Small Wind Can Bring Big Benefits to Communities in Need alicia.cypress… Wed, 11/05/2025 - 12:15

Much of the conversation around wind power often focuses on large-scale utility wind farms that provide energy to power grids deployed across cities, regions and even countries. Yet, smaller wind solutions can play a very important role in the clean energy transition.

In places where solar and other renewable technologies are not technically or economically feasible, small wind projects are a cost-effective option that can help power individual homes, schools and health facilities, or provide reliable and affordable electricity to entire communities. They can also support water pumping for irrigation, telecommunications and small businesses.

For example, two small wind energy systems installed in the tribal villages of Kamalaguda and Tijmali in the Kalahandi district of Odisha, India, not just provide electricity to 60 homes and 259 people, but brought jobs and new skills to the community.

Across the world, 11 miles off the coast of Maine, the Fox Islands community has installed three 1.5 megawatt turbines to power their homes and businesses. During the first 14 years of the project, local residents saved around $1.3 million in electricity costs.

Currently valued at $1.6 million in 2024, the global small wind turbine market is expected to grow over the next five years, reaching $2.2 million by 2030.

What Is Small Wind?

Wind energy systems that are not utility-scale wind farms, generating large amounts of electricity that feed into the electrical grid, are generally known as “small wind.” Sometimes categorized as small wind turbines (SWTs) or distributed wind, it represents an adaptable and flexible option for generating renewable electricity by converting wind energy into electricity using the aerodynamic force from rotor blades.

There isn’t a universally defined energy-generation capacity for small wind across all countries. In India, for example, small wind describes wind turbines with blades less than or equal to 200 square meters that generally have a maximum power rating of 50 kilowatts (kW). As the technology becomes more familiar worldwide, some SWTs now include higher-capacity models, ranging from 50 watts (W) to 10 kW.

In the United States, however, small wind turbines are typically up to 100 kW in size to account for the advancement in wind technologies. It’s also often described as “distributed wind” to emphasize that the power these turbines produce is consumed in the same place as it is produced.

Ultimately, small wind differs from large utility-scale wind turbines in terms of size, capacity, and operational complexity, while also being considerably easier to install and operate. This makes it a great option for geographies with high wind potential, space constraints, limited or unreliable grid infrastructure, or high electricity costs from diesel or imported fuels.

Where Is Small Wind Most Valuable?

Communities are increasingly turning to small wind to produce their own energy, especially where grid reliability, rising electricity costs or supply disruptions are a concern. The technology is most common in rural or remote areas, where it not only powers homes but also supports farming tasks like pumping water or grinding grain.

While small wind is not always suitable, there are a few noteworthy contexts in which it may play a pivotal role in diversifying energy sources and helping communities achieve greater energy independence.

Agricultural and Rural Communities

Agricultural and rural communities have had a lot of success with small wind due to the relatively small physical footprint of the turbine technology. Small wind energy systems have often proved to be an efficient use of space for the amount of electricity it can generate. One community organization in San Benito County, California is currently exploring ways to work with local zoning and land-use officials to allow for the deployment of small wind turbines on agricultural land. Along with an agrivoltaics project, which simultaneously uses land for agriculture and solar power, and a workforce development program, the organization’s proposal will help educate other community members and strengthen both the economic and grid resilience in the region.

In communities where it’s already legal for distributed wind installations, agricultural and industrial property owners can successfully offset their high energy usage and minimize disruptions to operations during power outages. An Anheuser-Busch brewery in California, which has a hybrid wind and solar system, and a 2.5 MW wind system on a farm in Nebraska, is already proving this success. Turbines in both locations are offsetting electricity demand to ensure the electricity used is both cleaner and cheaper than the general grid mix.

As small wind gains traction on farms and industrial facilities, even more rural communities have begun seeing it as an opportunity to gain control over their energy production. Communities like Ford County, Kansas, have built at least seven utility-scale wind projects in the last few decades that is transports electricity through nearby transmission lines to power other communities. But now, Ford County is modifying their zoning codes to include small wind and exploring municipal procurement so they too can utilize their exceptional wind resource and support energy independence for local farmers, businesses and residents.

Remote Communities

Remote communities are also looking to small wind for energy independence and freedom from unstable energy costs. Due to their heavy reliance on diesel generators and long-distance power lines, many communities in Alaska are exploring small wind as a solution. After installation, wind power has very low operating costs and can be cheaper than importing fuel. Highly successful projects, like the Winds of St. Mary’s in Alaska or Maine’s Fox Islands, have inspired other remote communities to engage technical experts and explore the potential of small wind in lowering steep energy costs.      

Around the Horn of Africa, small wind systems have become the most viable solution in the scarcely electrified parts of those countries. South Africa has more than 100,000 small wind turbines directly coupled with water pumps in operation across 46,000 farms.  A study from the UK suggested a 6 kW turbine is able to supply approximately 7.1% of the current electricity demand of a primary school in Isle of Arran, UK.

Small wind can bring power to remote areas like this desert in Rajasthan, India, on the border with Pakistan. Photo by Donyanedomam/iStock. Climate-Conscious Communities

Climate-conscious communities, which are seeking solutions to minimize their reliance on fossil fuels and meet clean energy goals like Bennington County in Vermont, are also actively putting rules in place to reduce soft costs — or any non-hardware costs of distributed wind deployment — and other barriers to small wind deployment. By following the lead of previous examples, such as the Huerfano River Wind Farm in San Isabel, Colo., these communities are pursuing multiple goals: helping residents control energy costs, enhancing local quality of life and supporting local climate ambitions.

What are the Barriers and Opportunities for Small Wind Projects?

Just as momentum is starting to build and the industry has begun to see some success, small wind is facing some challenges. Issues like limited resource mapping studies, maintenance issues, lack of standardization and quality control, limited awareness and business models, challenges in testing and certifications have hindered its growth.

In the U.S., for example, federal support has wavered since the beginning of the Trump administration and the recent elimination of federal tax credits that will severely impact the economic viability of new turbines and hybrid systems.

The industry does not have many workers trained in small wind installations and service, thus making new installations and servicing challenging, particularly in rural areas or new markets. And even where there is a strong enough wind resource and an installer willing to make the trek to build the turbine, the local permitting processes might be restrictive. All of these factors add to the final cost and limit the economic viability of small wind turbines.

In other countries, like India, higher capital costs compared to alternatives have found to be a challenge as policies and incentives have shifted toward solar energy.

Small wind in India typically costs between 80,000 rupees to 1 million rupees ($906 to $1,133) per kilowatt, whereas a 1 kW solar rooftop system costs around 40,000 rupees to 70,000 rupees ($453 to $793). This cost disparity is primarily due to the lack of economies of scale in manufacturing, expensive materials like rare earth magnets and the technical complexities involved in turbine production, installation and maintenance. The cessation of subsidies after 2017 further raised their effective price, making them less competitive compared to rapidly declining solar photovoltaic costs.

Yet with lower operating voltages, compatibility with hybrid systems and suitability for community- or household-level use, small wind still can be promising for rural and off-grid situations where localized, safe and easy-to-maintain solutions are critical.

To help counter some of these barriers, local government officials can pull a range of levers to encourage more growth of small wind projects. Staff might install a wind turbine on municipal property, work together with local utilities to reduce barriers to interconnection, or develop educational resources for residents seeking clean energy opportunities. An increasingly common action that governments might take is to streamline their permitting processes for small wind. Reducing the soft costs associated with the deployment of small wind turbines can lead to increased interest in the technology from local installers, residents, and other stakeholders.

Local government staff can also review zoning code and existing permitting processes to identify potential barriers to wind development, highlight areas for improvement, educate relevant staff on best practices, and, most importantly, communicate with local stakeholders to understand the community’s level of support for future small wind deployment. With robust public input, local governments can build a strong foundation for future small wind development in their community.

Unlocking Small Wind’s Potential

Small wind turbines may not be the perfect solution for every scenario, but there are many instances where they can play a role in scaling up deployment of renewable energy.

Scaling-Up Small Wind Turbines in India

To unlock the full potential of small wind projects, WRI India produced a study that highlights the need for better resource mapping; collaboration; support and interest from policymakers; technical improvements and standardization; and more. 

These systems have brought reliable power, supported livelihoods and built local workforce capacity. As a standalone unit or as part of hybrid systems, small wind offers a flexible, decentralized solution, especially in areas where land is limited or there are issues preventing large renewable installations. Small wind can also increase energy access to more people around the world and provide greater ownership over energy production at the same time.

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How to Reach $300 Billion — and the Full $1.3 Trillion — Under the New Climate Finance Goal margaret.overh… Wed, 11/05/2025 - 11:00

Nations set a new climate finance goal last year, committing to deliver at least $300 billion annually for developing countries' climate action by 2035. Developed nations agreed to take the lead in meeting this target.

The goal, known as the "new collective quantified goal," or "NCQG," also includes a much larger target. It calls on all actors to work toward mobilizing $1.3 trillion in international climate finance over the same timeframe; much closer to the amount developing countries truly need.

This finance, alongside their domestic finance, is essential for developing countries to adopt low-carbon technologies, protect themselves from climate threats and unleash green development. But it doesn't benefit only them: Stronger action in the developing world is needed to halt climate change and invest in sustainable growth globally. It's about building a safer and more prosperous future for everyone.

The recently released Baku-to-Belém Roadmap is the first big step toward operationalizing the NCQG. The roadmap fills in some key details about the path forward, helping to move conversations — especially those at this year's UN climate summit (COP30) in Belém, Brazil — from commitments to delivery.

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WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

We delved into the new finance goal, including what it could take to reach the $300 billion threshold — and what moving beyond it, toward $1.3 trillion, might look like.

Is the New Climate Finance Goal Enough?

The NCQG's $300 billion target is the largest climate finance commitment countries have ever agreed to and represents an important down payment for climate action. Meeting it will be a critical milestone. But finance cannot stop there.

The High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance (IHLEG) estimates developing countries (excluding China) need to spend $2.7 trillion annually by 2030 to meet climate and nature-related goals. $1.4 trillion of this would come from domestic sources and $1.3 trillion from abroad.

$1.3 trillion is therefore a more accurate reflection of developing countries' needs by 2035, and so the more important target. But of course, it is the much larger hill to climb. Important, too, is understanding how and where funds are likely to flow.

Is $300 Billion Achievable?

In short, yes. Though current political headwinds make it more difficult, achieving the goal remains possible.

In 2022, the latest data available, developed countries delivered around $116 billion to developing countries for climate action. This exceeded the previous climate finance goal of $100 billion annually, which the NCQG replaces. We reviewed the sources of this finance, looking at how funding trends are likely to grow over the next decade, and found that $300 billion by 2035 is very much in reach.

How this money is raised, though, could have implications for the type of finance made available and who can access it most easily.

Where Would the Money Come From?

We can generally assume that similar types of finance will be counted toward the $300 billion goal as were counted toward the $100 billion goal. This would include bilateral finance (country to country), multilateral finance (such as from multilateral development banks (MDBs) and multilateral climate funds), and private finance mobilized by public funds. Under the NCQG, there's also a possibility to count "alternative sources" of climate finance, such as international taxes or rechanneled IMF "special drawing rights" (a type of international reserve asset).

Moving beyond $300 billion, toward $1.3 trillion, will require much more private investment in climate action than we've seen to date in addition to increases from the sources above.

Public multilateral finance is the biggest source

Public multilateral finance involves public funds going from one country to another through a multilateral entity, like a development bank. This category represents the highest share of international climate finance so far — $51 billion of the $116 billion delivered in 2022 — and will likely continue to do so.

Multilateral development banks

MDBs like the World Bank provide a significant portion of international climate finance, and there are many ideas on the table for how to further supercharge their efforts.

At COP29, MDBs committed to providing $120 billion in climate finance to low- and middle-income countries by 2030; roughly double what they provided in 2022. Part of this growth is likely intended to come from an increase in the percentage of their funding going to climate action. And part will come from continued growth in total MDB finance, largely as a result of reforms to free up capital.

Additional growth is possible — especially if countries pay in more capital, increasing the base amount against which MDBs can lend. While such increases may be unlikely today with current political dynamics, they could feasibly happen before 2035. The IHLEG estimates that $60 billion in capital increases over a ten-year period could bring MDB climate and nature-related finance up to around $240 billion per year. This figure refers to growth across the entire MDB system, encompassing a range of banks and funds with varied shareholder structures.

Some of the increase in MDB climate finance will also come from a change in the way their contributions are counted. Under the $100 billion goal, only 70% of MDB's total climate finance was included in the tally. This is because not all countries channeling climate finance through MDBs were considered contributors to the goal. But any country can voluntarily contribute to the $300 billion — meaning potentially all climate finance flowing from MDBs to low- and middle-income countries could be counted.

If MDBs meet their 2030 target of $120 billion, this would comprise 40% of the $300 billion goal. This is around the same percentage the MDBs provided toward the $100 billion goal in 2022 (41%). If they could reach $240 billion, per the IHLEG's estimate, this would cover 80%.

People navigate heavily flooded streets in Sylhet, Bangladesh in June 2024. International climate finance helps countries build resilience to and cope with the aftermath of worsening disasters. Photo by H M Shahidul Islam/iStock

Private finance mobilized by MDBs

MDBs also announced that they would leverage $65 billion in private finance for climate action in developing countries by 2030, up from around $15 billion in 2022. There are a variety of ways they can do this, such as offering guarantees or insurance on climate projects to lower risks and attract private investors.

The $65 billion assumes that MDBs can leverage 54 cents in private finance for every $1 they spend (a mobilization ratio of 1:0.54) and meet their $120 billion goal. For comparison, they mobilized 38 cents per dollar spent in 2023 (a 1:0.38 ratio).

If MDBs deliver $240 billion in climate finance by 2030, they could mobilize as much as $91-$130 billion annually in private funds (reflecting a 1:0.38 and 1:0.54 ratio, respectively).

Multilateral climate funds

Multilateral climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund, are specifically dedicated to providing climate finance in developing nations and are financed primarily through governments pledges. Historically they've made up a very small proportion of international climate finance: just $3.4 billion (3%) in 2022, down from $4.2 billion in 2021.

Despite their modest size, the climate funds are valued by many for allowing direct access to developing country institutions. They also provide a higher rate of grants and highly concessional financing (loans with more favorable terms) than other sources. Between 2016 and 2022, 54% of finance from the climate funds came in the form of grants, compared to 39% of bilateral finance and 9% for the MDBs.

At the 2024 UN climate summit (COP29), countries agreed to at least triple the amount these funds disburse by 2030. This would require wealthy countries to significantly increase their contributions. If tripled, the funds would provide around $10 billion annually by 2030, or less than 4% of the $300 billion, with additional growth possible by 2035.

Public bilateral finance has grown, but faces political headwinds

Bilateral finance involves public funds directed from one country to another. In 2022, bilateral finance accounted for $41 billion (35%) of the $116 billion provided and mobilized.

The amount of bilateral finance needed will hinge on what other sources deliver:

• If MDBs reach their stated target of $120 billion and mobilize $65 billion in private finance, and if the multilateral climate funds cover $10 billion, this leaves a gap of $105 billion for bilateral institutions to fill.
• If MDB finance instead reaches the higher estimate of $240 billion, at current private sector mobilization rates, we could exceed the $300 billion target without any bilateral funds.

Bilateral climate finance doubled between 2013 and 2022, from $22.5 billion to $41 billion. If another doubling occurs by 2035, as called for by the IHLEG, bilateral finance would reach around $80 billion. But there's no guarantee of this: With strong political headwinds against international climate and development finance in many developed nations, significant growth in bilateral finance may be challenging — though the ten-year window leaves room for political cycles to turn.

Economic growth can help increase overseas development assistance to a degree, especially in countries like Denmark, where it is tied to gross national income (GNI). If we assume increases in bilateral finances of just 2% to follow an estimated 2% annual growth in GNI, it will reach a relatively modest $53 billion by 2035. It is also possible that some developing nations will increase and voluntarily report finance as part of the efforts to reach $300 billion.

Private finance mobilized by bilateral public finance

In 2022, developed countries reported that they mobilized $9.2 billion in private finance for climate action in developing countries. With bilateral finance reaching $41 billion that year, this implies a mobilization ratio of 22 cents per dollar spent.

Unlike the MDBs, countries have not stated a new target for mobilized private finance. If we assume bilateral finance reaches $53 billion in 2035 (a 2% annual growth rate), the same rate of mobilization as in 2022 would result in $11.7 billion by 2035. If bilateral finance were to double to $80 billion by 2035, the same mobilization rate could leverage $17.6 billion in private finance.

Solar-powered chargers for electric motorbikes in Kigali, Rwanda. Climate finance supports green projects that can help developing countries improve lives and sustainably grow their economies. Photo by IMF Photo/Kim Haughton/Flickr Alternative sources can now be counted, too

In addition to multilateral and bilateral finance, the NCQG recognizes "alternative sources" — such as international taxes or solidarity levies — as a potential option for raising finance toward the $300 billion goal.

Some experts have suggested a tax on international flights, applied to airlines based on greenhouse gas emissions, or wealth taxes as ways to raise finance for climate action. These measures are attractive in part because they could introduce entirely new funding streams. The IMF estimates that a carbon tax on international transportation emissions could bring in up to $200 billion per year, which could then in theory be disbursed as international climate finance.

Another option is rechanneling the IMF's special drawing rights, which are a type of international reserve. In 2022, nations with larger economies agreed to reallocate special drawing rights to developing countries. So far, this has resulted in around $40 billion in finance being distributed through the Resilience and Sustainability Trust, which mainly helps low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries tackle climate risks. Countries have also agreed to re-channel special drawing rights through MDBs and use them as hybrid capital. Moving forward, countries could agree to reallocate additional special drawing rights and modernize the framework to allow for more regular issuances — though governments currently appear reluctant to take this step.

High integrity, well-managed carbon markets also channel funds for developing nations' climate action, in theory. But the idea of counting these investments toward the NCQG is highly controversial, since any emissions reductions are claimed by the buyer (meaning they don't count toward the developing country's own climate goals). Governments have agreed that the Adaptation Fund (one of the climate funds) will receive a 5% share of proceeds under the Paris Agreement's international carbon crediting mechanism. But it remains to be seen whether this will count toward the $300 billion goal.

How Will Finance Be Delivered?

The NCQG is not just about the amount of finance developing countries receive, but also the type.

How finance is delivered matters immensely. Many of the poorest countries are already struggling with unsustainably high debt levels and cannot afford to take on new, high-interest-rate loans, even for climate projects which can aid their growth and reduce risks. They may require a higher proportion of grants or highly concessional funding — meaning loans with, for example, low interest rates and/or longer repayment periods. (This can be useful in the context of a more systematic approach to debt restructuring and relief.) In other countries, and in sectors where an economic or financial return is expected, loans and private finance can be a more appropriate investment type.

While the NCQG noted that grant-based and highly concessional finance is particularly important "for adaptation and responding to loss and damage in developing countries," it fell short of setting concrete targets for this.

In 2022, around 39% of bilateral and 9% of multilateral climate finance came in the form of grants, which mainly went to low-income countries. Between 2016 and 2022 these countries received 64% of their climate finance in grants, compared to around 12% for middle-income countries.

Going forward, even maintaining the current percentage of climate finance that is provided as grants or highly concessional finance will require concerted effort. Much of the growth in MDB finance, for example, is likely to come from reforms and capital increases that tend to boost lending to middle-income countries, not grants to low-income countries.

Similarly, if a larger portion of the $300 billion comes from mobilized private finance — as predicted by the MDBs — this will tend to flow through private loans or equity investments, not grants or highly concessional finance.

Who Will Receive the Funds?

International climate finance is meant exclusively for developing countries, but this is a broad and diverse group of nations. Who exactly will receive finance, and how much, was not laid out in the NCQG — though the final text did recognize that small island developing states and least developed countries are particularly in need of assistance, especially for adaptation and loss and damage.

In 2022, lower-middle income countries received 46.5% of reported climate finance, upper middle-income countries received 34.5%, and low-income countries received just 11.1%. A small number of high-income countries received 3.4% of the financing, and 20.4% of the funds were not allocated by income group. (Some developing countries classified as high-income may receive investments because they are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, such as small island states like Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados.)

Although climate finance approximately doubled between 2016 and 2022, its distribution across these income groups has stayed relatively constant. But major shifts in funding sources could potentially upend precedent. For example, if the growth in MDB finance is largely through non-concessional loans, this will tend to favor middle income rather than low-income countries. The same is true of mobilized private finance if it ends up playing a larger role. Only 3% of mobilized private finance counted in 2022 went to low-income countries.

Ultimately, the overall percentage of finance received is less important than how favorable the rates and terms are — or the share of finance on "grant equivalent" terms (meaning the amount that would have been provided if the finance was a grant, before taxes or other charges). Middle income countries will likely continue to receive the most finance overall, given the size and relative strength of their economies and the larger ticket sizes of low carbon investments there. What is important is that the lowest income and most vulnerable countries receive a good share of the grant and highly concessional finance, especially for adaptation and loss and damage.

How Do We Move from $300 Billion to $1.3 Trillion — the Real Target?

While $300 billion should be within reach, the real challenge will be how to scale up finance "from all public and private sources to at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2035" — the truer measure of what developing countries need.

Clearly, meeting the $1.3 trillion target will be a steep climb. Funding will need to come from the same sources listed above, as well as private financial flows not mobilized by public funds. The latest IHLEG report suggests that around half of the $1.3 trillion, or $650 billion, will come from cross-border private finance and the other half from international public funds.

Raising that amount of public funding will require much more ambition from wealthy nations and significant capital increases at the MDBs. In addition, countries will likely need to forge new international actions and agreements to leverage "alternative" sources of finance like international taxes, with a significant proportion of the funds dedicated to climate action in developing nations.

Growing private finance will also be a challenging — but vital — feat. While current data on cross-border climate investment in developing countries is limited, and estimates vary, $650 billion is almost certainly a massive leap from the present. Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that private climate finance to developing nations (excluding China) reached around $15 billion in 2022. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that foreign private investments just in renewable energy in least-developed countries reached $16 billion that same year.

Workers from a German-Filipino solar energy company install panels at a house in Quezon City, Philippines. International climate finance is an important source of funds for renewable energy and other green projects in low- and middle-income countries. Photo by IMF Photo/Lisa Marie David/Flickr

Substantially increasing private finance for developing nations will require efforts from high-, middle-, and low-income countries alike. Governments wanting to attract private sector investment need to set ambitious targets and transition plans, enhance investment environments, and work together with the private sector to develop investment opportunities and shift risk perceptions. From the financier side, it will be important to drive forward measures such as scaling up and replicating effective risk sharing and credit enhancement mechanisms, tapping into long term institutional investment, and increasing the role of national development banks and local currency.

"Country platforms" which bring public, private, domestic and international finance together behind green transition plans and policies, can play a role in mobilizing private finance and ensuring an efficient capital stack.

How Will Progress Be Measured?

Countries have decided to adopt the enhanced transparency framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the transparency system for the new finance goal. Through this system, countries will report on the finance they provide and receive and what it's used for. In addition, the UNFCCC's Standing Committee on Finance will prepare a "collective progress" report biennially to reflect on progress to date, drawing on a variety of sources.

But questions remain; particularly around how the $1.3 trillion target will be monitored, as it covers an array of funding sources that will not be reported through the UNFCCC system. Additional reporting and review of this — particularly in fora such as the G20, where Finance Ministers and Financial Institutions are present — will be important.

Charting a Path Forward

The NCQG represents an important — possibly transformative — step toward a safer and more sustainable future. But this hinges on how it's executed.

$300 billion is within arm's reach, as long as MDBs continue along their reform path and countries maintain their contributions. The important remaining question is how to ensure that the right funds are matched to resource needs and finance reaches those who need it most.

But where countries should truly be setting their sights is the full $1.3 trillion. This should be a guiding star as we head toward 2035, as it's not only the better measure of need, but also the true ambition the climate crisis demands.

While we have until 2035 to reach the finance targets agreed in Baku, the work must begin now. 

Several international summits this year helped build momentum around the new goal:

• At the Finance in Common Summit in February, public development banks recognized the critical role they play in operationalizing the NCQG.
• In June, many leaders from governments, development finance institutions, civil society organizations and elsewhere gathered at the International Conference for Finance for Development, held once a decade. Here, these players recommitted to bolstering finance for sustainable development, emphasizing the need for collaboration to mobilize climate finance at scale.
• At the BRICS summit in July, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa united behind calls for strengthened climate finance, including scaling up finance for climate adaptation.

Two more critical opportunities still remain to make headway in 2025:

• At the 2025 UN climate summit (COP30) in November, the Baku-to-Belém roadmap will provide a foundation for discussions on the $1.3 trillion target. At COP30, attendees could help build confidence that this roadmap is achievable by announcing new efforts to mobilize finance at scale, such as country platforms, finance commitments from the private sector and progress toward establishing solidarity levies.
• Leaders at the G20 summit, held immediately after COP30, could use this opportunity to lay out how to overcome economic hurdles faced by developing nations, including unsustainable debt and high costs of capital, that put the brakes on climate investments.

Leaders should capitalize on this momentum and use their time at COP30 and the G20 to chart a path forward, overcome headwinds, and ultimately deliver the finance the world needs to confront the climate crisis.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in February 2025. It was updated in November 2025 to reflect developments from recent high-level discussions and the release of the Baku-to-Belém roadmap.

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Authors Natalia Alayza Gaia Larsen

STATEMENT: EU Environment Ministers Back 2040 Emission Goal, but Plan To Reach It Remains Unclear darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 11/05/2025 - 08:33

BRUSSELS (November 5, 2025) - Today, the EU Council reaffirmed the bloc’s goal to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040, compared to 1990 levels. While this underscores Europe’s long-term ambition, up to 5% of the reductions are expected to come from carbon offsets outside the EU, with an agreement to periodically review the plan. 

The EU ministers also confirmed the European Commission’s earlier “statement of intent” for the 2035 nationally determined contribution (NDC) to reduce emissions by 66.25–72.5% from 1990 levels. The NDC will be a key input into the COP30 climate summit in Brazil next week. 

Following is a statement by Stientje van Veldhoven, Vice President and Regional Director for Europe, World Resources Institute:   

“The EU’s 90% target reflects the level of ambition this moment demands and stands out as one of the most ambitious commitments in the world. Finalizing it just ahead of COP30 shows that the bloc is determined to arrive at the summit with a serious contribution to tackling the climate crisis, and signals that it recognizes climate action as central to Europe's economic future.” 
 
“Europe’s climate competitiveness and energy independence will not be secured through hesitation or outsourcing. Keeping the door open to revising climate measures creates uncertainty for businesses that need long-term investment security. The announcement to revise and postpone the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS-2), while leaving open the possibility of additional offsets, adds to this unpredictability. The exact way these provisions will be applied will determine the EU's actual speed of transition.” 

“The EU’s 2035 target is a solid step toward reaching its longer-term climate goals, but only if the bloc strives for the highest end of its target.  WRI analysis shows the EU must cut emissions by 72.5% to stay on track for 1.5°C. It would also allow for a smoother emissions reduction towards the 90% goal, rather than relying on steeps cuts after 2035. Falling short would create an unmanageable gap and would undermine investor confidence in Europe’s long-term transition. 

“By phasing out fossil fuels and investing in clean energy and innovation, the EU can cut energy dependence and build a more resilient domestic economy in an increasingly volatile world. Any use of carbon credits requires strong guardrails to ensure they meet robust social and environmental standards, are fully transparent, and truly deliver additional emission cuts.   

“The EU must come to COP30 ready to deliver — with the tools, commitments, and measures needed to turn ambition into action and push other countries to advance ambitious plans as well.” 

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RELEASE: WRI, Bloomberg Philanthropies and Partners Strengthen City and State Climate Action in Brazil and Beyond sophie.brady@wri.org Wed, 11/05/2025 - 05:17

New commitments at the COP30 Local Leaders Forum aim to bridge local and national climate strategies and boost implementation

RIO DE JANEIRO (November 5, 2025) — The COP30 Local Leaders Forum in Rio de Janeiro, held ahead of this year's UN climate conference in Belém, concluded today with national and subnational leaders making bold new commitments to strengthen city- and state-level climate action while advancing the Coalition for High Ambition Multi-Level Partnerships (CHAMP), a group of 77 countries committed to greater multilevel cooperation in developing national climate plans.  

Cities are responsible for 70% of global energy-related CO2 emissions and over 60% of global energy use. Bold urban climate action can sharply cut emissions while simultaneously driving economic growth, creating jobs and improving quality of life. Yet, despite long-standing recognition of their importance, subnational climate strategies have often remained disconnected from national climate plans.  

At the COP30 Local Leaders Forum, World Resources Institute (WRI), Bloomberg Philanthropies and Brazil’s Ministry of Cities convened more than a dozen ministers, mayors and governors from CHAMP countries — which together represent 65% of global GDP and 37% of emissions — to share lessons learned and accelerate implementation. The resulting commitments aim to close the gap between local initiatives and national strategies, by institutionalizing support across all levels of governance.

Michael R. Bloomberg, UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Climate Ambition and Solutions and Founder of Bloomberg L.P. and Bloomberg Philanthropies, announced a $168-million commitment from Bloomberg Philanthropies to usher in the next era of local climate leadership and multilevel collaboration.  

“Mayors and governors are showing the world that cities and states can lead the way when it comes to fighting climate change,” said Bloomberg. “This investment will unlock new opportunities for leaders — in Brazil and around the world — as they partner with national governments, scale data-driven, proven solutions that cut emissions, and build a stronger and healthier world.”

Through this support, WRI will deepen its role in CHAMP, strengthening governance structures, expanding in-country partnerships and helping cities, states and regions deliver impact at scale.

“Local leaders are frontrunners in delivering solutions that both cut emissions and improve lives today,” said Ani Dasgupta, President and CEO of World Resources Institute. “When cities work hand in hand with regional and national governments — as we’re seeing in Brazil and around the world — their impact multiplies. By building on what works, we can turn local progress into lasting change that powers a more just, thriving and sustainable global economy.”

In Brazil, WRI Brasil will partner with C40 Cities, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, the National Front of Mayors (FNP), and government, multilateral and private sector partners, to help make the country a global model of climate federalism, supported by robust finance mechanisms to unlock mitigation and adaptation projects at the local level.  

Building on these efforts, Bloomberg Philanthropies, in partnership with the Mitigation Action Facility, WRI Brasil, Brazil's Ministry of Cities, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, and BTG Pactual, announced the creation of a 80-million-euro ($93-million) E-Bus Credit Enhancement Fund for Brazil, expected to unlock financing for more than 1,700 electric buses.

“Almost 90% of public transport in Brazil relies on city buses,” said Luis Antonio Lindau, Director of WRI Brasil Ross Center for Sustainable Cities. “Transitioning them to electric models is essential to improving quality of life for millions of citizens and helping the country get on track toward net-zero by 2050. As countries and financial institutions move from commitments to action, blended finance mechanisms like this credit enhancement fund are key to making electric mobility a reality.”

To date, CHAMP countries have submitted 50% of all new national climate commitments, or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), ahead of COP30, part of a broader wave of national-local collaboration reshaping the global climate process. COP28 in Dubai and COP29 in Baku both had more formal roles for mayors and governors, and COP30's Urban Ministerial on Urbanization and Climate Change will serve as a central platform to advance enhanced NDCs, improved finance flows, affordable and resilient housing, and inclusive economic transformation.

“Climate action works best when it starts locally, where it touches people’s daily lives,” said Rogier van den Berg, Global Director for WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities. “When cities and national governments align, they can deliver real change — for people, for nature and for the climate. Innovative local approaches can drive national policy and inspire solutions around the world.”

In the year ahead, WRI will continue helping governments convert climate commitments into action, mobilize financing and strengthen local leadership — turning local solutions into global impact.

About World Resources Institute   
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations.

 

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STATEMENT: Baku to Belém Roadmap Lays Out Pathway to Scale Climate Finance darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 11/05/2025 - 04:02

BELÉM (November 5, 2025) —Today, the COP presidencies of Azerbaijan and Brazil published the Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3T. This report represents a key output agreed to at COP29, detailing how to deliver $1.3 trillion annually for developing countries from all international sources by 2035.  

The Baku to Belém Roadmap presents numerous options for increasing investment in climate to reach this scale. Delivering on this will be critical for COP30’s focus on moving from commitments to action.    

Following is a statement from Melanie Robinson, Global Director of Climate, Economics and Finance at World Resources Institute:  

“The Baku to Belém Roadmap turns a promise made at COP29 into a plan. It charts a smart, holistic strategy to deliver $1.3 trillion a year in climate finance for developing countries, and start transforming the global economy, starting now. 

“The roadmap’s value is in its combination of pragmatism with a focus on scale and systems change. For too long, the climate community has been overly focused on relatively modest sums of public climate funding, whereas the Baku to Belém plan rightly shifts the lens to how a wider set of public finance and policy shifts can unlock much larger flows from private investors.  

“As Brazil and Azerbaijan rightly note, tackling the climate crisis means rewiring the financial system so that all actors pull in the same direction, from development banks and private capital providers to public policy makers and financial regulators. Thanks to input from the Circle of Finance Ministers, the roadmap is grounded in tackling the real-world challenges that finance ministers and other financial actors face. As the economic case grows ever clearer, this is exactly what’s needed to drive large-scale investment in clean energy, resilient agriculture and adaptation — creating jobs, strengthening economies and reducing risk. 

“With this roadmap in hand, COP30 must pivot from plans on paper to investment at scale. Success in Belém will depend on whether all sources of finance can work together to align behind country-led priorities, and whether scarce grants go where they are needed most. The roadmap shows how to reach $1.3 trillion — now the world must deliver.” 

 

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Building Better Climate Initiatives: 7 Essential Ingredients for Effective Intergovernmental Cooperation margaret.overh… Tue, 11/04/2025 - 15:56

The number of cooperative initiatives aimed at combating climate change has ballooned over the past decade. Since the Paris Agreement, governments have launched hundreds of pledges and coalitions to tackle everything from renewable energy, zero-emissions transport and methane, to forests, food systems and adaptation. As the number of joint announcements and initiatives grows, so too do expectations that these efforts can close the ambition and implementation gaps left by slower-moving formal negotiations.

Cooperative initiatives are critical because they bring together "coalitions of the willing" to tackle specific challenges that can be hard to address through multilateral negotiating processes — especially in areas where it has not been possible to reach consensus on ambitious goals (such as setting specific global decarbonization targets). By focusing on specific sectors, activities and approaches, these initiatives have the potential to spur change and strengthen collaboration across borders, providing a much-needed dimension to international climate governance. They can bring momentum to multi-country efforts that, in turn, drive domestic climate action — where change is most needed and impactful.

Yet the effectiveness of these efforts has been questioned at times. Some initiatives may generate political visibility at launch, but the political and media attention they garner do not guarantee that they will deliver measurable outcomes. Other initiatives may duplicate existing efforts or fail to attract the actors most essential to driving progress. Without greater intentionality in how initiatives are designed, governed and assessed, the growing landscape of climate cooperation risks dilution rather than delivery.

Based on recent WRI research and lessons from the past decade, the following seven elements offer a practical framework for building coalitions that can catalyze national action, drive international cooperation and spur systemic change over time. This provides a guide that stakeholders, including governments and initiatives themselves, can use to develop, build and carry out effective collaboration for climate action.

1) Identify a Clear Need and Opportunity for Impact

Initiatives should begin with a clearly defined purpose rooted in a real gap or opportunity. That means identifying whether they address a sectoral gap; a regional need; or a missing governance function, such as standard-setting, implementation support or finance mobilization. If initiatives do not first assess their role and added value within the existing ecosystem of climate action, they risk duplication, fragmentation and limited relevance.

A stronger starting point involves identifying where cooperation can unlock action that would not otherwise occur. This may mean targeting underserved sectors or identifying new contributions to high-impact opportunities. One example is the Global Methane Pledge, launched at COP26 to target the namesake super pollutant. Other opportunities could lie in areas like heavy industry, adaptation in climate-vulnerable regions or land-use transitions. Equally important is recognizing where participation is currently lacking — whether among high-emitting countries, rapidly growing economies, or climate-vulnerable regions that face the greatest implementation challenges. Establishing a clear rationale for the initiative is essential for attracting meaningful participation and designing goals that matter.

2) Define the Initiative's Purpose

International coalitions serve different functions: Some are designed to send political signals; others, to align standards, coordinate implementation, share technical knowledge or mobilize finance. When the intended function is vague, expectations can be misaligned, and success becomes difficult to assess.

A credible initiative should articulate whether commitments are collective or individual; whether their focus is political coordination or technical delivery; and whether they are meant to catalyze near-term action or longer-term transformation. This clarity helps determine who needs to be involved, what institutional arrangements are required, and how progress should be evaluated. Defining purpose early also reduces the likelihood of symbolic announcements that lack pathways to implementation.

For example, the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), launched by the United Kingdom and Canada at COP23, defined its purpose from the outset: as a collective political commitment to phase out unabated coal power and halt new plants without carbon capture and storage, while supporting clean energy transitions through domestic policy and finance measures.

3) Set Ambitious and Actionable Goals

Actionable goals are essential for moving initiatives beyond statements of intent. While broad aspirations can help shape narratives or bring attention to a particular issue, initiatives with specific targets or well-defined action areas can better guide decision-making and implementation. For example, the Glasgow Leaders Declaration set a broad target to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030, while the Forest & Climate Leaders' Partnership takes this a step further, with its participating countries working together on six action areas to help drive the achievement of the Glasgow Leaders goal.

Setting credible goals involves articulating what the initiative aims to achieve, by when and through what means. Furthermore, without clearly defined goals, it is difficult to assess progress, mobilize resources or coordinate efforts among participants.

Goal setting can be treated as an evolving process: At launch, initiatives should articulate clear quantitative or qualitative goals that signal intent and define their contribution to the cooperation landscape. As they mature, these goals should become time-bound and measurable. They can also be updated as progress is reviewed and the broader landscape evolves over time. For example, the SIDS Lighthouses Initiative, which aims to advance renewable energy installations in small islands states, has progressively revised and increased its targets several times. The initiative is now working toward achieving its third target (set for 2030), after meeting those previously set for 2020 and 2023.

A solar power installation in Fiji. Fiji is part of the SIDS Lighthouse Initiative, which aims to help expand renewable power in small island developing states. Photo by chameleonseye/iStock 4) Build with the Right Participants and Leadership

The effectiveness and credibility of an initiative depend heavily on who is involved. Strong initiatives intentionally recruit participants that reflect both the problem and the solution. This includes major emitters, countries with significant implementation needs and regions that have been underrepresented in existing efforts.

Today, however, the landscape of climate initiatives is largely dominated by participation from developed countries; the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Japan and the United States are among the five most active countries. Governments from Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and small island developing states participate at lower rates. Meanwhile, participation and leadership from governments in the Global South remain disproportionately low, reducing equity, ownership and relevance.

A better example comes from the International Solar Alliance. India's leadership, together with France, helped establish this initiative, which has since transformed into an intergovernmental organization bringing together more than 120 member countries, many of which are located in the tropics.

Political leadership also matters. Visible champions — whether national governments, regional blocs or ministerial coalitions -— can help attract buy-in, sustain visibility and influence others to join. Geographic diversity and shared leadership across North-South contexts can strengthen credibility, ensure initiatives are grounded in diverse realities, and eventually drive the impact they aim to achieve.

5) Set Up for Success through Robust Institutional and Governance Structures

Initiatives are unlikely to produce impact without sufficient structures, including governance and funding. Developing a robust institution is a prerequisite for effective delivery, with clear decision-making and governance processes.

Research has shown that secretariats support an initiative's ability to deliver and are valuable tools for coordinating participating actors, directing and supporting activities, and facilitating engagement with outside stakeholders. Some initiatives may choose to establish a new, bespoke secretariat, or to house one within an existing organization. The Climate and Clean Air Coalition, for example, has developed robust governance structures, with a secretariat housed at the UN Environment Programme, rotating co-chairs, a diverse board and a scientific advisory panel.

But initiatives and their secretariats cannot deliver without the necessary levels of support, including funding. A dedicated budget is necessary to support process management (such as the secretariat) and the initiative's activities. Equally important is ensuring that this funding is sustained over the long term; otherwise, the initiative risks fading away and being unable to continue its activities.

6) Implement Outcome-Driven Activities

Climate initiatives often succeed in generating visibility, at least during COPs and other major events, but fall short when it comes to execution. To achieve real results, an initiative must be able to translate commitments into activities directly tied to outcomes — whether through policy coordination, technical support, standard setting, information sharing or mobilization of finance. Outputs should be aligned with the stated purpose and structured to allow for delivery within member countries' national contexts.

In practice, this may look like designing workplans or roadmaps and producing concrete outputs (such as technical guidance, pilot projects, finance mobilization plans or capacity building activities) that help member countries deliver their commitments. Here, it is essential to identify the stakeholders needed to effectively carry forward these activities in respective member countries.

With intergovernmental cooperative initiatives, making sure objectives are integrated into national plans and strategies can help strengthen implementation. Embedding initiative goals in domestic policy processes not only ensures that they are aligned with domestic efforts, but also enables activities to be tailored to national realities and ultimately achieve stronger outcomes on the ground.

For example, the Zero Emission Vehicles Transition Council (ZEVTC) supports participating countries through tailored partnerships that align national transport decarbonization strategies with industrial and clean energy policies. It aims to accelerate the transition to zero-emission vehicles by supporting domestic measures to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles and expand charging and refueling infrastructure. Through its multi-stakeholder platforms and country partnerships, ZEVTC helps translate political commitments into coordinated action, mobilize private-sector investment, and catalyze systemic shifts in the transport sector and on the ground.

Electric cars at curbside chargers in Copenhagen. Denmark is a member of the Zero Emission Vehicles Transition Council, which aims to help countries deliver on their transportation decarbonization strategies. Photo by LIVINUS/iStock 7) Monitor Initiative Impacts with Regular Reporting

Transparency is essential for building trust that initiatives are making real progress toward their commitments, yet regular and systematic public reporting remains the exception rather than the rule. While some initiatives publish reports on their efforts online, including through UN Climate Change's Global Climate Action Portal, many provide only ad hoc statements or press releases. And others do not have any formal processes for tracking outputs and outcomes. A robust monitoring and evaluation system, through the development and use of indicators to measure progress against stated objectives, is critical for assessing whether initiatives are mobilizing resources, shifting policies or catalyzing systemic change — in other words, delivering.

This gap is more than a technical shortcoming: It strikes at the very credibility of international climate cooperation. Without clear evidence of delivery, the broader community cannot assess impact or hold initiatives accountable. As a result, confidence in these efforts can erode, raising doubts about the integrity of multilateral climate governance. Cooperation could start to appear as a vehicle solely for symbolic or even greenwashed leadership than as a driver for measurable results.

A Framework for Assessing Progress Assessing intergovernmental climate initiatives: An expectations-based framework

Explore the full report.

Download

WRI's recent research explores how to evaluate whether initiatives are equipped with the goals, governance structures, implementation strategies and reporting systems required to deliver on their commitments. This research puts forward a framework through which an initiative's maturity can be assessed. It tests whether an initiative's goals are clear, as well as complementary to the wider landscape of climate cooperation; whether governance and implementation structures are in place to turn commitments into concrete actions; and whether monitoring and reporting systems exist to track outcomes and communicate progress.

Applying this framework can help identify where climate initiatives need to enhance their efforts and transparency and, in turn, support a shift from one-off pledges toward concrete implementation and impact. Ultimately, the value of cooperation lies not only in what is promised, but in the impact delivered — and it's crucial that initiatives can demonstrate that they are making a difference.

How Can Cooperative Initiatives and COP30 Advance Climate Progress?

Delivering on the promise of international cooperation will require active engagement and collaboration — not only among governments, but across all stakeholders, including international organizations, civil society, subnational and local governments, and others. With the world still off track to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, enhancing international cooperation is imperative.

Brazil's COP30 Presidency has drawn renewed attention to the "Global Climate Action Agenda," an umbrella encompassing the wide range of climate efforts undertaken by diverse actors. The incoming Presidency has sought to align the Action Agenda with the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake in order to connect real-world action with the negotiations at COP30. This effort opens new possibilities for harmonizing the multilateral process with the broader ecosystem of climate action, allowing countries to harness the cooperation already underway, elevate successes and address persistent barriers to greater impact.

Ultimately, the promise of intergovernmental climate cooperation will be determined not by the number of initiatives launched or commitments made, but through effective collective action that delivers systemic transformations.

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• International Climate Action

Authors Nathan Cogswell Kiyomi de Zoysa

Why Once-Scarce Water Is Coming Back in North Mecha, Ethiopia margaret.overh… Tue, 11/04/2025 - 12:31

Minzir, in northern Ethiopia, looks different than it used to. Three years ago, water was dwindling and the landscape was barren. Today, wells have refilled, springs have emerged, and the area is greener.

"Streams used to dry up but are now flowing much longer. For the first time, we are using this water during the dry season. Honestly, I have never seen anything like this in my lifetime," said Molla Arega, a farmer and village leader living in the area.

At the root of the change? A watershed restoration project that's reviving local water supplies.

Photo by Asfaw Melese Landscapes Under Stress

Minzir 01 is a micro-watershed nestled in Ethiopia's North Mecha District, part of the larger Lake Tana Subbasin. The hills and lands of the Amhara Region, where the district is found, bear the marks of decades of overuse and mismanagement.

In Minzir, soil erosion had carved deep gullies through farmland, deforestation and overgrazing stripped the land of its fertility, and rainfall ran off the bare surface. Streams and wells that once provided water for households and crops saw their sources depleting.

"When I was a child, this place was meadow and suitable for farming," said Gedif Tadele, another farmer from the area, in 2022. "There was no deterioration. Now, the land is eroded."

Climate change has magnified these pressures. Increasingly unpredictable rainfall is further straining water supplies and making food harder to grow in the region, threatening household needs. For residents of Minzir 01, living under the shadows of land degradation and water scarcity offered a bleak future.­­­­

This story is not unique. Across Ethiopia and beyond, degraded landscapes are undermining water security and livelihoods, leaving communities increasingly vulnerable to shocks. Poor land management and vegetation loss exacerbate erosion, which strips valuable moisture from the ground. This prevents rainwater from being absorbed and curbs groundwater recharge. As a result, natural water cycles fall into disrepair, compromising everything from agricultural productivity and biodiversity to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) access.

But in Minzir 01, change has begun to take root

Water in landscapes: Land, trees, vegetation and rainfall interact to impact water availability and quality up and downstream. Graphic by WRI Healing the Land to Safeguard Water Supplies

In 2022, WRI partnered with WaterAid Ethiopia to launch a three-year community-led watershed restoration project across 400 hectares of Minzir 01. The goal was simple yet bold: rehabilitate degraded land to improve soil health, revive water sources and strengthen people's wellbeing. Community members from the area — those most affected — would be key actors in planning and implementation.

Seedlings ready for distribution. Photo by Mulatu Adane/WaterAid

The project focused on revegetation and other soil and water conservation practices. Together, participants planted over 187,000 tree and grass seedlings and built 20 kilometers of farmland terrace structures (such as soil bunds and fanya juu) to help stabilize the soil and improve water absorption. They constructed 28 check dams to control water runoff and trap sediment. They closed off over 200 hectares of land to livestock and farming, giving nature a chance to regenerate. And they promoted sustainable farming practices, like agroforestry, on both communal and individual croplands.

These measures were designed to help reduce erosion and rainwater runoff and limit sedimentation (which pollutes waterways). In so doing, they aimed to boost surface waters, replenish groundwater and improve water quality — sustaining the sources that feed local water supply systems.

A soil bund (left: Muluneh Bimrew/WRI) is a raised embankment built to reduce water runoff and soil erosion. Check dams (right: Francesca Battistelli/WRI) are small, localized dams built across a stream or drainage channel and designed to slow water flow, control erosion and trap sediment. The Water's Return

After three short years, the results are striking.

To understand how healthy watersheds affect local water supplies, WRI developed an extensive monitoring framework for this project. With the help of the Abbay Basin Administration Office, we tracked and measured changes in biophysical dynamics (mainly vegetation cover and water availability and quality), as well as impacts on people. An endline assessment of Minzir 01 carried out by external evaluators used GIS, remote sensing, field observation, household surveys and local interviews to compare conditions before and after intervention. With research amplified by local testimony, it highlights both the tangible and locally perceived benefits that have arisen.

Water is already coming back to the land.

Two new springs captured in April 2025. Photo by Muluedil Asres

Groundwater levels rose by 1.2 meters on average across five monitored community wells since the project started — a promising improvement in a region where locals are seeing levels falling. Two local streams, once seasonal, now flow through the dry season, bringing reliable water for over three additional months. New ponds have formed in the stream depressions, and the local wetland has expanded, boosting water retention and supporting irrigation. And two freshwater springs have appeared where none previously existed, standing as proxy for better groundwater.

"I have lived here my whole life. There was never a spring in that part of the land before," says Achenef Alemayehu. "Now, a spring has started to emerge, and it has not stopped flowing since. For a place that used to struggle with water shortages, this has really changed things for the better."

The project has also curbed erosion, stabilizing the area's steep slopes and gullies (an extreme form of soil degradation). It has reduced sediment concentration in local streams by 40%, leading to cleaner water and healthier soils. And the land is becoming greener — measurably so1 — indicating a healthier landscape. Native tree species such as misana, agam and girar are naturally regenerating.

A new water body that has emerged in Minzir 01. Photo by Mulatu Adane

For residents, the science and field data match their own experiences. All those surveyed noted improved water availability, rising water levels and extended stream durations.

"Even more encouraging," says Ambaye Ewnetu, who remembers many years ago when the wetland was stable and saw it thinning out over time, "is that people's attitudes have changed. We now understand the value of protecting our environment."

Locals Reap the Benefits

As the land mended and water availability improved, so did household opportunity and economic uplift. 

Agroforestry — a practice of planting trees alongside crops to improve soil fertility — has provided new fruit and market products, while plants grown for fodder are helping fatten livestock. When asked about income gains, all households surveyed reported an increase. Most (93%) reported higher crop production. Many were also able to start growing a second crop, shifting away from mono-cropping practices that endanger soils and household resilience.

A local woman harvests fodder to feed livestock. Photo by Mulatu Adane/WaterAid

With water more plentiful, homestead vegetable gardens have also flourished. This is important for combatting hunger and malnutrition in a region where approximately 46% of children under five are stunted and 20% of households face moderate to severe food insecurity.

A community water point in Minzir 01. Photo by Francesca Battistelli/WRI

As Yezina Alemneh, a young female farmer, explains: "I began growing wheat and vegetables in my backyard and fattening animals with the fodder. These changes have helped to improve my farm's production."

Her neighbor remarked: "I started growing crops twice a year. When I have extra, I sell it at the nearby market. That small income has helped support my family. We also use the stream water at home for cooking and washing. Some people have started using it for irrigation."

"It's made a big difference for me and others in the community," Molla, the village leader, adds.

Building Sustainable Landscapes: How It all Came Together

Ethiopia is no stranger to land restoration, yet this project stands apart.

What made this effort different was its focus on water outcomes and its integrated scope. For one, it did not treat watershed management solely as a conservation or agricultural endeavor. Instead, it was designed to directly support water security and water supply services, which in turn benefits domestic water, crop cultivation and the environment, as well as broader development goals.

Unlike earlier conservation programs in Ethiopia, which often sidelined the needs and realities of rural communities, the project placed local ownership and livelihood security at its core. The Minzir community jointly planned and implemented activities together with local government officials, who also collaborated in novel ways.

"Unlike the traditional approach, where watershed management was left primarily to the agriculture, environment and forestry offices, we in the Water and Energy Office participated from the beginning in project scoping, implementation, monitoring and evaluation," said Muluedil Asres from the North Mecha Water and Energy Office. "This cross-sectoral collaboration is, in my view, one of the project's most powerful strengths."

District officials also worked closely with the newly formed Watershed Management Committee, in time led by Molla. The committee brought together respected elders, women and others from local villages to ensure community buy-in and help mobilize households in the conservation activities, all on a voluntary basis. By the project's end, all 321 households in Minzir 01 were involved in its implementation and had received hands-on training.

The Minzir 01 Watershed Management Committee. Photo by Muluneh Bimrew/WRI

Alongside on-the-ground activities, the project worked to strengthen institutional decision-making and coordination on water at multiple scales, from basin-level planning to community-managed water systems. For example, the watershed committee joined forces with local Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Committees (WASHCOs) — "an innovative integration between two groups that had never worked together before," Muluedil explains. This helped align land-based restoration efforts with water-point management for a more holistic protection of water supplies and services. "These changes," continues Muluedil, "are now helping meet water needs, and they show that sustainable water source management is achievable."

WRI and partners, including the Millennium Water Alliance, also provided trainings and technical assistance targeting basin, region and woreda (district) authorities. Topics ranged from source water protection, to water allocation planning, to efficient irrigation and water safety planning (a risk assessment and management approach to ensure that water points remain safe and functioning). Trainings by WaterAid at the community level focused on sustainable land and water management practices, climate-smart agriculture and livelihood diversification — some tailor-made for youth and women-headed households.

Minzir 01 community members involved in project implementation. Project by Mulatu Adane/WaterAid

Endorsement across government agencies was and remains strong. Every interviewed official — representing the district's water, agriculture, environment, forestry, land and other offices — expressed solid support for the project's participatory approach and a desire to bring this integrated model to other watersheds in the district and region.

As Asfaw Melese from the Environment and Forest Office emphasized: "From the beginning, the intervention was designed and implemented through a truly participatory, integrated and coordinated approach. My office collaborated closely with other key offices in North Mecha, and most importantly, the local community. The project provided valuable training and experience-sharing opportunities, which significantly built technical capacity and led to improved planning and implementation of conservation measures. These gains represent a major step toward ensuring reliable and sustainable water access for the community."

Community members, too, expressed strong willingness to continue the conservation efforts, underscoring changing attitudes while pointing out the need for consistency. "Personally, I have taken it as my responsibility to maintain the structures on my own land and to encourage my neighbors to do the same," said one resident. "We have already seen the positive results of working together. If we continue, I believe the future will be even brighter for our community."

Key Takeaways

Lessons from Minzir 01 will inform the next project phase, and could offer helpful insights for other ecological restoration initiatives:

• Community leadership and local realities are foundations for long-term sustainability. Without strong local buy-in and livelihood considerations, conservation efforts are unlikely to endure.
• Agro-ecology matters. Local conditions always impact outcomes. Results must be seen in light of an area's agro-ecological circumstances, including climate conditions, soil profiles and topography.
• Water is a unifying thread. By linking landscape restoration to water access, interventions can deliver ecological, hydrological and socio-economic benefits, helping contribute to sustainable water services while improving the local context for water, sanitation and hygiene.
• Integration is powerful. Collaboration with local government and across the water, agriculture, environment, land administration and WASH sectors is essential to water security.
• Monitoring needs time to build evidence. Better data and consistent monitoring are critical to understanding trends and long-term impacts.

It is important to note that, while the results are positive overall, the findings and methodological limitations urge some caution. Rainfall variability dynamics could have influenced some outcomes, while survey and perception-based findings need prudence. However, the endline study did isolate rainfall dynamics, finding that a small increase during the project timeframe alone cannot explain the changes in streamflow and groundwater.

Looking Ahead: A Model for the Future

Minzir 01 has transformed from a degraded catchment into a landscape of recovery and hope.

Perhaps most importantly, the project has rekindled optimism. Community members see a future where their land provides environmental resilience and economic opportunity, while officials see a replicable example for other districts and regions and the larger river basin.

As Asfaw put it, "this is a model for how Ethiopia can secure its water future."

While sustaining these efforts and addressing long-term climate variability will require ongoing support, the lesson is clear: Healthy landscapes mean more water security. Investing in restoration delivers multi-dimensional benefits — not only more trees and carbon storage, but also reliable water, ample food and more resilient communities. Because when land heals, so do those who depend on it.

This article was written in collaboration with Mulatu Adane (WaterAid Ethiopia), Tamene Chaka (Millennium Water Alliance/MWA), and Bewuketu Abebe (Abbay Basin Administration Office/ABAO).

This work was made possible through a generous grant from the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation.

 

1 Using the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). An NDVI assessment involves using a remote sensing technique to measure and analyze vegetation health and density using satellite imagery.

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• Water Security
• Water for Sustainable Development in Ethiopia

Authors Francesca Battistelli Muluneh Bimrew Zablon Adane Tinebeb Yohannes

Expert Q&A: What Should the 2025 UN Climate Summit (COP30) Achieve? margaret.overh… Mon, 11/03/2025 - 15:03

While the impacts of climate change are becoming ever-clearer, so too are the benefits of action.

The shift toward technologies like renewable energy and electric vehicles is already cleaning the air and preventing deaths from pollution. Countries investing in greener development models are creating millions of new jobs in areas like power and manufacturing. Clean energy is lowering electricity costs and bringing power to those without.

Yet this transition is not happening nearly fast enough to prevent increasingly dangerous climate impacts, and progress remains uneven. As some countries forge ahead on low-carbon development, others are pulling back. Meanwhile, the cost of climate change continues to rise: Extreme weather caused over $300 billion in damages last year alone.

What we need now is a step change. The world must move from setting targets to delivering them. The upcoming UN climate summit (COP30) in Belém, Brazil is a prime opportunity to do so.

WRI experts have laid out four key areas where COP30 can put the world on track for a safer, more prosperous future:

1. Deliver robust national climate commitments, using detailed global and country plans to close the gap in climate action.
2. Transform the global financial system so that all forms of finance (public and private, domestic and international) support the transition to green, inclusive, resilient economies. Ensure that funds reach the countries and communities that need them most.
3. Step up climate resilience by recognizing that investing in adaptation means investing in growth, security and development; by delivering an ambitious new adaptation finance goal; and by setting clear, measurable indicators for tracking progress.
4. Protect nature, reform food systems and advance Indigenous land rights: three key elements for tackling the interconnected climate and nature crises together.

So, what must COP30 achieve in these areas and beyond to be considered a success? Here's what our experts are looking for:

Embrace Climate Action as an Economic StrategyAni Dasgupta, WRI President and CEO

About COP30

The 2025 UN climate summit (COP30) runs from Nov. 10-Nov. 21, 2025 in Belém, Brazil. To learn more about the key issues at stake and explore the latest news, research and events, visit WRI's Resource Hub

Right now, we face many headwinds for climate action and multilateralism. The U.S. has stepped back, and there are similar discussions of slowing down in parts of Europe. But that's not the whole story. Across the 50 countries WRI works in, what we see on the ground is that progress is happening.

All of the leaders I speak to from developing countries see this transition as their best economic opportunity, not as a burden. This is especially true in large middle-income countries. China and India are driving record renewable deployment, especially solar. Economic growth driven by clean energy is now even more of a motivator than climate. As COP host, Brazil is also showing how an economy rooted in forest protection, rather than destruction, can create over $8 billion in additional GDP and more than 300,000 new jobs in the Amazon region by 2050. For these countries, economic prosperity, energy security and decarbonization are essentially the same thing, driving the momentum we're seeing today.

There's a geopolitical realignment of climate leadership taking place. These middle-income countries played a key role in shaping the outcome [at COP29 in 2024] in Baku. With their large populations, substantial emissions and significant stores of biodiversity, they will continue to play an outsized role in determining the success of the global transition for people, nature and climate. We are watching closely to see what form their leadership will take at COP30.

Banners outside the UN climate talks in Bonn, Germany, that precede the annual COP climate conference. Photo by UNclimatechange/flickr Accelerate Action on National Climate Commitments, Finance and AdaptationMelanie Robinson, Global Climate, Economics and Finance Director, WRI

All countries are due to deliver new national climate plans (known as "nationally determined contributions," or "NDCs") this year. Sixty-five countries had formally submitted NDCs as of Oct. 27 — and the current plans fall far short of what's needed to meet the Paris Agreement's goals. Several major emitters are still expected to put forward NDCs ahead of or during COP30, which could help. But a substantial gap remains.

In Belém, leaders must agree on a decisive global response to address this shortfall. This includes: 1) reaffirming the 1.5 degree C goal and developing an "Ambition Framework" which sets out how to close the gap to achieve it; 2) accelerating sector-specific strategies to cut emissions from areas like energy and transport before 2030, reflecting the outcomes of the 2023 Global Stocktake on climate action; and 3) clarifying pathways to achieve countries' net-zero goals, particularly through updated long-term strategies.

On the finance front, leaders set a target last year to mobilize $1.3 trillion annually from all international sources for developing countries' climate action by 2035. The forthcoming Baku-to-Belém Roadmap will lay out pragmatic strategies to achieve this goal, showing how countries can get all sources working together as a system to deliver finance for the transition at scale. At COP30, countries must demonstrate how they will turn this plan into action. One promising development to look for is the unveiling of "country platforms": various country-led approaches that aim to align all sources of finance behind countries' climate and development plans, policy reforms and investment pipelines.

As for climate resilience, the 2021 "Glasgow pledge" to double adaptation finance expires this year, and countries must decide on a new goal at COP30. Some developing countries are calling for a needs-based target while others are calling to triple adaptation finance by 2030. Our own forthcoming analysis shows that a tripling is achievable by 2035, but it would take increases across all sources (including multilateral development banks' funds for the poorest, bilateral funds, new sources of concessional finance, and more private finance being mobilized), and finance working better as a system. 

COP30 also offers an opportunity to adopt a set of progress indicators under the Global Goal on Adaptation. This will create a common language to track resilience-building efforts and the support needed. Done right, this can help put resilience at the heart of countries', communities' and corporates' core economic, development and business planning.

Construction of a solar power plant in China. At this year's climate conference, it's critical that countries deliver concrete plans to put their national climate commitments into action. Photo by Xiangli Li/Shutterstock Strengthen Pledges that Align Action on Climate and NatureMariana Oliveira, Director of Forests and Land Use, WRI Brasil

We won't meet our climate goals — not on mitigation, not on adaptation — if forests and ecosystems aren't part of the plan. The science is clear that protecting and restoring nature and transforming food systems are powerful tools to cut emissions, build resilience and reduce climate impacts. The challenge? Mobilizing the resources to scale these solutions.

One initiative to watch at COP30 is the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) that will be launched by the Brazilian government. This bold proposal offers predictable, performance-based payments to countries that keep their forests standing, moving away from dependence on philanthropy. Brazil has already pledged $1 billion to the fund, and other countries, such as the U.K., Colombia, Norway and Indonesia, have expressed their support for it. But for the TFFF to work, it needs at least $25 billion to be announced during COP. Whether developed countries will step up is a key question.

Countries should also deliver a strong package to bolster Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' land tenure rights and increase funding to them. While these communities are some of the world's most effective forest stewards, their territories are under constant and increasing threats, and many lack legal rights to the lands they manage. COP30 can help by delivering an improved Forest Tenure Pledge 2.0 and ensuring that Indigenous Peoples and local communities receive at least 20% of funding from the TFFF.

Equally essential is unlocking investments in sustainable agriculture and land restoration. One development to watch is the launch of the RAIZ (Resilient Agriculture Investment for Net-Zero Land Degradation) initiative. This proposes innovative financial mechanisms to fund the restoration of up to 250 million hectares of degraded land by 2050 — while at the same time increasing global food production.

Alongside RAIZ, complementary initiatives already underway in Brazil (such as the National Productive Forests Program and the Action Plan for Deforestation Prevention and Control in the Amazon) underscore the country's emerging leadership in integrating action on climate, nature and food systems. Advancing this cohesive agenda more broadly can help ensure that COP30 delivers not only on climate ambition, but also on resilience, equity and shared prosperity.

A restoration initiative led by the organization BIOCOOR in Rwanda. Solutions like restoring degraded land and shifting to more sustainable farming practices can deliver wins for people, nature and the climate together. Photo by Serrah Galos/WRI Under Brazil's Leadership, Make This the 'COP of Implementation'Karen Silverwood-Cope, Climate Director, WRI Brasil

In its role as COP president, Brazil is bringing a clear and ambitious vision to COP30: to make Belém the "COP of Implementation." The Presidency's central challenge is to turn promises into real-world action — bridging divides between developed and developing countries, ambition and equity, mitigation and adaptation. The Brazilian Presidency has outlined three priorities that began to be articulated and implemented in 2024 and will culminate in Brazil's COP Presidency by the end of 2026.

First, Brazil has been working to align climate and economic priorities over the last year through convenings like the G20 and BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] summit, putting finance at the heart of international climate talks. Brazil also launched the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers, bringing together representatives from 37 countries who developed concrete recommendations on concessional finance, multilateral bank reform, country investment platforms and regulatory frameworks to unlock capital flows. This work provided key input to the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap and was an important step toward better integrating finance ministers, who are key to scaling up climate finance, into international climate talks.

Second, Brazil is redefining regional leadership, rooted in cooperation between emerging economies. For example, the Rio Declaration at the recent BRICS summit signaled a readiness among emerging economies to lead a resilient, low-carbon transition — from green bonds and tropical forest protection to new trade and carbon accounting initiatives.

Finally, Brazil's presidency is working to weave together the broader web of actors that drive progress outside of formal COP negotiations. It aims to deliver an "Action Agenda" that can better align all actors behind various climate commitments and processes (like the Global Stocktake, NDCs and long-term strategies), promoting transparency and accountability in climate action.

Other key deliverables to watch for at COP30 under Brazil's leadership include progress on the Just Transition Work Programme and the Gender Action Plan and the development of indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation.

Follow Along

WRI experts are tracking these issues closely in the lead-up to COP and will be on the ground in Belém during the summit. To learn more about the issues at stake, explore related articles and research, and stay abreast of the outcomes, visit WRI's COP30 resource hub.

amazon-rainforest-belem-brazil.jpg Climate COP30 climate change National Climate Action International Climate Action NDC climate finance adaptation Forests Food biodiversity Type Expert Take Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Maggie Overholt

CityMetrics Dashboard Helps Cities Understand and Reduce Climate Risks sarah.brown@wri.org Fri, 10/31/2025 - 09:48

The new CityMetrics site from WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities offers an interactive dashboard where users can explore key urban indicators and geospatial datasets from more than 60 cities that WRI works with. It includes cities participating in the Deep Dive Cities Initiative, Cities4Forests and UrbanShift.  

The dashboard is organized around seven key themes related to sustainability and resilience — flooding, heat, air quality, accessibility, land protection, biodiversity and climate change mitigation. It provides datasets and maps that let users analyze metrics within each city over a selected period and compare information across multiple cities.

The seven themes include different indicators such as:

Flooding: Exposure to coastal and river overflow, presence of built-up land near natural drainage, and the expected number of days of extreme rainfall.

Heat: Projected high temperatures and number of heat waves, presence of built-up land without tree cover and areas with low surface reflectivity.

Air Quality: Exposure to PM2.5, or fine particle, pollution.

Accessibility: Proximity to essential goods and services such as health care and public transportation, and the amount of green or recreational space per capita.

Land Protection: Protected areas, restored habitats, permeable areas and the presence of tree cover.

Biodiversity: Presence of species in natural and built-up areas, and habitat connectivity.

Climate Change Mitigation: Greenhouse gas emissions and potential mitigation measures.

Creating a broad and detailed view of urban risks can not only accelerate effective action but also encourage cities to learn from one another and track progress on key resilience priorities. By gathering, analyzing and presenting open data on cities worldwide, CityMetrics aims to empower city leaders and other decision-makers to better understand local challenges and prioritize actions. Through the dashboard, they can also identify opportunities for potential management and mitigation efforts based on a city's risk profile.

The CityMetrics dashboard stems from the technical expertise of WRI Ross Center’s Urban Analytics and Data Innovation team and core project partners. It builds on the Cities Indicators Dashboard, an earlier version of the tool created to support cities involved in the UrbanShift and the Cities4Forests programs. Because of its success and value to users, WRI’s Urban Analytics and Data Innovation team refreshed and expanded the tool, adding more cities and indicators for decision-makers to explore and analyze. With the CityMetrics dashboard, users can explore interactive views of data within the site and download background data for a deeper analysis. 

It helps city leaders and decision-makers answer questions such as:

Which risks impact my city the most?

From extreme temperature exposure to accessibility of green spaces, users can identify which risks affect their cities the most.

For example, in Delhi, India, air quality and flooding pose the greatest risks, with the city ranking among the those with the highest risk scores for these two themes in CityMetrics. High levels of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) pollution contribute to air quality challenges, while intense rainfall combined with development in low-lying, flood prone areas make the city particularly vulnerable to flooding.  

Which areas within the city are most at risk?

Users can explore which areas of a city face different levels of risk across the dashboard’s seven metrics.

For example, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, wards (the city’s neighborhoods) 402, 403, 430 and 422 have the most built-up land near natural drainage of all wards in the city, making them particularly vulnerable to flooding. The first three wards (402, 403 and 403) contain large areas of irregular settlements, while the last one (422) is mostly covered by a coastal port.  

How are specific populations impacted by certain risks?

Through the dashboard, users can see which segments of the population face risks across the seven themes.  

For example, the accessibility metric in Mexico City, Mexico, shows that children have less access to open spaces than the entire population. About 53.2% of children have access to an open space within a 400-meter walking distance, compared to 55.4% of the total population and 58.7% of the elderly.  

How have the risks in a city changed over time?

Users can explore historical trends to see how risks in a city have changed over a selected period.

In Jakarta, Indonesia, the amount of land that can naturally absorb rainwater has dropped significantly over the past 30 years. In 1989, nearly half (49%) of the city’s land could absorb water, but by 2018 that figure had fallen to just 8%.

To access the full dashboard and explore and compare indicators across cities, visit CityMetrics.wri.org. To learn more about the dashboard and why open data is essential for driving urban innovation and resilience, read the blog on CityMetrics at TheCityFix.org.

 

istock-1456244538.jpg Cities climate change climate impacts data data visualization Climate Resilience Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Eric Mackres Eillie Anzilotti Saif Shabou Ted Wong

Reducing Food Loss and Waste Could Feed More Than 7 Million Kenyans Every Year alicia.cypress… Fri, 10/31/2025 - 09:30

Africa is the only region where hunger is on the rise. Today, more than 300 million people — one in four Africans — are hungry and if current trends persist, the continent will account for over 60% of the world’s hungry by 2030.

In Kenya, at least a quarter of the population faces severe food insecurity, even as up to 40% of the food produced (worth an estimated $578 million) is lost or wasted each year. This not only squanders scarce resources such as land, water, labor and energy but also fuels climate change, contributing to 21% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.

While often discussed together, food loss and food waste are distinct: food loss occurs earlier in the supply chain — on farms or during handling, storage and transport — whereas food waste occurs later, at retail, in restaurants and in households.

A recent WRI report focused on Kenya’s key food value chains (maize, potato, fresh fruits and fish), has found that if Kenya achieves a 50% reduction in food loss and waste by 2030, it could: 

• Feed more than 7 million people annually with food that would otherwise be lost.
• Inject 36 billion Kenyan shillings ($279 million) back into the economy, boosting small farms and small business incomes. 

• Eliminate more than 7 million metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions significantly advancing Kenya’s climate goals and reducing pressure on biodiversity.

   

Despite Kenya’s commitment to reducing food loss and waste, WRI research found that progress has been slow due to limited data, weak coordination and insufficient financing for scalable solutions.

How Much and Where Do Losses and Waste Occur in Kenya?

Food loss and waste happen in all value chains, but we focused on specific foods for their importance as staples to the Kenyan diet (maize, potato, banana), nutrient-rich sources (fruits and fish) and commercially significant commodities (mango and avocado).

Due to long, complex supply chains and limited tracking data, it is challenging to ascertain exact figures for food loss. However, reported estimates indicate losses and waste ranging from 20% to 36% for maize, 19% to 22% for potato, 17% to 56% for mango, 15% to 35% for avocado, 7% to 11% for banana and 15% to 34% for fish.

While food loss and waste occur at all stages, critical points differ by commodity: Harvesting, retail and wholesale for potato, fruit and fish; drying and storage for maize; and processing for fish. The primary causes are inefficient harvesting, rough handling during packaging and transportation, limited storage and outdated processing methods for fish.

Innovations Can Reduce Food Loss and Waste

One of the most effective strategies Kenya can adopt to reduce food loss and waste is scaling up the use of proven technologies and innovations across the entire food value chain. These include improved harvesting tools, appropriate fishing gear, drying technologies, insecticides, fruit fly traps, better storage facilities (e.g., hermetic bags, silos, light-diffused rooms), cold chains and decentralized processing for perishables. Process innovations also improve supply-chain efficiency by connecting farmers to reliable markets through aggregation, contract farming and traceability systems, which track foods from farm to table.

However, the adoption of new technologies depends on proper training for farmers and value chain actors. Traditional methods — such as long-used harvesting practices — are deeply ingrained, making farmers hesitant to change. Some technologies, such as hermetic grain storage bags, can significantly reduce losses but remain less affordable than widely used polypropylene bags.

Cold chain systems, while effective, are often ill-suited to small farmers. Process innovations, such as contract farming and warehouse receipt systems, also face low acceptance due to mistrust stemming from side-selling, past negative experiences, and weak enforcement. Similarly, small farm processing initiatives, though promising, struggle with high marketing costs and limited reach, making it hard to sustain operations at a commercial scale.

Moving from Commitments to Action

Despite Kenya’s commitment to reduce food loss and waste, as the country has signed on to multiple national and global sustainability targets, the country lacks a robust mechanism for monitoring it, which hinders efforts to understand its scale, underlying causes and effective solutions. This gap presents a major bottleneck in identifying priorities and implementing targeted interventions.

Here are three key strategies that can help Kenya and other African countries reduce food loss and waste:

1) Strengthen Measurement of Food Loss and Waste Magnitudes, Hotspots and Causes

Like many countries, Kenya lacks disaggregated data on where losses happen and why. What gets measured gets managed. Without accurate data, it is challenging to establish national targets, implement effective interventions and measure progress. Developing a standardized system for tracking food loss and waste across the value chains is critical. This includes investing in data collection tools, training stakeholders, and integrating food loss and waste metrics into national agricultural and food systems reporting. WRI and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations are designing practical tools to measure and report food loss and waste in ways that reflect on-the-ground realities — small, scattered farms, seasonal harvests and complex supply chains. For Kenya and other African countries, these tools could be game changers in the fight against hunger, food loss and food waste.

2) Scaling Investment in Proven Food Loss and Waste Solutions and Practices

WRI’s research demonstrates that many proven technologies and practices exist to reduce food loss and waste in the selected value chains. However, without greater awareness and sufficient financing, most of these solutions remain small-scale and underused. Building capacity in areas such as pre-harvest checks, harvesting methods, drying, storage, hygiene, transport and aggregation is critical, and successful models — like maize cob-and-grain business hubs — should be scaled up.

Lessons from export value chains, including contract farming, farmer aggregation and cold storage, can also be adapted for domestic markets. At the consumer level, public education campaigns, school programs and retailer partnerships can help shift habits. Encouraging portion control, proper food storage and redistributing surplus food are practical steps to cut waste at the household and retail levels.

The World Bank estimates it will take $30 billion to $50 billion to halve food loss and waste by 2030, yet by 2020, only $1.1 billion had been invested. Closing this gap demands bold public–private partnerships and sustained financing — from seed to long-term capital — to deliver farm-to-fork reductions, save resources and cut emissions. At the same time, food loss and waste solutions, such as cold chains, reliable energy and improved handling, must be tested for real-world fit, affordability and trade-offs to ensure they are effective in local contexts.

3) Advance Policy and Coordination

Kenya needs holistic food strategies that move beyond sectoral approaches to systemic solutions, with food loss and waste at the center. Policy shifts must be evidence-based — grounded in accurate measurement of FLW across supply chains, an understanding of local drivers, and clear cost–benefit analysis of interventions, including potential trade-offs. Supportive policies for food donation and redistribution are also critical. To deliver impact, Kenya should strengthen implementation of its National Strategy on Postharvest Loss and Waste by operationalizing a national food loss and waste committee with clear mandates, county-level links and a dedicated budget, while also mainstreaming food loss and waste into its nationally determined commitments and sector plans as a lever for food security and climate action.

kenya-market-food-loss-waste.jpg Food Kenya Food Loss and Waste food security greenhouse gases biodiversity Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Fighting Food Loss and Waste

Authors Robert Mbeche James Wangu Susan Chomba

Modernizing Ports Is a Major Untapped Opportunity for a Healthier Planet alicia.cypress… Thu, 10/30/2025 - 15:03

If global shipping were a country, it would rank among the world’s top six emitters of climate-harming greenhouse gases (GHGs). Eighty percent of international trade — fundamental to the global economy and the goods we use in our everyday lives — travels by sea from port to port, generating 3% of global GHG emissions. Reducing these emissions is critically urgent to protecting our climate, oceans, economy and human health.

Countries have already focused significant attention on trying to decarbonize vessels and develop new fuels. Most recently, after 10 years of development and negotiations, the world was poised to pass a new framework from the International Maritime Organization that would have created a market-based system designed to promote vessel decarbonization.

Ships exceeding carbon-intensity targets would be required to pay penalties, while ships outperforming the targets would be rewarded and able to sell credits. The system would have raised revenue for an international fund that would help spur a transition to lower-emissions fuels.

But just as this paradigm-shifting program was set to be adopted, the U.S. and a small number of other countries abruptly withdrew their support, delaying the plan’s potential adoption for at least another year.

Port Vell, part of the Port of Barcelona, in Spain. Decarbonizing ports in cities around the world can play a significant role in addressing climate, ocean and human health. Photo by bearfotos/Shutterstock.

With progress on the water facing a fresh reckoning that calls for new collective efforts, now is the time to bolster efforts on the shore, where ports are largely an untapped resource in the fight against climate change.

Ports are a major polluter, generating harmful emissions and seldom prioritized for trailblazing climate action despite their importance to the ocean and global shipping. Of the world’s 50 largest ports, 42 are located around cities, where they generate jobs that support local and national economies and trade connections across the globe.

With the global move to address vessel-based emissions at a crossroad, there’s momentum and opportunity for ports and their home cities to play a more significant role in addressing climate change and economic development while safeguarding ocean and human health.

Early Movers Help Define Successful Decarbonization

Some countries and ports are already starting to pave the way toward full port decarbonization. These early actions present a wealth of experience that can facilitate broader progress on what works, what doesn’t, and what regulatory, financial and political conditions are required to succeed.

In 2024, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency launched a $3 billion Clean Ports Program, awarding 54 grants to fund clean port equipment and infrastructure as well as climate and air quality planning at ports located in 27 states and territories, where the work to decarbonize is still ongoing.

Earlier this year, government representatives of Brazil and Ocean Panel member, Norway signed a memorandum of understanding to promote sustainable maritime transport, including port decarbonization. This agreement looks to initiate low-carbon supply chains to create a green maritime corridor between the two countries.

The Port of Barcelona is already installing shore power for both container ships and passenger ferries, drawing on 100% renewable electricity. The port is also investing in electric straddle carriers for moving containers as part of its broader efforts to halve carbon emissions by 2030 (relative to 2017). Meanwhile, the Port of Trelleborg in Sweden is aiming for net-zero emissions by 2040 and exploring green fuel options. It is also establishing “green corridors,” which aim to create low-emission transportation routes with partner ports.

Cars line up to board a ferry in the Port of Trelleborg in Sweden. The port is aiming for net-zero emissions by 2040. Photo by Olrat/iStock. 

In China, the Port of Shanghai has developed a workplan to boost the transition toward alternative maritime fuels. This will increase the supply of liquefied natural gas, methanol and ammonia for vessel refueling (known as bunkering). A maritime decarbonization center is planned to help coordinate efforts in the transition toward alternative fuels.

In the Netherlands, major trading hubs like Rotterdam have set out a clear goal to become the green shipping hub of Europe. They, and many smaller ports including Walvis Bay in Namibia, have begun to pilot the production of green hydrogen.

4 Key Benefits of Decarbonizing Ports

Port decarbonization can provide a quadruple win, providing effective options for climate change mitigation, economic opportunity, improved human health and ocean ecosystem benefits:

1) A Powerful Force Against Climate Change

The decarbonization of shipping and ports is one of the most actionable and achievable opportunities to support the development of a sustainable ocean economy today while mitigating the impacts of climate change. Research indicates that action across seven ocean economy sectors can provide over 35% of the emissions reductions required by 2050 to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit). Of these sectors, decarbonizing shipping and ports can mitigate 2 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year in emissions reductions by 2050 — that’s equivalent to more than 3% of global greenhouse gas emissions, or taking around 430 million gas-fueled cars off the road every year.

2) More Economic and Job Opportunities 

Decarbonizing ports can generate new economic opportunities, greater security in the energy and food sectors, and enhance stable global trade connectivity and partnerships.  According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the ocean economy has doubled since 1995, growing at an average rate of 2.8% per year globally. The same research also concludes that a sustainable global ocean economy will continue to grow — tripling in production by 2050, relative to 2020. Considering employment as a metric, the decarbonization of ports and shipping could support 13.3 million additional jobs in 2050 — including shipbuilding, renewable and alternative fuel production, vessel and port facility retrofitting, shipbreaking, electrical work and more — relative to a business-as-usual scenario.   

3) Better Health Outcomes for Communities

There are clear benefits to human health from port decarbonization. Vessels currently running on heavy fuel oil emit toxic air pollution that includes particulate matter, black carbon, nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide. Decarbonizing vessels, when scaled to ports globally, could help to avoid as many as 265,000 premature deaths globally each year. Air quality improvements will benefit not only port workers, but also those communities living in proximity to ports, many of which are disadvantaged relative to other city neighborhoods. This would particularly benefit children, who breathe in more volume of air relative to their body weight and are in critical development stages, which make them especially vulnerable to air pollution.

4) Healthier Ocean Ecosystems

Ocean health would benefit from port decarbonization through a likely reduction in the frequency and size of oil and diesel spills. Decarbonization would also counter the localized ocean acidification that is associated with emissions of nitrous oxides and sulfur dioxide from fossil fuels. Alongside broader coastal habitat restoration activities, it’s possible that we could start to see nature returning to ports. 

Smaller ports in cities around the world, like Walvis Bay, Namibia, have begun to pilot the production of green hydrogen as an alternative to climate-harming fossil fuels. Photo by Pavel Mora/iStock.  Seizing the Opportunity

Achieving the full potential of decarbonized ports will require robust planning and implementation while aligning with business interests. Specifically, port planning needs to be paired with climate action plans and integrate terminal operators, logistics companies and local residents. As shipping is already a natural global connector, communication and coordination between cities and other ports will ensure that successes can scale widely.

Cities Are Key to Port Decarbonization

As seen from some of the early mover examples, high-level intergovernmental efforts to drive sector decarbonization requires city-level leadership for implementation. Cities are hubs of economic activity, and their administrations have influence over the businesses and developments within their limits.

To date, city leaders have played a key role as enablers and advocates for the rapid development of climate resilience. Decarbonizing ports provides further opportunities to promote sustainable growth and investment while mitigating climate change and boosting energy security and trade connectivity.

Private Sector Involvement is Crucial

The private sector has begun to set corporate targets and invest in low-carbon fuel and vessel innovations. In turn, ports are also starting to take action, identifying opportunities and challenges and developing plans for electrification.

Coordinating activities between the private sector and ports is challenging, however, because of a number of cross cutting areas that affect decision making both for shipping and cruise operators and ports. Chief among these is uncertainty generated by competing fuel technologies.

Putting One Decarbonized Step in Front of the Other

To make progress on decarbonization there are critical needs, including:

• Analysis on the economic case for action based on the current and projected future state of progress in vessel decarbonization and fuel choices.
• Analysis of the benefits and challenges associated with various alternative fuel options, including electrification, biofuel strategies that minimize suboptimal land use, ammonia, methanol and hydrogen, for land-side and water-side equipment and vessels.
• A roadmap for fuel development and cost/benefit analysis for the conversion of systems.
• Guidance and detailed case studies from ports that have started the transition exploring what has worked and why.

However, decarbonization efforts could start immediately with the electrification of port ground vehicles like terminal tractors, cranes, straddle carriers, heavy forklifts and heavy goods vehicles that serve as cargo handling equipment. These vehicles are under continuous intensive use in ports and typically powered by older diesel internal combustion engines. They consume about 15% of total port energy yet are responsible for up to 30% of particulate emissions. Switching to electric power will result in significant improvements of local air quality alongside reduced noise pollution.

Additionally, the electrification of short-trip port harbor vessels including tugs, pilot boats, mooring tenders and maintenance craft could lead to port greenhouse gas emissions reductions by as much as 25%. The electrification of domestic passenger ferry routes is becoming increasingly common as a method to increase operational efficiency and reduce port-based greenhouse gas emissions, with Norway in particular leading the charge.

A further step is for large vessels like cruise ships and cargo ships utilizing ports, such as container ships, to use electricity supplied through shore power (also known as ‘cold ironing’) when docked to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and immediately improve air quality by limiting the need for running diesel generators. Analysis suggests carbon emissions associated with docked ships could be reduced by 30% to 60% depending on the source of the shore power.

Emerging opportunities are also offering some solutions but will require more studies and testing. These include decarbonizing the main propulsion systems of ships through hybridization and/or use of alternative fuels like methanol and ammonia, which can lead to a significant reduction of carbon emissions. Further reductions can also take place if coupled with technical measures such as  air lubrication, sail assistance, efficient propellor designs, and operational measures like slow steaming, frequent hull de-fouling, and route optimization that consider prevailing weather conditions.

To support landside electrification of ports, the installation of increased port renewable energy generation capacity and battery storage capacity (through microgrids) will be crucial. Wind, solar and tidal generation show particular promise at ports, and can further enhance the resilience of operations to main grid disruptions and energy price fluctuations.

Countries like Norway have begun using hybrid ferries to reduce emissions. The Scandline Hybrid Ferry uses its Flettner rotor with wind power to save on fuel. Photo by Photofex-AT/iStock. Accelerating Port Decarbonization

As noted, cities have a key role to play in advancing port decarbonization as a method to reduce their overall emissions. Specific steps include: 

1. Naming port decarbonization as key to carbon neutrality. Many cities have announced reduced or net-zero emissions goals to combat climate change. Ports can be elevated as a priority to address significant emissions while improving public health.
2. Setting ambitious mid- and long-term targets for emissions reductions at the city-level would create momentum and accountability regardless of stalled national or international progress.
3. Translating clean technology deployments in other sectors to ports including leveraging lessons and infrastructure from land transport electrification. The rapidly growing electric vehicle segment offers innovative approaches in shipping and goods movement.
4. Promoting exchanges between cities and ports to create transparency around data, progress, and technical learnings while launching breakthrough collaborations like new green shipping corridors between cities and ports or aligning on a common clean fuel source.

This type of approach that leverages ambitious climate goals with cross-sector and global collaboration has been effective in signaling change in other industries. For example, the Ocean Panel set targets and common goals between diverse nations to protect the ocean. Electric transit buses and school buses gained momentum using a systems-wide approach that engaged fleets, communities, energy providers, manufacturers and policymakers.

Now, more than ever, ambitious climate action is necessary across the transportation sector and beyond. Ports present an opportunity to not only bolster climate action but also provide clear wins for human and ocean health while supporting global and local economies and sustainable growth.

At a time when geopolitical shifts and a changing global economic outlook are stalling national climate ambitions and commitments, putting sustainable development at risk, decarbonizing ports offers a scalable and actionable opportunity to tackle climate change, address health risks and promote sustainable development.

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• High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy
• Electric Mobility

Authors Jonathan Baines Oliver Ashford Sue Gander Stephanie Ly Micheline Khan Katie Wood

What Is the Paris Agreement’s Article 2.1(c) on Climate Finance, and Why Does it Matter? Key Questions, Answered christian.made… Thu, 10/30/2025 - 14:00

Recent studies indicate that the world will need $10 trillion annually between 2030 and 2050 to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. That’s a lot — but the world has the money.

As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) explains, “there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gaps … but there are barriers to redirecting capital to climate action.” The challenge, then, is not necessarily raising additional finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation, but how to align all of the world’s capital toward climate action.

Article 2.1(c) of the international Paris Agreement on climate change aims to do just that by “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient development.” However, the language of Article 2.1(c) is vague on what exactly it entails. Ten years after virtually all countries adopted the Paris Agreement, they’re still at odds over the scope of Article 2.1(c) and how it should be implemented.

Here, we explain what Article 2.1(c) is, how it interacts with other finance mandates, and what’s needed to put it into action.

What Does Article 2.1(c) Do? 

The heart of the Paris Agreement on climate change is Article 2, which sets the objectives of the agreement. Article 2.1(a) urges a global response to hold the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) to reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Article 2.1(b) outlines the need to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change, build resilience and pursue low-greenhouse gas development. Article 2.1(c) points out that we need to make finance flows consistent with these objectives if we’re ever going to attain them. Finally, Article 2.2 outlines the context these articles should be pursued under, including the principles of equity, common-but-differentiated responsibility, and respective capabilities and national circumstances.

2.1(c) is a holistic goal. That means it covers both mitigation and adaptation, potentially encompassing domestic and international finance flows. It requires not just scaling up the good finance — for example, climate resilience bonds and financing for new renewable energy projects — but also scaling down funding to carbon-intensive activities, like new coal plants or diesel truck fleets. And it doesn’t stop with government spending. Depending on how it’s interpreted, it could also encompass the private sector, including financial institutions, businesses, corporations and investors.

In short, financial systems broadly must align with the pursuit of sustainable development and international climate goals. This means that all types of investments and financing activities — all investors and actors in the real economy, stock as well as flows — should be “consistent” with achieving the world’s climate goals.

2.1(c) will require economic and financial reform. The tools (e.g., policies and economic and financial instruments) for getting there will be many and varied. Innovative policies and financial instruments will surely play a role, such as green procurement (where companies and governments would be required to decarbonize supply chains) and climate-related bonds to integrate climate priorities into economic development plans.

And in order to ensure equity, alignment of financial flows will have to be customized to each country’s economic, financial and social contexts. This especially includes developing countries’ pursuit of sustainable development, poverty eradication and a just transition.

What Progress Has Been Made Toward Achieving Article 2.1(c)? 

Though a common understanding of 2.1(c) has yet to be agreed upon by Paris Agreement signatories, efforts inside and outside the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are providing glimpses of what alignment could look like.

Efforts Within UNFCCC

Article 2.1(c) has been surfaced in several different forums within the UNFCCC over the past several years. These include the UN’s Global Stocktake, which concluded at the 2023 UN climate summit (COP28) and assessed progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement, including Article 2.1(c), for the first time. In its key findings, it recognized that financial flows include “international and domestic, public and private.”

In 2022 at COP27, negotiators established the Sharm el-Sheikh (SeS) dialogue on Article 2.1(c). This brought together countries, organizations and other stakeholders to exchange views and deepen the understanding of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9.

Between 2023 and 2025, six SeS dialogues were held, covering key topics including defining the scope of Article 2.1(c), identifying intended and unintended consequences of climate finance, methodologies for tracking financial flows, capacity building for the financial sector and more.

The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), established during COP16, has two tasks related to Article 2.1(c): mapping information that contributes to the implementation of Article 2.1(c) and preparing a synthesis report (published in November 2023) analyzing how to operationalize it. The SCF provided a first report at COP27 and an updated report at COP28 for countries’ consideration.

Efforts Outside UNFCCC

Stakeholders like investors and corporations have developed frameworks to identify progress in aligning financing per Article 2.1(c). For example, WRI developed a framework and identified tools governments already have at their disposal to shift and mobilize finance. Tools are available in four categories: financial policies and regulations, fiscal policy levers, public finance and information instruments.

Investors, corporations and financial institutions have also shown some progress on Article 2.1(c) alignment.

Paying for the Paris Agreement Resource Hub

WRI's Paying for Paris resource hub highlights different tools to make progress toward 2.1(c). This platform includes multimedia modules on 16 tools for aligning and increasing public and private finance for climate goals, including public-private partnerships, green procurement standards, mandatory climate risk disclosure and more.

Some are mainstreaming climate risk in their operations by applying risk management approaches, including disclosure frameworks to assess physical (e.g., fires and floods) and transitional (e.g., regulatory and technologies) risks. The theory of change is that disclosing information on climate-related risks may lead to investors deciding to shift their investments, contributing to alignment. To this end, corporations are applying the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures  frameworks to their own risk disclosures. Even some central banks have incorporated climate-related risks into their operations.

Additionally, investors with the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero  have developed guidelines for financial institutions to align their business and operations with the goal of achieving net-zero emissions. Financial institutions including asset owners and managers, commercial banks and insurers have made commitments to back sustainable finance and phase out coal. Multilateral development banks have also rolled out principles and a joint methodology to align their operations — including both direct investment and policy-based lending — to the goals of the Paris Agreement.

What Challenges Remain to Operationalize Article 2.1(c)?

Despite incremental progress, understanding the place of Article 2.1(c) in the overall climate negotiations, defining key terms like “financial flows” and “consistent,” and addressing concerns about countries’ sovereignty all pose challenges for the international finance community to move forward.

Defining ‘Consistency of Financial Flows’

One of the key challenges to operationalizing Article 2.1(c) is that countries are using different terms and concepts to interpret the word “consistency.” These include directing, orienting, aligning, shifting, steering, scaling up, scaling down and more. Some countries argue that “consistency of financial flows” is about directing finance to green, sustainable and/or climate-related activities, regardless of the financial instruments through which such flows are channeled. The IPCC has defined it more broadly as looking at all investments, whether or not they contribute to climate objectives, including those investments that play a transition role.

However, “consistency” will require some conversation about what not to do, as well. At the very least, countries need to come to a common understanding on how to scale down misaligned investments (like financing fossil fuels) and the impact this may have on countries’ domestic policies and national development.

Concerns About Unintended Consequences

Countries have different development pathways, needs and priorities. Policies and instruments to align their financial flows will need to account for this diversity. However, because 2.1(c) is a global effort, questions will arise about standards for action and whether similar policies and regulations need to be applied in all countries. For example, if one developing country does not reform a specific set of policies, will it no longer be eligible to access climate finance? Will there be trade restrictions imposed on specific products?

The Relationship of Article 2.1(c) to Other Global Finance Goals

Article 2.1(c) is just one goal within the Paris Agreement for addressing climate change. To effectively operationalize it, it must be considered within the context of the whole agreement — especially its other finance goals.

COP30 Resource Hub

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

For example, negotiators and other stakeholders like research organizations and academic institutions are examining the complementarity of Article 2.1(c) and the new collective quantified goal (NCQG). Agreed to at COP29 in Baku, the NCQG is a new finance objective that goes beyond developed nations’ goal of providing a collective $100 billion in climate finance annually. However, while Article 2.1(c) refers to all financial flows for countries that signed the Paris Agreement, the NCQG is specific to finance that supports developing countries.

Importantly, the mandate to adopt the NCQG states that the new goal must consider developing countries’ needs and priorities. Developing countries have reiterated their concern that Article 2.1(c) discussions could draw the NCQG conversations away from this focus and toward domestic policy and finance flow shifts, or lead to conditionalities or barriers to access financial support.

Through the adoption of the NCQG, negotiators reaffirmed its purpose of accelerating progress toward the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. But questions remain over how exactly this contribution will be measured and counted toward the NCQG.

What to Watch at Future COPs

Article 2.1(c) was addressed on several fronts at previous COPs, including as part of the Global Stocktake, in reports prepared by the SCF and in outcomes of the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue.

At COP28, developed countries suggested an agenda item focused on Article 2.1 (c), as well as a dedicated work program within the UNFCCC. Developing countries, however, expressed skepticism about this approach, on the basis that a focus on 2.1(c) could “lead to developed countries shying away from their commitments and obligations” to provide financial support to vulnerable nations. This concern was also expressed the year before at COP27.

There will be no way to meet global climate goals if countries can’t agree on how to steer finance toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient world. Investment is both the fuel and the steering wheel for arriving where we need to go. Article 2.1(c) will be complicated to operationalize, but in its very ambition, it provides a vision for the road forward.

At COP30 in 2025, it will be essential to establish both a mandate to develop the Article 2.1(c) framework as well as a roadmap for its development. Such a framework could be used as guidance for countries, covering key elements such as transparency, quality, enablers and disablers, as well as ways to transform the global financial architecture. The roadmap on the other hand should include structured dialogues or alternative formats that ensure the framework is both effectively designed and successfully implemented.

This article was originally published on Nov. 22,2023. It was updated on Oct. 30,2025, to reflect the progress needed at COP30.

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• Allied for Climate Transformation By 2025 (ACT2025)
• Next Generation NDCs
• Setting a New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance

Authors Natalia Alayza

STATEMENT: Indonesia Submits Its National Climate Commitment With New Emissions Targets Ahead of COP30 sophie.brady@wri.org Thu, 10/30/2025 - 11:15

JAKARTA (October 30, 2025) – Ahead of COP30, Indonesia has recently submitted its new nationally determined contribution (NDC), projecting that emissions will peak by 2030 and then decline to 1.26 and 1.49 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO₂e) by 2035 under two economic growth scenarios. 

Following is a statement from Nirarta "Koni" Samadhi, Country Director, WRI Indonesia:

“Indonesia’s new climate plan marks an important step forward, building on earlier commitments with an absolute target to reduce emissions by 2035. It strengthens transparency and accountability, and signals the country's commitment to tackling climate change. The plan also rightly recognizes the need to prepare for worsening climate impacts, while supporting workers through a just transition.” 

“The emissions reduction scenarios in the NDC are a welcome step, but both pathways show slower reductions through 2035, meaning steeper cuts will be needed after 2035 to stay on track for net-zero by 2060 or earlier.

“Bright spots in the plan include expanded coverage of potent greenhouse gases such as hydrofluorocarbons and new forestry and land use measures, including the use of harvested wood products, blue carbon initiatives such as mangroves and seagrass, and ambitious 2030 targets to restore millions of hectares of degraded land. It also aims to improve reforestation accounting through enhanced monitoring, reporting, and verification, while accelerating the energy transition with a target of 70–72% renewable energy in the national supply by 2060.

“Still, there is room for improvement. Greater clarity on the 2019 emissions baseline – currently reported with varying figures in its UN biennial update report – would make progress easier to track and increase transparency. It is also essential to align national plans with other key frameworks, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) Comprehensive Investment Plan and Policy (CIPP) and the National Energy Policy (NEP), which show there’s room to be even more ambitious.  

“Recent WRI analysis finds that aligning the NEP with the JETP CIPP scenario would reduce greenhouse gas emissions while delivering socio-economic benefits, including better health outcomes, increased investment and job creation – ultimately boosting economic growth. Indonesia's Just Transition approach is currently limited to workers, with less attention to communities and regional economic losses. A broader, more inclusive approach is needed across all climate action efforts, covering both mitigation and adaptation.” 

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Empowering the Next Generation of Climate Leaders in Ethiopia shannon.paton@… Wed, 10/29/2025 - 16:27

Addis Ababa University’s (AAU) Department of Economics, in collaboration with WRI, has successfully completed two phases of the Research Hub Program on systems thinking and green economic modeling. Supported through WRI’s National Climate Action (NCA) initiative, the program is building a strong foundation for Ethiopia’s next generation of climate and economic modelers.

Over the past two years, this partnership has advanced AAU’s pioneering work in green-economy modeling and systems thinking. WRI worked closely with the university to develop a cutting-edge curriculum and train academic staff in system dynamics, equipping educators and researchers with tools to tackle Ethiopia’s complex climate and economic challenges.

So far, 10 master’s students have received full scholarships to specialize in applied economic modeling relevant to policy and planning. Their research explores themes such as green employment, agricultural productivity, sustainable transport and urban waste management. They also received professional training alongside practitioners from key government institutions and participated in a series of academic seminars. These efforts are not only building expertise but also bridging the gap between policy and research.  

This initiative marks a significant step forward in embedding analytical and modeling capacity within Ethiopia’s higher education system to support national climate goals. By introducing the Green Economy Model into academic curriculum and applied research, AAU and WRI are equipping the country with stronger tools to design, assess and implement climate-resilient, low-carbon development strategies.

The Research Hub has evolved into a national and regional center of excellence, bridging research, policy and practice. It is empowering a new generation of economists and climate analysts to work with the Ministry of Planning and Development (MoPD), the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and other institutions to implement Ethiopia’s 2050 net-zero vision. This collaboration underscores the transformative role universities can play in shaping national climate governance when research and policy are aligned.

Through WRI’s partnership, AAU implemented a program that strengthened academic and professional skills in systems thinking and green economic modeling.

Practitioners from MoPD, EPA and the Ministry of Finance joined the program’s advanced system dynamics training sessions, designed to improve cross-institutional collaboration and analytical and policy modeling skills.

Through guest lectures and seminars, the Research Hub built a vibrant learning community of students, faculty and policymakers to explore how modeling can inform climate policy. Graduates presented their findings at a seminar hosted by WRI Ethiopia, receiving technical feedback from experts across different sectors. Building on this momentum, the AAU team presented the partnership at the second African Climate Summit as an example of how academic research can shape national and regional climate strategies. These engagements showcased the students’ achievements and reinforced AAU and WRI’s reputation as leaders in applied modeling for sustainable development.

The AAU-WRI Research Hub demonstrates how long-term collaboration can strengthen institutional capacity and support evidence-based policymaking. It shows the key role local universities can play in generating data and research that directly guide government planning. By training people in modeling and analysis, the project helps ensure Ethiopia’s development decisions are based on sound evidence and measurable outcomes.

As Dr. Mengesha, head of the economics department at AAU, noted, “This collaboration has not only trained experts, but it has also established a long-term foundation for climate modeling that will continue to serve Ethiopia’s policy processes for years to come.” This comment captures the essence of the project — capacity building, knowledge generation and sustainable impact.

What’s Next?

Building on these achievements, WRI and AAU aim to expand the Research Hub’s curriculum by introducing new modeling modules and aligning it with Ethiopia’s emerging Climate Data Hub — a tracking and monitoring system that feeds directly into Green Economy Model projections. The next phase will focus on developing a new group of master’s and doctoral researchers, strengthening the hub’s role as center for learning and innovation, and deepening collaboration between universities and government institutions.

The upcoming work will also prioritize producing high-quality, policy-relevant research and improving access to data-driven tools for climate planning. Through the continued partnership, AAU and WRI aim to strengthen Ethiopia’s modeling and analytical capacity to better support the country's development goals.

 

If you are interested in partnering with Addis Ababa University and WRI to build on and expand this work, please contact sara.ascher@wri.org.

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• National Climate Action

Authors Abiyot Dagne Belay Agimasie Demewoz Beakal Fasil Mikayla Pellerin

Are Countries’ New Climate Plans Ambitious Enough? What We Know So Far margaret.overh… Tue, 10/28/2025 - 08:00

Tracking NDCs

Countries are currently in the process of submitting new NDCs. This analysis incorporates submissions through Sept. 30, 2025. View WRI's Climate Watch NDC tracker to explore the latest.

2025 is a pivotal moment for climate action. Countries are submitting new national climate commitments, known as "nationally determined contributions" or "NDCs," that will shape the trajectory of global climate progress through 2035.

These new commitments will show how boldly countries plan to cut their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; transform their economies; and strengthen resilience to growing threats, like extreme weather, wildfires and floods. Together, they will determine how far the world goes toward limiting global temperature rise and avoiding the worst climate impacts.

Over 60 countries — including some major emitters, such as Brazil, Canada, Japan and the U.K. — have already put forward new NDCs. These represent an improvement from previous commitments, and many smaller and developing nations are leading the way with stronger targets. Yet collective ambition still falls short of what's needed to keep the world within critical warming thresholds, according to a recent NDC Synthesis Report from the UN.

This is not the complete picture: Countries representing nearly 70% of global emissions have yet to submit their NDCs and are expected to do so by the 2025 UN climate summit (COP30) this November. But the current NDCs do give us an idea of where progress is headed.

We analyzed the submissions thus far for a snapshot of how countries' climate plans are shaping up and what they reveal about the road ahead.

How Many Countries Have Submitted New NDCs?

Under the Paris Agreement, 2025 NDCs were technically due in February. As of Sept. 30, 61 countries, covering 31% of the world's emissions, had submitted them.

About the 2025 NDCs

NDCs are critical to halting climate change. They lay out how each country will contribute to global goals outlined under the Paris Agreement, including emissions cuts needed to keep temperature rise below 1.5-2 degrees C (2.7-3.6 degrees F). 2025 marks the third round of NDCs since the treaty's inception in 2015, with countries setting climate targets through 2035. These plans are expected to reflect the 2023 Global Stocktake — the first full review of global climate progress — which called for deeper emissions cuts and faster action on fossil fuels, renewables, transport and forests, and adaptation and resilience. Learn more.

Among the G20 — the world's largest GHG emitters — seven have put forth new NDCs: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. (The U.S. has since announced its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, effective January 2026, though its NDC remains officially listed with the UNFCCC.) Others, including China, the EU and Turkey, announced top-line emissions targets but have yet to submit official NDCs.

Many more countries have also stepped forward, including Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay in Latin America; Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria in Africa; and island states such as Singapore, the Marshall Islands and the Maldives.

Most of the remaining countries are expected to present their new NDCs by the UN Climate Conference (COP30) in November.

How Much Have 2025 NDCs Reduced the Emissions Gap?

Compared to previous 2030 targets, the NDCs submitted so far have made only a modest dent in the 2035 emissions gap: the difference between where emissions need to be to align with 1.5 degrees C and where they're expected to be under countries' climate plans.

If fully implemented, new "unconditional NDCs" (those that don't require international support) are projected to reduce emissions by an additional 1.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) by 2035 compared to 2030. This leaves an emissions gap of 29.9 GtCO2e to hold warming to 1.5 degrees C. When "conditional NDCs" (those that do require international support) are included, the projected emissions reductions rise to 1.6 GtCO2e, leaving a gap of 26.6 GtCO2e.

In other words, the NDCs submitted so far achieve less than 6% of the additional emissions reductions needed by 2035 to close the gap to 1.5 degrees C.

Factoring in countries that have put forth emissions targets but not official NDCs (like China, the EU and Turkey) brings emissions down by an additional 1.3 GtCO2e by 2035. Even this is far from what's needed to keep warming within safe limits.

Still, many of the G20 countries — which together account for about half of global GHG emissions — have yet to submit. This raises the stakes for the upcoming NDCs. Ambitious commitments (particularly from the highest emitters) could narrow the emissions gap. Or, if their pledges fall short, they could leave the world locked into a trajectory that puts global temperature targets out of reach.

Emissions-reduction targets put forward by major emitters so far:

CountryPrevious 2030 Emissions-Reduction TargetNew 2035 Emissions-Reduction TargetsNet-Zero Target YearAustralia43% from 2005 levels62%-70% from 2005 levels2050Brazil53.1% from 2005 levels59%-67% from 2005 levels2050Canada40%-45% from 2005 levels45%-50% from 2005 levels2050Japan46% from 2013 levels60% from 2013 levels2050Russian Federation70% of 1990 levels65%-67% of 1990 levels2060United Kingdom68% from 1990 levels81% from 1990 levels2050United States50%-52% from 2005 levels61%-66% from 2005 levels2050China*Over 65% carbon intensity reduction below 20057%-10% from peak2060European Union*55% from 1990 levels66.25%-72.5% from 1990 levels2050Turkey*41% below BAUReach 643 MtCO2e2053

*These countries have announced 2035 top-line emissions-reduction targets but had not yet submitted NDCs as of Sept. 30.

How Do Specific Countries' Climate Plans Stack Up?

Among the countries that have submitted new NDCs so far, the United Kingdom stands out for its ambitious goal to cut emissions 81% from 1990 levels by 2035. This rapid decline in the coming decade would put the country on track to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, based on realistic rates of technology deployment and ambitious but achievable shifts in consumer and business behavior.

Other countries, such as Japan and the United States, have opted for a "linear" approach toward net zero. This means if they drew a straight line to their net-zero target (for example, 0 GtCO2e in 2050), their 2030 and 2035 targets would fall along it, reflecting a constant decline in emissions each year. Japan aims to cut emissions 60% from 2013 levels by 2035, while the United States has pledged a 61%-66% reduction from 2005 levels by 2035. This linear approach — compared to earlier, steeper emissions cuts — can still achieve net zero by mid-century, but risks compromising global temperature targets by using more of the world's carbon budget sooner.

Despite the U.S. withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and reversing many federal climate policies, its NDC may still guide climate action at the state, city and local levels. Many of these entities have already rallied around the new NDC and are committed to making progress toward its targets.

Brazil presented a range of emissions targets in its NDC, committing to a 59%-67% reduction from 2005 levels by 2035. A 67% reduction could put Brazil on track for climate neutrality by 2050, while a 59% reduction falls short of that goal. It is unclear which target the government intends to pursue, leaving Brazil's true ambition in question. The NDC also omits carbon budgets for specific sectors (such as energy, transport or agriculture), which would clarify how it plans to meet its overarching emissions goals. However, Brazil committed to develop these sectoral plans at a later date.

Canada made only a marginal increase to its target, shifting from a 40%-45% emissions reduction by 2030 to 45%-50% by 2035 from 2005 levels. This falls short of the recommendation from Canada's own Net-Zero Advisory Body, which called for a 50%-55% reduction by 2035 — and warned that anything below 50% risks derailing progress toward the country's legislated net-zero goal by 2050. Canada is also working to cut methane emissions by over 35% by 2030, including a 75% reduction from its oil and gas sector relative to 2012.

Among the major emitters that have put forward emissions targets but not NDCs, ambition is mixed. China announced that it aims to cut emissions 7%-10% from peak levels by 2035, though without specifying a baseline year. Turkey pledged to cut emissions to 643 million tonnes by 2035. And the European Union released a statement of intent pledging a 66.25%-72.5% reduction by 2035 from 1990 levels.

Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, Brazil, is car-free on Sundays to allow for more pedestrians and cyclists. Tackling high-emitting sectors like transport is critical to halting climate change. Photo by William Rodrigues dos Santos/Alamy Stock Photo How Are High-Emitting Countries Addressing Key Areas like Energy, Forestry and Transport?

Establishing specific targets and measures for high-emitting sectors like energy, forestry and transport is essential for driving progress on the ground. It signals to stakeholders across government, industry and finance where action and investment are most needed to meet climate goals. Such measures are especially important among G20 countries, which can shape global supply chains, set standards, and direct vast public and private capital toward low-carbon solutions.

As more G20 countries come forth with new NDCs, a clearer picture is emerging of how they are embedding sector-specific action into their climate commitments.

Energy

Only a few G20 countries have set clear renewable electricity targets. The U.K., for example, pledged to achieve at least 95% clean electricity by 2030. Australia committed to 82% renewables by the same year. Others, including Canada, Brazil and Russia, signaled plans to expand clean energy but without quantified targets. China's announcement pledged that, by 2035, it will raise the share of non-fossil fuels in domestic energy consumption to over 30% and increase wind and solar capacity sixfold from 2020 levels.

Meanwhile, progress on transitioning away from fossil fuels remains uneven. The U.K. has already phased out coal power and pledged to hold consultations on ending new oil and gas exploration licenses. Canada and Australia are working to end coal power by 2030 and 2040, respectively. Russia positioned natural gas as a transitional fuel, while Brazil encourages the replacement of fossil fuels by promoting sustainable biofuels and electrification.

But this is not enough: Much of the focus remains on phasing out coal, particularly among developed economies, while oil and gas receive less attention. Without clear, time-bound decline pathways for all fossil fuels, clean-energy growth alone may not cut absolute emissions fast enough to align with the Paris Agreement's goals.

Transport

Only two G20 countries include clear targets for zero-emission vehicles in their NDCs. The U.K. has adopted a mandate requiring 80% of new cars and 70% of new vans to be zero-emission by 2030, reaching 100% by 2035. Canada's Electric Vehicle Availability Standard requires 100% zero-emissions vehicle sales by 2035.

Forestry

Brazil has pledged to suppress illegal deforestation and scale restoration initiatives, with goals to recover millions of hectares of forest by 2030 and 2050. Canada and the United States have committed to protecting and conserving 30% of their land and waters by 2030, while Australia's Strategy for Nature 2024-2030 seeks to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by the same year. China has pledged to expand its forests significantly by 2035.

Related

• What Are NDCs and How Do They Address Climate Change?
• What Would Ambitious Climate Commitments Look Like for the World's Top Emitters?
• Learn More About How Countries Can Incorporate Sectoral Targets into NDCs

What Other Trends Are Emerging Among NDCs Submitted So Far?

Several other trends are starting to emerge among the new NDCs. While submissions so far offer valuable insights, they don't yet reflect the full picture; deeper analysis will be needed as more NDCs come in by COP30 in November.

1) Nearly all new NDCs include 2035 mitigation measures, with half setting economy-wide emissions-reduction targets.

Almost all of the 61 NDCs submitted thus far — with the exceptions of Niue and Zambia — include new mitigation measures through 2035.

Most (56) express their 2035 targets as emissions-reduction goals. The exceptions are Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua, which instead included sectoral mitigation measures. Cuba, for example, committed to increase renewable electricity generation and improve energy efficiency by 2035.

Half of the countries with emissions-reduction goals set economy-wide targets covering all sectors and greenhouse gases (as encouraged by the 2023 Global Stocktake). Notably, China announced that its new top-line emissions target will for the first time cover all sectors and GHGs. This is an important step: China's previous NDCs covered only CO2, but the country's non-CO2 emissions alone place it among the world's top 10 emitters.

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries are required to submit economy-wide targets, while developing countries are encouraged to work toward them over time.

2) Most countries did not strengthen their 2030 targets.

Despite clear scientific evidence and UN decisions urging stronger 2030 targets, only 14 (23%) of 61 countries have strengthened their 2030 emissions pledges. This includes Ethiopia, Saint Lucia, Nepal, Moldova, Jamaica and Montenegro, among others. For example, Montenegro revised its 2030 emissions-reduction target from 35% to 55% and set a 60% target by 2035, compared to 1990 levels.

Notably, none of the wealthier, high-emitting and more developed countries have strengthened their 2030 targets — despite having the greatest capacity and responsibility to take the lead on slashing emissions.

3) Most countries have strengthened their adaptation measures.

In the face of worsening climate impacts, 45 of 61 countries set stronger adaptation commitments in their new NDCs, continuing a trend seen in previous rounds. Many of these countries are prioritizing adaptation across sectors such as food and water systems, public health and nature-based solutions.

For example, Ecuador, which is particularly vulnerable to heavy rainfall and floods, prioritized action to build resilience of its water resources, human health and settlements, and natural heritage. Canada, which has witnessed devastating wildfires in recent years, cited its National Adaptation Strategy, which provides a framework for disaster resilience, biodiversity, public health and infrastructure.

Canadian firefighters in 2021. After being ravaged by wildfires in recent years, Canada's new national climate plan puts an emphasis on climate adaptation and disaster resilience. Photo by nathan4847/iStock 4) Developing countries continue to take the lead on reporting finance needs in their NDCs.

Among the 61 countries with new NDCs, 29 developing countries have reported specific financial requirements to implement their plans, totaling $1.9 trillion so far. This continues a trend seen in previous rounds, with the vast majority of reported finance needs consistently coming from developing countries.

Six, including Ecuador, Barbados and Tonga, reported finance needs for the first time in 2025, while 14 increased their estimates compared to previous NDCs. The largest increases came from Angola, whose needs jumped from $44 billion to $412 billion (with about 89% conditional on international support), and Pakistan, whose funding needs rose from $241 billion to $565 billion.

These numbers highlight the urgent need for scaled and predictable finance to support developing countries' climate goals. At the same time, total finance needs are likely underestimated, given that only about half of the 61 countries included cost data. This underscores the importance of enhanced transparency and support in climate finance planning.

5) More and more countries are incorporating 'just transition' in their NDCs.

Forty-four (72%) of the NDCs submitted so far explicitly mention a "just transition," representing a major increase from previous rounds. Crucially, more countries are now going beyond one-line references and expanding upon specific just transition efforts that are already underway or planned. Many, such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Eswatini and the U.K., dedicate entire sections of their new NDCs to this concept.

Countries are also defining "just transition" more clearly and specifying where it is most relevant to their national climate action. Bangladesh and Brazil, for example, explicitly reference decent work and quality jobs. Countries like Moldova and the UAE reference the importance of skills and training to support workers and youth. While the energy sector remains the main focus for just transition discussions, some countries also incorporate areas such as water, agriculture, waste and climate adaptation.

6) Countries are recognizing the importance of subnational action.

Some countries' NDCs also recognize the critical role that subnational actors, such as cities, states and regions, play in shaping and delivering climate action.

More than 30 of the newly submitted NDCs come from countries that have endorsed the Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships (CHAMP), and several mention it explicitly. The CHAMP initiative — launched in 2023 by the COP28 Presidency, in partnership with Bloomberg Philanthropies and with the support of WRI and other partners — aims to strengthen collaboration between national and subnational governments on climate planning and implementation. As part of this commitment, 77 countries pledged to consult with and integrate subnational priorities and needs into their NDCs.

Brazil, for example, highlights an instrument called "climate federalism" designed to support the integration of climate action into planning and decision-making across all levels of government. Similarly, Colombia acknowledged the role of subnational governments in planning and implementing measures to both mitigate and adapt to climate change in its NDC.

What's Next for NDCs?

While many countries have yet to submit their commitments, the storyline is already clear: New NDCs will not put the world on track to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C.

The big question now is how countries respond at COP30 to narrow that gap. They must address what comes after NDCs, grappling with how to turn ambition into action and keep a safer future within reach.

Ultimately, putting forward strong plans — and fulfilling them — are essential levers; not only for limiting warming, but for safeguarding the health, prosperity and security of current and future generations.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in June 2025. It was updated in October 2025 with analysis of new NDCs submitted through Sept. 30.

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• National Climate Action
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Authors Jamal Srouji Héctor Miguel Donado Natalia Alayza Ginette Walls

STATEMENT: UN Report Finds Country Climate Commitments Falling Short darla.vanhoorn… Tue, 10/28/2025 - 04:41

WASHINGTON, DC (October 28, 2025) — The UNFCCC released its NDC Synthesis Report today, reviewing climate plans from 64 countries, covering roughly 30% of global emissions. The report aggregates submitted plans and their projected emissions reductions, finding that current pledges would reduce emissions by about 17% from their 2019 levels, far short of what’s needed to limit warming to 1.5°C. The analysis reflects submissions received up until September 30, 2025.

Countries representing 64% of global emissions still have not formally submitted new NDCs and are not included in this analysis.

Following is a statement from Melanie Robinson, Global Climate, Economics and Finance Program Director, World Resources Institute: 

“This report lays bare a frightening gap between what governments have promised and what is needed to protect people and planet. While the transition to a low-carbon economy is underway, it’s clear that countries need to shift from a jog to an all-out sprint.  

"Some countries have recognized the economic gains to be made by being among the front-runners in the global energy transition. But too many nations are lagging behind, failing to see that climate action costs less than dealing with climate impacts – and that investing in the new economy is a catalyst for growth, driving jobs, prosperity and security.

"The UN analysis shows national climate plans are starting to bend global emissions downward: 2035 targets would lower emissions by about 6% compared with previous 2030 NDC targets, and emissions would peak by 2030 if those NDCs are implemented. But that progress is dwarfed by the vast gap still needed to avoid breaching the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit.  

“The report paints an incomplete picture because countries representing nearly two-thirds of global emissions either missed the September cut-off for inclusion or have not yet submitted new plans. Those still on the hook to submit must deliver ambitious climate targets if they want to stay competitive, attract investment and benefit their workforce.  

“Encouragingly, the analysis points out examples of real momentum, with more countries scaling renewable energy, decarbonizing transport and integrating adaptation and just transition into their plans. These are promising developments both countries and cities can seize upon, replicate and scale.

“Leaders should treat this report not as a warning but as a rallying cry. COP30 must deliver a practical plan to accelerate action this decade - because every fraction of a degree avoided means lives saved, more abundant food and water, better livelihoods, and stronger economies.” 

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Financing Nature Conservation: Will the Tropical Forest Forever Facility Finally Do It? alicia.cypress… Mon, 10/27/2025 - 09:30

At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit in Brazil, the nations of the world agreed as part of the Forest Principles to provide financial resources for conservation efforts in developing countries with significant forest areas.

Yet for more than three decades, the international community has struggled — and largely failed — to fulfill that commitment, particularly to developing nations with tropical rainforests.

These tropical forests are home to a majority of the planet’s biodiversity, play a crucial role in combating climate change, and are critical to people’s livelihoods. Between 2002 and 2022, according to Global Forest Watch data, the world’s tropical humid primary rainforests shrunk by 8%, losing an area equivalent to nearly the size of Pakistan. This magnitude of loss has continued unabated, except in a few key tropical rainforest countries such as Brazil and Indonesia.

The basic challenge continues to be one of simple economics: Cutting and clearing natural forests for timber and agriculture is generally more profitable than leaving trees standing.

Conventional business practices are not designed to tangibly value and reward the conservation of forests, or their biodiversity and ecosystem services. Combined with continuing global demand for commodities, harmful subsidies in many countries, and weak and/or corrupt forest governance practices, this dynamic has increasingly degraded and destroyed the Earth’s tropical forests.

According to data from Global Forest Watch, between 2002 and 2022, the world’s tropical humid primary rainforests shrunk by 8%. Photo by PARALAXIS/Shutterstock.  A Potential Breakthrough: The Tropical Forest Forever Facility

Now, Brazil is once again playing a critical role, leading the development of an innovative new forest finance mechanism that could offer a breakthrough and flip the economics in favor of conservation. The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) is designed as a “payment-for-performance” model that uses agreed satellite monitoring standards and systems to reward tropical forest countries with a continuing source of funding as long as they preserve their forests.

 While other forest conservation mechanisms such as REDD+ and carbon markets focus on rewarding emissions reductions, the TFFF takes a different approach. It aims to pay tropical forest countries directly for each hectare of standing forest they maintain, with payments decreasing based on any deforestation or fire-related forest degradation.

With Brazil’s leadership, the momentum of this year’s annual United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) taking place in the Amazon, and with effective new satellite monitoring technologies, the TFFF could finally turn forest conservation into an investment that benefits countries, investors and the planet.

Following several years of technical and diplomatic work, Brazil published the latest iteration of the TFFF Concept Note in October 2025. Just weeks before, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced at the UN General Assembly that Brazil would make the first $1 billion investment into the facility, which ultimately is expected to reach $125 billion. A few weeks later, Indonesia announced it would also contribute to the facility. The TFFF’s success now depends on other nations, as well as private sector investors, to make it a reality at COP30 and beyond. Currently, Brazil is working with other governments, including the UK, Germany, Norway, the UAE, Singapore and China, and potential private sector investors, to explore how they can commit funding in time for COP30.

The Tropical Forest Forever Facility is an innovative fund designed to reward countries for keeping their forests standing. Photo by Teo Tarras/Shutterstock. How Exactly Will the TFFF Be Funded?

Unlike most previous international assistance to conserve tropical forests, the TFFF will not be financed by donor grants. Once the facility reaches its $125 billion target (or, likely in the shorter term, a smaller sum), it will be the world’s largest “blended finance” mechanism of its kind, designed to pay eligible, participating tropical forest countries annually for maintaining their deforestation rates below 0.5% per year, as measured by agreed geospatial monitoring standards and systems.

The TFFF will borrow an initial capital base (targeted at $25 billion) from traditional “donor” nations and other countries in a position to invest, such as Brazil and China, and potentially philanthropic foundations, too. These “sponsors” would provide 40-year loans (the facility’s capital), or other comparable investment modalities, at an interest rate comparable to the yield of U.S. Treasury bonds (a 30-year bond is currently less than 5%) and would be the first to take responsibility over any losses in what’s known as a junior position in the debt structure.

This arrangement creates a safety net that enables the fund to raise an additional $100 billion from private, corporate and philanthropic investors. The combined $125 billion would then be invested in fixed income emerging markets and other sovereign and corporate bonds (excluding fossil fuels and other environmentally destructive sectors), which would earn a higher return.

The return is ultimately expected to generate some $3 billion to $4 billion per year — enough to make payments of around $4 per hectare of conserved forest to eligible countries which maintain deforestation rates below 0.5% over the long term. (Even in the short term, with a much lesser sum than $125 billion, the payments generated would still be significant.)

The TFFF governance structure is divided into the Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF), managed by the World Bank under a separate governance structure that would manage the investment fund and determine the availability of funds for forest payments; and the TFFF itself, which would coordinate monitoring and reporting, and distribute forest payments to countries.

Where Would the Money Go?

The current TFFF proposal includes 74 UN-listed developing countries that combined are home to more than 1 billion hectares of moist, broadleaf tropical and sub-tropical forests.

The TFFF is not designed to fund countries to reduce their deforestation rates. Rather, it is meant to reward those that already have relatively low deforestation rates, providing a financial incentive to keep their remaining tropical forests standing and prevent any further deforestation. However, if it’s successful, the facility will serve as encouragement for countries with currently high deforestation rates to qualify to join the scheme. A good result would be if countries such as Bolivia, with one of the world’s highest deforestation rates, were able to qualify for TFFF funding in the years to come. The current structure would lead to significant flows of finance to some of the world’s poorest forest countries, including in Africa’s Congo Basin.

The TFFF includes several innovative features focused on where the money should go. The first is that it allows countries to allocate TFFF payments as they see fit on their national policies and programs that, directly or indirectly, contribute to tropical and subtropical forest conservation and forests’ sustainable use. Crucially, the TFFF requires countries to disclose what the funds are used for to ensure transparency and allow for public scrutiny and feedback.

Another striking and positive feature is a provision requiring 20% of payments to go to Indigenous peoples and local communities engaged in tropical forest conservation in eligible countries. This could be the single biggest source of international finance for Indigenous peoples and local communities, so often at the frontline of conservation. This finance could help these communities protect their rights, secure land tenure, tackle illegal mining and criminality, and pursue sustainable alternative livelihoods that are not dependent on clearing areas of forest.

It is also significant because the TFFF is the only such source of funding that could in some instances be accessed directly by Indigenous peoples and local communities — a provision that they have repeatedly asked for, granting these communities decision-making over the use of the funds.

Payments from the TFFF could help protect the rights of Indigenous communities and help them pursue sustainable alternative livelihoods that are not dependent on clearing areas of forest. Photo by Dekaro/iStock. How Will Forests Be Monitored?

The TFFF can only succeed if it is built on credible, transparent and operational forest monitoring that relies on satellite data. This requires methods and data that are produced in a way that can be verified, applied consistently through time and comparable across countries. Robust and universally applied technical standards must be established from the outset, not only to ensure credibility but also to build investor confidence that will attract the early capital needed for scale.

A core principle of the TFFF is that participating nations are expected to use their own national forest monitoring systems, provided these systems meet established quality and transparency criteria. For countries without a qualifying national system, a compliant third-party system, such as Global Forest Watch (managed by WRI) or the EU’s Joint Research Center tropical forests platform, may be used. Given this diversity in monitoring approaches, establishing agreed common methodological standards and definitions across all systems will be paramount.

The TFFF also proposes a fixed forest definition to be applied across all participating countries, creating a common basis for how forests are measured and valued. By setting a 20% to 30% canopy density threshold, a 5-meter minimum tree height and by excluding plantations, this definition establishes a solid technical foundation for consistent and comparable measurements.

What’s Still Needed to Launch the TFFF?

First, sponsors need to follow Brazil’s and Indonesia’s lead and commit contributions to the initial hoped-for $25 billion tranche of junior capital. If additional sponsors fail to make commitments at COP30, the TFFF may lose momentum in 2026, causing private sector investors to doubt the viability of the model.

It is therefore vitally important for industrialized nations across the world without tropical forests to make a significant financial commitment to this bold and ambitious idea. The stakes are global: If tropical forests are lost, adaptation costs from the ensuing climate impacts would far exceed these investments. For wealthy nations, investing in the TFFF is not only about justice and responsibility, but also a matter of economic self-interest. Tropical forests are, in addition to being sovereign national assets, a global public good, with a universal responsibility for their protection.

The World Bank Board has agreed to manage the funds as the trustee and interim host of the TFFF and formalized initial arrangements at its October 2025 meeting, which should provide a strong confidence signal for both sponsors and the private sector. But the World Bank will have to move rapidly to establish the TFIF to maintain momentum and move toward an operational phase of the facility.

Once all of that is in place, a key priority will be development of the operations manual that will govern how the TFFF actually works, including work on some of the more difficult technical issues. These include:

Degradation and Leakage

Not all forest loss is caused by deforestation. Forest degradation, which plays a major role in carbon loss and ecosystem decline (and often occurs at smaller spatial scales) can also take place.

Currently, the TFFF proposes to only consider fire-damaged areas (using burn scars as a proxy) as indicators of degradation, subsequently reducing payments by a 1:35 discount rate. But other degradation factors, such as selective logging, roadbuilding, mining and some edge effects, can be detected using 30-meter or 10-meter satellite data. Including both fire and non-fire degradation would strengthen the system’s integrity and ensure payments reflect actual forest conditions.

Deforestation “leakage” is another thorny issue: the TFFF focuses on broadleaf tropical and sub-tropical forests, the most important forests globally for both biodiversity and climate change. However, there is worry that this might cause deforestation to move into other biomes not covered by the TFFF — Brazil’s Cerrado and southern Africa’s Miombo woodlands are good examples — without notice or punitive measures. The TFFF seeks to address this by requiring participating countries to monitor and report forest cover changes in non-TFFF forest areas where significant increases in deforestation could trigger additional scrutiny and potential payment holds. Though this is a good conceptual solution, implementation could be complex given, among other issues, the difficulties associated with monitoring deforestation in drier or sparser forest landscapes. More work will be needed to ensure that the TFFF does not simply displace, rather than prevent, forest loss.

Consideration for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

It will also be critical to maintain a strong consultative process with civil society and Indigenous communities as the TFFF — particularly its operations manual — is developed and moves toward implementation. Much of civil society is supportive of the TFFF and its efforts to engage Indigenous peoples and local communities; some remain critical and circumspect. There is no formal consensus on the TFFF among the diverse Indigenous peoples’ organizations across the world’s tropical forests. Continuing dialogue, consultation and free, prior and informed consent will therefore be critical in the years ahead.

A home along the Guama River in Belém, Brazil, where COP30 will take place. The TFFF will require that 20% of payments to countries that keep deforestation rates below 0.5% to go to Indigenous peoples and local communities. Photo by RudiErnst/Shutterstock.  Developing an Agreed Global Geospatial Monitoring System

Finally, the credibility and longevity of the TFFF will also depend on the quality and reliability of the geospatial monitoring systems that are used to base decisions on eligibility, standing forest area and deforestation rates. It is only in the past decade that credible, affordable satellite monitoring of forest cover has emerged. And there are no international covenants or treaties designating official satellite monitoring standards or systems.

In developing its monitoring standards, the TFFF should consider:

• Fine-tuning its measurement standards by aligning the standard minimum mapping unit with the pixel resolution of existing, free satellite data archives (30-meters or 10-meters) to provide a more accurate picture of forest dynamics. Using a finer mapping unit, instead of the proposed 1-hectare minimum mapping unit, would also enable more effective monitoring of forest degradation events like logging and roadbuilding.
• Ensuring that the monitoring systems that underpin the TFFF’s payment calculations provide open, independently verifiable data; use methods that produce data that are transparent and reproducible; and regularly validate the results using good practice and international reporting guidelines.
• Finally, governance will be critical to help ensure that technical decisions remain evidence based. The TFFF’s operations manual will codify the detailed rules and procedures for monitoring, so its development should include structured opportunities for expert and stakeholder input.

In short, there is a clear pathway: strong technical standards, robust degradation monitoring, validation, open data and shared governance. The technology is ready; what is needed now is collective agreement to put it into practice.

The TFFF’s Critical Contribution to the Global Forest Challenge

In summary, the TFFF could make a potentially critical contribution to addressing the world’s forest challenges, which are so closely linked to the biodiversity and climate crises we face. But, as the TFFF proponents themselves have noted, it is not a panacea; other forms of finance will also be needed, and of course there are many other dimensions of tackling tropical forest loss, including governance, legality, regulation, demand and consumption shifts.

The TFFF also inherently faces risks in a volatile world where the future of economies and markets cannot be predicted; it is a bold idea at a time of volatility and instability. But after more than 30 years of forest conservation, forest finance commitments and arrangements that have yet to turn the tide, the TFFF presents an ambitious idea from a major rainforest country that has real potential to make a potentially transformative impact in conserving tropical forests.

It is therefore a pressing global imperative for the international community to contribute generously to its success, starting at COP30, in the heart of the Amazon rainforest — a tropical rainforest, like others, on which the future well-being of humanity so profoundly depends.  

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STATEMENT: Commitment Without Clarity Risks Europe’s Climate Ambitions and Leadership darla.vanhoorn… Fri, 10/24/2025 - 07:50

Brussels (October 24, 2025) – The European Council yesterday reaffirmed its support for the EU’s goal to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040. However, it stopped short of setting a clear and ambitious target for its upcoming Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), which is due by COP30. 

In September, the European Commission put forward a “statement of intent” to cut emissions by 66.25 – 72.5% by 2035 from 1990 levels.  

Following is a statement by Stientje van Veldhoven, Vice President and Regional Director for Europe, World Resources Institute:  

“Europe stands behind the 90% emission cut goal by 2040 ‒ a strong signal of continued intent. But without formalizing its 2035 climate plan (NDC), the pathway to climate neutrality remains unclear.  

"EU leaders have now put the ball in the court of environment ministers, who must deliver a science-based and credible NDC by early November, ahead of COP30 in Belém. A clear, high-ambition pathway is the most credible way to turn the EU's climate goals into real action: cleaner air, stronger energy security, resilient communities and lasting competitiveness. 

“We warn against the EU Council’s reliance on carbon credits to hit its 2040 goal. While credits, under strict guardrails, can help support decarbonization efforts abroad, they don't replace the structural changes needed at home. Europe must invest in transforming energy, industry, housing, and transport.   

“Every euro spent on credits is a euro not invested in delivering cleaner, economic growth, jobs and resilience for European citizens. In this context, the Council’s call to revise the agreed EU ETS 2, the EU's emissions trading scheme for transport and buildings starting in 2027, risks undermining business confidence and the credibility of EU climate policy.  

"The EU's repeated delays come at a cost. Missing the September 2025 NDC deadline means the EU ‒ one of the world's major economic blocs ‒ will be left out of the UNFCCC's NDC forthcoming Synthesis Report, losing an opportunity to spur greater ambition from other major emitters. EU environment ministers must grab the chance to reclaim Europe’s global climate leadership with the most ambitious NDC before COP30, showing European business clear investment pathways to a clean, competitive economy.”  

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What Is the EU Deforestation Regulation? 7 Key Questions, Answered sarah.brown@wri.org Thu, 10/23/2025 - 13:52

The world is losing 18 soccer fields of tropical primary every minute; much of it is the result of clearing for farms, pastures and tree plantations.

As a major buyer of commodities largely responsible for fueling deforestation — such as palm oil, cocoa, coffee, soy, cattle and timber — the EU has both a responsibility and an opportunity to help shift global markets toward more sustainable supply chains. The landmark EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), adopted in 2023, requires businesses to demonstrate that the products they sell or export to the EU do not come from land that was recently deforested or degraded. 

The EUDR is a key step in responding to today’s deforestation and supporting countries in achieving their national forest protection policies. Yet despite its promise, the regulation has faced delays and pushback, threatening its timely implementation.

In September 2025, the EU Commission proposed delaying the EUDR's enforcement until December 2026, pushing back its start date for the second year in a row. This was after the  EU Agriculture Ministers issued a letter calling for the EUDR's simplification, in July 2025. The EU Commission then reversed course in October 2025, putting forward a formal proposal to simplify the EUDR for micro and small businesses, as well as downstream operators. If approved by the European Parliament and European Council, the December 2026 delay would only be in place for these businesses. For all other companies, the EUDR will go into force as initially planned on Dec. 30, 2025, with a six-month grace period.

At a time when forests are increasingly under threat, it’s more urgent than ever to understand the regulation and ensure its full and rapid implementation. Here, we dive deeply into the legislation's details and potential impacts.

What Is the EUDR?

The EUDR is a landmark law that came into force in June 2023. Its goal is to ensure that certain products sold in or exported to the EU do not come from land that was deforested or degraded after Dec. 31, 2020. The regulation is designed to prevent EU consumer demand from driving further forest loss or damage, while also reducing the region’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and global biodiversity decline.

The EUDR covers timber and six key agricultural commodities: cattle, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, soy, as well as products made from them such as beef, furniture and chocolate. To be sold in or exported from the EU market, these products must meet the following three conditions:

1. They are deforestation-free.
2. They have been produced in compliance with the relevant laws of the country of origin.
3. They are covered by a due diligence statement, showing that the company has checked the origin and ensured the products meet EUDR requirements.

This means businesses must demonstrate that any EUDR-covered commodities were not produced on land that was deforested nor did they contribute to forest degradation after the Dec. 31, 2020 cutoff date. Although the regulation is legally in place, companies are not yet required to comply yet. The rules will apply starting from Dec. 30, 2025, for large enterprises and December 2026, for small and medium-sized businesses (if the proposal made by the European Commission is adopted by the EU institutions).

Why Is the EUDR important?

The EUDR offers a major opportunity for the EU to reduce its role in global deforestation and biodiversity loss, as well as help create deforestation-free supply chains. It supports the commitment made by the 144 countries that signed the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration in 2021 to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030. It can also serve as a model for other major consumer markets looking to lower their environmental footprints.

Since 2014, the EU has been the second-largest importer of goods linked to tropical deforestation after China. In 2017 alone, it accounted for 16% of global deforestation tied to international trade — equal to 203,000 hectares of forest.

More recently, in 2021, the EU was among the world’s top five importers of five of the six agricultural commodities covered by the EUDR (cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber and soy) and the largest importer of cocoa beans and coffee worldwide1 . Among all the agricultural products the EU buys, beef, cocoa and palm oil were linked to the most deforestation in the countries they came from. In fact, out of 160 agricultural commodities imported by the EU, just six — beef, palm oil, soy, cocoa, coffee and rubber, as covered by the EUDR — made up 58% of the estimated forest loss tied to EU imports.

By reducing the EU’s forest-loss footprint and tackling deforestation risks in its supply chains, the EUDR could help reverse deforestation worldwide. In 2024, a record 6.7 million hectares of primary tropical forests were lost — nearly double the 2023 rate and equivalent of losing 18 soccer fields of forest every minute. While wildfires captured global attention, some of the increase was due to agricultural conversion and logging.

What Challenges and Setbacks Has the EUDR Faced?

In December 2024, the EU postponed the start of EUDR compliance by 12 months to give companies more time to prepare to meet the regulation’s requirements. Then in September 2025, the EU Commission again signaled its intention to delay implementation by another year, reportedly because of issues with the EU platform used to submit due diligence statements.

A month later, the EU Commission put forward a formal proposal to simplify the EUDR for micro and small businesses, as well as downstream operators, delaying the enforcement date of the EUDR for these enterprises. If approved by the European Parliament and European Council, these businesses would not have to comply with the EUDR until December 2026. Large companies would still be held to a Dec. 30, 2025 start date, but with a 6-month grace period for checks and enforcement in light of issues with the IT platform.

In May 2025, the European Commission published the regulation’s benchmarking classification system, which ranks countries as low, standard and high risk based on indicators assessing the deforestation risk linked to commodity production in each country. The ranking system was designed to help businesses and enforcement authorities in the EU to conduct due diligence and enforce compliance. The risk levels indicate the percentage of checks on shipments, with greater scrutiny given to higher-risk countries. 

New proposals call on the EU Commission to revise the benchmarking classification system introduced in 2025. Some EU member state representatives have suggested adding a “no-risk” category to exempt certain countries from due diligence requirements; another suggestion proposed removing the system altogether. But changes like these could create loopholes and ultimately weaken the regulation’s effectiveness. The European Parliament already rejected a similar idea in 2024 for that very reason.

The EUDR was agreed upon following a lengthy negotiation between EU institutions and member states, as well as impact assessments and extensive consultations. Derailing its implementation would penalize producer countries and companies that have already invested in compliance, and it would create confusion and uncertainty in the EU market. The regulation may not be perfect, but it’s a necessary step toward deforestation-free supply chains. Many companies have already shown that EUDR compliance is possible, and several have urged the EU to uphold the legal text and stick to implementation timeline.

Since adoption, the EUDR has faced criticism from both inside and outside the EU. Most concerns focus on cost and complexity of compliance, as well as fairness, particularly for smallholder farmers. In response, the European Commission, EU member states and other development institutions have ramped up investment in EUDR preparedness by issuing resources and guidance, with a particular emphasis on preventing smallholder exclusion from the EU market.

What Counts as Deforestation and Degradation Under the EUDR?

The regulation's definition of a forest largely follows the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which defines it as land larger than 0.5 hectares with trees taller than 5 meters and a canopy cover of at least 10% that is not primarily used for farming or urban development.

Under the EUDR, deforestation refers to clearing forest to make way for agriculture. The key factor is the conversion of land that was forest in 2020 into farmland — such as pastures or soy plantations. It’s a complete land-use change: the forest is no longer a forest.

• If that forest is cleared — whether by people or natural events like fire — and then converted into farmland, such as pastures for raising cattle or fields for soy or palm oil, it is considered deforestation.
• However, if a forest is cleared, for example by fire (whether from human activity or natural causes) and is not used to produce any of the six EUDR-covered agricultural commodities, it is not considered deforestation under the regulations.
• Forests used for wood production are not considered deforestation unless they’re also used for agriculture, for example, cattle grazing under the tree canopy.

The EUDR also covers degradation. Land that was forest in 2020 can be used for wood production and remain classified as a forest, even if it’s temporarily unstocked, according to EUDR definitions. A forest used for wood production is not considered degraded unless there's a specific structural change, such as:

• Converting primary forest (native, untouched forest) into other wooded land (trees have 5%-10% canopy cover) or into plantation or planted forest.
• Converting naturally regenerating forest (which has largely grown back on its own) into other wooded land used or plantation forest.

Who Does the EUDR Affect?

The EUDR affects any company that imports, produces or exports specific products, and their derivatives, to or from the EU market. This includes operators (those placing products on the market or exporting them from the market) and traders (those distributing and selling products).

It applies to companies based in the EU and internationally, and to businesses of all sizes, from micro and small enterprises to large corporations. However, larger businesses face stricter reporting requirements than smaller ones.

The EUDR spans multiple sectors, from food and beverage (such as companies sourcing cocoa and coffee) to fashion (leather goods, for example) to the healthcare industry (products such as latex gloves).

How Are Countries and Companies Preparing for the EUDR?

Under the EUDR, companies must prove that products linked to deforestation or degradation after Dec. 31, 2020, are not entering the EU market. This requires a due diligence process: collecting supply chain information (including geolocation), assessing the risk of deforestation and taking steps to eliminate any identified risk before the product can be put on the market.

Country-level efforts

Many producer countries are already taking concrete steps to prepare for the EUDR, from adopting national plans to developing traceability systems and improving data transparency. For example, Indonesia, Ghana and Vietnam are investing in government-led efforts to make information available to companies that must comply with the regulation. Delaying enforcement or altering the regulation’s scope could undermine these leading producer countries.

Vietnam stands out as a strong example of how the EUDR is reinforcing national policies to combat deforestation. As a top exporter of rubber and coffee, the country has shifted its focus from illegal logging to broader deforestation risks in agriculture since the regulation’s introduction.  In 2023, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development adopted a national action plan prioritizing sustainable agricultural transformation. The following year, it launched a traceability system for coffee farms, piloting geospatial verification (such as satellite images) in key producing provinces. Developed through public-private collaboration, the system cross-references land-use maps and cadastral data to ensure EUDR compliance. Plans are also underway to expand it to rubber and cocoa.

Vietnam’s progress shows how the regulation can act as a catalyst for stronger policy alignment between global market demands and local sustainability goals. 

EU member states are also preparing by using satellite and aerial earth observation data, such as forest maps from 2020 (the EUDR cutoff year) to detect deforestation, alongside other monitoring solutions and tools to support compliant imports. 

Private-sector efforts

Companies across supply chains are ramping up EUDR preparations, sparking a wave of innovation in monitoring and traceability. Many are developing satellite-based systems to verify deforestation-free sourcing, training smallholder farmers to meet EUDR requirements and partnering with governments and NGOs to improve data sharing and risk assessment.

For example, Unilever and Meridia are working together to map smallholder farmers in Indonesia, making it possible to trace palm oil from plantation to mill. The Global Platform for Sustainable Natural Rubber (GPSNR) has created a system to help companies follow sustainability practices and demonstrate EUDR compliance. Open-source platforms like WRI’s Global Forest Watch are also supporting companies in verifying supply chains.

These efforts from governments, companies and EU countries show how the EUDR is already driving unprecedented action — transforming compliance from a burden into an opportunity to build more responsible and transparent supply chains. The challenge now is scaling these solutions across all commodities and regions.

What's Next for the EUDR?

The EUDR represents a major milestone in the fight against commodity-driven deforestation.

The EU must reject attempts to weaken the regulation’s core requirements. Its effectiveness depends on maintaining its ambition without dilution or delay. Backtracking at this stage would undermine the EUDR’s credibility and send the wrong signal to global markets. 

At the same time, the EU should also step up efforts to provide businesses with practical training and support to help them develop the skills needed for compliance, especially for small businesses that may otherwise struggle to meet requirements.

The European Parliament and Council must also give businesses clear guidance — and avoid adding uncertainty with further changes to the law. The EUDR is not only a necessary response to the crisis of forest loss, but also a vital tool to support and complement producer country efforts to halt deforestation by 2030.

Editor's Note: This piece was originally published on July 8, 2025. It was updated in October 2025 to reflect new policy developments. 

Footnotes

1Timber and timber products are not included.

14244777628_a88be761e2_k.jpg Forests Europe deforestation regulation climate policy commodities corporate sustainability Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Bo Li Sarah Carter Tina Schneider Sophie Labaste Olivia Campbell

When Your EV Battery Expires, Who’s Responsible for It? margaret.overh… Thu, 10/23/2025 - 09:00

More than one in five cars sold globally in 2024 was electric, with sales crossing 17 million — a new record. And similar trends are emerging across other vehicle types, such as electric trucks, electric bikes and U.S. electric school buses.

This marks a much-needed shift toward cleaner, healthier transportation that doesn't warm the planet or pollute the air. Yet rising EV use also presents a burgeoning challenge: How to manage the influx of retired batteries?

The amount of EV battery power needed globally is projected to triple in the coming years, from 1 terawatt-hour (TWh) in 2024 to 3 TWh in 2030. A typical EV battery is expected to last 8-12 years on average, after which it must be removed and replaced. At the current pace of EV sales globally, experts predict there will be about 20,500 kilotons of end-of-life batteries by 2040 — roughly 55 times the weight of the Empire State Building.

So, what happens to these batteries at the end of their life in a vehicle? How do we ensure they don't become a threat to people or the environment? And, critically, whose duty should it be to ensure they're managed responsibly?

We explored how some countries and U.S. states are addressing these questions — particularly through a policy known as "extended producer responsibility" — and what to watch on the road ahead.

EVs for sale on a lot in China. Rising EV use globally will lead to an influx of retired batteries that must be managed with care to avoid potential health and environmental risks. Photo by Wengen Ling/iStock The Challenge with EV Batteries

Used EV batteries are classified as hazardous waste in the U.S. and elsewhere. There's currently a lack of consensus on the best approach to handling this waste, and while solutions are starting to emerge, concerns around its potential environmental and social impacts are growing.

Batteries left in landfills can leach toxic chemicals that pollute soil and groundwater. This can expose nearby communities to severe health risks, including developmental and reproductive disorders, kidney damage and skin allergies. Ecosystems are also affected; for example, soil contamination can hamper plant growth and cause toxic chemicals to accumulate throughout the food chain.

Fires, which can happen during transport and at waste management facilities, recycling centers and landfills, are another major risk of mishandling batteries. EV battery fires are especially dangerous due to "thermal runaway" — a chain reaction of rapid, uncontrollable temperature and pressure increase within a battery that causes fires to burn hotter and release toxic fumes. This also makes them particularly difficult to extinguish.

Battery fires can expose workers to hazardous gases, metals and chemicals that can cause injuries and long-term respiratory damage. The risks are especially acute for workers in the informal sector (such as in developing countries, where waste is often shipped) who may not have the right training or equipment to safely handle used batteries.

The key to preventing such risks is keeping battery waste out of landfills and ensuring it's handled safely. This requires strong regulations around collection, repurposing and recycling. Yet progress in this area has been piecemeal. In the U.S., for example, recycling programs are largely voluntary, and battery recycling rates remain below 15%.

What Happens When an EV Battery Expires?

If an EV owner notices that their car has a lower driving range, slower charging, a warning light or a system issue, this can mean its battery is ready to be retired. The next step would typically be to take the vehicle back to the dealership or to a service center to either replace the battery or sell the car.

Importantly, EV batteries at the end of their "first life" aren't fully spent. Many still retain around 70%-80% of their original charge and could be put to use in less demanding applications, such as renewable energy storage. But they need to be assessed and rerouted for this purpose rather than thrown away.

Once they're removed, batteries are inspected for their state of health and safety characteristics (like flammability, ignitability, corrosivity and toxicity) to determine whether they can be reused or recycled. This can be done by specialized technicians at the dealer, outsourced to a partner company, or managed by waste handlers. After this, the batteries are dismantled, and their various components are sent to landfills, recycling facilities or repurposing centers as appropriate.

Much battery waste, at least from the U.S., is exported to other countries (often low-income) where it is handled based on local legislation.

The problem is that this system is far from airtight. For one, EV owners may not know who collects used EVs or EV batteries near them. If they aren't able to access a collection facility, or if their dealer lacks capacity and infrastructure, they might go to an informal auto dismantler. Once the battery is taken out of the vehicle, it is no longer covered by warranty, and its ownership is unclear. This can result in "orphan batteries" that are nobody's responsibility to collect or safely dispose of. In addition, most battery collection infrastructure in the U.S. is located far from facilities for recycling or repurposing, increasing transportation costs and the risk of fires en route.

The process of discharging old batteries and assessing their remaining health, if done improperly, can also expose workers to toxic metals, chemical spills and fires. These risks are exacerbated in countries that import e-waste or secondhand vehicles from abroad, as well as at informal vehicle dismantlers within the U.S. These places may lack regulation and enforcement, formal worker protections, and proper training and safety gear.

Who Should Be Responsible for Used EV batteries?

Keeping EV batteries out of landfills, mitigating safety risks, and increasing reuse and recycling will require oversight at each stage of their end-of-life journey. There needs to be an authority to take responsibility for ensuring that used batteries are collected, assessed and utilized to their full capacity — and paying for the process.

That's where extended producer responsibility (EPR) comes in.

EPR policies are intended to hold producers responsible for their products throughout the entire lifecycle. They are already used in some places for products like electronics, appliances and mattresses. For EV batteries, extended producer responsibility means putting the onus for end-of-life management on vehicle or battery producers, rather than consumers or waste handlers.

Most regions with significant EV adoption, including the EU, India and China, already have some form of EPR in place for EV batteries. But while a few U.S. states are following suit, the country lacks a national law.

How Do EPR Policies for Used Batteries Work?

While their broader design varies, all EPR laws have a minimum requirement for manufacturers to collect a percentage (often by weight) of the total product they place on the market. This could include working directly or indirectly with retailers to educate car owners on best practices and set up collection infrastructure; with waste haulers to help ensure safe transportation; and with recycling centers and repurposing facilities to aggregate batteries and data and determine the next best use for end-of-life batteries. Producers may even receive economic benefits by controlling end-of-life batteries, such as through revenue sharing agreements with repurposing or recycling companies.

Some EPR laws also include measures to increase rates of recycling, repurposing or remanufacturing. For example:

• The EU batteries directive requires that battery manufacturers minimize their environmental footprint by using specified amounts of recycled minerals in new batteries or designing them to be more repairable.
• The New Jersey Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Battery EPR law explicitly bans disposal of EV batteries in landfills and imposes a fine for doing so, incentivizing manufacturers to ensure all used batteries are collected. It also encourages repurposing, as partner companies could acquire a higher volume of used batteries from the manufacturers at a more predictable cost and quality.
• India's Battery Waste Management Rules allow producers to leverage deposit refund schemes or buy-back policies to incentivize car owners to return used batteries. They also require producers to use up to 20% recycled minerals in battery production by 2030.

In addition, EPR laws often include a component on public education to ensure that consumers are aware of how to handle used EV batteries and have access to information on drop-off points or dealership services.

• Voluntary Producer Responsibility Programs for Used Batteries
• While government policies are critical, better battery management can also happen from the bottom up. For example, over 25 companies in the U.S. set up a voluntary EPR program — the eBike Battery Recycling Program — to help manage their used e-bike batteries safely and ensure they are recycled. For a nominal cost (less than 1% of total vehicle price), a third-party organization tracks batteries placed on the market by participating companies and assesses their value at end-of-life. This cost is borne by the manufacturer, and the third-party organization aggregates, transports and safely recycles the used batteries.

EPR Laws Show Promise, but Hurdles Remain

While EPR laws related to EV batteries are relatively nascent, similar regulations for other commodities have proven to significantly increase collection, recycling and reuse. For example, British Columbia enacted an EPR law for residential packaging and paper in 2014, which increased their collected waste by over 60% in a single year. Japan's Home Appliance Recycling Law obliges retailers and manufacturers to collect and recycle specified household appliances; this led to over 15 million units collected in FY2021, with recycling rates above 90% for certain appliances — exceeding expectations. Meanwhile, a 2021 report by PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency claimed that approximately 75% of all collected battery material in the country was reused in 2019. Such examples shed light on the promise of a well-designed EPR regulation for EV batteries.

However, these laws aren't without potential pitfalls. For example, manufacturers could pass the cost of battery management onto consumers by raising EV prices, which risks deterring some buyers and slowing the transition to EVs.

While the goal of an EPR law is to collect used batteries locally and build a domestic supply chain for reuse and recycling, this isn't guaranteed. E-waste is often shipped from wealthier to low-income countries, with very little retained and recycled domestically (around 20% in 2017). Exporting materials such as black mass (shredded battery scrap) simply shifts the environmental and safety burden to a different region.

Finally, with a loosely regulated battery collection market, waste haulers, retailers and producers may find it valuable to hoard used EV batteries in anticipation of rising demand and the potential for greater profits later. If batteries aren't stored safely, this could increase the risk of fires and dangerous chemical leakage.

Used EV batteries still hold much of their original charge and can be repurposed for other uses, like renewable energy storage, if they are collected and handled responsibly. Photo by Soonthorn Wongsaita/Shutterstock What's Next?

The U.S. currently lacks a national battery EPR law, although its Environmental Protection Agency is developing a national EPR framework. Meanwhile, many states are moving forward on policies and regulations. New Jersey was the first state to pass a used EV battery collection law, and others (including Washington, California, Hawaii, Illinois and Massachusetts) are in various stages of designing their own.

Other countries are exploring the prospect, too: In Australia, the Auto Recyclers Association is advocating for an EPR law and the adoption of the Global Battery Passport to increase collection rates and transparency in the battery supply chain.

For policymakers, expanding EPR laws — such as passing national laws in the U.S., Australia and elsewhere — is a good first step toward more responsible battery management. Equally important will be streamlining these policies and regulations between and within countries to make it easier for companies to comply and to help regulate waste flows across borders. This is particularly crucial for countries with active trade agreements related to used vehicles. Laying guardrails in EPR laws that require used batteries to be retained in the country or region could ensure that most collected batteries are repurposed and recycled domestically, encouraging energy security and helping limit e-waste exports.

Meanwhile, building consumer awareness about the drawbacks and opportunities from used batteries could help mitigate any potential adverse impacts to EV adoption. Companies in specific segments, like electric school buses, have a chance to lead the way through voluntary EPR programs, giving customers (i.e. school districts) certainty that their used batteries are being managed sustainably. As school buses are in every community, there's an added benefit of setting up partnerships and infrastructure with nationwide coverage.

Ultimately, EPR is just one of many strategies needed to enable a truly sustainable and circular battery value chain. Complementary policies can help ensure that used batteries are managed responsibly and not landfilled overseas, typically in low-income countries. Policies like a federal ban on landfilling and limits on exporting used EV batteries could help incentivize producers to create a safe and circular system.

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Authors Kriti Shah Vishant Kothari