seeks to ensure that climate actions promote social equity, protecting those who might face greater challenges in the process. 

Infographic adapted from the Just Transition Finance Lab’s report “Mapping Justice in National Climate Action: A Global Overview of Just Transition Policies”. 

To identify the needs, challenges and perspectives that the just transition implies in the country, WRI Colombia organized a series of dialogues together with the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development that brought together public and private sector actors. Notably, this was one of the first times the private sector was engaged in discussions around this topic in the country, laying the groundwork for a constructive and collaborative dialogue on advancing the just transition.  

During the dialogues, participants discussed the progress, opportunities and challenges for a just transition in Colombia. Photo by WRI Colombia.  

Key insights include:

• Colombia has included the just transition as a central component of its climate policies. The country has been working to develop a holistic national approach to fostering a just transition of the workforce. The country's nationally determined contribution (NDC), launched in 2020, recognizes the just transition of the workforce as a cross-cutting and unifying element of climate action. A broader approach is found in the Long-Term Climate Strategy (E2050), which sets milestones to be achieved by 2030, 2040 and 2050.  
• Strengthening social dialogues is crucial to ensuring that the transition resolves existing conflicts and prevents new ones. The importance of implementing learning platforms and training centers for the just transition throughout the country was also raised.
• The lack of effective collaboration between public and private sector institutions in defining what the just transition involves and guiding progress forward is one of the main challenges to advancing it. Additionally, legal barriers to critical processes such as the energy transition were identified. In the public sphere, Colombia’s heavy reliance on fossil fuel revenues was recognized, limiting the possibilities for financing a sustainable transition.
• Difficulties persist in accessing financing to transition to more sustainable economies, especially for small businesses. It is essential to design innovative financial mechanisms and incentives that allow sustainable projects to be scaled up and improve collaboration between the banking sector and companies, especially given Colombia’s struggle to price climate and just transition measures. The country’s continued reliance on fossil fuel revenue to close social and environmental gaps creates an interdependence that complicates transition efforts, especially as it seeks to avoid taking on more debt. Public and private stakeholders also agree on the need to develop and implement green jobs as part of the alternatives to workforce retraining and closing employment gaps.
• The just transition in Colombia must be tailored to the country’s unique social, economic and territorial contexts. Diverse, gender-sensitive approaches are needed to ensure that local voices are heard and valued at the national level. With a cohesive and adapted vision, Colombia can turn its transition into an opportunity to promote equity, sustainability and peace. 

Although Colombia has made significant efforts to advance the just transition, notable challenges remain. These stem from national circumstances such as internal conflict, high levels of internal and foreign migration, the lack of quality jobs — especially for women, young people and the rural population — and the urban-rural divide. There is also an urgent need to strengthen understanding of the just transition among private and public sector actors so they can promote and drive its implementation.  

As Colombia prepares its new NDC, to be submitted in 2025 as part of the Paris Agreement, the country has an opportunity to deepen its existing commitments to a just transition. By recognizing the complexity of the country’s social and economic landscape while setting concrete pathways to ensure climate action contributes to decent work, inclusion and resilience, Colombia can demonstrate that a just transition is not an add-on but a fundamental pillar of effective climate action.  

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• National Climate Action
• Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships (CHAMP) for Climate Action
• Long-Term Climate Strategies
• Just Transition and Equitable Climate Action Resource Center

Authors Héctor Miguel Donado Javier Eduardo Mendoza Carolina Useche Celine Novenario Alex Simpkins

ADVISORY: Embargoed WRI Press Call on 2024 Global Tree Cover Loss Data and Analysis darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 05/07/2025 - 02:25

Registration is for members of the media only. 

WASHINGTON D.C. (May 7, 2025) – Join World Resources Institute (WRI) and the University of Maryland’s GLAD Lab (UMD) on May 15, 2025, for an embargoed press call previewing how much global tree cover was lost in 2024 and offering an analysis of the state of the world’s forests. The call will take place at 9AM EDT/3PM CEST/8PM WIB, featuring global forest experts from WRI and UMD. 

Speakers will present new forest loss data from UMD’s GLAD Lab, showing which countries were forest loss hotspots in 2024, as well as the key drivers. They’ll also discuss the impacts of tree cover loss on people, biodiversity and climate; present solutions; and make the scientific and economic case for forest protection. 

Please note: The 2024 Tree Cover Loss data and analysis is strictly embargoed until May 21, 2025, 12:01AM EDT/6:01AM CEST/11:01AM WIB. By registering for this press call, you agree to respect the embargo date and time. 

This press call will be hosted in English, with live interpretation into French, Spanish, Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesian. 

UMD’s 2024 tree cover loss data will launch on the Global Forest Watch platform, alongside in-depth analysis and expert insights on the state of the world’s forests on the Global Forest Review — all releasing May 21. 

WHAT  
Embargoed press call to preview 2024 global Tree Cover Loss data  
  
WHEN  
Tuesday, May 15, 2025, at 9AM EDT/3PM CEST/8PM WIB 
  
WHO  
Speakers:  

• Elizabeth Goldman, Co-Director, Global Forest Watch, WRI 
• Sarah Carter, Research Associate, Global Forest Watch, WRI 
• Matthew Hansen, Professor, University of Maryland; Co-Director, Global Land Analysis and Discovery (GLAD) Lab
• Peter Potapov, Research Professor, University of Maryland; Co-Director, Global Land Analysis and Discovery (GLAD) Lab 

Respondents: 

• Rod Taylor, Director, Forests and Nature Conservation, WRI 
• Joaquin Carrizosa, Senior Advisor, WRI Colombia 
• Arief Wijaya, Managing Director, WRI Indonesia
• Mariana Oliveira, Manager, Forests, Land Use and Agriculture Program, WRI Brasil 
• Stasiek Czaplicki Cabezas, Bolivian researcher and Data Journalist for Revista Nomadas
• Teodyl Nkuintchua, Congo Basin Strategy and Engagement Leader, WRI Africa 

Moderator:

• Alison Cinnamond, Global Director, Strategic Communications, WRI  

WHERE  
To RSVP, please register here. Registration is for members of the media only.

For any questions, please reach out to Darla van Hoorn, Kaitlyn Thayer or Alison Cinnamond. 

  

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Through Benefits-Sharing Agreements, Clean Energy Projects Can Earn Community Trust alicia.cypress… Tue, 05/06/2025 - 08:45

The U.S. needs a lot more clean energy, and it needs it fast.

If done well, clean energy projects can result in a number of benefits — new job opportunities, improved air quality and public health, cheaper electricity bills and so much more. However, even before recent political challenges in the U.S., renewable energy projects like offshore wind turbines or solar fields have faced increasing local opposition, oftentimes delaying deployment and running up costs. Virtually every U.S. state now has at least one local law restricting renewable energy development.

The pushback is understandable: Energy projects have a long history of inequity in the U.S., with communities of color, low-income neighborhoods and other marginalized groups often being disproportionately affected by pollution and other problems.

But it doesn’t have to be this way.

Community Benefits Snapshots and Database 

WRI and Data for Progress are working to understand how local communities and developers engaged, negotiated and secured localized benefits from project development. In the process, we’ve created a series of Community Benefits Snapshots that offer in-depth analyses of how projects across different sectors have incorporated community benefits frameworks.

These snapshots, which were informed by desk research and interviews with project developers, community members and other stakeholders, can help local communities and developers learn how to build strong agreements and provide best practices for future engagement.

We also created a Database of Community Benefits Frameworks, which includes more than 70 previously negotiated frameworks and analyzed the shortcomings and opportunities of benefits-sharing agreements in the database.

One promising way to ensure that communities benefit from the boom of clean energy deployment while also overcoming tensions with developers is through community benefits frameworks. These formalized agreements — which can vary in legal enforceability and scope — can offer communities a voice in project development, along with tangible benefits, such as long-term financial investments in the community, job creation and other social or economic improvements. Through cooperation with local communities, developers benefit from less opposition and faster siting and development.

Community benefits frameworks are not a silver bullet for achieving equity or accelerating project development. But they ensure that communities’ concerns are heard and that projects bring meaningful benefits to residents.

In this article, we examine four examples of clean energy infrastructure projects — a critical minerals mining development, an offshore wind farm, a carbon dioxide (CO2) pipeline and an electric bus manufacturing plant — in which community benefits frameworks helped move projects forward by fostering trust, creating accountability and ensuring local voices were heard.

Creating a Safer Community During Mine Expansion in Montana

When the Stillwater Mining Company (now known as Sibanye-Stillwater) proposed expanding its mining of palladium and platinum — two critical minerals used in low-emissions technologies — in rural Montana in the 1990s, three local environmental organizations campaigned against it. The Northern Plains Resource Council, Cottonwood Resource Council and Stillwater Protective Association, collectively known as “the Councils,” also launched lawsuits to try to stop the project. They feared the expansion would pollute local watersheds, deplete resources and contribute to public health risks like arsenic and lead poisoning.

But after recognizing that litigation would be both costly and challenging, the Councils proposed entering into a good neighbor agreement with Stillwater Mining. Good neighbor agreements are entered into voluntarily but act as legally binding contracts between a business and a neighboring community.

When the Stillwater Mining Company sought to expand its mining operations at sites like its East Boulder Mine in Montana, the company entered into a good neighbor agreement with local organizations. Photo courtesy of Sibanye-Stillwater. 

The closed-door negotiations took over a year, but they resulted in tangible benefits for the local communities. For example, the mining company agreed to water quality monitoring and protection measures, regular environmental audits and conservation programs for land and wildlife to address citizens’ concerns about the mines’ potential impacts.

Local organizations had worried that increased traffic from mining activity would impact the rural character of their community, so they negotiated a provision obligating Stillwater to bus workers into their mines to reduce vehicle traffic and air pollution. Stillwater compensated the Councils for legal advisors, technical consultants, as well as negotiator training, offering them greater negotiating leverage.

The agreement also provided the Councils with significant oversight over the mining company’s operations. Oversight committees with representation from both the Councils and Stillwater meet three times a year to monitor the agreement’s implementation and address new issues as they come up.

The agreement’s provisions on continued community engagement have earned its reputation as the “Cadillac” of good neighbor agreements.  A central reason is that the agreement applies directly to the mines, independent of their owners. If the mines are sold, the agreement will continue to be upheld by whoever owns the mines over their lifetimes.

Since the agreement was signed in 2000, it’s been amended six times to resolve unexpected issues and address new concerns. Furthermore, there has been no arbitration or litigation, reflecting its effectiveness, flexibility and dispute resolution mechanisms. One of the agreement’s participants said: “When you're sitting at the table with somebody for 20 years, you develop a relationship with them and you also develop credibility from both sides, and you can take each other on as equals.” 

Reducing Energy Costs, Increasing Internet Access for Block Island

In 2009, the state of Rhode Island selected Deepwater Wind, a Rhode Island-based company, to develop the first U.S. offshore wind farm near Block Island. Deepwater Wind engaged with the town of New Shoreham on Block Island to create a community benefits agreement and win the town council’s support of the project.

The developer’s ability to forge strong ties with the New Shoreham community was key to the success of Deepwater Wind’s Block Island Wind Farm. Early on, Deepwater Wind hired a highly respected local resident to act as a full-time community liaison between the developer and the town. This liaison simultaneously helped to socialize the economic and environmental benefits of the project, while also helping Deepwater Wind identify the town’s unique internet and electricity infrastructure needs. Another channel for community engagement came through Rhode Island’s Special Area Management Plan which allows the public to provide recommendations for the siting of offshore wind. It sought to balance the protection and development of the state’s ocean resources and created a unique opportunity for proactive engagement between the state’s Coastal Resources Management Council, the developer and the public.

Deepwater Wind developed the first U.S. offshore wind farm near Block Island, Rhode Island. Photo by the U.S. Department of Energy/Flickr.

Ultimately, Deepwater Wind agreed to provide various tangible benefits to New Shoreham. It devoted $2.5 million to construct a fiber optic internet cable connection, reducing the island’s energy costs and air pollution by replacing diesel generators with power from the newly constructed wind farm. It also donated $2.5 million to local historical and tourism organizations and hired third-party consultants to provide environmental impact studies. Notably, with these community engagement efforts and guarantees for tangible benefits, Deepwater Wind avoided litigation and permitting problems, beginning operations in 2016.

Despite the community’s initial concerns about the wind farm’s potential impacts on fishing and bird life, community members are reportedly pleased with the outcomes of both the project and the community benefits agreement nearly 10 years later. One fisherman stated that the offshore turbines have created artificial reefs to support fish populations while another resident shared there had been negligible impacts on bird migration patterns from the turbines. Another resident praised the reduction of air and noise pollution from replacing the island’s diesel generators with wind power, which avoids 40,000 tons of CO2 emissions per year. Just 10% of the power generated from the turbines is needed to power the entire island’s electricity consumption, with the rest moved onshore.

Community Engagement Builds Local Trust in Pipeline Development

In 2022, Tallgrass, an energy infrastructure company, announced its intention to convert its Trailblazer natural gas pipeline, spanning 392 miles from Nebraska to Wyoming, into a CO2 transport pipeline for carbon sequestration. Tallgrass then began engaging communities along the pipeline route — holding more than 1,000 stakeholder engagements in 2023 and 2024, as well as over a dozen community roundtables and eight open houses — to hear their concerns about the risk of pipeline ruptures or the possible use of eminent domain.

Bold Alliance, an organization focused on partnership building for environmental protection, soon approached Tallgrass and proposed negotiating a community benefits agreement in 2023. Tallgrass agreed and eventually signed the agreement, which was also endorsed by 11 other Nebraska-based community organizations.

One person involved in the process underscored the importance of the company acting in good faith with the community, even before they entered the agreement: “I think it was really refreshing for [the community] to see an infrastructure company, after some of their other experiences, that would come in and say, ‘I know that this bothered you and we’re going to address it in writing and make sure it doesn’t happen again’.”

Pipelines under construction that run through communities, like this one in Pennsylvania, can face local opposition and lawsuits. However, through community engagement, and signing benefits-sharing agreements, this kind of opposition is less likely to occur. Photo by JanaShea/iStock.

The community benefits agreement includes a variety of benefits including landowner protections, public safety and community investment. For example, Tallgrass agreed to offer landowners the option to choose between an up-front lump-sum payment or an annually recurring payment for the use of their land, established a 10-year royalty program for landowners — paying them 10 cents per metric ton of CO2 sequestered through the pipeline — and included a provision for decommissioning the pipeline at the end of the project’s life.

In addition, Tallgrass agreed to provide $400,000 to equip and $200,000 to train first responders on CO2 pipeline incident response and donated $500,000 to a community fund to support counties located along the pipeline. And, as a testament to these engagement efforts, in February 2025 Tallgrass secured 100% of the project’s access to build without the use of eminent domain.

The community benefits agreement also gave Bold Alliance the authority to respond to any violations of the agreement. Since the agreement was signed in 2024 and the pipeline is expected to begin operating in late 2025, it is too early to evaluate its implementation.

Compared to other Midwestern CO2 pipeline projects that have been scuttled by litigation, local opposition and permit denials, Tallgrass’ Trailblazer pipeline project proceeded with relative ease. While some of the reduced community opposition could be because the project entails converting an existing pipeline rather than constructing a new one, Tallgrass’ early engagement with key stakeholders, enhanced by the involvement of Bold Alliance — a trusted community partner —  has served Tallgrass well so far.

Creating Equitable Jobs in Bus Manufacturing Plants

To build electric bus manufacturing facilities in Ontario, Calif., and Anniston, Ala., New Flyer, a bus manufacturer based in Canada, entered into a community benefits agreement with the nonprofit organizations Jobs to Move America (JMA) and Greater Birmingham Ministries, engaging alongside a coalition of around 25 other organizations (referred to collectively as “the Coalition”).

Initially, JMA sued New Flyer in 2019 alleging the company had failed to pay its workers as agreed in a deal New Flyer made with the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. New Flyer settled JMA’s lawsuit for $7 million, while denying the allegations and agreed to negotiate a community benefits agreement covering its factories in Alabama and California to address locally relevant concerns of racial discrimination and fair labor practices.

Through the community benefits agreement, the Coalition established several workforce benefits. New Flyer must select 45% of new hires and 20% of promotions at each plant from groups that have been historically disadvantaged in the communities in which it operated, develop a pre-apprenticeship program to train new workers with preferential entry for disadvantaged groups, establish an anonymous reporting system for harassment and discrimination, and conduct semi-annual workplace safety training sessions at each plant.

A New Flyer electric bus is seen on display at an auto show in New York City. After signing a community benefits agreement, the electric bus manufacturer established workforce benefits at its plants in California and Alabama. Photo by Just Dance/Shutterstock.

The community benefits agreement also requires New Flyer to track its hiring and promotion efforts and disclose the data to the Coalition and JMA, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreement. Furthermore, the agreement includes explicit dispute resolution procedures.

While the Ontario facility has since shut down, New Flyer has successfully increased its hiring and promotion of workers from historically disadvantaged groups in its Anniston facility. A separate union agreement was also produced from the engagement process, which has had positive ripple effects for workers at the Anniston facility. A representative from JMA noted that New Flyer is “well on its way to being one of the best employers … in east Alabama, if not the entire state.”

Frameworks Can Be a Powerful Tool

Community benefits frameworks can help level the playing field between local communities and project developers. When successful, they allow local communities to shape the impact of large-scale clean energy infrastructure projects and hold companies accountable to deliver substantive benefits. In turn, companies can also benefit from these agreements by gaining community support, building stronger local partnerships and learning from local community organizations’ deep expertise of their region — all of which can help developers avoid legal challenges, assuage local opposition and, ultimately, build successful projects.

To ensure the success of community benefits frameworks and community engagement efforts broadly, companies should engage communities early, proactively and authentically to understand community concerns about a given project. With such engagement, these frameworks can then be tailored to meaningfully address community concerns and deliver tangible local benefits.  

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• U.S. People-Centered Transitions

Authors Willy Carlsen Devashree Saha Danielle Riedl Grace Adcox Eva Brungard Catherine Fraser

What Is 'Loss and Damage' from Climate Change? 8 Key Questions, Answered helen.morgan@wri.org Mon, 05/05/2025 - 15:00

Read this article in Portuguese

The planet has already warmed by about 1.3 degrees C (2.3 degrees F) and, in 2024, it temporarily surpassed the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees C threshold for the first time — an alarming milestone driven by human-induced climate change. Millions of people today are facing the real-life consequences of higher temperatures, rising seas, fiercer storms and unpredictable rainfall. 

Rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions is essential to limit temperature rise and secure a safer future for us all. So is making major investments to protect communities from severe impacts that will continue to worsen. 

Yet collective efforts to curb emissions and adapt are currently not enough to tackle the speed and scale of climate impacts. Even if we rein in warming in the long term, we’re already seeing daily reminders of the risks a warmer world brings, from increased wildfires to extreme flooding — meaning some losses and damages from climate change are inevitable. How countries handle these losses and damages has been a key issue at the UN climate negotiations and beyond. 

Here we provide an explainer on the concept of “loss and damage” and what’s needed to address it. 

1) What Is Loss and Damage?

While there is no official definition of loss and damage under the UN, the term is used in international climate negotiations to refer to the consequences of climate change that go beyond what people can adapt to — for example, the loss of coastal heritage sites due to rising sea levels or the loss of homes and lives during extreme floods. This also includes situations where adaptation options exist but a community doesn’t have the resources to access or utilize them. 

Loss and damage is harming and will continue to harm vulnerable communities the most, meaning addressing the issue is an urgent matter of climate justice. But the subject has historically been fraught with contention both inside and outside of UN climate negotiations. In particular, countries have struggled to reach agreement on how much money developed countries should supply to address loss and damage in developing nations, which have contributed the least to the climate crisis but are often hit hardest by its impacts. While an international loss and damage fund was established in 2022 to begin addressing this need, long-term financing commitments remain unsolved. 

2) What Counts as Loss and Damage?

Loss and damage can result from extreme weather events like cyclones, droughts and heat waves, as well as from slow-onset changes such as sea level rise, desertification, glacial retreat, land degradation, ocean acidification and salinization. In some cases, damages may permanently alter places — for example, rising seas encroaching on low-lying islands, drought shrinking water supplies and once-productive farmland turning into barren land. 

Harko, 12 years old, walks across the land with her younger brother in search of water during a drought in Ethiopia. Photo by UNICEF Ethiopia/2016/Ayene

Damages from the effects of climate change can be further divided into two categories — economic and non-economic — though there is overlap between the two. 

Economic losses and damages are those affecting resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets, such as damage to critical infrastructure and property or supply chain disruptions. This can play out at an international or national scale as well as locally, such as impacts on individual farmers or communities. 

In coastal Bangladesh, for example, salt farming is a major source of employment. Yet in recent years, frequent cyclones, tidal surges and heavy rainfall have hampered salt production, eroding the country’s self-sufficiency and forcing it to import salt to manage the market shortfall. 

Non-economic losses and damages can be some of the most devastating, such as the incalculable toll of losing family members, the disappearance of cultures and ways of living or the trauma of being forced to migrate from ancestral homes. 

Take the communities in Kosrae, Micronesia, who have lost burial grounds due to coastal erosion caused by sea level rise. Likewise, the loss of sea ice in the Arctic has affected the cultural identity and hunting practices among Inuit communities. While harder to quantify and monetize, non-economic losses have severe and detrimental effects on communities’ well-being. 

3) What Is the Difference Between Mitigation, Adaptation and Addressing Loss and Damage?

Under the Paris Agreement, countries recognized the importance of “averting, minimizing and addressing” loss and damage. These approaches are closely linked to the three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss and damage. 

Loss and damage can be averted by curbing greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) and minimized by taking preemptive action to protect communities from the consequences of climate change (adaptation). Climate adaptation actions include protecting communities from sea level rise by helping them move to higher ground, preparing for extreme weather disasters by investing in early warning systems, protecting food supplies, switching to drought-resistant crops and much more. 

But not all impacts can be prevented or adapted to. This is where the third pillar — addressing loss and damage — comes in. It focuses on addressing issues such as displacement, destruction of livelihoods and cultural loss. 

Loss and damage is linked to adaptation and mitigation because it happens when efforts to reduce emissions are not ambitious enough and when adaptation efforts are unsuccessful or impossible to implement. Research from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) acknowledges that as the magnitude of climate change increases, so does the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits. It differentiates between “soft” limits — when adaptation options exist but communities don’t have the resources needed to pursue them — and “hard” limits, where “there are no reasonable prospects for avoiding intolerable risks.” These limits are particularly acute in vulnerable communities that lack the resources needed to implement effective adaptation options. 

Coral reefs offer a good example of where adaptation is likely to reach its limits. The IPCC found that 70% to 90% of tropical coral reefs will die by mid-century even if temperature rise is limited to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), with nearly total loss with 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) of warming. This will lead to irreversible losses of biodiversity and have major social and financial impacts on coastal communities that eat and sell reef-dwelling fish. 

While further research is needed to fully understand the limits of climate adaptation, it’s clear that losses and damage are already happening and many communities lack the resources to deal with them. Climate plans and policies should account for loss and damage alongside mitigation and adaptation, and ensure adequate funding and support are made available. 

Damage to buildings caused by Hurricane Irma in Nanny Cay on the British Virgin Island of Tortola. The Caribbean island suffered widespread damage and destruction when Hurricane Irma passed over in 2017. Photo by Russell Watkins/DFID 4) What’s the History of Loss and Damage in UN Climate Negotiations?

The issue of loss and damage has been a lively one in UN climate negotiations for over three decades. 

It began in 1991, when Vanuatu and other small island states proposed a scheme to provide financial resources to countries impacted by sea level rise. Under its proposal, each country would contribute funds based on its relative contribution to global emissions and share of the global gross national product. The idea was rejected and left out of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted in 1992. 

Driving Action on Loss and Damage

ACT2025 is a consortium that aims to elevate the voices of climate-vulnerable countries on issues such as loss and damage at UN climate negotiations. Learn more about ACT2025.

The issue of loss and damage didn’t formally enter climate negotiations until 2007 (as part of the Bali Action Plan) and only gained real traction in 2013, when the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM) was established. But neither the WIM nor any other established mechanism delivered funding to help countries manage loss and damage. 

In 2015, developing countries successfully secured an article on loss and damage (Article 8) in the Paris Agreement. However, finance related to loss and damage was ignored. Not only that, but developed countries ensured that the decision text of the accompanying UN climate summit (COP21) included language ruling out lability or compensation claims associated with loss and damage. At the UN climate summit in 2021 (COP26), climate-vulnerable nations again pushed for a loss and damage fund but were rejected once more. Instead, negotiators launched a two-year Glasgow Dialogue to explore possible loss and damage arrangements. They also agreed to fund the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD), established in 2019 to provide technical assistance to those impacted by loss and damage. 

In 2022, countries finally agreed to create a new loss and damage fund. The following year, it was operationalized as the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), with almost $700 million in initial pledges to fill the fund. The SNLD was also formally operationalized that year. 

It was a landmark moment for loss and damage negotiations — but the work was far from done. 

Since 2023, efforts have continued to operationalize the FRLD — the Philippines was confirmed as the host country, an executive director was appointed and the World Bank successfully met the conditions required to host the FRLD. Meanwhile, the SNLD is mobilizing its first round of technical assistance, following Vanuatu’s request to develop a long-term program to address loss and damage impacts. Since the 2024 UN climate summit (COP29), additional pledges to the FRLD came from Australia, Austria, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden and others. As of April 2025, pledges to the FRLD total $768.4 million. 

It is also worth noting that, at COP29, the new climate finance goal was adopted but did not include a subgoal for loss and damage. While it acknowledged the widening gap in addressing the growing scale and frequency of loss and damage impacts, it did not include details on how much developed countries would be expected to contribute. Countries also failed to finalize the third five-year review of the WIM — now deferred to the UN climate summit in November 2025. 

While the $768.4 million pledged to date is a start, it falls far short of the up to $580 billion that vulnerable countries may require for climate-related damages by 2030. 

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

5) Is Loss and Damage an Issue of Liability and Compensation?

One reason loss and damage has been so contentious historically is due to developed countries’ concerns that compensating for losses and damages caused by adverse climate impacts may be construed as an admission of legal liability, triggering litigation and compensation claims on a major scale. As such, developed countries fought to include language in the Paris Agreement to prevent them from being legally on the hook to provide compensation. 

This concern was addressed in loss and damage funding discussions at the 2022 UN climate summit (COP27) and in the final decision the following year at COP28, which states that “funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage are based on cooperation and facilitation and do not involve liability or compensation.” This provided the assurance that developed countries were looking for to continue negotiations and set the loss and damage fund in motion. 

6) What Are Some Possible Sources of Funding for Addressing Loss and Damage?

A range of funding sources, including public and private, will be needed to address the scale and scope of loss and damage from climate change. But these sources cannot function separately. They all need to work together as part of a broader “mosaic of solutions”. 

Beyond the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), some developed countries point to humanitarian aid, disaster-risk management and insurance as sources of finance for loss and damage. Other more innovative sources have also been proposed, such as levies on air travel and shipping, financial transactions taxes, taxes on windfall profits of fossil fuel companies and other non-public sources.

Examples from across the world show why this funding mix is necessary. In the wake of the devastating floods in 2022, Pakistan needed short-term humanitarian assistance as well as long-term support for rebuilding. Meanwhile, Palau is concerned that tuna are migrating out of its fishing areas as the ocean warms. Without the ability to fish for tuna, some Pacific Island nations could lose income averaging 37% of government revenue. While humanitarian aid would not be poised nor mandated to address this problem, other forms of finance could. 

Thai and migrant workers from Laos and Myanmar line up to collect donations after floods, 2011. Photo by ILO/Sai Min Zaw

This underscores the need for broader funding arrangements, including the dedicated loss and damage fund, which can coordinate and align various types of funding from both within and outside of the UNFCCC to adequately address loss and damage. The fund could facilitate coordination with a wide variety of funding arrangements through multilateral development banks, relevant UN agencies, multilateral climate funds, the Santiago Network and others. 

Outside of the UNFCCC, there have been additional important developments for financing loss and damage. These include the Climate Vulnerable Forum and Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group’s crowd-sourced loss and damage fund and the G7 and V20’s Global Shield Against Climate Risks initiative, which aims to enhance existing financial structures on climate risk and loss and damage finance. 

7) What Activities Could Finance for Loss and Damage Support?

Action to address loss and damage could span a range of activities and should be shaped by the needs and priorities of the communities most affected by climate change impacts. For example, this could include weather-indexed crop insurance for farmers or proactively setting aside funds to rebuild critical infrastructure when disaster strikes. 

It could also entail providing immediate humanitarian assistance after an extreme weather event, offering relief and rehabilitation to victims through provision of basic amenities, enabling social protection systems to provide emergency cash transfers to the poor and enhancing microcredit institutions to provide financing for livelihood restoration. 

Loss and damage funding could also help people rebuild when their homes are destroyed. For example, while early warning systems in Bangladesh have helped radically reduce fatalities from extreme weather events, people leave the storm shelters to find their homes and livelihoods destroyed and have therefore unquestionably experienced loss and damage. 

Finally, when necessary, funding for loss and damage can assist with migration and relocation of people who are permanently displaced and help diversify skills if their original livelihoods are no longer available. 

8) What Needs to Happen Next to Address Loss and Damage?

Climate impacts are already causing widespread disruptions and are only poised to worsen, even with ambitious action on emissions reductions and adaptation. The need for loss and damage solutions — and finance to enable them — is more urgent than ever before. 

With the loss and damage fund now in motion, the international community will have to work diligently to finalize the details of new funding arrangements and to mobilize finance at scale. Attention will also turn to the board of the FRLD to ensure institutional structures are in place to deliver resources with the necessary speed and scale. 

As countries prepare for the 2025 UN climate summit (COP30), the world will be looking for clear signals on loss and damage from countries’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs). This could include information outlining loss and damage response plans, developing countries’ needs and commitments from developed countries to contribute to loss and damage finance. Moreover, additional commitments to the FRLD — as well as financial support for the broader global international arrangements for addressing loss and damage, including the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Santiago Network (SNLD) — will be critical to building momentum as the world enters the second half of this critical decade.  

Developing countries and communities on the front lines of climate impacts are counting on the world to deliver. 

This article was originally published in April 2022. It was last updated in May 2025, to reflect the latest state of play for loss and damage in UN climate negotiations.

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Authors Preety Bhandari Nate Warszawski Deirdre Cogan Rhys Gerholdt

Grasslands Are Some of Earth’s Most Underrated Ecosystems margaret.overh… Fri, 05/02/2025 - 08:00

Earth is home to a spectacular array of ecosystems, each with their own unique characteristics and benefits. Yet not all of them receive equal attention: Grasslands, for one, are often overlooked — despite their importance.

The world's grasslands are arguably the single most extensive land cover on Earth's ice-free land surface. Grasslands or "grassy ecosystems" — used here to encompass natural and semi-natural savannas, open shrubland and tundra (but excluding cultivated pastures) — are also incredibly diverse. They range from the Great Plains of North American and the Pampas of South America to the Eurasian Steppes and East African savannas (such as the Serengeti and Maasai Mara).

These ecosystems are critical for a wide range of plants and animals and for mitigating climate change. They also offer sustenance, income, cultural identity and essential ecosystem services, such as pollination and water regulation, to populations around the globe. Over a billion people directly depend on grasslands for their food and livelihoods, many of them Indigenous groups and other local communities.

Yet despite all this, grasslands receive disproportionately little protection, funding and attention in global conservation and climate agendas. Only 4.6% of temperate grasslands are protected, compared to 18% of forests and around 16% of wetlands. And close to half of all grasslands may have already been converted to uses, such as agriculture or development. As a result, they are among the most at-risk biomes on Earth.

The good news is that a growing body of research is shedding light on grasslands' many benefits, making the case for increased investment and protection. Here are five key reasons why they deserve more attention:

1) Grasslands Play a Vital Role in Mitigating Climate Change

One of the most underrecognized benefits of grasslands is their vital role in mitigating climate change. Although they store less carbon per unit area than forests, the sheer expanse of grasslands globally means they are a major storehouse, accounting for up to 34% of the world's terrestrial carbon. Forests, by comparison, account for about 39%.

Ninety percent of this carbon is stored underground, where the diversity of grassland plants helps increase the amount of organic carbon stored in roots and soils. Because of this, and because many grasslands plants have deep and resilient root systems, their carbon stores may be more stable than those in forests, better able to withstand environmental stressors like drought and fires. When fires do sweep through, belowground carbon remains mostly intact. But carbon stored above ground is mostly lost when vegetation burns.

In fact, emerging research shows that a significant portion of grasslands' soil carbon is stored in deeper subsoil layers than are typically measured in the field. This means the amount they hold may be greater than currently estimated.

Various strategies could help grasslands store even more carbon. For example, silvopasture (deliberately integrating trees into pasturelands) has shown particular promise. In tropical regions, silvopasture consistently improves carbon sequestration — often in pastures with degraded soils or low existing productivity.

Grasslands also help regulate temperatures thanks to their high "albedo," meaning they reflect solar radiation and contribute to local cooling. Recent research highlights that light-colored grassy vegetation in South Africa reflects more radiation compared to areas with shrubs. As woody plants encroach into these ecosystems, they absorb more solar radiation, diminishing this cooling effect. This highlights the importance of maintaining open grasslands, where appropriate, as a nature-based climate solution.

2) Grasslands Are Crucial Habitats for Many Plants and Animals

Grasslands support an extraordinary variety of life. Many are considered biodiversity hotspots, with grassland, shrubland and savanna accounting for nearly a third (6.8 million square kilometers) of Key Biodiversity Areas globally. Indeed, some temperate grasslands host nearly 90 species per square meter, making them among the most species-rich ecosystems on the planet.

Grasslands are home to many of the world's iconic large mammals — from bison in the Northern Great Plains of the U.S. and Canada; to elephants, giraffes, hippos and lions in the African savanna; to the last remaining wild horses in the Eurasian Steppes. Many grassland birds, such as the greater sage-grouse and eastern meadowlark, rely on these open landscapes for breeding and nesting. Beyond large mammals and birds, grasslands also support critical species of reptiles, amphibians, and small mammals like prairie voles.

African elephants in Kenya's Amboseli National Park. Photo by Ray in Manila/Flickr

Many plants and animals that live in these ecosystems are grassland specialists and are endemic to specific regions and grassland types, meaning they're only found in that one habitat. Due to their limited range and ongoing habitat loss, these species are increasingly becoming rare or endangered. For example, the plains-wanderer — a small ground-dwelling bird native to eastern Australia, which is so evolutionarily distinct that it has its own taxonomic family — is considered critically endangered due to the widespread conversion of the native grasslands it requires for foraging and roosting to cropland.

The plains-wanderer, a unique bird endemic to the grasslands of eastern Australia. Photo by Dominic Sherony/Flickr 3) Grasslands Provide Essential Ecosystem Services

In addition to their climate and biodiversity benefits, grasslands — including well-managed grazing areas — provide ecosystem services that benefit people worldwide. For one, they support habitat for pollinators such as native bees and butterflies that enhance crop yields on nearby farmland. It's estimated that as much as 35% of the world's food crops depend on animal pollinators, making healthy grasslands essential for sustaining agricultural productivity.

Belowground, the roots, microbes and fungi in grassland ecosystems help decompose and release nutrients, resulting in more resilient, productive landscapes that sustain both people and wildlife. Deep-rooted native grasses also anchor and strengthen the soil, helping to reduce erosion and keep landscapes intact. Over the last 150 years, nearly half of the world's topsoil has been lost, in part due to conversion and poor management of grasslands.

These underground systems are also critical for regulating water. They enable rainwater to penetrate into the soil and recharge groundwater stores, helping plants, animals and nearby people to weather dry spells. Grasslands absorb surplus rain during periods of heavy rainfall, regulating water discharge into streams and rivers and helping to buffer against floods. And their underground ecosystems naturally purify water by filtering out pollutants and excess nutrients.

4) Over 1 Billion People Rely on Grasslands for Their Food and Livelihoods

Grasslands are a key source of livelihoods and food security for pastoralists, smallholder farmers and Indigenous communities. They contribute approximately US$20.8 trillion in economic value each year through livestock production and other economic services, which is higher than the GDP of every nation except the U.S. and China. Livestock farmed on grass and pasturelands are also an important animal protein source in many developing countries — especially in regions where other options, such as fish, are limited.

These benefits are particularly vital for marginalized groups. An estimated 1 billion people, the majority of whom live under the poverty line, depend on grazing livestock for subsistence and income. In underdeveloped regions like sub-Saharan Africa, grassland- and savanna-based pastoralism and extensive livestock production contribute to 5%-25% of some countries' GDP.1

A Maasai herdsman driving his livestock across the savannah in Kenya's Naboisho Conservancy. Grassland-grazed livestock are a critical source of food and income, particularly in underdeveloped regions. Photo by Stuart Black/Alamy Stock Photo 5) Communities Around the Globe Have Deep Cultural Ties to Grasslands

Beyond providing food and livelihoods, grasslands hold great cultural, historical and spiritual importance, particularly for Indigenous Peoples and local communities whose cultural identities are enmeshed with the land.

Many traditions and Indigenous land management practices developed around ecological cycles associated with grazing lands. For example, Aboriginal Australians have practiced "fire-stick farming" for thousands of years. This method uses controlled fires to reduce fuel loads and prevent larger blazes, while also creating vegetation mosaics that promote biodiversity and improve the land's productivity.

The Afar people, pastoralists in East Africa, have the "Edo" tradition. Scouts use Indigenous knowledge of factors overlooked by conventional assessments — such as soil color and the presence of certain plants and animals — to evaluate potential grazing areas. They consider factors like water sources, vegetation, pests and social dynamics to ensure the land is used sustainably.

In the U.S. and Canada, human life in the prairies dates back 10,000 years, to when the Indigenous A'aninin, Assiniboine, Cree, Sioux and Blackfoot linked their travel through the grasslands with the migration of bison. Bison still hold a sacred status in the culture of the Sicangu Oyate and other Indigenous North American communities, inspiring traditional ceremonies, dances and songs that are passed down through generations.

Buck Spotted Tail of the Sicangu Lakota Oyate (a band of the Lakota people) performing a Grass Dance in Badlands National Park, U.S. The Sicangu Oyate have deep cultural ties to North America's grasslands and the bison that roam them. Photo by Greg Vaughn/Alamy Stock Photo

These and other cultural practices, such as camel praise poetry in East Africa — which depicts grassland and rangeland fauna and flora in colorful oral poems — indicate how deeply these ecosystems are linked not just with livelihoods, but with traditional knowledge and spiritual cosmology.

But these cultures don't just depend on grassland ecosystems; they also play a crucial role in their protection. Native American Nations, together with ranching and farming families, own and oversee 85% of the remaining intact Northern Great Plains grassland. These communities are stewards of their ancestral lands, with crucial knowledge about sustainable land use and ecosystem management.

It's Time We Recognize and Protect Grasslands' Importance

Despite their incredible benefits, grasslands are undervalued — and under threat. They are one of the most at-risk biomes due to significant loss, inadequate protection, and inappropriate or absent management.

Indeed, half the world's grasslands have already suffered some degree of degradation, whether due to agricultural expansion, development and urbanization, invasive species, overgrazing or species replacement. Shifting temperatures and weather patterns driven by climate change only exacerbate this decline.

This is already affecting wildlife habitat and endangering species — as well as releasing carbon stores that further accelerate climate change. In fact, grassland conversion could cause up to 4.25 gigatons of emissions globally by 2050, equivalent to India's annual greenhouse gas emissions. As the health of the grasslands suffers, so, too, does the wellbeing of their human inhabitants. Many will face mounting vulnerability as their livelihoods and food security are threatened.

Grasslands have largely been overlooked in global conservation and climate commitments so far. But they are beginning to receive more attention: Research is shedding light on grasslands' many benefits, and 2026 will be the UN International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. Now, this growing awareness must translate to action. We urgently need governments, investors and businesses to align policies and commitments with protecting grasslands. This can help maximize their potential to curb climate change, safeguard biodiversity and contribute to sustainable development.

To support these actions, more information is needed about the threats to grasslands and how they are changing. Upcoming research from Land & Carbon Lab's Global Pasture Watch research consortium will help fill this gap by providing critical new research about the state of grasslands. 

Learn what the latest data can show us about grasslands and follow our research.

 

1 Based on author's calculations. Sources: Sudan  | Ethiopia | Kenya | Mali | Uganda | Nigeria

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How to Create Long-Term Demand for Carbon Removal in the US alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/01/2025 - 14:45

The United States has emerged as a leader in developing innovative ways to remove and store carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere — using approaches that rely on chemicals, rocks, the ocean and biomass. Known as carbon dioxide removal (CDR), these efforts help remove the excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that are already contributing to rising temperatures and extreme weather events.

CDR can help mitigate damaging climate impacts if it’s paired with deep and rapid emissions reductions across all sectors. While development and deployment of CDR technologies and approaches have seen remarkable progress over the past five years through efforts in the public and private sectors, neither the U.S. nor the global community is on track to scale CDR to the level that’s needed to reach climate goals. New policy approaches need to be considered to close this gap.

Discussions in the European Union and the United Kingdom are exploring options for incorporating carbon removal into emissions trading systems. And state-level legislation was introduced (but not passed) in the U.S. to require emitters to purchase increasing levels of CDR. Although these kinds of regulatory policies would face significant political challenges at the federal level in the U.S., there are steps that can be taken now, like better defining what counts as “high-quality” carbon removal, that can pave the way for any potential future regulatory policy.   

Why Is a New Policy Approach Needed to Drive CDR Demand?

Climate modeling estimates indicate that CDR approaches will need to remove roughly 1 billion metric tons (1 gigaton) of carbon dioxide each year by 2050 for the U.S. to reach net zero. Currently, just over 1 million metric tons of durable CDR is being removed annually across all countries in the world. Once net zero is achieved, CDR will be instrumental to achieving net-negative emissions, where the global community is removing more emissions than what’s being added to the atmosphere.

Achieving gigaton scale of CDR in the United States will be challenging. Unlike other clean technologies, CDR is not a consumer product or service, such as electric vehicles or solar PV, which reduce emissions while providing something people need. However, many CDR approaches can generate economic benefits. For instance, some carbon mineralization approaches can be used to extract rare and valuable minerals or reclaim useful chemicals in mining waste. In other cases, CDR can help increase crop yields, reduce fuel for forest fires and provide jobs. Yet, these benefits alone are generally not enough to drive sufficient levels of investment to scale CDR to the level that’s needed.

Some companies have voluntarily purchased carbon removal credits, which has created a limited market for CDR projects. Global voluntary purchases have grown from 0.6 million metric tons CO2 (MtCO2) removal in 2022 to 7.8 MtCO2 in 2024. Although the voluntary market’s demand for CDR is projected to grow, with some estimates highlighting potential global demand of up to 870 MtCO2 by 2040, this would still be insufficient to achieve the scale of CDR needed to reach global climate goals.

Government incentives and procurement could also play a larger role, but the U.S. government is unlikely to directly purchase a gigaton of CDR each year (assuming an ambitious $100 per metric ton of CO2 (tCO2), it would cost $100 billion annually). Creating long-term, consistent demand for CDR may depend on regulation or compliance mechanisms that compel emitters to purchase CDR, alongside their emissions reduction efforts, as part of a portfolio of policies to scale CDR. Such an approach can also provide a level of accountability for emitters to begin addressing the climate impacts of their pollution.

What Are Current and Proposed CDR Policies?

U.S. policy support for CDR, whether for research and development, deployment support or to help create demand, has increased from virtually nothing to billions of dollars in public support over the past five years. Some key funding in the United States includes:

Focus of SupportType of SupportAmountResearch and development Annual budget appropriations for agencies like the Department of Energy.$118 million for fiscal year 2024.Large-scale demonstrationRegional direct air capture hubs in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.$3.5 billion for 4 MtCO2 scale DAC hubs (FY22-FY26).Deployment45Q tax credit, enhanced in the Inflation Reduction Act.Up to $180/tCO2 for DAC and up to $85/tCO2 for BECCS.Creating demandCDR Purchase Pilot Prize.$35 million for program directed in FY2023 appropriations; $20 million included in FY2024 appropriations to continue the program.

Note: As of April 2025, there is uncertainty associated with the status of some of these funding streams following funding freezes by the Trump administration.

Several bills were introduced, though not passed, in the 118th Congress (January 2023 through January 2025), suggesting growing CDR support. The Federal CDR Leadership Act and the bipartisan CREST Act proposed scaling government procurement of CDR, while the Climate Pollution Standard and Community Investment Act included direct government procurement through a Negative Emissions Activities Fund as part of a larger climate policy. In the 119th Congress, lawmakers introduced the Foreign Pollution Fee Act, which levies a fee on imported industrial products based on their carbon intensity and includes a provision to allow producers to purchase CDR to reduce their liability.

While none were adopted, a handful of noteworthy bills were also introduced in state legislatures. A California bill (SB 308), which passed the state Senate in 2023, would have required companies to purchase CDR to address an increasing fraction of their remaining emissions. This would complement state requirements for net-zero emissions by 2045 and 85% gross emissions reduction by that year. Bills were also introduced in New York in 2021 and Massachusetts in 2023 that would require state government procurement of certain amounts of CDR. While none of these measures advanced, they indicate growing interest in the topic.

Other state legislation is also relevant: Vermont and New York adopted climate change superfund acts in 2024. These require fossil fuel companies to pay for damage caused by their historic GHG emissions. A similar federal bill was introduced in Congress in 2024 and other state bills were introduced in California, Maryland and Massachusetts. While none of these bills direct funds to CDR, they introduce a potential funding mechanism — fees tied to past GHG emissions — that could be used for a variety of climate-related costs, including but not limited to, funding development and deployment of CDR.

What Policy Design Considerations Are Needed?

Scaling CDR in the U.S. to the level needed to meaningfully address climate impacts will be a multi-decade project. Because of limitations on government purchasing capacity and the voluntary market, reaching that goal may require future policies that mandate purchase of CDR in some way by companies that continue to emit greenhouse gases. Before such a policy could become feasible, two key puzzle pieces will need to be in place:

1) CDR policy must be paired with, and complement, deep emissions reductions.

CDR policies cannot exist in a vacuum, but rather, must complement emission reduction requirements to achieve net-zero by 2050. This is important for a few reasons.

Reducing emissions is generally less expensive than CDR and will play the largest part in reaching global climate goals. Scaling CDR to gigaton level will not make much of a difference if emissions continue at their current rate or only decline slightly; CDR must be paired with deep emissions reductions (around 80% to 85% or more based on various modeling estimates) to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Reducing emissions by moving away from fossil fuels also reduces other air pollutants which can improve air quality and human health.

Further, CDR is not an unlimited resource. How it is used must be carefully planned so as not to impede sustainability limits on land, water and energy availability as well as societal impacts. Once net zero is achieved, scaling CDR will be necessary to move toward net-negative emissions in the second half of the century. Deeply reducing emissions reduces the need for CDR to achieve net zero but does not eliminate the need to scale up CDR to address legacy emissions once net-zero has been achieved.

Recent legislation such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act have provided significant incentives for developing and deploying low-carbon infrastructure and projects, while recent regulations have targeted emission reductions for power plants and vehicles. But with President Trump and the Republican-led Congress already moving to redirect funding and roll back regulations, progress on economywide decarbonization is likely to slow — though it’s unlikely to stop.

A federal CDR purchase mandate is therefore currently unlikely and will remain so until significant progress can again be made on emission reduction incentives and requirements. For now, efforts can focus on ensuring that CDR investments and projects meet high standards of quality during the initial stages of deployment.

2) Establish a framework to ensure high-quality CDR is scaled.

Defining what counts as “high-quality” CDR can include a wide range of attributes. While some principles might be specific to certain CDR approaches, others cut across all types of CDR. Criteria included in CDR procurement legislation and those already being used by private buyers to make purchasing decisions can serve as starting points. Across these efforts, general categories of quality criteria include:

• Criteria related to measurement, reporting and verification (MRV): for example, proving or maximizing net-negativity, proving additionality, meeting a certain duration of permanence, sharing data transparently, conducting third-party verification and addressing uncertainty associated with permanence, as well as physical leakage.
• Criteria for impacts on the environment and people: for example, measuring and minimizing environmental harms, using only waste or residue biomass, minimizing negative impacts on people and providing social benefits (e.g., job creation).
• Criteria related to technology development: for example, maximum cost, leveraging private finance, contribution to technological diversification or demonstrated potential to scale.
• Other criteria: for example, prohibition on use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery or requirements on the use of or investment in renewable energy.

Differences in quality criteria among existing efforts may be attributable to the different objectives within the various policies and corporate purchases. Some focus on increasing technological diversity and supporting industry development, while others focus on supporting approaches with the capacity to scale to the highest level.

What Could a Policy Look Like?

A policy that requires companies that continue to emit GHGs to purchase a proportional amount of CDR could be an important part of a comprehensive set of policies and incentives that also includes emission reduction requirements. Such a package is needed to mitigate climate change and its impacts.

This approach is attractive because it simultaneously generates investment in CDR while incentivizing emissions reductions. If the CDR purchase requirement increases over time, companies would be further incentivized to invest in emissions reduction measures to avoid the increasing CDR obligation. reach certain targets for CDR scaling.

The 2023 version of California’s SB 308 provides one approach to such a CDR policy. California already has in place an important prerequisite that is not yet in place at the national level: targets established for net-zero GHG emissions by 2045 with at least an 85% reduction in gross emissions from 1990 levels by that year. These dual targets help ensure that any CDR policy is additional to significant emission reductions and not in lieu of them. Establishing such requirements in law or regulation at the national level will be a heavy lift but ultimately necessary for the U.S. to achieve net-zero emissions.

SB 308 included three critical elements for scaling CDR to help California achieve net-zero:

• Requiring California’s Air Resources Board to create a process for ensuring that any carbon removal included was durable, together with systems for monitoring, reporting and verification, ensuring financial responsibility and tracking any CDR credits allowed into the system.
• Requiring consideration of the benefits to and impacts on neighboring communities in certifying CDR projects for inclusion in the system.
• Requiring major GHG polluters, including fuel providers covered under California’s cap-and-trade program, to purchase certified CDR credits to cover a percentage of their emissions, with the percentage increasing from 1% in 2030 to 100% in 2045 in line with California’s net-zero emissions target.

In addition, SB 308 included provisions for a two-phase crediting system that would allow temporary credit for some less-durable sequestration methods that would need to be replaced by credits for more durable options. This was included to allow for the use of nature-based credits, which are currently less expensive and often have additional non-climate benefits.

Beyond determining quality considerations and ensuring complementary effort on emissions reduction, federal regulatory policy for CDR would require consideration of other design questions, such as: which emitters are covered, which greenhouse gases are in scope, would historical emissions be covered in addition to current emissions, and how is permanence addressed in the quality requirements (i.e., are nature-based approaches included).

Where Do We Go from Here?

While federal action on is unlikely in the near-term, there are ways to start developing and building support for carbon removal policies that can be implemented in the future. Steps that can be taken now to build a foundation for future regulatory policy include:

• Enacting CDR procurement programs and purchase requirements at the state level, particularly states with net-zero targets.
• Expanding federal government procurement of CDR.
• Assessing and identifying the incentives and regulations that will be needed to reduce emissions as a complement to scaling CDR.
• Establishing strong quality standards for CDR in near-term regulation (e.g., around government procurement for CDR).
• Developing an outline for regulatory policy design, in part based on the first two elements.

Meanwhile, continued dialogue among a diverse set of constituencies can help ensure that CDR is deployed safely and to the benefit of local communities, and can help build a broader base of support. This dialogue can also help pave the way for greater political support.

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Authors Katie Lebling Kevin Kennedy Angela Anderson Danielle Riedl Hannah Harasaki

What Is a ‘Just Transition,’ and Are Countries Really Making Progress? margaret.overh… Thu, 05/01/2025 - 12:30

Building a sustainable future will require major changes to how we power and operate our economies, with inevitable ripple effects on people's livelihoods. Consider how coal communities could be reshaped when a plant closes, or how auto workers will navigate the shift to electric vehicle manufacturing.

At the same time, transitioning from carbon-intensive industries to more sustainable ones can bring remarkable benefits. Alongside protecting people from increasingly dangerous climate extremes, the transition can create millions of new jobs and boost global GDP, offering new opportunities for growth and development in regions affected by the transition.

A "just transition" seeks to balance these risks and benefits fairly, leaving no one behind.

A growing number of countries have embraced just transition principles in their national climate plans and policies over the last decade. And many are taking concrete steps to achieve their goals, such as working with stakeholders to develop just transition roadmaps or plans, upskilling and reskilling workers in green jobs, or phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. But the question remains: How much progress are countries really making toward a just transition?

Few countries transparently monitor their just transition efforts, making it difficult to assess progress and for communities to hold governments accountable to their promises. But new guidance developed by WRI and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT), informed by select countries that are leading the charge in this area, offers a way forward.

What Does a 'Just Transition' Really Mean?

A "just transition" refers to addressing climate change in a fair, just and inclusive manner. This means creating decent work opportunities for all, avoiding risks like unemployment and displacement, and taking an inclusive approach to managing challenges associated with the low-carbon transition.

There are many pieces to this puzzle. A just transition should include "distributive justice," which calls for the benefits and challenges of the transition to be fairly shared across society; "procedural justice," which means people should be involved in decision-making processes that impact them; and "restorative justice," which calls for addressing past harms.

In other words, a just transition is not only about creating new jobs for those whose livelihoods are linked to fossil fuels (though that's an important component). It can also be about repairing historical inequities, such as unequal pollution burdens. It can mean ensuring social benefits, such as clean transportation or new workforce opportunities, are available for all. It can involve prioritizing social welfare as a key indicator of national progress.

A vibrant park on the site of a former coal mine in Gelsenkirchen, Germany. A just transition aims to ensure that all the benefits of shifting to a cleaner economy, including things like cleaner air and social welfare, are equally shared. Photo by Rupert Oberhauser/Alamy Stock Photo

Importantly, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to a just transition. Each community, country and region will face unique challenges in addressing climate change, and the right path forward will vary based on their social, political and geographical contexts.

For example, South Africa — a coal-dependent country that struggles with high unemployment and inequality — views its just transition as an opportunity to "achieve a quality life for all South Africans." It specifies that the transition should boost social inclusion, reduce poverty, and "[put] people at the centre of decision making, especially those most impacted, the poor, women, people with disabilities, and the youth." South Africa also calls out opportunities for action, such as building "affordable, decentralised, diversely owned renewable energy systems" and ensuring "sustainable, equitable, inclusive land use for all."

Scotland, one of Europe's largest fossil fuel producers, has put a strong focus on employment for its just transition. Scotland highlights the need for "skills training and education that helps to secure good, high value jobs in green industries like low-carbon manufacturing, renewables, and tech," as well as "job security for those in industries that will play the biggest part in the transition … from those working in petrol stations to those on oil platforms."

Are Countries Making Progress on Just Transitions?

The idea of a "just transition" gained prominence when it was included in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Since then, it has taken root in national plans and policies.

The number of countries that explicitly include just transition concepts in their climate plans (known as "Nationally Determined Contributions," or "NDCs") has increased from just one (South Africa) in 2015 to 66 (as of April 2025). Some countries only refer to the concept in passing while others, such as Chile and the United Kingdom, dedicate entire sections to how they'll address a just transition. The U.K.'s NDC, for example, notes the creation of an Office for Clean Energy Jobs to help ensure quality and abundant opportunities for its energy workforce.

Countries have also been incorporating just transition in their long-term low-emissions development strategies (LT-LEDS or "long-term strategies"), which aim to align national development priorities with climate action. Fifty-seven percent of long-term strategies submitted as of September 2023 reference a just transition, though to varying degrees; countries such as Indonesia and Spain offer clear descriptions of just transition efforts, while others lack such details.

Some countries are now moving beyond pledging and planning, developing national strategies and policies that translate just transition principles into concrete action.

• In addition to its Office of Clean Energy Jobs, the United Kingdom launched Skills England, an initiative aimed at upskilling or reskilling workers so they can take advantage of jobs in the clean economy.
• In the United States, past policies have had a strong focus on distributive justice. The Biden Administration's Justice40 initiative, for example, aimed to channel 40% of federal climate investments into communities that have been disproportionately burdened by pollution (though the future of this initiative is unclear under new leadership).
• In South Korea, the government has noted it will support small and medium-sized enterprises in their low-carbon transitions by enforcing policy measures that facilitate green technology and sustainability.
• In Canada, the government developed a Coal Community Transition Fund to support municipalities and First Nations impacted by coal phaseout in Alberta. Resulting funds have helped pay for things like social and economic impact studies, community transition planning and initiatives to build up local businesses.

In parallel with this, innovative climate finance mechanisms are emerging to help accelerate countries' just transition efforts. Models such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and Country Climate and Development Platforms are mobilizing finance at the national level to implement green growth at scale. For example, South Africa signed a deal for a JETP in 2021 to mobilize $8.5 billion from partner countries. This has allowed the country to make strategic investments in at-risk value chains, such as the automotive industry and the agriculture industry, to begin the transition towards a cleaner, greener and more equal society.

From Commitment to Measuring Impact

This growth in just transition commitments suggests a promising trend. But how much progress are countries actually making? The answer to this is less clear-cut.

Most countries still lack processes and systems to track progress toward their just transition goals. While this may sound like a "nice to have," it's critical for driving real-world change. Clear information on progress can help governments refine their approaches and better align policy and finance with just transition goals. By transparently assessing impacts on jobs, gender equity and other socioeconomic priorities, governments can show national and international stakeholders what's working well, what could be emulated and what they might need further support on.

Determining how to measure and track this progress can be challenging. Despite over a decade of tracking sustainable development indicators, many countries do not have consistent socioeconomic data tracking mechanisms in place, creating a blind spot when it comes to identifying specific support that could be provided to disadvantaged groups.

However, some countries are starting to make progress on this front.

Nigeria is working toward understanding whether the benefits of climate action are equitably distributed, with a focus on vulnerable populations such as women, youth, Indigenous communities, and people with disabilities. The country's Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment, with the support of ICAT, worked to develop a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework for a Just and Gender Inclusive Transition. The framework — which applies to the oil and gas and agriculture, forestry and land use sectors — identified key indicators to track how transition efforts in these areas are affecting vulnerable groups.

South Africa recently developed a monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) framework to support policy makers in understanding national and local progress toward a just transition, including the impacts on specific at-risk sectors. The country identified key indicators, looking at things like racial and gender employment disparities in transition-impacted sectors such as energy; multidimensional poverty levels in coal-dominated communities, such as Mpumalanga; and the percentage of people with vocational training in clean sectors who find employment within six months of graduating.

Cleaning off rooftop solar panels in Nigeria. Nigeria is working to assess how its efforts to shift toward a cleaner economy affect people across society, particularly vulnerable groups like women and children. Photo by SnapperUK/Alamy Stock Photo

The new ICAT Just Transitions Monitoring Guide draws lessons from these countries, offering comprehensive guidance for other governments looking to monitor their just transition efforts and better understand where support could be targeted. The guide includes step-by-step processes to develop just transition-related goals and priorities; select targets; identify social, economic and environmental indicators; and analyze and communicate data to a range of stakeholders.

Wherever countries are in defining and formulating their just transition plans, they can start developing monitoring processes and identifying indicators to track and inform these efforts. For instance, with ICAT's support, Brazil's environment ministry is utilizing the guide to develop a strategy for monitoring the socio-economic impacts of its National Climate Plan. Countries can leverage this guidance to get a clearer picture of their own progress, build on successes, and identify areas where further support or targeted policies may be needed.

Enabling Just Transitions at Scale

Countries are increasing their commitments to a just transition and working to define what this could look like in their own unique contexts. But without monitoring in place, it will remain difficult for communities to understand whether governments are delivering on their promises.

While monitoring is one of the key factors for ensuring transparency and accountability towards a just transition, it is not the only one. Scaling just transitions across regions, sectors and countries will require significant shifts from both institutions and the public. Governments will need to make a concerted effort to move from developing one-off projects toward fostering consistent, systemic and coordinated action that can enable just transitions at larger scales. This includes working together with other governments (both domestically and internationally) as well as the private sector to scale up financing and promote public-private partnerships.

At every stage, social dialogues need to be built in so that impacted groups are meaningfully involved in the decisions that impact their communities. Only when all groups of people are represented and planned for can we ensure the transition to a more sustainable future is truly just.

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Authors Chelsea Gómez Cynthia Elliott Mikayla Pellerin Neelam Singh Ginette Walls

Biomass Can Fight Climate Change, But Only If You Do It Right alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/01/2025 - 07:00

Biomass is fast becoming a topic of interest for governments looking for alternative energy sources and solutions for the climate crisis. New WRI research shows that limited biomass use can help achieve net-zero emissions goals in the United States. However, guidelines will be needed to ensure its use doesn’t displace agricultural land used for food production or inadvertently contribute to higher carbon emissions that results from land-use change.

What Is Biomass? What Are its Best Uses to Curb Climate Change?

Biomass refers to any material that comes from living things, including wood and bark from trees, leaves or stems from plants, and even animal manure.

When it comes to fighting climate change, carbon-rich biomass material can be used to remove carbon from the atmosphere, or it can be used as an alternative to fossil fuels for producing energy and other products. Many industries, including aviation, chemical manufacturing and carbon removal are increasingly looking to use biomass as a potential energy source or feedstock.

Agricultural waste, such as corn stover — the parts of the corn plant that are not harvested for food production — is one source of biomass that could be used for climate benefit. Photo by Matauw/Shutterstock.

However, as demand for biomass increases, unsustainable use of biomass resources could thwart decarbonization efforts. Growing trees or crops specifically for biomass energy can displace land needed for food and other agricultural production, potentially forcing additional land to be cleared elsewhere to make up the difference. That, in turn, releases carbon dioxide previously stored in soils and vegetation.

Using energy systems modeling and land-use analysis, new WRI research on biomass and land use  has found that a few use cases for biomass can contribute to decarbonization. These include replacing carbon in products that do not have an easy substitute for fossil fuels, like petrochemicals, creating next-generation fuels that do not make dedicated use of land and carbon removal.

Sequestering the carbon in biomass could be one of the most climate-friendly uses of biomass, because — if it’s done right — it could provide relatively durable and cost-effective carbon removal while providing land management benefits, like mitigating wildfire risk.

The Role of Biomass in Carbon Removal

Biomass’s molecular structure contains a lot of carbon that originates from absorbed atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2). This means that biomass theoretically has high carbon removal potential.

Biomass carbon removal and storage (BiCRS) can both store carbon and produce products that replace fossil fuels, such as hydrogen. Whereas some biomass approaches prioritize energy generation, BiCRS prioritizes carbon removal and may produce byproducts that can be synthesized and used for fuel or in industrial processes.

There is potential for BiCRS to play a significant role in U.S. carbon removal. WRI analysis shows that BiCRS could account for around 20% of total biomass use by 2050 if biomass is optimally allocated between BiCRS and other uses.

How Does BiCRS Work? 

Different chemical and physical processes break down biomass and turn it into energy, fuel or products while capturing the carbon that is contained in biomass. Some BiCRS pathways that are most promising for supporting economy-wide decarbonization are:

• • Gasification, a process that produces synthesis gas, which can be used to produce liquid fuels, or hydrogen. Hydrogen can provide energy storage or be further reformed to create clean electrofuels or chemicals. Up to 100% of the carbon from these processes can be captured and sequestered underground.
   
• • Pyrolysis, a high-heat process that creates charcoal-like biochar and bio-oil. Biochar can be used as a soil additive that sequesters carbon, and bio-oil can be injected underground or mixed with products like asphalt to provide carbon removal, or it can be further refined to make hydrogen or other valuable fuels.
   
• • Products, a pathway that utilizes forestry residues that are too small to be used for timber to create other building materials like particle board that store carbon for the lifetime of the material.
   
• • Burial, a pathway that relies on the natural ability of forest residue and wood to decay slowly. Biomass can be permanently preserved and buried in special underground containers when the transportation of waste biomass is difficult. Biomass burial may be a cost-effective in some areas, such as in forests with high fire risk and large quantities of flammable biomass.
   
• • Fermentation, a process of turning biomass into alcohol and capturing the carbon that is produced. Today, most biomass fermentation uses corn to make ethanol, but the production of cellulosic biofuels using biomass wastes and residues is a more sustainable option. These fuels are known as ‘cellulosic’ fuels because they break down the tough cellulose structure that makes up wood and plant stems.

Some BiCRS pathways like biomass burial and underground injection of bio-oil are in development and currently exist at a pilot scale. Other BiCRS approaches like biomass gasification for carbon removal and hydrogen production will require costly new facilities to create a steady demand for biomass for these uses.

Responsible biomass sourcing and strong policies that include monitoring, reporting and verification for carbon removal projects would be needed to ensure that BiCRS projects provide real climate benefits.

Despite the nascence of BiCRS approaches, companies are attracting millions of dollars of federal and private investment, signaling the likely expansion of the industry. New legislation also looks to expand federal support to include BiCRS with biomass guardrails. BiCRS accounts for 90% of carbon removal that has been delivered through the voluntary carbon market to date, and BiCRS could contribute a high percentage of durable carbon removal credits in the coming decade.

How to Sustainably Source Biomass in the US

To build a net-zero economy by 2050, sourcing and using biomass in ways that do not increase national and global emissions will be critical.

In the face of climate change, lands will be put under increasing pressure to meet demand for food, fiber, energy, carbon removal and other ecosystem services. Meanwhile, land is finite and diverting agricultural and forestry lands to biomass production could, in turn, emit more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. WRI research shows that without proper regulation, demand for biomass could take up over 100 million acres by 2050 — an area around the size of California and equal to almost a quarter of present-day U.S. cropland. This is nearly 12 times the land that could be needed for wind and solar by 2050. Therefore, guardrails will be needed to avoid negative climate and other environmental impact.

Robust lifecycle assessment and project-level monitoring, reporting and verification will be needed to keep track of factors like forgone land carbon sequestration; displaced production of food, feed and fiber; the time it takes for plants and trees to regenerate after harvest; and the emissions associated with transporting, processing and refining biomass. To be truly net-beneficial to the climate, biomass carbon removal should abide by the following sourcing principles. (These principles are tailored to the U.S. but can provide a useful guide for how other countries or regions can develop their own.)

1) Prioritize wastes, residues and by-products.

The sources of biomass most likely to provide effective carbon removal are wastes, residues and by-products from unused plant or animal materials that result from normal farm, forestry or municipal operations.

Agricultural waste can include corn stover — the non-edible parts of the corn plant — rice hulls and nut shells. Forestry wastes include wood and paper mill residues, such as sawdust and black liquor — the substance that remains after the pulping of wood to make paper — and woody waste from forestry operations or dead wood from wildfire treatments or natural disasters. Finally, municipal organic waste comes from urban and residential areas and includes things like food waste from homes and restaurants.

Food waste is one way to sustainably source materials for biomass. Photo by joerngebhardt68/Shutterstock.

Many wastes and residues are currently burned or left to decompose, which releases carbon into the atmosphere. Using wastes for BiCRS can avoid or at least delay these emissions. However, when wastes are removed from fields or forests, good management is essential for maintaining soil health and ecological functioning. Certain agricultural conservation practices entail retaining residues, as the decomposition of dead material can enhance soil health. More research is needed to determine the appropriate amount of agricultural and forestry residue that should be left on farms and forest floors to maintain soil health and soil carbon stocks in each region of the U.S. While biomass wastes and residues have the potential to be used for carbon removal, quantities are limited and will likely be in demand across multiple industries.

2) Avoid biomass that makes dedicated use of land.

WRI research shows that once land use emissions are accounted for, using food crops for non-food purposes, like energy production or carbon removal, does not support decarbonization. For example, when corn and soybeans are diverted for biofuel, it displaces food production. To make up for the lost food production, agriculture often expands into high-carbon ecosystems. This phenomenon is called indirect land use change, and it is responsible for the large carbon footprint of crop-based biofuels. Also, using crops to produce energy uses far more land per unit of useable energy than other renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind farms. Because of this, dedicated corn or soy crops are not appropriate sources of biomass for carbon removal nor energy production. This principle also holds true for purpose-grown energy crops that compete with food crops for land.

Guardrails on the collection of biomass raw material are needed to prevent this type of environmental harm, which undermines both nature and climate goals. WRI’s analysis shows that unrestricted expansion and use of purpose-grown biomass would have enormous land use implications. Biomass should not be grown on prime farmland nor natural or high conservation value lands. If natural lands are converted to biomass production systems, they will likely undergo a drastic decrease in carbon storage from either their vegetation, soil or both. As such, lands with large natural carbon stores in soil or aboveground vegetation should never be compromised for the sake of sourcing biomass.

3) Forestry wastes, residues and by-products should come from ecologically managed forests.

When done responsibly, BiCRS may provide a win-win opportunity by using material from forestry practices that would otherwise decay or burn. 

This is especially relevant in the western U.S., where land management agencies aim to reduce severe wildfires through forest treatments that often include biomass removal (i.e., thinning). However, creating a market for forestry wastes could incentivize over-harvesting, particularly if large-diameter forestry residues like large branches and tree stumps are removed, which can deplete forest carbon stocks over several decades. To ensure mutual benefit, residues should come from practices that increase the resilience and health of forest ecosystems and protect soil carbon and habitats.

Using Biomass Responsibly

Using biomass to decarbonize comes with environmental and climate risks, but there are opportunities to use biomass responsibly.

As industries like aviation, chemical manufacturing and carbon removal look to biomass as a potential replacement for fossil fuels, demand for biomass is likely to far outstrip the sustainable supply. Therefore, policymakers will need to carefully consider the trade-offs between different land uses, like food and agricultural production, as the U.S. works toward its climate goals.

Despite decades of incentives for first generation biofuels made from food crops, WRI analysis finds that they are not an effective tool for reaching net-zero emissions. In contrast, when residues from agriculture and forestry are used for BiCRS, chemicals and next-generation fuels, they have the potential to support decarbonization. 

Biomass is a limited resource, and in some cases, the optimal climate benefit may be from leaving it in place on natural landscapes to preserve the ecosystem services it provides. With the growing demand for biomass, policies with sourcing guardrails that can be tailored to the complex realities of different biomass types and BiCRS methods, as well as accurate carbon accounting, will be critical. Guardrails must prevent the use of biomass feedstocks that contribute to land use change, cause environmental degradation, or do not truly lead to net greenhouse gas mitigation. Where certification standards exist, enforcement is often a challenge that needs to be addressed. Here, again, rigorous monitoring, reporting, and verification and accurate carbon accounting are needed to ensure climate benefits.

In all cases of biomass use, input from local and Indigenous communities must be carefully considered to ensure no harm is being done. Biomass processing facilities must take steps to minimize negative air and water quality impacts. And moreover, policymakers at all levels should enact policies or regulations to prevent any undue environmental burden of biomass harvesting, processing or usage on historically disadvantaged communities.

Editor's Note: This article was first published Jan. 16, 2024. We updated it on May 1, 2025 with new research, data and information.

 

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Our Ocean Conference: 10 Years of Progress, With More to Achieve shannon.paton@… Tue, 04/29/2025 - 16:16

International conferences are often criticized as talk shops — lots of interesting discussions and impressive attendees, but a far cry from the tangible action needed to tackle existential issues like climate change and pollution. Meanwhile, multilateral processes can be long and complicated, with outcomes that can take years to take effect. For example, the High Seas Treaty, which aims to protect the nearly two-thirds of the ocean that lie beyond national borders, was 20 years in the making — and, despite being agreed to in March 2023, it has yet to come into force.

Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry founded the Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in 2014 to “focus on action, not talk.” A decade later, has it delivered?

Our Ocean Conference, Athens Greece Assessing 10 Years of International Commitments to Sustainable Ocean Action: A Global Stocktake of the Our Ocean Conference

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As the new secretariat of the OOC, WRI sought to answer this question in an effort to improve the transparency and accountability of pledges. For the first time, we analyzed 10 years of OOC-related commitments from governments, companies and many others. We found that the conference has generated an impressive 2,600 commitments worth $160 billion — but there’s still more work to do.

1) Mobilizing Ocean Finance

Possibly the most impressive finding from our research is the total value of the pledges made at the OOC: $160 billion from public and private organizations, $133 billion of which has either already been delivered or is in progress. 

The majority of the financial commitments — $86.8 billion — have gone toward ocean-climate projects, ranging from offshore wind and blue carbon to green shipping. Thirteen of these projects are valued at over $1 billion apiece, underscoring the growing recognition that ocean-based action can support emissions reductions while also delivering marine conservation. 

However, to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14), which aims to conserve and sustainably use the ocean for sustainable development, it is estimated that $175 billion per year is needed for ocean conservation, while the overall global climate finance goal is $1.3 trillion annually.

2) Ocean Partnerships

The OOC has also spawned a wide variety of global partnerships and projects. Partnerships are key to scaling resources, coordinating action, sharing knowledge and best practices and raising global ocean ambition. For example:

• Subnational governments launched the Ocean Acidification Alliance in 2016 to address the impacts of ocean acidification on oyster hatchery production along the North American Pacific Coast. As the ocean absorbs more carbon dioxide, it is becoming more acidic, which heavily impacts marine life. Today, the alliance has expanded to over 130 members across 22 countries, delivering action to protect coastal communities and livelihoods from acidification and other climate-ocean impacts.
• Global Fishing Watch, launched in 2016, uses satellite data to spotlight where fishing activity is taking place and where it may harm vulnerable marine populations and ecosystems. It now provides a global open-ocean data platform to help governments identify and halt illegal fishing, among other things.

Global Fishing Watch’s vessel viewer tool

• The Green Shipping Challenge seeks to align the shipping sector with the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C. Related OOC announcements have included new green shipping corridors connecting ports and governments across ocean basins and public-private partnerships to reduce emissions.

3) Ocean Protection

The Our Ocean Conference aims to support the 30x30 target, the global goal to protect at least 30% of the planet’s land and ocean by 2030. In total, 42% of globally implemented Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) were first announced at the OOC, an area totaling 8.7 million square kilometers (3.4 million square miles), roughly the size of Brazil.

Small island states have led the way. Palau announced its National Marine Sanctuary at the 2015 conference, protecting an incredible 475,077 square kilometers (183,428 square miles) — 80% of its ocean territory. The Cook Islands announced its Moana reserve spanning 1.9 million square kilometers (733,594 square miles) in 2017, and Niue’s announcement at the 2022 conference established its 317,500-square-kilometers (122,587-square-miles) marine park.

Protecting 30% of the ocean will, however, require the number of MPAs to be significantly scaled up in the next five years.

What’s Next for the Our Ocean Conference?

The OOC has driven considerable progress over the last decade. But to truly help protect critical ocean ecosystems and achieve global goals, it will need to lean into a few areas over the next 10 years:

1) Mobilize action to support negotiated ocean goals and targets

With only five years remaining to meet the goals of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 30x30 target, the ocean is at a critical juncture.

Multilateral instruments such as the High Seas Treaty, the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and the International Maritime Organization’s plan to reduce shipping emissions will be critical to achieving these goals. But they need to be backed by concrete commitments, sustained finance and ambitious policies. The OCC will be an important platform to maintain this implementation and delivery focus as the decade continues.

2) Strengthen transparency and accountability in the global ocean community

The OOC is not just about ambition — it’s about accountability. More than 65% of OOC commitments have received at least one progress update.

While that is an impressive statistic for a global platform that engages hundreds of organizations and governments, there is still progress to be made. There are also inherent challenges in assessing impact when relying on governments and organizations to provide voluntary, self-reported data. In the next 10 years, the OOC can further its commitment to transparency and accountability by improving reporting outcomes. This can include modifying the reporting framework to collect more detailed progress updates and increasing engagement with commitment-makers to encourage more accurate and timely updates.  

While an estimated $24 billion has been delivered, the disbursement of $109 billion in committed funding remains in progress. The OOC can help unlock this disbursement by supporting commitment-makers with implementation, such as a convening platform to share lessons learned, best practices, successes and challenges. 

3) Expand geographic and sectoral engagement

Ocean solutions work best when everyone has a seat at the table. The ocean is interconnected, and its issues are global, so it’s vital that all regions and stakeholders are represented, especially those most impacted, such as small-island developing states, whose communities and economies are intrinsically linked to the health of the ocean.

While the OOC has served as a critical incubator for cross-sector partnerships, an analysis of all commitments revealed a notable geographic skew, with the majority made by organizations and governments based in Europe and North America, and comparably very few from Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In the face of ongoing Global North-Global South divisions in the environmental policy space, it will be critical for the OOC to increase engagement with historically underrepresented regions and countries to raise overall global ambition, address their unique needs and vulnerabilities and ensure equitable implementation of ocean solutions.

Additionally, the conference can and should seek to improve engagement with non-state actors, especially the private sector and financing institutions, which have made less than 10% of all commitments. With reports indicating that $175 billion is required to finance SDG 14 per year, there is an urgent need for continued ocean finance from all sources, both public and private. Meanwhile, more inclusive engagement can ensure that the needs of young people, Indigenous groups and women are at the forefront of future conferences.

Protecting the Ocean for People, Nature and the Climate

The voluntary commitments generated through the OOC have a valuable role in the ocean policy space, complementing and strengthening the outcomes of negotiated processes and agreements. They present a more flexible tool to encourage ocean action and engagement, especially from governments, communities and organizations with limited capacity and resources.

As the planet continues to warm and communities face the devastating impacts of climate change, now is the time for even greater momentum in protecting our global ocean.

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Our Ocean Conference Delivers $133 Billion For Ocean Action darla.vanhoorn… Mon, 04/28/2025 - 09:15

Urgent Challenges Remain to Meet Global Deadlines in a Pivotal Year for the Ocean – Including High Seas Treaty and 30x30

BUSAN, Korea (April 29, 2025) — The Our Ocean Conference (OOC) has mobilized $133 billion in funding for ocean action over the past decade, according to a new report launched today by World Resources Institute (WRI) to mark the conference’s 10th anniversary. 

However, the report also underscores the urgent need for greater ambition, especially in light of key global ocean targets, including the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) and the 30x30 goal, which calls on countries to protect 30% of the world's land and water by 2030.

Since its inaugural meeting in 2014, OOC has become a leading platform for governments, businesses and civil society to make commitments advancing marine conservation, ocean-based climate solutions and sustainable blue economy initiatives.  

WRI’s analysis identifies over 2,600 commitments for ocean action made at the conference over the past decade, collectively worth approximately $160 billion. As of January 2025, $133 billion has already been delivered or is currently in progress (with 43% of pledges successfully completed; 38% still in progress; and, 18% yet to be started). 

The majority of the financial commitments, $86.8 billion, have gone towards ocean-climate projects, ranging from offshore wind and blue carbon to green shipping, with 13 climate-related commitments valued at over $1 billion a piece—underscoring the growing recognition that ocean-based action can support carbon dioxide emission reductions while also delivering marine conservation. 

To meet UN SDG 14 (life below water), it’s estimated that $175 billion per year is needed for ocean conservation, while the overall global climate finance goal is $1.3 trillion annually. As world leaders prepare for COP30 in November, integrating ocean-based solutions into the global climate finance agenda is crucial to meeting ambitious targets. 

OOC has been particularly effective at attracting support for marine protected areas (MPAs), an essential tool in ocean conservation at a time when marine systems face unprecedented pressure from overfishing, pollution, and warming waters. 42% of all the world’s MPAs implemented globally can be traced to announcements made at OOC, covering a total of 8.5 million square kilometers- an area roughly the size of Brazil, according to an independent study from Oregon State University.

These voluntary commitments take on renewed significance in this critical year for the ocean, helping to deliver on recent landmark treaties and global ocean goals. The High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which includes the "30x30" target, both demand unprecedented ocean protection. So far, just 21 countries have ratified the High Seas Treaty, with anticipation that 60 can be reached by the UN Ocean Conference this June for it to enter into force. 

“The 10th Our Ocean Conference will encourage the international community to take immediate action to address the crisis our ocean is facing under the slogan 'Our Ocean, Our Action', said Do-hyung Kang, Minister of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea. "The conference will primarily focus on the achievements and success stories over the past 10 years while also establishing the future direction for international cooperation over the next decade. It is set to be a significant moment for international cooperation, providing a crucial foundation for our collective efforts towards a shared future.” 

“Our research demonstrates that the Our Ocean Conference is a leading platform for mobilizing finance and vital ocean action, but greater global ambition is required to address the urgent challenges," said Dr. Tom Pickerell, Global Director, WRI Ocean Program. "For example, we know that readily available ocean-based solutions can deliver up to 35 percent of the annual greenhouse gas emission cuts needed by 2050 to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. It’s time the ocean’s potential was realized.”

“From ecotourism, to green shipping, to renewable energy, vibrant sustainable development and a healthy ocean can go hand-in-hand," said Dr. Dionysia-Theodora Avgerinopoulou, Greek Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Ocean; Member of the Hellenic Parliament; 2024 Our Ocean Conference Coordinator. "The Our Ocean Conference is an important champion of this vision, and one I hope will inspire both the public and private stakeholders to become more involved worldwide.” 

WRI’s progress report includes a series of recommendations to improve OOC outcomes moving forward, including:

• Actively fill geographic and policy gaps in OOC commitments to increase inclusion and mobilize commitment across Africa, Latin America and South Asia.
• Strengthen partnerships with governments while scaling engagement with the private sector, academia, intergovernmental organizations, local communities and underrepresented groups.
• Improve the OOC online platform to enhance data quality, consistency and transparency.
• Conduct further thematic analysis of commitments including deep dives, regular progress assessments, and an exploration of implementation barriers and solutions.
• Increase coordination between OOC and other multilateral forums, including the UN Ocean Conference, to address the risk of duplication between voluntary commitment platforms and drive to global ocean ambition.
• Explore options to provide more concrete support for organizations to implement their commitments through internal knowledge sharing and external partnerships.

About the Our Ocean Conference 
The Our Ocean Conference gathers approximately 1,000 global leaders from various sectors, including heads of state and high-level government officials from over 100 countries, and representatives from more than 400 international and non-profit organizations. Together, they discuss diverse and concrete actions for a sustainable ocean.

Since the inaugural Our Ocean Conference in the United States in 2014, over 2,600 voluntary commitments have been announced at subsequent conferences held in Chile, the European Union, Indonesia, Norway, Palau, and Greece. Today, the conference serves as a leading platform for establishing global ocean norms.

Key achievements of OOC include expanding marine protected areas, reducing marine plastic pollution, eradicating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, reducing lost and discarded fishing gear, ratifying the High Seas Treaty, supporting ocean research, science and technology, and addressing the impact of climate change on the ocean.

About World Resources Institute (WRI)
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations. Learn more at wri.org. 

 

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RELEASE: 2025 P4G Vietnam Summit Concludes, Driving Climate Action and Green Investment in Emerging Economies darla.vanhoorn… Fri, 04/25/2025 - 12:56

Global leaders gather to discuss scalable solutions for climate impact; P4G announces $4.7 million in funding and technical assistance for 17 startup partnerships.  

HANOI, VIETNAM (April 25, 2025) — The 2025 Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030 (P4G) Vietnam Summit concluded with an urgent call to action and renewed global commitment to scaling innovative climate solutions and unlocking green investment in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs).  

Hosted by the Government of Vietnam on April 16-17 under the theme "Sustainable and People-Centered Green Transition," the Summit brought together over 800 leaders from governments, businesses, multilateral institutions and civil society to explore scalable climate solutions and build partnerships that support startups across Africa, Asia and Latin America.  

This included discussions on strategies for fast-tracking the green transition in EMDEs, business matching that paired startups with investors and the Green Growth Exhibition, which showcased climate startups’ products and solutions. 

H.E. To Lam, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, opened with the need for comprehensive national planning, bold public sector leadership and private sector involvement to scale green growth, noting Vietnam's commitment to integrating the green transition into its national development strategy. Other high-level attendees included Pham Minh Chinh, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; and Abiy Ahmed Ali, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, with virtual remarks by Mette Frederiksen, Prime Minister of Denmark and Emmanuel Macron, President of France.  

A pre-summit hosted by P4G, a World Resources Institute initiative, took place on April 14-15, showcasing climate startups through panel sessions and the P4G Pitch Day, and convening its National Platforms — high-level public-private country networks that support climate entrepreneurs — and the Global Advisory Council for their annual meetings. 

Key outcomes and achievements from the pre-summit include: 

• P4G announced $4.7 million in grant funding and technical assistance for 17 startup partnerships in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.
• Over 70 climate startups from Vietnam and other developing economies pitched their business models to investors, with several, including P4G-funded startups Crustea, Sabio and agriBora, attracting investor interest.
• P4G signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Republic of Korea committing $1.8 million to accelerate P4G’s impact — reaffirming Korea's long-standing support for sustainable growth in emerging economies as a P4G founding member.
• Participating countries endorsed a declaration calling for people-centered green growth policies and support for global entrepreneurship and innovation.  

“The Summit was a clarion call for countries to invest in climate innovation and design strong policies that support climate startups,” said Robyn McGuckin, Executive Director, P4G. “P4G is showcasing how startups are a powerful yet underutilized tool for mobilizing private investment toward national climate goals.” 

At COP29, wealthy nations agreed to increase climate finance for developing nations by $300 billion annually by 2035, but this falls short of the $1.3 trillion needed. The Summit serves as a model for how public-private partnerships can help fill that gap and drive tangible solutions for climate action, job creation and economic growth.  

As attention turns to the 2027 P4G Ethiopia Summit, the momentum from Hanoi provides a foundation for ongoing progress, with a continued focus on innovation, inclusion and securing the investments needed to drive resilient country transitions. 

About P4G 
P4G helps early-stage climate startups in emerging markets and developing economies become investment ready. We provide startups with grants and technical assistance, and partner them with national level public-private platforms to help navigate the marketplace. Through this approach, P4G strengthens market systems for climate entrepreneurs and accelerates just and resilient country economic transitions. Hosted by World Resources Institute and funded by Denmark, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea, P4G accelerates food, water and energy partnerships in Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa and Vietnam. Learn more at p4gpartnerships.org.  

About World Resources Institute 
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations. Learn more at wri.org. 

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What We Know About Deep-Sea Mining — and What We Don’t margaret.overh… Wed, 04/23/2025 - 09:00

Minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth elements are essential ingredients in everything from wind turbines and electric vehicles to cell phones, medical technologies and military infrastructure. Mining for these materials on land is already well established, but with demand surging, some are now looking to tap the seafloor for its millions of square kilometers of metal ores.

Some countries and companies have already begun exploring underwater mineral deposits and mining techniques — but the prospect of deep-sea mining remains controversial. Despite years of research, little is known about the deep ocean. Many fear that extracting minerals from it could pose grave consequences for both marine life and planetary health.

While nations can currently pursue deep-sea mining in their own domestic waters, the world is still awaiting exploitation regulations from the UN's International Seabed Authority (ISA) that will dictate whether and how it could proceed in international waters, where the bulk of the ocean's critical minerals are found.

With the future of deep-sea mining still under debate, here's what we know so far about the proposed practice and its impacts — and what we don't:

1) What Is Deep-Sea Mining and How Would It Be Done?

Deep-sea mining aims to retrieve valuable mineral deposits found on the ocean's floor, hundreds or even thousands of meters below its surface. Alongside a diverse array of marine life at these depths are significant reserves of copper, cobalt, nickel, zinc, silver, gold and rare earth elements.

In the deep sea, these minerals are contained within slow-forming, potato-sized polymetallic "nodules," as well as in polymetallic sulfides (large deposits made up of sulfur compounds and other metals that form around hydrothermal vents) and metal-rich crusts on underwater mountains (seamounts). While there has been commercial interest in these minerals for decades, recent advancements in technology have made it feasible to mine these areas by sending vehicles down to harvest mineral deposits from the seafloor.

Mineral nodules on the seafloor in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a key area of interest for deep-sea mining. Photo by ROV KIEL 6000/GEOMAR

In the case of polymetallic nodules — which are currently the primary focus for deep-sea mining in international waters — mining vehicles would remove mineral deposits from the surface of the seabed, along with the top layers of sediment, using a suction device not unlike a vacuum cleaner. The materials collected would then be piped up to a surface vessel for processing. Any waste, such as sediments and other organic materials, would be pumped back into the water column.

The bulk of the most attractive mineral deposits are found on vast seafloor abyssal plains in international waters. One area of particular interest is the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific Ocean. This mineral-rich region already hosts exploration contracts for 17 deep-sea mining contractors, with their combined exploration areas covering approximately 1 million square kilometers (about the same area as Egypt).

2) What's the Current Status of Deep-Sea Mining?

While exploratory mining to test equipment has occurred at a small scale, deep-sea mining has not yet been undertaken commercially. But some national governments and mining companies plan to begin as soon as possible.

A few countries have already approved permits to explore mineral resources in their own domestic waters (known as "exclusive economic zones," or "EEZs"). However, most deep-sea mining interest is concentrated in international waters, which means the industry's future will largely hinge on how the ISA decides to regulate it. After years of negotiations, the ISA is due to adopt a final set of regulations in July 2025 that will govern responsible commercial mining operations in international waters.

Opinion remains deeply divided on whether deep-sea mining should be allowed at all. Given the insufficiency of information on how it could affect marine environments, countries such as Germany and Canada, as well as the European Parliament, have called for national and regional moratoria on deep-sea mining. Portugal recently passed a law banning the practice in its national waters for the next 25 years.

Meanwhile, Canadian mining company The Metals Company announced in March 2025 that, through a U.S. subsidiary (The Metals Company USA LLC), it had begun the process of applying for licenses and permits under the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's mining code, known as the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA). This pathway is possible because the U.S. has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), under which the ISA sits. Hence the U.S. is not an ISA member and is not bound by ISA processes.

This could potentially accelerate the timeline for commercial deep-sea mining by circumventing the ISA's permitting process altogether. Depending on the outcome of The Mining Company's application, other companies may follow this route, undermining international efforts to secure shared standards.

3) What Are the Potential Benefits of Deep-Sea Mining?

Proponents of deep-sea mining argue that it can help meet the world's pressing need for critical minerals, which will likely only continue to grow as countries invest more in decarbonization, digitization, defense and infrastructure. Estimates suggest that global demand for nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements may double by 2040 in a net-zero emissions scenario. Several studies have concluded that there is no shortage of mineral resources on land, but the world still faces significant hurdles in locating viable reserves and quickly scaling up mining and processing operations.

Some also view deep-sea mining as an alternative pathway that can circumvent certain risks associated with mining on land. Since extraction would occur exclusively at sea, deep-sea mining is unlikely to be associated with environmental hazards such as deforestation and freshwater pollution that can impact communities neighboring terrestrial mines. Yet others argue that infrastructure built to process and transport deep-sea minerals would require land acquisition and development, which may impact local communities' property, food sources and lifestyle.

Similarly, the difficulty in accessing deep-sea mineral deposits for exploitation means that artisanal (small-scale) mining operations would be impossible, and strong regulation of labor conditions may be feasible. This could potentially avoid the human rights abuses associated with some terrestrial mining operations. However, experiences of labor abuse in distant-water fishing operations show this outcome is not guaranteed.

4) What Are the Risks of Deep-Sea Mining?

While the deep sea was once thought to be devoid of life — too dark, cold and starved of food for anything to survive — we now know that it is the largest habitable space on the planet and home to a dazzling array of life. To date, tens of thousands of species have been found in the deep ocean. Estimates say there could be millions more. In the Clarion-Clipperton Zone alone, a key area of interest for deep-sea mining, researchers have recently discovered over 5,000 species that were entirely new to science.

A starfish in a field of manganese nodules on the seafloor in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Thousands of previously unknown deep-sea species have already been discovered in this area, which some seek to mine for its mineral resources. Photo by ROV-Team/GEOMAR

With exploration and testing still in the early stages, further research is needed to determine the possible ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. But the science to date paints a concerning picture.

• Direct harm to marine life: There is a high likelihood that less mobile deep-sea organisms would be killed through direct contact with heavy mining equipment deployed on the seabed, and that organisms would be smothered and suffocated by the sediment plumes these machines are likely to create. Warm mining wastewater could also kill marine life through overheating and poisoning.
• Long-term species and ecosystem disruption: Mining activities could impair the feeding and reproduction of deep-sea species through the creation of intense noise and light pollution in a naturally dark and silent environment. For example, the sound pollution from these activities could negatively impact large mega-fauna like whales, posing further risk to populations already strained by climate change and other human activities. Because many deep-sea species are rare, long-lived and slow to reproduce, and because polymetallic nodules (which may take millions of years to develop to a harvestable size) are an important habitat for deep-sea species, scientists are fairly certain that some species would face extinction from habitat removal due to mining, and that these ecosystems would require extremely long time periods to recover, if ever.
• Possible impacts on fishing and food security: It's not just the seafloor that's at risk. Under current designs, waste discharge from mining vessels could spread over large distances, potentially kilometers away from the areas being mined. This may pose a threat to open ocean fish and invertebrates which are crucial to international fisheries — such as tuna stocks that help drive the economies of small island developing states like Kiribati, Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands. Effects of this mining waste could include suffocation, damaged respiratory and feeding structures, and disrupted visual communication within and amongst species, alongside changes in the oxygen content, pH, temperature and toxicity of seawater. However, more research is needed on the characteristics of the discharge plumes themselves and the tolerance of ocean species to fully understand these impacts.
• Social and governance risks: While extraction would occur offshore, the deep-sea mining industry would still need shoreline facilities for processing and transshipment of material. This would require land acquisition and development, which has historically driven habitat loss affecting coastal communities that depend on marine resources. Though the UN has designated high-seas minerals "the common heritage of [hu]mankind" and declared that any mineral extraction should benefit all nations, the current regulatory regime of the ISA appears to promote the flow of mining profits to developed states, or to shareholders of mining companies, rather than being inclusive of developing nations.
• Potential climate impacts: The ocean is the world's largest carbon sink, absorbing around 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions. Microscopic organisms play a critical role in this climate-regulating system, helping to sequester carbon in the deep sea and reduce emissions of other planet-warming gases (such as methane) from seabed sediments. The loss of deep-sea biodiversity following mining activity may impact the ocean's carbon cycle and reduce its ability to help mitigate global temperature rise.

5) Is Deep-Sea Mining Necessary?

The global supply of critical minerals (including rare earth elements) must grow in the coming years, and quickly. But there is no easy answer to meet this demand responsibly given the immature state and potential dangers of mining at sea and the well-understood harms associated with mining on land. While mineral resources on land appear sufficient to meet global needs, the world must address how to responsibly scale up supply in a way that minimizes environmental, social and governance risks while also creating benefits (such as safe, good-paying jobs) for nearby communities.

Circularity is an important pathway to meet the demand for minerals while reducing dependency on new mining. IEA estimates that significantly scaling up recycling could reduce the need for newly mined minerals by 40% for copper and nickel and 25% for lithium and cobalt by 2050. For some minerals, such as lithium and battery-grade nickel, the share from recycling will remain low for another 5-10 years before end-of-life EV battery volume starts to rise. For other minerals, such as copper and cobalt, there is already opportunity to scale recycling today, since they are widely used in many sectors such as electronics and infrastructure.

Better recycling practices in established waste streams, such as from electronics and electrical equipment, can help alleviate some short-term supply pressure while preparing the secondary supply chain to handle a large volume of end-of-life zero-carbon energy products in the future. There is also a range of research efforts underway to obtain the necessary minerals without mining virgin land, including recovery from coal waste or hard rock mine tailings.

How technology evolution is changing demand for minerals should also be considered. Take batteries as an example: There is a growing shift away from nickel manganese cobalt oxides (NMC) batteries toward lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. LFP batteries gained significant market share from 2015 to 2022, and their key materials, lithium and iron, are not targets of deep-sea mining. Emerging technologies such as sodium-ion batteries also have the potential to alter the EV battery market by replacing lithium and cobalt with cheaper, more abundant options.

With Serious Questions Still Unanswered, What Comes Next?

After failing to reach an agreement at previous meetings, the ISA is aiming to finalize regulations for commercial mining during its 30th session in July 2025. It is crucial that the regulations fully consider the following key questions and knowledge gaps:

• What is the potential magnitude and extent (both in space and time) of deep-sea mining impacts on marine species and environments, and what are the likely ecological consequences?
• What are the potential social and economic impacts of deep-sea mining? Is it possible for the industry to be advanced in a way that meets the UNCLOS goal of fostering sustainable economic development, international cooperation and equitable trade growth for all countries?
• How can a circular mineral economy be further developed to lessen the need for environmentally intrusive practices? More research must be conducted into land-based and urban mining practices to improve their efficiency, as well as into improving product design to reduce demand for and increase recycling of critical minerals.
• What are the possible positive and negative implications of deep-sea mining in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, as well as for furthering research into deep-sea environments?
• What regulations could be developed to ensure that the financial benefits from deep-sea mining operations, should they occur, are equitably distributed among nations?

Finally, for the exploration of deep-sea mineral resources to continue, regulations should be transparent and collaborative, with participation from interested parties and key stakeholders — including ISA members, mining corporations and scientists. The regulations need to be backed by science and other forms of knowledge, enforceable, and offer effective protection for delicate marine environments from the impacts of mining.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in July 2023. It was last updated in April 2025 to reflect developments in deep-sea mining policy.

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• High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy
• Energy Minerals and Circularity

Authors Oliver Ashford Jonathan Baines Melissa Barbanell Ke Wang

What Would Ambitious Climate Commitments Look Like for the World’s Top Emitters? It’s Complicated shannon.paton@… Tue, 04/22/2025 - 15:10

It’s been nearly 10 years since 194 countries adopted the Paris Agreement on climate change. And while many have made strides forward, their collective efforts still fall far short of what’s needed to avoid increasingly dangerous impacts and limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F).

The UN’s latest assessment, for example, finds that countries’ current policies put the world on course for 3.1 degrees C (5.6 degrees F) of warming, with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions holding steady at 57 metric gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030 and 2035. To limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C, these emissions must instead decline rapidly to 33 GtCO2e in 2030 and 25 GtCO2e in 2035.

The good news is that this year presents a prime opportunity to change course, with countries set to put forward new nationally determined contributions (NDCs) ahead of COP30 in November 2025. The Paris Agreement requires that each successive NDC reflect a country’s “highest possible ambition,” as well as its “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” All eyes are now on governments to establish bold, new emissions-reduction targets for 2035, as well as strengthen their existing targets for 2030, in line with these core tenants. But as NDCs begin to trickle in, a critical question remains: What would ambitious targets look like for major emitters like the European Union or China?

The short answer? No matter which way you slice it, major emitters need to go further.

The longer answer is more complicated ...

5 Approaches for Setting National Emissions-Reduction Targets for 2030 and 2035

Divvying up the responsibility of achieving any global goal to individual countries is a complex, value-laden process. For example, should countries that can achieve the largest and cheapest emissions reductions set the most ambitious targets? Or should wealthy nations that have historically emitted the most GHGs shoulder the greatest responsibilities?

Various corners of the climate community tackle these questions differently, using a range of methods to develop near-term national benchmarks. These perspectives can yield distinct — and for some countries, contradictory — results.

To illustrate what ambition looks like under different lenses for six major emitters, we compiled 2030 and 2035 national benchmarks derived from five of the most widely used approaches and compared them to targets in these countries’ most recent NDCs. They include:

1) 1.5°C-aligned, Least-cost Pathways: Modelled scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C at the lowest possible cost — such as those featured in reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — are among the most common sources for establishing national benchmarks. While some global climate models can now generate least-cost pathways for major emitters, others still lack country-level data. They instead simulate global or regional scenarios that must be downscaled to the national level.

A Deeper Look at 1.5°C-Aligned, Least-Cost Pathways

In addition to maximizing cost-effectiveness globally, one of the main benefits of deriving national benchmarks from 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost scenarios is that they can account for important interactions across sectors (such as how decarbonizing power generation alongside scaling up electric vehicles can reduce transport emissions) and countries (for example, how supportive policies adopted in one major economy can help reduce the cost of zero-carbon technologies more broadly and, in doing so, accelerate adoption in other nations).

But these scenarios have also faced criticisms that extend beyond their treatment of equity and fairness. More specifically, some 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways feature large-scale carbon removal from bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation/reforestation that could harm biodiversity, food security and human rights.

So, while we present 2030 and 2035 benchmarks from least-cost pathways that hold warming to 1.5 degrees C from the IPCC scenario database, we filter out those that rely on unsustainable levels of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation to achieve this temperature goal, following criteria developed by Climate Analytics and used for global, sectoral benchmarking in the State of Climate Action series. Ideally, other approaches that rely on these least-cost pathways as a starting point for national benchmarking — namely 1.5 degrees-C-aligned, fair-share perspectives — would employ similar filters.

2) 1.5°C-aligned, Fair-share Pathways: A well-cited critique of relying solely on least-cost pathways to establish national benchmarks is that they ignore equity and fairness. Not only do inequalities in incomes, energy use and GHG emissions among countries persist in IPCC scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, but because they prioritize economic efficiency, these least-cost pathways can also assign some developing countries disproportionate responsibility for reducing GHG emissions, relative to their contributions to the climate crisis. Fair-share perspectives attempt to address such limitations — for instance, by considering historical responsibility for total emissions, economic capacity and equality in per capita emissions — when determining each country’s contribution to limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C.

But even defining equity and fairness across different fair-share approaches remains hotly contested, and such perspectives do not necessarily consider feasibility. Some countries’ fair-share contributions, for example, require GHG emissions to reach net zero or net negative by 2030, but such steep declines strain the bounds of feasibility even under the most favorable political conditions. In these select cases, approaches may allow for countries to compensate for what they cannot reduce domestically by financing emissions reductions beyond their borders.

3) National Modelled Pathways to Net Zero: Still other methods avoid global pathways entirely and instead rely on country-specific modeling. These scenarios focus not on determining an individual nation’s contribution to the global goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C, but rather on achieving that country’s pledge to reach net-zero emissions. They show how steeply emissions need to decline in 2030 and 2035 to stay on track to reach net zero — typically around mid-century for most countries.

4) Linear Trajectories to Net Zero: A related but simpler approach gaining traction among some governments is a “linear or steeper” trajectory to net zero. Essentially, if countries drew a straight line to their net-zero target — for example, 0 GtCO2e in 2050 — then their 2030 and 2035 targets should either be on this line or below it, reflecting a constant decline in GtCO2e each year. But the devil is in the details, as the starting point governments select may significantly impact the steepness of the line; the steeper the line, the more ambitious the national benchmarks will be.

5) Bottom-up, Feasibility-focused Modeling: This method relies on country-specific modeling to determine what level of mitigation is feasible within a given nation, irrespective of a global limit on warming or that country’s commitment to reach net zero. Often relying on more granular, country-specific data, these studies primarily estimate GHG emissions reductions that could be achieved if a government instituted a carbon price, championed a specific policy portfolio or deployed a particular suite of zero-carbon technologies. Some of these modeling efforts also quantify mitigation that is possible if a country pursues a “just transition” or achieves national development priorities, alongside efforts to mitigate climate change. These scenarios may end up charting pathways to net-zero emissions or show that deep GHG emissions cuts in line with 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways are feasible, but these end goals are not inputs to the modeling.

This list of methods is not exhaustive. For example, we excluded a carbon budgeting approach due to a lack of national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035. But like 1.5 degree C-aligned, fair-share pathways, this method aims to more equitably distribute responsibility for achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal by allocating the global carbon budget to countries according to their relative shares of the world’s population.

What Do Ambitious 2030 and 2035 Emissions-Reduction Targets Look Like for 6 of the World’s Biggest Emitters?

Together, China, the United States, India, the European Union, Brazil and Indonesia currently emit more than half of the world’s GHGs each year. Their near-term climate ambition, then, plays an outsized role in determining whether the world can reduce emissions enough to hold global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C.

Relying on the five approaches above, we assessed just how ambitious these major emitters’ current mitigation targets are, as well as what strong 2030 and 2035 targets could look like for those that have not yet submitted their new NDCs.

The headline is that while most major emitters have set near-term targets that would be considered ambitious under at least one perspective, none feature targets for 2030 and 2035 that are sufficiently ambitious across each of the five approaches assessed. What’s more, all six NDCs fall well short of what’s needed to keep the 1.5 degrees C limit within reach.

Brazil

Among the first countries to submit a new NDC in November 2024, Brazil committed to reduce GHG emissions 59-67% by 2035, relative to 2005. While President Lula’s government did not strengthen the country’s 2030 target that aims to lower GHG emissions 53% from 2005 levels, it did reiterate Brazil’s pledge to reach climate neutrality by 2050. If achieved, these targets would cause GHG emissions to fall from 2.6 GtCO2e in 2005 to 1.2 GtCO2e by 2030, 0.84-1.0 GtCO2e by 2035 and 0 GtCO2e by 2050. 

Brazil’s target for 2030 is considered ambitious under only two of the five approaches, while its target for 2035 is fully aligned with just one. More specifically, linear trajectories to net zero show that the country’s GHG emissions drop to 1.1-1.5 GtCO2e by 2030 and 0.85-1.1 GtCO2e by 2035 — equivalent to cuts of 43-56% and 57-67% from 2005 levels, respectively. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling affirm that near-term reductions of this magnitude are possible.

Aligning Brazil’s NDC with 1.5 degrees C, however, would require deeper cuts. Least-cost pathways to 1.5 degrees C show the country’s GHG emissions dropping 84-93% by 2035, relative to 2005, while a fair-share approach developed by Observatório do Clima calls for similarly steep declines, with GHG emissions decreasing 93% from 2005 levels by the same year. In real terms, this means that GHG emissions would fall to just 0.17-0.42 GtCO2e by 2035.

Although Brazil has already submitted its new NDC, there are still opportunities for President Lula’s administration to deepen mitigation efforts over the next decade. For example, the government has yet to publish a long-term strategy, which could help guide implementation.

China

China overtook the United States as the world’s largest emitter in the early 2000s, with annual GHG emissions climbing from roughly 6.9 GtCO2e in 2005 to nearly 13 GtCO2e in 2021. In its most recent NDC published in 2021, the Chinese government committed to peaking CO2 emissions before 2030, reducing the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of GDP produced (also known as carbon intensity) by at least 65% from 2005 levels by 2030, and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060. Lack of detail in China’s most recent NDC as well as some ambiguity in the scope of the country’s net-zero target makes it challenging to translate these commitments into absolute levels of GtCO2e. But a recent analysis from Climate Watch suggests that the country’s GHG emissions would reach roughly 13 GtCO2e in 2030 if the government achieved its near-term intensity target.

China’s 2030 target falls short on ambition across all approaches. These lenses, however, differ on the magnitude of cuts required by the end of this decade. 1.5 degree C-aligned, least-cost pathways, for example, show steep declines down to 4.9-5.9 GtCO2e, while country-specific modelling to net zero suggests smaller decreases to roughly 11 GtCO2e. But across all perspectives, GHG emissions fall below the 13 GtCO2e implied by China’s current NDC. This suggests that there’s considerable room for China to strengthen its 2030 target.

These five approaches also call for continued GHG emissions reductions through 2035. Fair share-based perspectives suggest relatively modest declines in GHG emissions to 7.3-12 GtCO2e (note that these figures exclude emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), which acts as a net sink and accounts for -5% of China’s total net emissions). Modelled pathways to net zero also fall within this range. Yet other approaches imply much deeper cuts. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, for example, indicates that China could reduce its GHG emissions to 4.8-8.9 Gt CO2e by 2035, while 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways project emissions falling all the way down to 3.8-4.6 GtCO2e in the same year.

Emitting roughly a quarter of the world’s GHGs, China’s ambition on climate change significantly impacts the world’s ability to confront this global crisis. A bold, new commitment to slash economy-wide emissions by 2035, as well as a far stronger 2030 target in the country’s next NDC, could go a long way in keeping the 1.5-degrees C limit within reach.  

European Union

Submitted in 2023, the European Union’s most recent NDC commits its 27 members to reduce GHG emissions at least 55% from 1990 levels by 2030, as well as to collectively achieve climate neutrality by 2050. If fully implemented, the region’s GHG emissions would fall from today’s 3.1 GtCO2e to 2.1 GtCO2e by the end of this decade and to 0 GtCO2e by midcentury.  

The EU’s current target for 2030 aligns with just two approaches. Linear trajectories to net zero show the region’s GHG emissions falling to 1.5-2.2 GtCO2e by the end of this decade, with bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling suggesting that the upper bound of this range is possible. But to help limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, the EU would need to strengthen its near-term ambition. More specifically, least-cost pathways aligned with this temperature goal project GHG emissions declining to 1.9-2.0 GtCO2e — equivalent to a 57-60% reduction from 1990 levels. A fair-share-based contribution from the EU would require still greater ambition. Under this lens, GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) drop to near or below zero, representing at least a 91% reduction from 1990 levels. These trends roughly hold even when accounting for the region’s land sink, which has sequestered an average 0.29 GtCO2e per year since 1990.  

Looking beyond 2030, continued steep declines in emissions are paramount. EU lawmakers are currently debating a new target proposed by the European Commission that would reduce GHG emissions 90% by 2040, relative to 1990. And while the region’s 2035 target is not yet formally on the table, policymakers are actively discussing how to estimate it. Some are drawing a straight line from the EU’s 2030 target to its existing 2050 target and arguing that the 2035 target should achieve a 66% decline from 1990 levels, while others are drawing a straight line from the EU’s 2030 target to the proposed 2040 target and advocating for a 73% reduction from 1990 levels by 2035. Approaches that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C call for even greater ambition. Least-cost pathways, for example, model a 71-80% decrease in GHG emissions relative to 1990, while fair-share approaches indicate that the EU’s GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) fall by more than 100%. Therefore, only the 73% reduction under discussion among EU lawmakers could be considered sufficiently ambitious for a 1.5 degrees C future.

India

India’s GHG emissions have yet to peak, rising in recent years from about 2.0 GtCO2e in 2005 to 3.4 GtCO2e in 2021. India’s most recent NDC from 2022 commits to reducing the amount of emissions released per unit of GDP produced (also known as emissions intensity) by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030, as well as reaffirms its pledge to reach net-zero emissions by 2070. The government, however, has yet to clarify whether these targets refer to all GHGs or just to CO2, and this lack of clarity complicates efforts to assess the country’s ambition. But assuming that India’s pledge to reduce emissions intensity covers all GHGs, recent analysis featured on Climate Watch suggests that achieving this near-term target would further increase emissions to 4.7 GtCO2e by 2030.

While all approaches allow India’s GHG emissions some room to increase through 2030, its current target aligns with only two of them. Country-specific modelling efforts that estimate feasible GHG emissions reductions under different policy portfolios, for example, show India’s emissions reaching between 3.4-5.1 GtCO2e in 2030, while national modelling to net zero similarly project GHG emissions rising to 4.8 GtCO2e by the end of this decade. 1.5 degrees C-aligned, fair-share approaches — which are particularly salient in the context of India’s relatively small historical contribution to the climate crisis, low per capita emissions and development challenges — show somewhat smaller increases in GHG emissions to 3.7-4.0 GtCO2e by 2030 (excluding emissions from LULUCF, which act as a net sink and accounts for just -1% of India’s total net emissions). 

While approaches diverge on whether India’s emissions can continue rising through 2035, all agree that GHG emissions cannot grow substantially beyond levels implied by the government’s 2030 target. On one end of the spectrum, 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways model GHG emissions declining to 1.6-2.3 GtCO2e by 2035, while on the other, country-specific modelling to net zero indicates that GHG emissions roughly stabilize at their projected 2030 value of 4.8 GtCO2e in 2035. Fair-share approaches similarly find that GHG emissions remain relatively steady at 3.7-4.1 GtCO2e in 2035. But bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling project a more mixed bag of GHG emissions rising and falling between 2030 and 2035 across different scenarios.

Indonesia

Indonesia’s latest NDC from 2022 commits to lowering GHG emissions almost 32% by 2030, relative to a business-as-usual scenario (its “unconditional” target). With additional climate finance from international funders, the government could achieve more aggressive cuts of just over 43% (its “conditional target”). These targets translate to absolute GHG emissions of 2 GtCO2e (unconditional) or 1.6 GtCO2e (conditional) in 2030, as compared to the approximately 1.4 GtCO2e emitted today. The Indonesian government has also previously pledged to peak GHG emissions by 2030 and reach net zero by 2060. 

Indonesia’s 2030 targets fall short of all but one of the approaches. Indeed, 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways show GHG emissions declining to 0.80-0.88 GtCO2e by 2030, while bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling call for cuts of a similar, albeit smaller magnitude. Only country-specific modelling to net zero by 2060 shows GHG emissions rising from current levels to reach 1.6-2.8 GtCO2e by 2030 — a range that encompasses both the country’s conditional and unconditional targets.

Submitting a new NDC this year offers Indonesia an opportunity not only to strengthen its current target for 2030, but also to set a new, ambitious target for 2035. National modelling to net zero by 2060 generally show GHG emissions peaking in 2030 before declining to between 1.3-2.4 GtCO2e in 2035, while linear trajectories to this same pledge show slightly deeper cuts from Indonesia’s 2030 targets to 1.0-1.6 GtCO2e. 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways chart even more ambitious declines to 0.61-0.78 GtCO2e in 2035, with bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling affirming that cuts of this magnitude could technically be achieved.

United States

Just prior to leaving office, the Biden administration published the United States’ new NDC. It commits the world’s second-largest emitter to reducing GHG emissions 61-66% from 2005 levels by 2035, as well as reaffirms the country’s previous pledge to cut emissions 50-52% from 2005 levels by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050. In real terms, this NDC promises that GHG emissions will fall from 6.6 GtCO2e in 2005 to 3.2-3.3 GtCO2e by 2030, 2.2-2.6 GtCO2e by 2035 and 0 GtCO2e by 2050.

But with the change in administration and President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the federal government is already beginning to roll back climate action, as well as adopt tariffs that are disrupting efforts to combat the climate crisis. Still, civil society groups and many state governments have rallied around this new NDC and have committed to still make progress toward these targets.

U.S. targets for 2030 and 2035 are fully consistent with three of the five approaches. Lowering GHG emissions to 2.2-2.6 GtCO2e by 2035 falls within the range estimated by bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, pathways to net zero, and linear trajectories to net zero. These same trends hold for the U.S.’ existing target for 2030. 

But aligning the U.S. targets with a 1.5 degrees-C future would require deeper cuts. Least-cost pathways to this temperature limit, for example, call for GHG emissions to fall to 2.4-3.1 GtCO2e by 2030 and 1.6-2.3 GtCO2e by 2035. Only the most ambitious bound of the U.S. target for 2035 falls within this range. Fair-share perspectives posit that the U.S. — as the world’s wealthiest country, a nation with relatively high per capita emissions and the largest cumulative emitter of GHGs since the pre-industrial era — has an imperative to go further still. Under this lens, GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) fall at least 87% by 2030 and 99% by 2035, relative to 2005. These trends roughly hold even when accounting for the country’s land sink, which has sequestered an average 0.90 GtCO2e per year since 2005. Since such steep declines would prove enormously difficult to achieve domestically, the United States could still deliver a fair-share contribution to 1.5 degrees C by providing additional finance to support emissions reductions and carbon removals beyond its borders.   

Will Major Emitters Submit Stronger NDCs?

The Paris Agreement is clear: NDCs should reflect countries’ “highest possible ambition,” with each round putting forward stronger targets than the last. But as this analysis confirms, there are still gaps between major emitters’ near-term targets and what’s urgently needed to keep the 1.5 degrees limit within reach. For some countries, their 2030 and 2035 targets also fall short of the ambition required to stay on track to achieve their own net-zero pledges.

Greater ambition from all countries — and especially these major emitters — is paramount. In a moment of global economic uncertainty, the need for ambitious climate action that targets both inclusive economic prosperity and long-term stability is stronger than ever. The NDCs that governments submit this year, as well as the plans and finance they put in place to achieve them, will decide the fate of the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. Major emitters must meet this moment by stepping up their ambition in their new round of NDCs. 

About the Data

Brazil 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to Brazil’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Deep Decarbonization’ scenario by Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative and from the two ‘Just Transition’ scenarios from the Climate and Development Initiative (2021). For linear trajectories to net zero, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from its 2005 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from Observatório do Clima (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Brazil’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019. 

China 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to China’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Carbon Neutrality’ scenario by the Energy Policy Simulator and the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative’s ‘GHG Net Zero’ scenario. For linear trajectories to China’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing a straight line from China’s 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2060. Because China’s emissions have yet to peak, authors did not draw a straight line from the most recent year of historical data. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Climate Mitigation’ and ‘Towards Sustainability’ scenarios by Lu et al. (2024) and from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by  Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Climate Watch in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Climate Watch, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

European Union 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the minimum and maximum values of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change’s filtered pathways. Regional modelled pathways to the EU’s net-zero pledge were not available. For linear trajectories to the EU’s net-zero pledge, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from the EU’s 1990 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from the EU’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from the EU’s First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

India 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to India’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Enhanced NDC’ scenario by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative. For linear trajectories to India’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing a straight line from India’s 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2070. Because India’s emissions have yet to peak, authors did not draw a straight line from the most recent year of historical data. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Long-term Decarbonization’ and ‘NDC-SDG Linkages’ scenarios by the Energy Policy Simulator, GEM India’s ‘Net Zero’ scenario and the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Climate Watch in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Climate Watch, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

Indonesia 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to Indonesia’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘DDS Low’ and ‘DDS High’ scenarios by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative and the ‘NZ2060’ scenario by the Low Carbon Development Initiative (2021). For linear trajectories to Indonesia’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing straight lines from the country’s 2030 NDC targets and stated peak value in 2030 to net-zero GHG emissions in 2060. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Indonesia’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Indonesia’s First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

United States 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to the U.S.’ net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Central’ scenario by Jones et al. (2024), the ‘Net Zero’ scenario by Jenkins et al. (2024), the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative’s ‘Deep Decarbonization’ scenario and the Energy Policy Simulator’s ‘NDC’ scenario. For linear trajectories to the U.S.’ net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from the U.S.’ 2005 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Higher Ambition’ and ‘Higher Ambition+’ scenarios by Iyer et al. (2025), the ‘Enhanced Ambition’ scenario by Zhao et al. (2024) and from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from the U.S.’ First Biennial Transparency Report in 2021. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from the U.S.’ First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

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Authors Clea Schumer Sophie Boehm Kirian Mischke-Reeds Cynthia Elliott