Mexico Made Safe Mobility a Human Right — Here’s How Its Streets Can Become Safer alicia.cypress… Wed, 05/08/2024 - 09:25

Mexico became the first nation to declare access to safe mobility a human right in 2020 and two years later passed the General Law of Mobility and Road Safety to protect people, reduce collisions and promote sustainable modes of travel. Now, with this new constitutional mandate, it must redesign its streets to prioritize public transport modes and the safety of pedestrians and cyclists.

WRI research shows that relatively simple modifications — such as lowering vehicle speed limits, expanding sidewalks, adding crosswalks to streets and planting greenery along walkways — can make a huge difference in protecting pedestrians — especially women, children and other vulnerable road users — in Mexico and beyond.

Jalisco Is Paving the Way

Mexico’s cities, like most urban areas around the world, have designed their streets to prioritize fast-moving vehicle traffic, often neglecting pedestrian safety and accessibility. This prioritization has inadvertently marginalized pedestrian infrastructure, crucial not only as a sustainable mode of travel, but also for accessing public transport systems.

Even with increasing vehicle ownership across Latin America, walking is still the most common form of transportation in many urban areas. In Mexico City, walking represents 47% of all trips, yet only 10% of Mexico’s transportation spending is allocated to pedestrian infrastructure. The World Health Organization estimates there were 16,725 road crashes in 2016, and of these, pedestrians accounted for the largest share of deaths from road collisions (46%), higher than the rate for the entire Latin American region (35%).

The western state of Jalisco, along Mexico’s Pacific coast, is among the first in the country to invest in a transformation. The Jalisco state government, through the Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works, has already identified the need to build streets that prioritize safe accessibility for pedestrians and integrate with public transport, especially near schools, hospitals, parks and public markets. 

These sidewalks in Mexico are poorly designed for pedestrians. The narrow walkways are often interrupted for vehicles' access, and steps, steep ramps, utility poles and planter boxers are impediments to walkers. Photo by WRI Mexico.

The state is currently planning projects that include an indicator system to evaluate the safety of bus rapid transit stations and ensure the surrounding infrastructure supports high quality access for pedestrians, including installing safe lighting, pedestrian crossing signals, and green buffer zones. The government of Jalisco is also strengthening the technical procedures for the design (and redesign) of public spaces near schools. These areas have a higher need for additional traffic-calming measures like wider sidewalks for children who are walking to school or riding their bikes next to caregivers, raised pedestrian crossings that also act like speed bumps and continuous plant strips to prevent people from crossing the road in unsafe locations.

7 Interventions that Make Streets Safer and More Sustainable

WRI Mexico has been working with state and local governments, including Jalisco, to standardize safer streets, especially around public spaces like schools and hospitals. Infrastructure such as pedestrian zones, green spaces, public transport and traffic calming measures are all examples of modifications that can be implemented not just in Mexico, but in cities around the world. Here are seven interventions cities should consider:

1) Redesigning Existing Streets

To make streets safer, city planners must first understand existing street elements such as road hierarchy (is it intended as a highway or a residential street?), lane width, signage and street lighting, which are basic concepts for a comprehensive starting point. But then the focus of a redesign needs to be on pedestrians. Speed management interventions, such as narrower car lanes, planting trees along the side of the road to create a feeling of enclosure, smaller turning radii at intersections and raised pedestrian crosswalks, can help make streets safer for walkers. Streetlights should be spaced every 30 meters (100 feet) apart on busy vehicle roads. But for smaller roads that see more pedestrians, streetlights should be placed closer — every 10 meters (33 feet) apart — to make streets brighter at night.

2) Pedestrian Infrastructure

A critical element of safe pedestrian infrastructure is even, unobstructed sidewalks. According to minimum safe design recommendations, sidewalks should span 1.8 meters (about 6 feet) with an additional buffer of 0.8 meters (2.6 feet) from road traffic. The buffer zone can include vegetation, street furniture, bike racks, utility poles or other infrastructure. The “Complete Streets” design principles include best practices for accommodating all road users, including obstacle-free pedestrian circulation, ramps with adequate dimensions, rest furniture such as benches, protected bike lanes and safe road crossings. Even if a city can’t fully implement a full complete streets design, each of its elements can provide individual value.

This sketch shows elements of a pedestrian-friendly sidewalk in a Complete Street design. It features three zones: On the left, an area to operate doors or windows from homes or businesses while providing space for furniture; in the middle, a pedestrian-through zone for people to walk by without encountering obstacles; and on the right, space for more infrastructure like bike parking, benches, vegetation and transit stops. Graphic by WRI Mexico. 3) Green Infrastructure

Green infrastructure offers solutions to the many environmental pressures cities face, such as air pollution, noise, flooding and extreme heat. For example, planting tall trees can provide shade, green walls can keep surfaces cool and more permeable surfaces such as rain gardens, bioswales or planter boxes can absorb rainwater. Landscaping and greenery can also be implemented alongside pedestrian infrastructure, utilizing space on medians and buffers, alongside walls and in roundabouts. Not only does greenery provide physical benefits, but it can also improve pedestrian safety by blocking people from stepping into busy roadways or preventing street crossings at dangerous points. The added greenery also has been proven to improve the visual landscape and increase residents’ happiness.

Green infrastructure provides many environmental solutions for cities. In the image on the left, the trees are too low to offer shade and the surrounding strip does not allow for rainwater absorption. The photo on the right, however, depicts a sidewalk with a continuous strip of trees that can create shade, provide climate regulation and visual improvement to the street. Photos by WRI Mexico.  4) Cycling Infrastructure

Cycling is a very efficient and inclusive mode of transportation that requires little space and resources. But more infrastructure and safety provisions could encourage more riders and fewer cars on the road. Key components of cycling infrastructure include segregated one-way lanes with a minimum width of 1.8 meters (6 feet), well-organized intersections to minimize the risk of collisions and frequent bicycle parking where bikes can be locked and secured by one or both wheels. Additionally, bike lanes should be continuous and connected to other modes of transportation like public transit stations.

However, infrastructure alone might not be a complete solution. More consideration for women could encourage more riders. Bogota, Colombia recently saw an increase in bike trips from 6% before the pandemic to 8% in 2023, but found the number of female riders, who currently account for only 24% of cyclists of cyclists, has not increased. Women report that barriers include safety concerns, particularly from harassment, lack of amenities such as bike parking and showers at work, as well as insufficient knowledge on how to ride.

5) Bus Infrastructure

City planners often forget that public transit users start and end as pedestrians who need safe spaces to wait for buses or other forms of public transportation. Several types of bus stops can be implemented, with varying amounts of space used for benches and coverings. Better vertical signage with route information, fare costs and a contact number should be located next to street lighting and must not obstruct pedestrian traffic. Space permitting, a 1.5-meter (5-foot) roof over benches is recommended, with a covered space of the same size for people standing or in wheelchairs. Additional safety suggestions include a transparent backing of the waiting area and a panic button for emergencies, which can be placed on a light post for simple electricity connection.

These sketches show different Types of bus stops with increasing amount of dedicated waiting space and shelter. Green infrastructure can be integrated into the design to offer additional shade. Graphics by WRI Mexico.

Also, bus transit lines should be well integrated into other travel networks. Mi Macro Periférico, the newest bus rapid transit corridor in Guadalajara (the capital of Jalisco), saw a surge in ridership to more than 300,000 riders per day because of its integration with cycling and walking infrastructure. The city built 620 bicycle parking spaces along the corridor to improve accessibility, as well as constructed pedestrian bridges and planted trees and other greenery along walkways, demonstrating the benefits of connecting public transit with “active mobility” like biking and walking.

6) Traffic Calming Infrastructure

When designing or redesigning streets, there must be a shift in perspective from moving vehicles to moving people. Modifications to roads can reduce speeds and create safe spaces for all its users. These street elements include medians, speed bumps, raised pedestrian crossings, roundabouts and curb extensions.

One tactic, called a “road diet,” reduces the space allocated for vehicles and parking to make room for bicycle lanes, medians, wider sidewalks, landscaping or an exclusive bus lane.

In Jakarta, Indonesia, which in 2017 was the fourth-most congested city in the world, the government  expanded its sidewalks to make the city more walkable. Implementing a road diet in Jakarta’s biggest financial district in 2018 increased walkability by up to 40% and increased public transportation ridership by 15%. By 2021, Jakarta’s world congestion rating dropped to 46th.

7) Gender Accessibility

Alongside each of these elements of safer streets, greater attention should be given to women’s mobility and safety needs. Globally, men and women’s travel patterns are distinct. While men most often travel directly from point A to point B, women tend to make more stops along their journey, or “trip-chain” for basic activities such as shopping for daily goods, running errands and completing other administrative tasks along their main route. Additionally, women are still the majority of caretakers and often travel with children or elderly people. Yet streets and sidewalks are often inaccessible or inadequate for pushing karts, wheelchairs or strollers, and for resting along the walking route.

A woman, who is pushing a stroller and walking with a child, walks on the road because of narrow and poor sidewalk conditions in Mexico. Photo by WRI Mexico. 

Safe streets don’t stop at sidewalks and better lighting. Crosswalks need to provide more time for a mother pushing a stroller, shrubs should be trimmed to maintain a clear line of sight to public spaces and there should be signage on how to get help if needed. Cities should also make it a priority to provide safe and clean public toilet facilities.  A report from Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health shows anxiety around finding a toilet outside of the home can prohibit girls and women from partaking in daily activities.

As Congestion Increases, Walkable Streets Need to Be a Priority

Walking and cycling are the most climate-friendly modes of travel and increasing their use will be critical for cities to reducing emissions.  But this cannot be achieved without safe infrastructure. As cities’ streets get more congested with cars and trucks, more collisions are likely to occur between vehicles and pedestrians, particularly if they must continue to share the road. Protecting the most vulnerable road users must be a priority.

A city with equal access to public spaces with open air, greenery, slower vehicle speeds, convenient public transportation, low levels of noise and air pollution, and short travel times will improve the quality of life for all its residents. Additionally, planning urban spaces, streets, crosswalks, bus stops and cycling lanes with attention to women’s needs and their dependents will further improve the safety and travel quality of all users.

To learn more about how Mexican cities are improving road safety, read the Safe and Walkable Environments Guidebook in Spanish or the document brief in English here. This post is part of WRI’s Mobility and Accessibility Program (MAP), supported by FedEx, to improve public transport globally and in Brazil, China, India and Mexico.

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Authors Anna Kustar Sandra López José Hernández Anamaría Martinez

Corporate Climate Disclosure Has Passed a Tipping Point. Companies Need to Catch Up margaret.overh… Mon, 05/06/2024 - 08:00

Until recently, companies could decide whether to share information about their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and how climate change might affect their business models. But that’s changing rapidly. A suite of new laws — most notably in the European Union and United States — will soon make “climate-related disclosures” mandatory across much of the global economy.

While the United States’ long-awaited disclosure rule, issued in March 2024, was less ambitious than originally proposed, it still signaled a critical shift from voluntary practices to mandatory requirements. It cemented for the world’s largest economy that climate risks can be financially “material” — and that when they are, they must be reported like any other risk to a company’s bottom line. Once all pending disclosure rules are in force, we estimate that they will cover nearly 40% of the world’s economy.1

But it’s not just that: Companies have long seen the global patchwork of disclosure frameworks as an impediment to reporting. But these are consolidating as regulators develop a better understanding of how climate change affects business performance. This is making reporting standards clearer and thus easier for firms, dispelling one of the key arguments against climate disclosures.

The bottom line is that climate disclosure has reached a tipping point. Mandates are becoming the norm. And where differences lie between more stringent and ‘weaker’ mandates, current trends point toward the stronger rules pulling ahead.

Major global firms should prepare to start reporting across more than one jurisdiction and meeting more robust requirements. Meanwhile, a greater number of smaller firms will be required to report which have not done so before. For all involved, preparation should begin now.

Why Are Climate-related Disclosures Such a Big Deal?

Climate-related disclosures are a key enabler for corporate climate action. After all, companies cannot reduce their planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions or build resilience to climate change impacts without robust information on where emissions and climate risks occur within their businesses. This transparency can be an important tool for holding companies accountable to setting up and meeting their climate goals.

But climate disclosures aren’t just a political tool. They’re good for companies, too. The transparency provided by disclosure helps companies to operate more efficiently by surfacing potential risks so that management can respond proactively. Risk disclosure also makes investors happy, because the more information they have, the better they are at avoiding bad investment decisions.

Learn more about how mandatory risk disclosures can help countries achieve their climate goals with our Paying for Paris Resource Hub.

For their part, investors recognize that climate change presents real risks to companies. This includes the direct “physical risks” that climate impacts like heatwaves or sea-level rise pose to a company’s physical assets and supply chains. It also includes “transition risks,” which refer to the ways that reliance on fossil fuels could undermine a business as the world shifts away from them. For instance, a company that produces products such as cement or beef using carbon-intensive methods may become undesirable to consumers as preferences shift toward more climate-friendly options. This is a market risk.

Other types of transition risks could include policy and legal risks (if business practices contradict new climate policies or laws), technology risks (if a company does not keep pace with low-carbon technological advancement), and reputational risks (if the public perceives a company's practices to be harmful to society or the environment). Such risks are considered “material” because they could affect companies’ financial conditions and therefore a reasonable investor’s decision to buy stock — for example, by having a demonstrable impact on share price.

Armed with this information, investors can allocate capital in a way that accounts for climate risks and protects their returns and those of their fiduciaries. In a report surveying 416 institutional investors, 51% said climate risk disclosure was as important as financial reporting, compared with 18% and 4% who felt it was less important or much less important, respectively.

More of this reporting ultimately benefits everyone by helping to manage financial and market stability. And it directs finance toward firms with responsible, low-carbon business practices that are better for people and the planet.

Mandatory Disclosure Requirements Are Ratcheting Up

Over the course of only a few years, disclosure mandates have been passed in jurisdictions on nearly every continent — not only Europe and the United States, but also in Switzerland, Hong Kong, Brazil and New Zealand, among others. Some of these rules are more stringent than others.

In the U.S., new climate disclosure rules from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were delayed two years before a watered-down version was announced in March 2024. Importantly, these rules dropped a clause requiring companies to disclose their “scope 3” emissions. Scope 3, which includes all emissions associated with a company’s value chain, including investments, accounts for around 75% of companies’ GHG emissions on average. This is particularly relevant for financial institutions: Although they may not produce significant direct emissions (scope 1) or indirect emissions associated with energy use (scope 2), they often invest in fossil fuel companies or firms otherwise exposed to climate risks (scope 3).

The immediate future of the SEC’s rule may depend on the 2024 US Presidential election; the rules are currently on pause due to litigation and it will be up to the Justice Department to defend them or not from these challenges. Partisan tension over environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations, which are closely related to climate disclosure, also makes national legislation requiring climate disclosures unlikely in the U.S.

However, taking a broader lens, many companies around the world are already going to begin higher-quality reporting than what the SEC rules will require.

First, legislation underway at the U.S. state level will have national and global implications. California's Corporate Climate Data Act, for example, requires public and private companies to disclose their scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions to the state government. In July 2023, California also passed law the Climate-Related Financial Risk Act. This goes beyond the SEC proposals: Not only does it apply to any firm, foreign or domestic, that does business in California’s nearly $3 billion economy, but the legislation also includes penalties for companies who do not report or inadequately report. Around 10,000 companies will likely be in scope for California’s mandate; by comparison, just 4,900 companies globally follow voluntary reporting guidelines under the Task Force on Climate-related Disclosures (TCFD). Although not yet passed, New York State Bill 7704 contains similar measures.

Learn More About Disclosure Rules

What Are Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Corporate Climate Disclosures? 6 Questions, Answered

Meanwhile, the European Union has three directives related to climate and sustainability: the EU Taxonomy, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive (CSDD). The CSRD is perhaps the most complex and comprehensive climate disclosure mandate globally. It requires companies to assess and report on a wider range of risks than other frameworks, including social- and nature-related risks. Along with EU-based companies, this will have implications for larger firms (with over 500 employees or revenue above €50 million) operating but not headquartered in the EU. It is estimated that around 10,000 non-EU companies will fall under the CSRD mandate, including 3,000 U.S. companies.

As Frameworks Consolidate, Reporting Is Becoming More Standardized

Perhaps the most common objection to climate risk reporting is that it presents an undue burden to companies. The fractured reporting frameworks have been criticized as too confusing, unhelpful in creating comparable data and ultimately used as an excuse for not reporting.

It is true that reporting requires companies to collect and collate complex information. Adding to this concern is the fact that some multinational companies will fall into reporting scope in more than one place — for example, both California and the EU. If these jurisdictions have different reporting requirements, the company might appear to be presented with double the work.

However, a closer look reveals significant overlap in the information required by major mandatory disclosure frameworks. It may not be a cut-and-paste job, but it shouldn’t be double the work, either.

This is because as governments have announced mandated disclosures, legacy voluntary reporting frameworks have consolidated. In 2022, the International Financial Reporting Standards Board (IFRS) announced the launch of the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) disclosure frameworks 1 and 2. These merged several legacy frameworks, including the Global Reporting Initiative and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose framework was used as a baseline for several jurisdictions’ disclosure mandates, has also wound down its oversight of the framework and passed the baton to the ISSB. It declared that the ISSB frameworks mark “the culmination of the work of the TCFD.”

Thanks to this consolidation, most reporting rules now rely on the same underlying ISSB framework as a foundation. The table below shows a sample of proposed or active mandates and their criteria for companies which fall within their reporting requirements.

Comparison of climate risk reporting mandatesScopeReporting frameworkFirm typeThresholdAuditingPenaltiesEU-CSRDAligns with TCFD (ISSB), plus additional requirementsOperations in EU or listed500 employees, €50M revenue, €25M balance sheetRequires third party verificationDetermined by member-stateCaliforniaTCFD (ISSB) or other verifiable frameworkAny firms with operations in CA$500MRequires third party assurance$50,000 maxNY BillTCFD (ISSB) or other verifiable frameworkUS based, with any business operating in NY$500MRequired third party verification$50,000 maxHong KongBased on ISSB/IFRSCompanies listed on HK ExchangeN/ANot requiredN/AUKISSB/IFRSUK registered & large companiesNon-UK: 500 employees or >£500M turnoverN/A£2,500 to £50,000

Despite the perception that mandates are overwhelmingly complex, efforts have been made by framework developers and policy makers to ensure overlap in the various regulations. Moreover, U.S. state legislation is not prescriptive in its requirement for a framework; the rules call for the use of the TCFD or another verifiable framework.

On the other hand, the EU’s CSRD claims that no single currently available framework encompasses all of its required disclosures. These include reporting on social and human rights risks in addition to climate risks, for which TCFD guidance has served as a foundation.

Comparison of climate risk reporting frameworksFrameworkAudienceEmissionsFocusMaterialityKey pointsISSB S2 (Voluntary)InvestorScopes 1, 2 & 3Climate (material physical risks, transition risks)Single

Global baseline

Consolidates SASB & GRI

Connects financial statements

EU-CSRD (Mandatory)Stakeholder

Scopes 1 & 2

Scope 3, if material

Environmental & socialDouble

Transition plans

Nature, biodiversity, circular economy

U.S. SEC Rules (Paused)InvestorScopes 1 & 2, if materialClimateSingleCodifies some voluntary practices 

These regional differences can certainly make reporting more challenging. However, multinational companies already comply with various requirements in different jurisdictions when it comes to things like taxes, registration and accounting standards. So environmental and social disclosures are not unique in this regard.

The Next Frontier for Climate Risk Reporting

While climate reporting frameworks are becoming progressively more unified, one new and important difference is emerging: how firms must assess materiality.

“Materiality” is a central concept for investors and businesses. It separates what matters to a firm’s bottom line from what does not.

Most current disclosure rules, including the SEC’s, California’s and voluntary frameworks like the TCFD, are built around the concept of “single materiality.” This means that the requirement to disclose a certain risk is triggered by that risk having a direct financial impact on the company at or above a given threshold.

For instance, take an insurance company that provides homeowners insurance policies for properties in coastal areas. The risks of climate change causing more frequent, intense storms and rising sea levels have a real impact on the company’s bottom line, as storm surges or sea level rise could cause an insurance company to have to make major payouts to policyholders. This is a material climate risk.

The next frontier is “double materiality.” This is the idea that, in addition to the ways climate change impacts the firm, the firm’s impacts on the climate, the environment, and society can also be material. Decision-making for identifying double materiality would ask:

• Does an environmental or climate impact translate into financial risks?
• Would a ‘reasonable person’ consider this business activity to have an impact on people or the environment?

A European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) working paper uses an example of a company that has cobalt in its products. The suppliers of the cobalt were found to use child labor for mining the mining. Here's how that company might assess risk from a single and double materiality standpoint:

• Financial (“Single”) Materiality
  • The use of child labor in supply chains increases reputational and legal risks for the company, which could impact its profitability.
• Impact (“Double”) Materiality
  • Child labor is a negative social impact directly linked to the company’s supply chain.
  • Cobalt mining results in high carbon emissions and loud blasting which can impact local communities and the climate.

Reporting frameworks based on double materiality would require the company to disclose all of these social, environmental and climate impacts — not just those risks which affect its own bottom line.

Continuing the pattern of being ahead of the U.S. in disclosures, double materiality is accepted by the EU and integrated into the CSRD mandates. Double materiality has been a tougher sell in the U.S., where fiduciary duty and materiality have been more narrowly constructed. But once thousands of companies begin reporting on it for the EU, it will likely be more easily accepted by all but hardline skeptics.

What Should Companies Be Doing Right Now?

Although most mandatory disclosures will not go into force for a few years, corporates should start preparing to report now. Those that fall into more than one jurisdiction regime should begin by finding interoperability, implementing processes to collect and analyze the necessary data and contracting a third-party verifier.

Because regions like the EU and California have more rigorous reporting requirements and firms incorporated outside their jurisdictions fall into scope, these mandates could become more accepted as more firms have to report. Further, as other jurisdictions develop their own reporting mandates, taking up the ISSB framework or adapting the CSRD, increasing instances of interoperability should appear. Meanwhile, trends point toward more disclosure rather than less. This would include firms reporting on risks related to nature and biodiversity as well as linking climate risk with human rights and social risk.

In short, as WRI Managing Director Janet Ranganathan recently put it, climate disclosure rules are expanding. And companies need to keep up.

 

1GDP calculations from IMF data. Countries included in the calculations include Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, European Union states, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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Authors Amanda Carter

4 Things to Know About US EPA’s New Power Plant Rules alicia.cypress… Fri, 05/03/2024 - 14:25

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Biden administration announced four major regulations for power plants designed to slash multiple forms of toxic and planet-warming pollution. These rules, announced on April 25, 2024, represent the first legal limits on heat-trapping pollution from coal-fired power plants and will accelerate emissions reductions from the U.S. power sector.

When combined with other policies like tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act, the new rules will help reduce power plant emissions 75% below 2005 levels by 2035, and 83% by 2040. The rules are expected to yield an estimated $370 billion in climate and public health benefits and reduce 1.4 billion metric tons of carbon emissions over 25 years, according to EPA. They are critical for providing certainty in decision-making by utilities, regulators and others about investments in the power sector in the coming years.

In addition to new standards that address carbon dioxide emissions, EPA also announced new rules covering mercury, wastewater and coal ash disposal at power plants.

Here are four important things to know about the EPA’s new power plant rules:

What Do the EPA’s Power Plant Rules Require?

The new rules require existing coal plants and future natural gas plants to address carbon dioxide emissions in coming years. The rules address coal plants based on how long they expect to operate. For new gas plants, the required emissions controls will depend on how much they operate over the course of a year.

Coal plants that expect to operate beyond 2039 will have to reduce their carbon emissions by 90% by 2032 using carbon capture or other means, two years later than what was initially proposed in the draft rule released in May 2023. Coal plants closing by 2039 will have to reduce their emissions 16% by 2030 (based on what’s achievable using 40% gas co-firing, though plants can use any technology they want to achieve the necessary reductions). Those plants scheduled to retire before 2032 are exempt from reducing emissions, but do have reporting requirements.

If fully implemented, these rules could lead to the closure of most of the country's coal plants — the country’s dirtiest source of electricity — before 2040.

It is, however, important to recognize that coal-fired electricity generation plummeted in the U.S. during the last few decades from just over 50% of total generation in 1990 to 17% in 2022 due to both a surge in natural gas, wind and solar power, as well as regulations requiring cleaner generation. In the final rules, the EPA moved up the retirement date that triggers the need for emissions controls for coal plants from 2040 to 2039, requiring a larger set of plants to control emissions if they extend their lifetimes beyond 2039.  

While rules for existing natural gas plants, which are responsible for more than 40% of electricity generation today, will be addressed in a forthcoming rule covering a wider set of air pollutants, the current rule addresses three categories of new natural gas plants based on their hours of operation over the course of a year:

• For “baseload” plants that operate more than 40% of the time, EPA will require reductions that are the equivalent to 90% carbon capture and sequestration by 2032. 
• For “intermediate” natural gas plants that operate 20%-40% of the time, the rules require them to meet a performance threshold of an efficient simple cycle plant, or 1,150 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour (CO2/MWh).
• For peaker plants that operate less than 20% of the time, the rules require the use of lower-emitting fuels such as natural gas, which is already common practice, rather than diesel or high-emitting alternatives.

In addition to the greenhouse gas rule, EPA also finalized new rules strengthening and updating the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for coal-fired power plants, reducing pollutants discharged through wastewater from coal-fired power plants, and requiring the safe management of toxic coal ash left after burning coal for electricity.

New EPA Rules for Coal Plants and New Natural Gas PlantsType of Coal PlantEPA Rule, April 2024Long-lived plants (operating beyond 2039)Reductions equivalent to 90% carbon capture and storage by 2032Medium-term retirement (retiring between 2032 and 2039)Reductions equivalent to 40% gas co-firing by 2030Near-term retirement (retiring before 2032) Reporting requirement onlyType of Natural Gas PlantEPA Rule, April 2024Peaker/Low Load (operates < 20% of hours in a year)Emissions based on using lower emitting fuels (e.g., natural gas rather than diesel)Intermediate (operates 20%-40% of hours in a year)Emissions based on efficient simple cycle plant operation (~1,150 lbs. CO2/MWh)Baseload (operates > 40% of hours in a year)Reductions equivalent to 90% carbon capture and storage by 2032

Source: EPA

How Can Power Plants Comply with the New Rules?

Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts vs. EPA in 2007 that the agency was responsible for regulating the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as pollution under the Clean Air Act, EPA has attempted to craft regulations that are based on the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) to comply with this directive.

The first attempt was in 2015 with the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, which proposed a systemwide approach to require carbon emissions reductions. Those regulations were halted by court challenges before full implementation and replaced by the Trump administration’s inaccurately named Affordable Clean Energy Rule in 2019. That rule proposed to raise pollution limits and lower efficiency measures, which would have resulted in more damage to human and environmental health. But it was also halted by the courts before taking effect.

The new rules put forward by the EPA focus on reducing emissions from individual facilities by employing traditional, at-the-source pollution control measures for carbon as well as other forms of pollution. At present, the best way to control carbon emissions at individual power plants is through carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Utilities planning to operate a plant beyond the 2030s can comply with the rule by using carbon capture technologies. If other kinds of technologies develop over time, utilities can use them given the compliance flexibility written into the final rules. The EPA estimates using CCS technology would slash 88% of the carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, preventing up to 1.38 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions over the next 23 years, the equivalent of taking 328 million gasoline-powered cars off the road for a year.

Critics, including the Edison Electric Institute, have been quick to protest that CCS is not a fully mature technology ready for widespread deployment, and that it would be too expensive to widely deploy in order to comply by the 2032 deadlines. However, CCS was among the technologies that earned generous tax credits (known as provision 45Q) and research funding through the Inflation Reduction Act. These tax credits will provide utilities with a strong incentive to install the technology where it makes sense, reducing compliance costs for at least the next decade.

Will the EPA’s New Power Plant Rules Be Overturned or Challenged?

The new rules are expected to face myriad challenges from Congress, the courts and potentially from future administrations.

Before the final rules were even officially announced, members of Congress indicated they plan to use a legislative tool called the Congressional Review Act, which only requires a simple majority to pass, in an effort to overturn the rules. However, in the current 118th Congress, such attempts would likely be vetoed upon landing on President Joe Biden’s desk. Chances of a two-thirds majority in both chambers voting to override the veto are also slim. Efforts to overturn these rules in the next Congress would hinge on when the rules are officially published in the Federal Register, as any rule finalized within 60 working days of the new Congress could be subject to additional review and votes.

On the other hand, the rules will almost certainly be challenged in the courts, and the outcomes are uncertain. Various states’ attorneys general, led by West Virginia's Attorney General Patrick Morrisey, have indicated they will file legal challenges as soon as the rules are published in the Federal Register, which is expected by the end of May. It is possible that utilities and other companies who see themselves impacted by these rules may join in legal filings.

Such legal challenges would likely end up at the Supreme Court, just as the Obama-era Clean Power Plan rules did in West Virginia vs. EPA. In that 2022 ruling, the Supreme Court declared that EPA could not force utilities to meet future regulations by requiring them to shift generation to different sources (e.g., replacing coal with gas or wind), but must rely instead upon the best system of emissions reductions that can be applied on a plant-by-plant basis, which is the path EPA has attempted to follow with these new rules.

In addition to challenges from Congress and the courts, a change of presidential administration would threaten power plant rules. Former President Donald Trump, who is the presumptive Republican nominee for the 2024 election, has promised to roll back these and other climate-focused regulations if elected.

What’s Missing from the New EPA Power Plant Rules?

While these rules will address various forms of pollution from the oldest and dirtiest sources of electricity generation, they do not address the largest source of current carbon pollution in the electricity sector: existing natural gas power plants.

EPA has delayed regulatory standards for existing gas plants, indicating that the rule-making process could begin as soon as 2025 and include control of other air pollutants as well. This could strengthen the regulations and make them potentially less vulnerable to legal challenges.

While the new rules were both weakened and strengthened in areas compared to the 2023 draft rule, the emissions performance standards were substantially watered down for intermediate natural gas plants that operate from 20%-40% of the time. Under the draft rules, these plants would have needed to reduce emissions to a rate of about 1,000 pounds CO2/MWh by 2030 based on blending 30% hydrogen fuel with natural gas.

The removal of the requirement based on hydrogen co-firing and only limiting emissions to those equivalent to a simple cycle turbine is a substantial weakening of the rule for these plants. While the maximum operation of plants in this category was reduced to 40% from 50% in the draft rule, which would reduce the number of qualifying plants and the amount of generation that could come from this category of plants, the emissions standards should be revisited and strengthened in the future.  

As WRI wrote last spring when the draft rule was first proposed, achieving faster and deeper reductions from coal- and gas-fired power plants is the most important thing the United States can do to build on the Inflation Reduction Act and achieve the national target of reducing emissions 50%-52% below 2005 levels by 2030. It’s critical for the federal government to take additional actions to accelerate the construction of zero-emissions generation, energy storage and transmission capacity. The Biden administration should continue enacting its action plan for quicker, smarter permitting of this essential infrastructure. Congress, along with state and local governments, must also continue to encourage more effective community engagement while eliminating duplicative processes that add time without improving decision-making.

EDITOR'S NOTE: This piece was originally published in 2023 to evaluate the EPA's proposed power plant rules. We updated the article in May 2024 once the rules were finalized. 

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Authors Dan Lashof Lori Bird Jennifer Rennicks

The Impacts of El Niño Go Far Beyond Water wil.thomas@wri.org Thu, 05/02/2024 - 17:10

Over the past several months, the climate pattern El Niño has disrupted different regions and sectors across the world. Zimbabwe recently declared a state of disaster, due largely to El Nino-induced drought. The city government in Bogota, Colombia announced water rationing as reservoir levels dropped to critical lows, restricting water use for approximately 10 million people.

El Niño occurs every two to seven years, usually lasting between nine and 12 months. It decreases Pacific trade winds, which increase water temperatures in the Pacific Ocean and lead to a range of climate and weather effects across the Americas, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia.

And while most attention surrounding El Niño focuses on drier conditions and water shortages, cascading effects impact food and energy production, air quality, human health and more. These impacts are only expected to worsen as climate change intensifies both the frequency and severity of El Niño occurrences and makes precipitation more erratic. 

Below, we examine the ripple effects of El Niño-fueled drought across three countries where WRI works — Colombia, Indonesia and South Africa.

El Niño Threatens Energy Production in Colombia

Colombia’s energy sector is especially vulnerable to drought. The country relies on hydropower for approximately 75% of its power generation.

In July of 2023, the World Meteorological Organization declared the start of the El Niño season. Energy prices rose in August 2023 in anticipation of the predicted El Niño, and the country imported more Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) to supply its thermoelectric power plants in case of reduced hydroelectric supply. By October 2023, experts warned of an extended dry season and the risk of further inflation based on previous El Niño events in the region. As of April 2024, Colombia's reservoirs were at less than 30% capacity, well below historical averages.

Nevertheless, the country was able to meet energy demands — but historically, this has not always been the case.

During the 2015-2016 El Niño, Colombia saw a 40% decrease in rainfall, straining the electrical grid and spiking electricity costs, while increasing the risk of blackouts. In 1992, unprecedented drought and El Niño patterns caused a severe energy crisis, with the government implementing power rationing for up to 9 hours a day in Bogotá and 18 hours a day in San Andrés and Providencia for nearly an entire year. President Cesar Gaviria moved the clocks forward one hour to secure an extra hour of daylight each day, changing Colombia’s time zone from UTC-5 to UTC-4 at midnight on May 2, 1992. The measure, informally known as the “Gaviria Hour,” lasted nine months.

Wildfire smoke in South Kalimantan, Indonesia in August 2023. Wildfires spiked in 2023, due in large part to El Nino-induced drought. Photo by Mas Paijan/Shutterstock El Niño Linked to Crop Failures, Wildfires and Poor Air Quality in Indonesia

Experts predicted that the current El Niño would increase the risks of wildfire and crop damage in Indonesia, warning of drought conditions across several regions. Those predictions were largely proven correct. Crop prices spiked due to drought. Wildfire levels in 2023 increased by a factor of five compared to the previous year. Coffee production in Indonesia declined by 20% and rice prices climbed 25% over government-recommended levels, as farmers either avoided their third rice crop planting in October/November 2023 or planted crops failed due to lack of water.

Warmer, drier conditions from El Niño also caused air pollution to spike in cities like Jakarta, far exceeding the World Health Organization’s recommended limits for particulate matter (PM 2.5). Wildfires spurred by El Niño also reduced air quality, with smoke and haze felt both within and outside national borders.

Like other countries, Indonesia also experienced an intense El Niño in 2015-2016, which led to severe wildfires. These same conditions caused crop failures and price spikes, forcing the Indonesian government to rely on food imports and cloud seeding efforts.

The Indonesian government has since taken aggressive action, including increasing the country’s firefighting capacity and  importing 2 million metric tonnes of rice to boost food supplies. It’s also working to reform agricultural practices by reducing the use of fire in crop and bush clearing in peatlands and restoring fire-damaged areas. But ultimately, more systemic interventions will be needed.

El Niño Hits South Africa’s Economy

South Africa is overwhelmingly dependent on rainfall and surface water for its water needs, making it particularly vulnerable to changes in temperature.

In the months prior to the 2023/2024 El Niño, experts predicted severe drought. And while the current El Niño seems to have passed without drastic impacts on water supplies in the region, the last one in 2018 showed how disruptive the weather pattern can be.

Six years ago, Cape Town faced down a “Day Zero,” where the city came dangerously close to running out of drinking water. This was precipitated by a regional three-year rainfall deficit, linked to El Niño’s effect on ocean weather patterns. Residents were restricted to 50 liters of water per day at the height of the of the crisis. Tariffs were raised on water use, with the heaviest users facing fines and penalties.

But impacts went far beyond water, with economic disruptions extending outside of Cape Town. The years of drought leading up to the potential Day Zero were estimated to have cost the wider Western Cape regional economy R15 billion (approximately $780 million), roughly 3.4% of the provincial GDP and 0.3% percent of the national GDP. The agricultural sector alone suffered an estimated $400 million in damages and tens of thousands of lost jobs. Cape Town’s tourism sector was also impacted, as 2018 saw a record 12.6% decline in April tourist arrivals, with smaller declines throughout the year.

The City of Cape town and the wider province narrowly avoided Day Zero by cutting water usage by 50% over three years, using a combination of severe water restrictions, public communications campaigns promoting efficient water use, technical solutions involving groundwater and desalination, as well as a timely and fortunate increase in rainfall in 2018. But in the long-term, the country will need more systemic measures to address the ongoing risk of drought.

Building Resilience to El Niño and Climate Change

The recurrence of El Niño is historically documented, and its impacts are expected to be heightened because of climate change. Meanwhile, climate change itself is expected to make precipitation patterns increasingly erratic, with many countries grappling with increased risk of floods, droughts or both.

While countries like Colombia, Indonesia and South Africa have managed to overcome El Nino’s threats in recent years through crisis-response measures, longer-term planning and systemic interventions are essential for increasing resilience over the long-term. National leaders and decision-makers will need to increase adaptation and mitigation to fight both El Nino and climate change alike.

This means acting both in the water sector and outside it.

For example, South Africa can expand its water conservation efforts, as well as explore additional sources of water through desalination or water reuse. Already, the country is removing “water hungry” invasive tree species, such as pine and eucalyptus, from the areas surrounding Cape Town. As of October 2023, 46,000 hectares of invasive trees had been removed, saving an estimated 15.2 billion liters of water.

Colombia can reduce its reliance on hydroelectric power and reduce emissions by incorporating more renewable energy into its mix. Research shows there is significant potential for the country to expand its wind and solar power generation capacity, up to 30 and 32 GW, respectively.

And in Indonesia, the government can expand its efforts beyond reforming agricultural and firefighting practices. By fully protecting the country’s wetlands and peatlands, it can further reduce the risk of wildfires, while preserving native food sources such as fish can reduce demands on agricultural land.

Additionally, nature-based solutions can help build more resilient water systems that can withstand the extreme weather associated with El Niño and climate change. Wetland restoration, for example, has the potential to restore depleted groundwater. Healthy forests can filter contaminants from water sources. Restored ecosystems can reduce the risk of wildfires.

The synergistic effects of climate change and El Niño have global implications. All countries will need to work domestically and collaboratively to properly adapt to these changing, increasingly severe weather patterns.

Indonesia-drought.jpg Freshwater Climate Air Quality Energy Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Alex Simpkins Marlena Chertock Sara Walker Héctor Donado Katie Connolly Iryna Payosova

STATEMENT: U.S. Treasury Department Issues New Guidance for Sustainable Aviation Fuel Tax Incentives, Boosting High-Emitting Crop-based Biofuels wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 04/30/2024 - 16:50

WASHINGTON (April 30, 2024) — Today the U.S. Department of Treasury released final tax credit guidance for sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) production. The new guidance allows the use of the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model favored by the ethanol industry to determine the greenhouse gas emissions from aviation fuel production and use.

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) created the SAF tax credit to reduce aviation emissions by subsidizing fuels that achieve at least a 50% reduction in emissions compared with conventional petroleum-based jet fuel. This tax credit is intended to help the aviation industry meet its decarbonization goals.

The original IRA language for the tax credit refers to the criteria used globally by the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), under which neither corn ethanol nor biofuels from vegetable oil would qualify as Sustainable Aviation Fuel. Allowance of the GREET model version announced today to determine fuel eligibility, however, will allow corn ethanol and other food crop-based fuels to qualify for the SAF tax credit because it fails to adequately account for the opportunity cost of dedicating prime farmland to energy, rather than food, production.

Following is a statement from Dan Lashof, Director, United States, World Resources Institute:

“Powering planes with crop-based biofuels is anything but sustainable. The United States missed a major opportunity to focus incentives on climate-friendly fuel to help the aviation industry decarbonize.

“At a time of increasing demands on limited global land, we cannot afford to use food to fuel airplanes. Research has shown that crop-based biofuels have lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions factors that are as bad, or worse, than fossil fuels. Tax credits for corn ethanol or vegetable oil to make jet fuel is not the solution for decarbonizing aviation, and any policies that subsidize use of such fuels benefits wealthier air travelers at the expense of average consumers who will pay more for food.

“WRI analysis shows that using corn ethanol to meet the anticipated demand for aviation fuel would require an unviable amount of cropland, and using vegetable oil, such as soy biodiesel, would cause devastating deforestation.

“The Biden administration should use the best available science, which shows that crop-based biofuels do not meet the 50% emissions reduction threshold required to qualify for the SAF tax credit under the IRA. By bowing to pressure from the ethanol industry the administration has put the U.S. aviation industry out of step with its international competitors and made its own climate protection goals harder to achieve.”

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STATEMENT: G7 Leaders Agree to Shut Down Coal Plants alison.cinnamo… Tue, 04/30/2024 - 09:03

TURIN, ITALY (April 30, 2024) – The Group of Seven (G7) countries, which include Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US, announced at a ministerial meeting that they will shut down coal-fired power plants by 2030-2035, or on a timeline consistent with the 1.5 C degree temperature limit. In addition, the G7 countries announced they will rapidly scale-up battery storage sixfold by 2030 to support electricity grids powered by renewable energy sources.

Following is a statement from Jennifer Layke, Global Director, Energy, World Resources Institute: 

“Stamping an end date on the coal era is precisely the kind of leadership we need from the world’s wealthiest countries. This decision provides a beacon of hope for the rest of the world, showing the transition away from coal can happen much faster than many thought possible.

“As some of the largest emitters — and with the greatest concentrations of wealth — the G7 countries have a unique ability to steer the world’s course toward a clean energy future. This commitment says to the rest of the planet that this transition is possible — and international cooperation is critical to getting us there. It marks a profound shift in thinking from last year’s G7 meetings when countries failed to reach an agreement to move away from fossil fuels.

“Putting an end to the world’s dirtiest fuel will provide cleaner air and massive health benefits to communities throughout these countries. It’s now imperative that these countries prioritize just transition measures to support the workers and communities who have relied on coal for decades.

“The G7 countries’ commitment to rapidly expand battery storage capacity sixfold by 2030 is critical to meeting countries’ prior commitment to tripling renewable energy, and needed to create resilient electrical grids.

"Today these countries have taken positive steps toward building a zero-carbon energy system that will transform the global economy. Now the G7 countries should back this political will with the critical finance needed to rapidly transition the world away from fossil fuels and toward zero-carbon energy, both in their own countries and abroad.”
 

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E-liabilities vs. GHG Protocol Approaches to Emissions Reporting: What You Need to Know shannon.paton@… Mon, 04/29/2024 - 09:54

In an ever-changing climate landscape, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions measurement and management must continue to adapt and evolve to stay relevant as new opportunities and challenges emerge. There is no shortage of ideas. More than 1,400 survey responses and 230 new proposals were received by the GHG Protocol, the world’s most widely used GHG accounting approach, as part of its two-year update process.

One such proposal is E-liability accounting. But for numerous reasons, which I unpack in this article, E-liability is not a replacement for the GHG Protocol.

E-liability and the GHG Protocol serve different purposes, adopt different approaches to accounting, and are in different stages of maturity. E-liability aims to deliver mutually exclusive, comparable, emissions data to support a liabilities approach to holding companies accountable for emissions. The GHG Protocol supports comprehensive corporate GHG management, value-chain wide emissions disclosures and ambitious target-setting. The E-liability concept was first introduced in 2021 in a management magazine. The GHG Protocol is a widely used family of codified standards developed through multi-stakeholder processes over the last 20 years.

One of main criticisms of GHG Protocol by E-liabilities’ authors is the double-counting inherent in the design of its scopes. Yet this is one of GHG Protocol’s greatest strengths. It supports comprehensive GHG management by incentivizing cradle-to-grave value-chain GHG reduction efforts.

Many questions remain on whether and how E-liability could support GHG management. The E-liabilities approach would likely require a regulated system to drive the universal participation necessary to deliver its aims while GHG Protocol can and is used in both voluntary and regulated systems.

This article describes the E-liabilities approach, compares it to the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard, explores how it might be implemented in practice and discusses its potential to support GHG management. 

What Is E-liability Accounting?

First introduced in 2021 by Professors Robert S. Kaplan and Karthik Ramanna, E-liability accounting aims to deliver mutually exclusive and comparable product and entity-level emissions data to enable “well-functioning green-finance and carbon-sequestration markets.” In E-liability accounting, “E” refers to environmental, and one metric ton of E-liability is synonymous with one metric ton of GHG emissions. Similar proposals by other academics include the carbon emissions statement by Reichelstein 2022, the carbon balance sheet by Jia et al. 2022 and consequential impact-based accounting by Ballentine 2023.

How Might the E-liability Approach Work?

E-liability is envisioned to work like a company’s financial cost accounting system, transferring emissions down supply chains with the sale of products. Each company in a value chain would calculate its own direct GHG emissions (scope 1 in GHG Protocol) using primary data and allocate these to its products, together with the cradle-to-gate supply chain emissions of the purchased inputs used to produce them. The upstream cradle-to-gate emissions would be transferred to the company by its direct (tier 1) suppliers. While financial liabilities can include future services owed to others or unsettled obligations from previous transactions, E-liability uses liabilities to refer exclusively to historical or cradle-to-gate emissions ex-post.

The idea behind the approach is that emissions information, referred to as “E-liabilities,” would be transferred sequentially along supply chains to downstream customers. Each company in the supply chain would deduct the E-liabilities attributable to its sold products from its cumulative record of E-liabilities and transfer them to the downstream company buying its products. The buyers would add these cradle-to-gate E-liabilities attributable to the products it purchased to its cumulative record of E-liabilities. With this approach, each metric ton of GHG emissions would be “owned” by only one company at a time.

If companies reduce their cradle-to-gate emissions by sourcing less carbon-intensive inputs (upstream) or decrease their own direct emissions, then they will incur and pass on fewer emissions — “E-liabilities”— to their customers. A company’s cumulative E-liabilities would not reflect the emissions it caused over a period; rather, it would be a point-in-time “owned” E-liabilities value on a “carbon balance sheet,” or “E-ledger.” Companies could also record cradle-to-gate emissions for a given period, like the corporate inventory approach, separately from point-in-time E-liabilities, but this would be limited to cradle-to-gate emissions and direct emissions. 

How Does E-liabilities Relate to Emissions Liability Management? 

Emissions Liability Management, introduced by Roston, Seiger & Heller, 2023, builds on E-liability accounting to create an E-liability Management framework, or “carbon solvency,” whereby a company’s emissions liabilities are matched on a balance sheet (E-ledger) with “duration-matched removal assets” (E-assets). A company’s E-Ledger would net E-liabilities and E-assets. A company with more E-liabilities than E-assets would show net E-liabilities; and a company with more E-assets than E-Liabilities would show net E-assets. E-assets are carbon removal offsets that certify permanent carbon sequestration. The E-asset system aims to tackle some of the existing carbon-offset market challenges, such as inconsistent reporting and lack of audits, by using financial accounting principles to define what constitutes an allowable carbon-offset asset.

A company could buy offsets that are “nettable against liabilities,” effectively counterbalancing their E-liabilities — much like the carbon-neutral concept. Emissions Liability Management authors initially suggested that the liability duration for E-assets be 1,000 years, but in a subsequent paper acknowledged that in practice companies would choose their own liability duration. No limit is set on the use of E-assets, meaning that a company could theoretically buy removal offsets for all its E-liabilities and never decarbonize. This contrasts with the Science-based Target Initiative (SBTi), which only allows a very limited quantity of residual emissions (5-10%) to be neutralized with high-quality carbon removals once a company has achieved its long-term science-based target. 

How Does the E-liabilities Accounting Concept Differ from the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard?

The differences between the E-liability approach and the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard reflect their different goals and maturity.  Five differences are discussed below, noting that E-liability is still evolving and subject to change:

• Cradle-to-gate and direct versus cradle-to-grave emissions accounting;
• Transferring emissions liabilities to customers versus collective value-chain emissions accounting;
• Mutually exclusive versus double-counting of emissions;
• Use of primary versus estimated data; and
• Concept versus codified standard.

While this comparison focuses on E-liability and the GHG Protocol’s Corporate Standard, it should be noted that allocating emissions on a product-level basis, a key feature of E-liability accounting, was standardized over a decade ago in the GHG Protocol Product Standard (2011). Further, allocating (e.g., depreciating or amortizing) cradle-to-gate emissions of capital equipment on a product-level basis, per product generated, is not a new concept. Such practices have been commonplace in lifecycle analysis for decades.

1) Cradle-to-gate and direct versus cradle-to-grave emissions accounting

E-liability focuses on accounting for a company’s cradle-to-gate and direct emissions. An oil and gas company, for example, would not account for the downstream emissions from the combustion of its sold products by end users (where most of their cradle-to-grave emissions occur). The authors’ rationale for omitting downstream emissions was threefold: including downstream emissions double counts emissions, collecting emissions data from downstream customers is challenging, and companies have more control or influence over their suppliers than their customers.

A subsequent working paper by the E-liabilities authors reversed this stance and incorporated the disclosure of downstream emissions from product use by end consumers (B2C) when products require energy for their use and when a product’s sourcing and design decisions could influence product energy use. If these conditions are met, companies would disclose per-product performance metrics (GHG intensity) rather than aggregate emissions, as in the case of the GHG Protocol. It is unclear why the E-liabilities authors omitted high use phase emissions from B2B products from disclosure. Such information would likely be material to investors and other users.

The GHG Protocol’s corporate standard quantifies the upstream (cradle-to-gate) and downstream emissions attributable to a company’s activities, classified into three scopes. Scope 1 refers to direct emissions from a company’s owned or controlled sources. Scope 2 refers to indirect emissions from the generation of energy purchased and consumed by a company. Scope 3 refers to indirect emissions (not included in scope 2) that occur in the value chain of a reporting company. Scope 3 emissions are categorized into 15 mutually exclusive categories that distinguish upstream and downstream emissions. Downstream product-use phase emissions include individual end users and business users. The GHG Protocol Scope 3 Standard also provides guidance on how to report product performance metrics effectively, e.g., for long-lived products that result in significant cumulative emissions despite low-carbon on a per-product level.

2) Transferring emissions liabilities to customers versus collective value-chain emissions responsibility

Using the E-liability approach, companies transfer the E-liabilities of their products to downstream customers. This approach risks companies offloading the burden of managing emissions (liabilities) to customers instead of encouraging collaboration and collective target-setting across value chains. A fertilizer manufacturer, for example, would transfer its production emissions liabilities to customers and would not be responsible for the downstream emissions associated with the application of its fertilizers. 

It is unclear who would require E-ledgers and whose E-ledgers, if anyone’s, would capture the E-liabilities effectively offloaded to individual (non-business) end consumers (e.g., individuals driving cars or heating homes). Even if individual consumers did maintain personal E-ledgers, what would happen to their liabilities when they die?

Under the GHG Protocol, responsibility for emissions is not transferred between companies or to end users. Instead, each company in a value chain accounts for and takes responsibility for its upstream (cradle-to-gate), direct (Scope 1) and downstream emissions. This helps companies focus their GHG mitigation efforts on emissions “hot spots” in value chains and prioritize where they can drive the biggest GHG reductions.

Incentivizing an approach like E-liability where everyone looks at their own plates first risks slowing down the decarbonization of value chains. Returning to the oil and gas company example, emissions from sold products typically comprise 90% of oil and gas companies’ total emissions. These would show up as Scope 3 emissions using the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard, creating an incentive for companies to manage and reduce them. Oil and gas companies have opportunities to reduce downstream emissions through the design of their products or by selling energy generated with low-carbon technologies. Calculating product use-phase emissions need not be challenging. Making assumptions about how products are typically used is standard practice for product development. 

3) Mutually exclusive versus double-counting of emissions

By allowing companies to transfer emissions liabilities to their customers, E-liability avoids the double-counting of the same E-liability by different companies. This supports their goal of providing mutually exclusive accounts of emissions. The GHG Protocol’s three scopes result in multiple companies counting the same emissions in shared value chains. One company’s direct (Scope 1) emissions are another company’s indirect (Scope 2 or 3) emissions.

Does double-counting matter? The answer depends on how the information is used. Yes, if the goal is to create a mutually exclusive corporate GHG liabilities framework. No, if the goal is to help companies strategically manage emissions across value chains.

The GHG Protocol scopes drive an expansive approach to GHG reductions. A delivery truck company, for example, can lower emissions by optimizing routes and selecting low-emissions vehicles (Scope 1). A truck manufacturer can lower emissions by making its trucks more energy-efficient and shifting from gas to electric vehicles (Scope 3). The energy provider can explore alternative low carbon energy sources (Scopes 1 and 3). The scopes’ design enables companies to focus on the part of the value chain where they have the greatest opportunities to reduce emissions.

The scopes’ design also ensures no double-counting within a single company’s GHG inventory. Upstream and downstream emissions are also not conflated in an inventory. The GHG Protocol’s Scope 3 Standard (2011) requires the separate disclosure of Scope 3 emissions, in 15 categories, which are grouped exclusively as upstream or downstream. 

4) Use of primary versus estimated data

Primary data is specific and traceable to a company’s products and services. It does not include the use of averaged industry or regional data. The E-liability approach initially advocated for only using primary data to improve accuracy and reliability, acknowledging that this would involve a three or six-year phase-in period. In practice, its approach, as exhibited by recent case studies, mirrors the GHG Protocol by encouraging companies to collect as much primary data as possible, especially for significant emissions sources, while relying on secondary data for less relevant or material emissions sources.

Ideally all companies would collect and share primary data. The challenges to this are multiple, especially in voluntary systems. Supply chains can have thousands of suppliers and components. Suppliers may be unwilling to share proprietary primary data. Thus, it is practical and efficient to use representative secondary (industry average) data to fill data gaps, while focusing a company’s primary data-collection efforts on emissions “hot spots” in the value chain that could make the greatest contribution to mitigating overall emissions. A CDP analysis on the relevance of Scope 3 categories by 16 high-impact sectors, for example, found that on average, companies had significant emissions in only three of the 15 GHG Protocol Scope 3 categories. 

5) Concept versus codified standard 

The E-liability approach is not a codified standard. In their September 2023 updates, the authors indicated that they were not working to “standardize their methodology” because they are still “field testing” their concepts. As a result, it does not specify the GHG accounting and allocation rules, quantification methods, emission factors, and other key elements needed to ensure comparability between companies. E-liability will either need to develop these rules or draw on the GHG Protocol’s existing, codified guidance, as the authors appear to be doing with their recent addition of downstream emissions estimates and disclosures. 

The GHG Protocol is a family of codified standards developed through multi-stakeholder processes involving thousands of experts and stakeholders from business, academia, NGOs and governments over the last 20 years. These include the Corporate Standard (2004), Project Protocol (2005), Scope 2 Guidance (2015), Scope 3 Standard (2011), Scope 3 Technical Guidance (2013), Product Life Cycle Standard (2011), and the forthcoming Land Sector and Removals Guidance (expected in 2024).

In What Ways Is E-liability Like the GHG Protocol?

Both the E-liability and the GHG Protocol’s Corporate Standard involve collecting emissions data and passing it sequentially along a supply chain. E-liability passes along liabilities as mutually exclusive emissions information. The GHG Protocol passes along information, not the associated “ownership” of emissions liabilities.

The E-liability primary data collection methods and principles of allocating supplier-specific, cradle-to-gate emissions to sold products mirrors the specifications from GHG Protocol’s “corporate suite” of standards and guidance. 

The activity-based costing method of assigning overhead and indirect costs to products and services recommended by E-Liability resembles the physical allocation methods (including mass, volume, energy, chemical and unit sales) specified in the GHG Protocol Scope 3 and Product Standards, which build on long-established guidance on allocation within attributional lifecycle assessment (ISO, 2006).

Other similarities include:

• Both allow a reporting company to collect data from its immediate (tier 1) suppliers and its own activities. The GHG Protocol’s Scope 3 Standard states that reporting companies should use product-level cradle-to-gate GHG data from suppliers to calculate their emissions. Detailed guidance on how to do this is provided in the GHG Protocol’s Product Life Cycle Accounting and Reporting Standard.
• Both include direct emissions and indirect upstream emissions (cradle-to-gate); GHG Protocol also includes indirect downstream emissions (cradle-to-grave).
• Both encourage primary data collection.
• Both specify supplier-specific emissions data transfer.
• Both use similar data sources and calculations. 

How Practical Would it Be to Implement E-liability?

E-liability is still being prototyped. An E-liability case study of a tire company, for example, included the GHG emissions from only four of the 200 raw materials used to produce tires, and even then had to rely on estimates from environmental product declarations. 

E-liability is not a standalone GHG accounting system. It does not provide methods for calculating emissions. It is not a codified standard. Nor has it specified data formatting or data transfer rules to tackle data-sharing problems and the need to link-up supply chains to facilitate emissions sharing among companies using different technologies and platforms. This data sharing problem is being addressed by GHG Protocol’s co-convenor, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, through its Partnership for Carbon Transparency (PACT). PACT develops a standardized approach for calculating and exchanging consistent, comparable and credible Scope 3 emissions data across value chains. It has two elements: the PACT Framework,  which provides guidance on how to calculate primary product GHG footprints, and the PACT Network,  which facilitates peer-to-peer exchange for ensuring interoperability between technology solutions.

To achieve its goal of only using primary data to calculate emissions, the E-liability approach would need each company in a value chain to quantify and register its GHG emissions liabilities. Such a universal approach is unlikely to be feasible in a voluntary system. Companies with diverse product portfolios or deep global supply chains touch many small- to medium-sized enterprises. Large-cap companies, for example, can have supplier pools of up to 100,000 businesses that span the globe. 

Lastly, and most importantly, it is unclear why companies would be compelled to create E-ledgers, purchase E-assets and treat E-liabilities as costs or legal responsibilities in the absence of regulations or punitive carbon taxes. Liabilities will not matter without regulatory teeth.

Is E-liabilities an Effective Approach to Inform GHG Management?  

The raison d'être of counting emissions is to help manage and reduce them in line with achieving the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees Celsius temperature stabilization goal. E-liabilities is based on financial accounting approaches. Financial accounting was not designed to count GHGs or address GHG risks. The flow of money is unconstrained by the laws of physics and chemistry. GHG emissions are different. It is therefore reasonable to ask: Is an approach based on financial accounting an effective way to inform GHG management? The answer is unclear since E-liabilities has not been tried beyond a handful of case studies. 

Other questions remain. Would E-liabilities encourage companies to think strategically across their value chains to identify their most impactful GHG reduction opportunities? No, because it focuses a company’s accounting on Scope 1 and cradle-to gate emissions. And while downstream product use phase disclosures have now been added, these are limited to a subset of product use types and do not account for product use phase emissions. Would it help investors assess GHG risks? No, because investors want information on the full value chain risks, as evidenced by the 297 comment letters submitted on a draft U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Climate Disclosure Rule. In these submissions, a whopping 97% of investors supported including Scope 3 emissions in the disclosure rule.

What about the Emissions Liability Management E-ledger approach that allows a company to purchase unlimited E-assets or offsets to cancel its E-liabilities? All sectors need to reduce their value-chain emissions. This includes radical decarbonization of GHG-intensive sectors such as utilities, oil and gas, transportation, banking, chemicals, steel, and concrete. 

Emissions Liability Management claims to provide a mechanism for pricing emissions to “properly reflect the cost of the externalities (emissions).” It states that price is determined by the cost to manage a portfolio of E-assets over a specified duration. This assumes well-functioning markets with regulators, enforcers, and controllers. Unfortunately, this is not the reality today. And absent regulations on emissions, such as a cap or carbon tax, it is unclear what would determine a price on emissions or E-liabilities other than the cost of purchasing voluntary offsets.

In a voluntary system, E-liabilities’ effectiveness would depend on upstream companies being motivated to reduce GHGs because they see a competitive advantage to passing lower liabilities to customers. This would only happen if end customers cared about GHG liabilities. And if they don’t care, would producers simply pass their production-related E-liabilities to customers and assume no responsibility for these emissions? 

Lastly, would regulators be likely to adopt an E-liabilities approach to drive decarbonization of the economy? The answer is unclear, given concerns around its efficacy for GHG risk management. And as Gillenwater, 2024 notes, regulators typically target individual facilities or end products rather than companies as their point of regulation.

Is E-liability Accounting a Replacement for the GHG Protocol? 

No. E-liability and the GHG Protocol serve different goals and adopt different accounting approaches. E-liability is not a codified standard and it is unclear how it would work in a voluntary system.

The world is not on track to achieve the Paris Agreement on climate change. Neither the GHG Protocol nor E-liabilities can be surrogates for GHG regulations. Liabilities will not matter without regulatory teeth. Voluntary reduction efforts can only go so far, absent a regulatory leveling of the playing field. It’s time for governments to mandate GHG reductions. This may require new forms of GHG emissions information. 

While it is important to remain open to new ideas, we shouldn’t be too quick to throw the baby out with the bathwater. For voluntary programs and regulatory systems, the GHG Protocol’s family of standards provides a policy-neutral foundation for accounting for emissions attributed to business activities.

Regulators can and do prescribe which elements of the GHG Protocol to use to meet specific objectives, including achieving comparability across companies (e.g., organizational boundary method, scope, minimum inclusion, and data quality). If regulators or others see value in new approaches to GHG accounting, these could operate side-by-side with the GHG Protocol and rely on its technical foundation.

Disclosure Statement: WRI is a co-convener of the GHG Protocol Initiative. Janet Ranganathan was a co-founder of the GHG Protocol Initiative and lead author of the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard.

power-plant.jpeg Climate Climate greenhouse gases GHG Protocol GHG emissions Type Technical Perspective Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Greenhouse Gas Protocol

Authors Janet Ranganathan

New Platform Will Promote Integrated Water Management in Ethiopia's Amhara Region ciara.regan@wri.org Fri, 04/26/2024 - 10:31

Ethiopia’s Amhara region lies partially within the Abbay (Blue Nile) River Basin, which is one of the country’s twelve major river basins. It is also home to Ethiopia’s largest freshwater lake — Lake Tana — from which the Blue Nile River originates. Within the broader river basin, the Tana Subbasin is an area identified as a growth corridor for Ethiopia due to its vast productive potential. However, the subbasin faces challenges with water access and availability due to growing water withdrawals, agro-industrial pollution, changing climatic patterns, and environmental damage like deforestation and soil erosion. This puts economic activities and the livelihoods of the region’s predominantly rural communities at risk, making it a vital issue to address.

Amhara IWRM-WASH Platform launching event in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. Photo by Cherinet Tsegaw/ ABAO Photographer

For this reason, many government agencies, nongovernmental organizations and development partners are working on projects to improve water resources governance and access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) in Amhara. However, many of these interventions lack coordination or complementarity. This siloed approach leads to duplication of efforts, redundancy in activities, minimal accountability, resource loss and reduced capacity to collectively scale. In addition, the intersection of the Amhara administrative region with catchment boundaries adds further complexity. Water is primarily governed from an administrative perspective without considering natural hydrological flows and settings important to its continuity. Managing water without considering hydrological boundaries or broader catchment conditions could severely hinder sustainable water resources management (WRM) in both the region and the larger basin.

The Abbay Basin Administration Office (ABAO), an agency of the Ministry of Water and Energy (MoWE), is mandated to advance sustainable water resources management at the basin level. On the other hand, the Amhara Regional State Bureau for Water and Energy (BoWE) is MoWE’s operating branch at the regional scale, responsible to endorse and implement water policies and regulations, improve utilization and management of water resources, and expand safe drinking water supply to both urban and rural areas. The mandates of these two government agencies align in many ways, but complementarity and cooperation are generally inadequate, sometimes even leading to overlap. And until recently, there was no system or platform in the region for increasing collaboration and integration in planning, implementation, monitoring and policy.

The Amhara Regional IWRM-WASH Platform was launched in December 2023 with the main purpose of uniting actors working in both the WRM and WASH spheres and tackling institutional, governance and integration challenges. The platform was driven by the need to improve integrated water resources management (IWRM) in the region, an approach which seeks to promote the sustainable use of water resources for socio-economic development while protecting the environment. The Amhara Regional IWRM-WASH Platform was initiated by ABAO and BoWE, with the support of World Resources Institute (WRI), IRC WASH, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Millennium Water Alliance (MWA), Plan International Ethiopia and WaterAid Ethiopia. Although it was established as a platform at the regional level, due to institutional decisions on water in Ethiopia being made at the administrative scale, the platform aims to better connect different water-using sectors and actors while enhancing the region-basin linkage.

Objectives of the IWRM-WASH Platform

The overall objective of the IWRM-WASH Platform is to promote, support, and better coordinate regional and basin efforts to enhance sustainable WRM and WASH services, improve livelihoods, and protect the health of the environment and freshwater ecosystems.

Specific objectives include:

• Enhance cross-sectoral coordination and planning and build collaboration for better collective impact in the WRM and WASH sectors.
• Avoid silos in WRM and WASH as well as among basin and sub-basin authorities, regional bureaus, and other sub-national offices in the development and management of water and other natural resources.
• Share data and information and engage in regular learning and promotion of best practices.
• Enhance coordination among relevant programs and/or projects undertaken by government agencies, development partners, NGOs/CSOs, universities/research institutes, etc.
• Facilitate forums and discussions and engage in joint advocacy on WRM-WASH linkage.
• Monitor progress in the WRM and WASH agendas and identify challenges and recommendations for improvement in policy, strategy and implementation.
• Help set a shared agenda for IWRM-WASH implementation in the Amhara region.

The platform launch event saw broad participation from high level officials and experts from different governmental and non-governmental organizations. During the launch ceremony, Yewendwesen Mengistu, Head of ABAO, said that one of the main responsibilities of ABAO is to prepare a strategic plan for the Abbay Basin with the full participation of stakeholders in the water sector. Once prepared, the basin plan must be executed by different actors and multiple sector offices in each region overlapping the Abbay Basin. He said the existence of this platform will allow better integration and cooperation during the implementation of the plan.

Mamaru Moges, Head of BoWE, also acknowledged the importance of the platform to address the intersectionality of WASH and WRM issues. He said the platform will improve the much-needed coordination and integration of government agencies, nongovernment organizations and all stakeholders working towards water security. He pledged BoWE’s full support for the participation and sustainability of the platform. 

According to Haymanot Belete, a federal representative of MoWE, a similar platform was recently launched at the national level. However, regional IWRM-WASH platforms are still missing and are critical to ensure that the national platform translates into action on the ground. He said regional platforms are critical for sharing expertise, securing financing and implementing more sustainable interventions. MoWE is happy to provide support from the federal level for this first regional platform that links basin and region and actors working across the water sector, he added.

The platform was established primarily as a collaborative effort by ABAO and BoWE with initial technical and financial support provided by WRI, IRC WASH, UNICEF and Plan International, representing a good example of cross-agency cooperation. Following the platform launch, ABAO and BoWE organized the first IWRM-WASH stakeholder and member meeting in February 2024 to share updates on progress, including finalizing the terms of reference for the platform and establishing working groups. This first event included sessions by BoWE and NGOs active locally on continued challenges in water access in addition to good regional experiences in WRM and WASH implementation.

The first stakeholder platform meeting in February 2024. Photo by Cherinet Tsegaw/ ABAO Photographer

During this first meeting, ABAO was also elected to chair the platform, with BoWE as co-chair. In addition, the Amhara Plan and Development Commission was nominated as secretary while the Amhara Environment & Forest Protection Authority and Health bureaus were designated to lead the IWRM and WASH thematic subgroups respectively. WRI, UNICEF and IRC WASH will take on advisory roles.

Since the launch of the platform, 32 agencies and organizations submitted applications for official membership.

IWRM is a long and participatory process. Gaining political support at various levels is important, and the establishment of multi-stakeholder platforms for consultation, experience sharing and coordination can be vital. A key discussion point going forward will be exploring solutions to ensure platform sustainability.

WRI’s support to the IWRM-WASH platform falls within an ongoing program of technical assistance to the ABAO. WRI long acknowledged the need for the establishment of such a platform to foster better alignment and collaboration to collectively improve water management and governance in the Amhara region, to both spur the protection of water supplies and freshwater ecosystems and to improve water access. WRI has provided technical and financial support to establish this platform, mainly through a project funded by the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, titled “Promoting IWRM and environmental sustainability to enhance water availability and livelihoods in Ethiopia’s Tana Subbasin."

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• Water for Sustainable Development in Ethiopia

Authors Muluneh Bimrew Francesca Battistelli Zablon Adane

Zero-emission Zones Are Helping Some Cities Fight Pollution alicia.cypress… Thu, 04/25/2024 - 09:15

With growing urban populations and increases in cars, trucks and buses, cities are poised to experience more harmful pollution threatening people’s health and livelihoods.

But some cities around the world are turning to an emerging solution called zero-emission zones (ZEZs).

These are designated small areas of about 1.5 square miles to 11 square miles inside large cities in Europe, Asia and North America where only zero-emission vehicles (such as electric cars and trucks), pedestrians and bikes are granted unrestricted access, with gas and diesel vehicles either prohibited or forced to pay an access fee.

What Are the Pros and Cons of Zero-emission Zones?

The policy, which requires limited public funds, considerably reduces emissions and can bring additional environmental and economic benefits. For example, research shows that ZEZs can reduce most tailpipe nitrogen dioxide emissions from trucks — a major source of air pollution. Further, carefully-conceived ZEZs are expected to reduce the number of cars on the road making cities less congested and helping spur the market for more zero-emission vehicles.  

A sign warns drivers of a zero-emissions zone in Oxford, England. Oxford is among a dozen cities across the world that have implemented or announced formal plans for a zero-emissions zone. Photo by Martin Anderson / Alamy Stock Photo.

              

Although city leaders often like the idea of ZEZs, they are also daunted by the possible negative socioeconomic impacts of the policy. For example, the high costs of new zero-emission vehicles or access to transportation may impact low-income residents and vulnerable groups living in the zones, who need to get to work or school. Or small freight carriers may not be able to reach their customers, disrupting the supply of food and other goods.

Overcoming Barriers: Lessons from Zero-emission Zones Leaders

Still, even though ZEZs are still a nascent approach with some knots to untangle, several cities are beginning to implement them. A WRI report, “Feasibility of Zero-Emission Freight Zones: Scenario Analysis and Risk Assessment,” shows only about a dozen cities around the world have officially implemented or announced formal proposals to pilot ZEZs. Currently, these cities include Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the Netherlands, London and Oxford in England, Brussels in Belgium, Santa Monica and Los Angeles in the United States, Oslo in Norway and the cities of Shenzhen, Foshan, Dongguan and Hangzhou in China.

 These early adopters have already found effective ways to implement ZEZs, offering lessons for other cities:

1) Start By Targeting Trucks

When first implementing a program, it’s more common to prioritize trucks over private cars for a couple of reasons. First, in recent years, banning gas-powered private cars from entering ZEZs (often in city centers) could have profound accessibility impacts for local residents and stimulate widespread public objection. Further, compared with the soaring market shares of electric passenger cars (22% in the EU, 35% in China and 9% in the U.S. by 2023), the adoption of zero-emission trucks has been much slower. Implementing more policy instruments like ZEZs can help stimulate the growth of zero-emission trucks.

To reduce air pollution and to bring the transport emissions close to zero by 2030, Amsterdam initially proposed to introduce a ZEZ for all vehicles — including private cars — within the city’s built-up area (which is almost the entire city) in 2030. However, due to concerns about public acceptance, the city postponed private car restrictions to after 2030, to provide ample time to foster public support. Instead, the city plans to pursue a ZEZ for trucks inside of the A10, a ring road circling Amsterdam, beginning in 2025.

Within the truck segment, light-duty trucks and vans will be targeted first in Amsterdam, because heavy-duty trucks — particularly long-haul trucks — have limited zero-emission models and are too expensive to purchase.

A PostNL truck parked along the side of a road in Amsterdam. The Netherlands mail service uses electric trucks to make its deliveries in city centers. Photo by Bjoern Wylezich.

Amsterdam is not an isolated case. All the global cities WRI studied restricted or plan to restrict gas- or diesel-powered trucks in the initial phase of implementing a ZEZ policy. Only London and Oxford have also banned private cars, which will be planned pilots on a few streets that are less than 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) long.

Oslo plans to target both gas or diesel-powered light-duty trucks and heavy-duty trucks in the first phase of its ZEZ implementation. Chinese cities, such as Dongguan and Hangzhou, are also banning diesel heavy-duty trucks from entering the ZEZs, aiming to eliminate heavy-duty trucks in the city center. Arguably, this measure could lead to increased freight movements and worsen traffic congestion since heavy-duty vehicles could be replaced by many smaller vehicles.

2) Small Zones Avoid Bigger Challenges

Cities need to make sure the design of ZEZs doesn’t disrupt the supply of goods and interfere with a city’s economic and social activities. Opting for small zones, like Shenzhen did, is one strategy to avoid these challenges.

As part of the 2018 “Shenzhen Blue” Sustainable Initiative, the city government created to quickly curb air pollution, 10 ZEZs were established. But to manage potential public objection, the city started by designating small zones in high visibility areas of the city.

Under the rationale, the 10 zones totaling 22 square kilometers (8.5 square miles), or 1.1% of Shenzhen, were established in the center of each urban district where there were high levels of air pollution, traffic congestion and parking shortages. The individual zones span from 0.37 to 5.4 square kilometers (0.14 to 2.1 square miles).

Some ZEZs are also located around city government offices or public schools to take advantage of public procurement of zero-emission trucks and avoid impacting local residents.

In 2023, Shenzhen introduced six additional ZEZs near universities and public parks to further accelerate the adoption of zero-emission trucks, increasing the total ZEZ area to 26 square kilometers (10 square miles).  

Similar to Shenzhen, most of the global cities WRI analyzed have all started or planned to implement ZEZs in small areas that measure 4 to 31 square kilometers (1.5 to 12 square miles). Some cities are also exploring other small locations outside of city centers. For example, the Chinese central government is considering establishing ZEZs (or ultra-low emission zones) at industrial parks, seaports, railway yards and airports.

More From WRI on Zero-emission Zones

Report: Feasibility of Zero-Emission Freight Zones: Scenario Analysis and Risk Assessment

Insights: Zero-emission Delivery Zones: A New Way to Cut Traffic, Air Pollution and Greenhouse Gases

Project: Advancing Equity-centered Zero-emission Delivery Zones

3) Create Support Measures for Small Businesses

Small trucking companies serving areas and neighborhoods within ZEZs are particularly vulnerable to the economic impact from new ZEZ policies. Therefore, supportive measures should be designed to protect this segment of traffic that would need to reach residents and businesses located in these zones.

Staff from a zero-emissions delivery program use an electric cargo trike for distribution. Zero-emissions delivery will be a critical practice as ZEZs continue to grow. Photo by Simon Turner/Alamy Stock Photo 

In Rotterdam, during the transition to electric vehicles, small trucking companies, which transport goods in and out of the city, warned that the high transitional costs from purchasing new vehicles would diminish their profits. But supportive government measures were created to help. The city of Rotterdam expanded subsidies created by the Netherlands that encouraged small carriers to purchase electric trucks. The city is also providing advice on costs, information on relevant subsidies and tax exemptions, advice on charging solutions and making free trials of zero-emission vehicles available.

Further, to ensure small companies are prepared for the new policy, Rotterdam is also providing a long phase-in period. The ZEZ policy, which covers 13 square kilometers (5 square miles) and restricts various sizes of trucks from all-day access, was communicated to the public in 2020, about four years before its implementation is set to begin in 2025. In addition, Rotterdam included a 3 to 5 year phase-out period for existing gas- or diesel-powered trucks (Euro V and VI). These trucks won’t be banned completely until 2030 so that small companies don’t have to retire newly-purchased gas- or diesel-powered trucks and can buy zero-emission vehicles at cheaper prices.

Last but not the least, Rotterdam is expanding the battery-charging network at public parking lots and major destinations (such as distribution centers, offices and depots). It is also addressing issues such as the interoperability of chargers and the charging impact on the grid systems. 

4) Combine Zero-emission Zones with Additional Benefits

ZEZs do not necessarily generate additional benefits such as congestion relief or delivery efficiency. For example, zero-emission trucks may not be able to travel as far as gas- or diesel-powered trucks before needing to recharge and the heavy weight of the batteries may mean these zero-emission trucks can carry less goods. This leads to operational inefficiencies and increased traffic congestion. Therefore, cities need to go beyond the single goal of emission reduction when designing ZEZs.

When the city of Rotterdam created its policies, it wanted the ZEZs to have multiple goals: achieve zero emissions, efficient operation and zero congestion through the implementation of the ZEZs. To tackle operational inefficiency and create additional benefits, Rotterdam adopted a series of efficiency improvement measures, including establishing urban consolidation centers outside the ZEZ so that goods from various origins are bundled into fewer vehicles and distributed to ZEZs and adopting efficient delivery practices (such as data-driven route planning) to reduce empty runs.

Successfully Achieving More Zero-emission Zones

Accelerating the transition to more zero-emission vehicles is vital to improving air quality, reducing human health risks and lowering emissions that harm the climate and environment. While the introduction of ZEZs may be daunting, cities like Amsterdam, Shenzhen and Rotterdam show that creating ZEZs is possible. However, it’s important that the policies should also avoid negative impacts that could impact small trucking companies and residents, as well as create co-benefits for operational efficiency and congestion alleviation.

zero-emisssion-oxford-neighborhodhood.jpg Cities electric mobility net-zero emissions Air Quality transportation Urban Mobility Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Lulu Xue Ke Chen

Next-generation Climate Targets: A 5-Point Plan for NDCs shannon.paton@… Thu, 04/25/2024 - 08:29

By early 2025, countries are due to unveil new national climate commitments under the Paris Agreement, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs). These commitments form the foundation of international climate action, establishing emissions-reduction targets and other measures that countries promise to implement. The Paris Agreement requires nations to put forward new NDCs every five years, with each round stronger than the last. In short, NDCs are important because they are the main vehicle for countries to collectively confront the global climate crisis.

Yet NDCs to date fall well short of what’s needed to avert increasingly dangerous climate impacts and hold global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F). A recent UN report found current commitments put the world on track for a catastrophic 2.5-2.9 degrees C (4.5 - 5.2 degrees F) of warming by 2100.

Key developments since the last round of NDCs in 2020 can help spur countries to step things up considerably this time around. The question is: Will they rise to the occasion?

The Seeds for Stronger Climate Action Are Taking Root

Indeed, the impetus for ambitious national climate action has never been stronger. For instance, most countries now have targets to achieve net-zero emissions by or around 2050. This round of NDCs will extend to 2035 – the midpoint between 2020 (when many countries began implementing their NDCs) and 2050 – making them an important milestone for aligning near- and mid-term action with long-term aspirations. The new NDCs must also be informed by last year’s Global Stocktake, a UN assessment that reveals the shortcomings in current national climate policies and clearly calls for countries to move away from fossil fuels, as well as transform transportation, food and agriculture, and more.

Countries are also increasingly joining global cooperative initiatives on issues ranging from food and forests to renewable energy and methane; translating those commitments into NDCs could unlock stronger ambition. Finally, new scientific evidence like last year’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report reveals that the impacts of climate change are leading to more devastating consequences sooner than anticipated, reinforcing the urgent need to curb emissions, drive adaptation and significantly increase financing for both.

In the past, too many NDCs fell short of their potential to set out the ambition and actions needed for truly transformative climate action. This time around, NDCs must evolve to set the sights of government on the pace and scale of change needed and advance implementation to deliver it.

Here, we propose a five-point plan for the next generation of NDCs:

1) Set 2035 and strengthen 2030 emissions-reduction targets aligned with 1.5-degrees C and net-zero emissions goals.

Research shows that preventing increasingly dangerous impacts of climate change requires limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels. That means cutting global greenhouse gas emissions by 43% by 2030 and 60% by 2035, relative to 2019.

This is a collective goal supported by 194 vastly different countries, so it’s hard to prescribe a single, objective 2030 and 2035 emissions target at the national level (though various tools can help do so). Two things, however, are clear: First, countries, especially major emitters, must go much further in their emissions cuts than their current NDCs. And second, developed countries — historically the world’s largest emitters — have a responsibility to make the deepest reductions while providing substantially more finance to help developing countries accelerate climate action.

Less ambiguous than the collective 1.5- degrees C goal are the net-zero emissions targets that most countries have now adopted. Those countries should ensure that their 2030 and 2035 targets put them on a realistic path to phasing out emissions entirely by their net-zero target date. The window to align near- and mid-term climate action with long-term goals is finite. Infrastructure, for example, can take decades to turn over. If NDCs continue to lag so far behind, long-term goals will not be met without costly interventions later. The UN invited countries to submit their long-term climate strategies by November 2024, which can help inform countries’ near-term actions in their 2025 NDCs.

Finally, all countries should set targets that include non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane. Reining in these potent climate pollutants is among the fastest ways to reduce near-term warming, yet some countries still do not address them in their NDCs. Last year, China made a significant commitment to include non-CO2 emissions for the first time in its new NDC. This is especially important, as China’s non-CO2 emissions alone would rank among the world’s top 10 national emitters of total GHGs.

2) Accelerate systemwide transformations by establishing ambitious, timebound sectoral targets.

Limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C will require immediate action to transform nearly every sector. To spur such far-reaching changes, countries should set sector-specific targets that underpin their topline emissions-reduction goals, as well as jumpstart a process with ministries to integrate these targets into their strategic planning. Doing so can help guide domestic policymaking across the whole of government, signal the direction of travel to public and private sector investors and enable more effective implementation.

While most NDCs currently commit to reducing economy-wide GHG emissions, fewer feature sector-specific goals. But establishing ambitious, timebound targets for the energy system (which includes energy supply and end use sectors like transport), as well as for food, agriculture and land, will be particularly important, as these sectors collectively emit about 90% of GHGs globally.

A just transition to zero-carbon energy

NDCs should commit to phasing down fossil fuels rapidly this decade, while also scaling up zero-carbon power; electrifying buildings, industry and transport; shifting to low- and zero-carbon fuels in harder-to-abate industries like steel and cement; and improving energy efficiency.

Fortunately, countries aren’t starting from scratch. The Global Stocktake, as well as multilateral commitments like the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, provide building blocks for national target-setting. At COP28, for example, countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels, triple renewable energy capacity by 2030 and advance efforts to achieve net-zero energy systems by mid-century. These political commitments represent significant progress. NDCs should reaffirm them.

But to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, countries will also need to go further. One study, for example, finds that zero-carbon power sources like wind and solar must account for at least 88% of electricity generation by 2030, while coal and unabated fossil gas should decline to no more than 4% and 7% of power generation by the end of this decade, respectively. Similarly, decarbonizing transport will require bringing jobs, services and goods closer to where people live to avoid motorized travel; doubling public transit infrastructure across urban areas; and increasing the share of electric vehicles in the passenger car fleet to at least 20% this decade.

Countries do not need to progress at the same pace or reach the same target to achieve these global benchmarks. While developed countries have a responsibility to go furthest, fastest, other major emitters also need to decarbonize rapidly to keep the 1.5-degree C limit within reach, though some may require finance and other support to do so. Still, these benchmarks provide a rough approximation of where nations need to be in the near term.

Finally, NDCs should lay the groundwork for a just and equitable energy transition by committing to extend affordable, reliable electricity access to those currently living without it, provide safe and accessible mobility for all, and support those negatively impacted by the shift to zero-carbon energy, such as fossil fuel workers.

A shift to resilient food systems that feed a growing population, help halt deforestation and reduce emissions

Today’s farmers face an enormously difficult task of boosting agricultural productivity to improve food security in the face of intensifying climate change impacts, while also shifting to practices that enhance soil health, safeguard water and mitigate climate change. Agriculture, forestry and other land uses, for example, account for nearly one-fifth of annual GHG emissions globally; when combined with emissions across food supply chains, this share jumps to roughly a third.

Recent years have seen this sector rise up the political agenda, with an increasing number of countries referencing it in their current NDCs, the inclusion of ecosystem conservation within the Global Stocktake and the Global Goal on Adaptation’s target to attain climate-resilient food systems. Complementary commitments like the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use and the Emirates Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems and Climate Action have also received widespread support from countries.

Though these developments are welcome news, NDCs must go further to deliver the Paris Agreement’s goals, including to protect vulnerable farmers, particularly smallholders, from intensifying impacts and to lower food systems’ emissions.

On the demand-side, all countries should set targets to halve food loss and waste by 2030, while those in high-consuming regions (the Americas, Europe and Oceania) should aim to lower per capita consumption of emissions-intensive beef, lamb and goat to two servings per week or less by the end of this decade. Supply-side, 1.5-degree C benchmarks call for reducing global GHG emissions from agricultural production by 22% this decade, while also sustainably boosting crop yields by 18% and building resilience. Pairing these food and agriculture goals with those focused on halting and reversing ecosystem loss, particularly for forests, peatlands, mangroves and grasslands, is also urgently needed to help conserve the world’s carbon sinks and stores.

Critically, efforts to achieve these targets must be pursued in tandem. Failure to do so risks unintended consequences, such as farms expanding into forests and accelerating biodiversity losses, tree-planting across productive croplands that harms farmers’ livelihoods and threatens food security, or adoption of agricultural practices that increase yields but heighten vulnerability to climate change by degrading soil or overdrawing groundwater.

Bike lane in Sao Paulo, Brazil. In their next round of climate plans, countries should shift toward zero-carbon energy, including moving away from motorized travel. Photo by Pulsar Imagens/Alamy 3) Build resilience to increasingly dangerous and irreversible impacts.

With escalating climate impacts like heatwaves, severe storms and wildfires, as well as longer-term, slow onset effects like sea level rise and desertification, it's increasingly crucial for countries to step up their efforts to adapt and build resilience. Despite their focus on mitigation, NDCs — along with other tools like national adaptation plans (NAPs) — play a vital role in elevating the political profile of adaptation and facilitating much-needed shifts in policies and finance.

This next generation of NDCs follows adoption of the first Global Goal on Adaptation, which outlines sectoral adaptation targets. Countries can refer to these global priorities when identifying national and local priorities, such as attaining climate-resilient food and agricultural production and distribution; building resilience to climate change-related health impacts; and reducing climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, among others. This requires conducting periodic vulnerability assessments, undertaking cost-benefit analyses (using the “triple dividend” approach), and consulting mayors and local communities to prioritize opportunities for enhancing adaptation and strengthening actions to keep pace with intensifying climate impacts. Once implementation begins, progress should be tracked through the development of monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems.

The NDC process also offers countries the opportunity to engage the most vulnerable communities and Indigenous Peoples in developing national adaptation measures. Inclusive stakeholder participation helps ensure that investments in adaptation and climate-resilient development meet local needs. The principles for locally led adaptation can help guide implementation.

Finally, NDCs offer countries a chance to prioritize loss and damage, and thereby raise awareness of areas in which the limits to adaptation are likely to be exceeded. This can include providing specific information on financial costs and technical and capacity needs to respond to the most severe impacts of climate change, as well as national efforts related to disaster-risk reduction, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, migration and slow-onset events, such as loss of biodiversity and erosion of cultural heritage.

4) Spur investment and strengthen governance to turn targets into practice.

It is critical that NDCs not only make commitments, but also lay the groundwork for implementing them. This includes a vision for how government ministries, subnational governments, the private sector and civil society, as well as others, will work together to turn ambition into reality, including through policies, institutions and finance.

To start with, implementing NDCs will require a whole-of-government effort. The profile, legitimacy and associated international scrutiny of the NDC process can shift the political calculus, creating opportunities to strengthen climate governance accordingly. For example, as they develop their NDCs, countries can pass laws or foster coordination across the entire government — from the head of state and all-important economic ministries to line ministries and regulatory bodies. The process can also help facilitate consensus-building and integrate climate issues into mainstream planning, policy, finance and legislative decisions. The NDC document itself can describe allocation of responsibility for implementation to certain ministries, and note whether the country is establishing or strengthening national climate bodies that can drive forward integration and accountability. Leveraging these opportunities may prove critical to establishing the legal and institutional infrastructure necessary to implement ambitious goals. 

The NDC process is also an opportunity to engage subnational actorssuch as cities, states, regions and local communities. This can achieve several goals: ensuring alignment between local and national climate goals; strengthening subnational implementation via policies and budgets; and increasing countries’ overall ambition.

Implementation of NDCs will also depend on investment and finance. Ambitious targets and policy objectives in a country's NDC can send strong signals to investors and finance providers that the government is committed to the climate agenda. This signal is even stronger if NDC targets, policies and institutional measures are integrated into core national and sectoral plans. This can help to mobilize the finance and investment to carry out national commitments.

But the NDCs’ targets and measures, even if strengthened through integration into core national and sectoral planning, cannot stand alone if they are to succeed. They’ll need to be buttressed by credible strategies to mobilize investment and financing. Such strategies would build on but go beyond the estimates some developing countries made in previous NDCs of the cost of their proposed actions. They can also delineate the actions countries could finance domestically and those which would be conditional on international finance.

Strategies can also identify a pipeline of bankable projects. Clear finance strategies will not only strengthen the viability and credibility of countries’ NDC targets, but also help turn commitments into action.

NDC investment strategies can also provide a rallying point that enables developing country governments to bring together public financing partners (e.g. Multilateral Development Banks, Development Finance Institutions, Climate Funds, donors, philanthropists) and the private sector to coordinate how they will support countries’ targets. Such coordination processes — which should be driven by a country's own objectives and internal alignment could enable the co-creation of project pipelines, structure investment programs, and help identify policies that encourage greater investment.

5) Put people at the center, ensuring climate action creates jobs, improves health and more.

Given the widespread ramifications of climate change and the many potential benefits of tackling it, NDCs will need to draw clear linkages to a wide range of issues that are critical for peoples’ lives – from employment to health to local economies and beyond. Doing so is essential to maximize the economic, development and social opportunities from well-planned climate policies, as well as for managing challenges like loss of livelihoods for workers in the fossil fuel industry or certain types of land use. Taking these issues into account is also critical for building public and political support for greater climate action.

Some NDCs have already highlighted connections between the actions they lay out and the Sustainable Development Goals, while others refer to “just transitions,” decent work and gender rights. Yet most current NDCs only skim the surface on these issues.

While NDCs cannot provide fully granular policies across all issues, what they can do is outline clear plans for a just transition, including working directly with communities, workers and other affected groups to develop strategies for an inclusive zero-carbon and resilient transition.

NDCs can also outline ways in which countries will support communities that might be negatively affected by zero-carbon, resilient development. These approaches could include employment creation and worker retraining, support for community development and economic diversification, social safety nets and more.  NDCs can also provide quantitative goals on objectives such as access to high-quality green jobs, health improvements through pollutant reduction, and equitable access to renewable energy and sustainable transport.

What’s Next?

By 2035, the world needs to be on a radically different pathway if we have any hope of overcoming the climate crisis. The NDCs that countries submit by next year will show in black and white which countries are committed to slash emissions and accelerate adaptation quickly enough to get there.

Our five-point plan offers a blueprint for success: setting ambitious emissions-reduction targets aligned with the 1.5 degrees C limit, accelerating sectoral transformations, building resilience across all systems, catalyzing multi-stakeholder action and investment, and putting people at the center of climate action. By embracing these principles as they craft next-generation NDCs, countries can not only help avoid the devastating impacts of climate change, but also unlock opportunities for sustainable development, job creation and better public health.

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• National Climate Action

Authors Jamal Srouji Taryn Fransen Sophie Boehm David Waskow Rebecca Carter Gaia Larsen

STATEMENT: U.S. EPA Issues Strong Pollution Standards for New and Existing Power Plants alison.cinnamo… Thu, 04/25/2024 - 08:03

WASHINGTON DC (April 25, 2024) — Today the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized strong new pollution standards for the electric power sector, which will result in unprecedented reductions in greenhouse gas emissions as part of the Biden administration’s whole-of-government approach to tackling the climate crisis.

The new rule requires existing coal-fired units to begin capturing nearly all carbon dioxide emissions by 2032 or cease operations by 2039, compared to 2030 and 2040 in the draft rule. New natural gas plants that operate more than 40% of the time would need to capture nearly all of their carbon by 2032, several years earlier than in the draft rule. The final rule removes the dual performance standard involving use of hydrogen and only includes a standard based on carbon capture and storage for new baseload natural gas plants. It sets emissions standards based on available control technologies and what is feasible on a plant-by-plant basis.  

The power sector currently accounts for a quarter of the greenhouse gas emissions in the United States and emits other forms of air pollution which disproportionately affects disadvantaged communities. These new regulations will drive 1.4 billion tons of carbon emissions reductions by 2047 to help achieve U.S. climate goals.

EPA indicates it will issue additional regulations to cover existing gas plants soon to more robustly address the multiple forms of pollution resulting from those power sources.  

Following is a statement from Lori Bird, Director, US Energy Program, World Resources Institute:

“The days of unlimited carbon pollution are over. This rule is a massive step forward in the Biden Administration’s efforts to fight the climate crisis. It provides the certainty needed for the power industry and regulators to evaluate new generation sources, plan for changes to the grid and electricity mix, and maintain reliability in coming years.  

“The power sector is the second largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Requiring power plants to slash carbon pollution by more than 80% below 2005 levels by 2040 represents a massive step toward a more prosperous, clean and equitable future for everyone. With electricity demand growing, it’s more important than ever that the U.S. cuts its power sector emissions.  

“The Inflation Reduction Act's generous tax incentives provide multiple pathways for electricity producers to keep consumer costs low even as they cut emissions from America’s dirtiest power plants. This smart approach is a win-win for electricity consumers, local communities and power companies.

“With the power plant rule and recently unveiled vehicle standards, the Biden administration has delivered a powerful one-two punch in the fight against climate change. Now the administration should finalize additional rules that cover multiple air pollutant emissions from existing gas plants. These existing plants represent the majority of power generation emissions and will be critical to comprehensively addressing emissions from the power sector.”  

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STATEMENT: EPA Makes Nearly $1 Billion in Funding Available for Clean Heavy-Duty Vehicles Including Electric School Buses and Trucks nate.shelter@wri.org Wed, 04/24/2024 - 10:02

WASHINGTON (April 24, 2024) — Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) launched its new 2024 Clean Heavy-Duty Vehicles Grant Program, designed to help transition heavy-duty vehicles – including school buses and trucks – to zero-emission models. EPA released program guidance and officially opened the funding program’s application portal on the agency’s website.

The program, created by the Inflation Reduction Act, makes nearly $1 billion in funding available to help municipalities, states, territories, Tribes, school districts and nonprofit school transportation associations replace existing heavy-duty vehicles with zero-emission vehicles, deploy zero-emission vehicle infrastructure, and train and develop workers. With $400 million allocated for projects in communities that suffer from poor air quality as defined by EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards, this effort supports the aims of the Justice40 Initiative by emphasizing environmental justice efforts in communities disproportionately affected by pollution. There are over three million Class 6 and Class 7 vehicles currently in use in the U.S., spanning a wide variety of vehicle types and vocations, including school buses as well as refuse haulers and utility and delivery trucks.

EPA expects approximately 70% of the total funding will support school bus-related projects, with approximately 30% of funding for vocational vehicles. Grant applications will be due July 25, 2024, and awards are expected to be announced by the end of the year.

Following is a statement from Sue Gander, Director of WRI’s Electric School Bus Initiative:

“This program is a game-changer for communities across the country that want to transition to clean buses and trucks – and breathe cleaner air – but don’t have the means to do so. As we commemorate Earth Day this week, this is good news for neighborhoods everywhere.

“Heavy-duty vehicles emit huge amounts of air pollution that harm the health and wellbeing of our children and communities. Historically underserved communities living near depots, ports and highways are often more exposed to pollution from these vehicles, underscoring the equity benefits of this program. We are pleased to see the program cover vehicle costs as well as the purchase and installation of infrastructure, plus training for drivers and mechanics, all of which are essential for this transition.

“This program marks a critical milestone in the transition of the country’s nearly half a million school buses from diesel and other fossil fuels to the cleaner, quieter rides that our kids deserve. As demand for electric school buses grows, this grant program will bring health benefits to kids, drivers, and communities and support jobs in the clean economy. We encourage all eligible entities to apply and to start talking to their utilities now about planning for the necessary infrastructure.”

###

Additional details:

Applications will be open from April 24 to July 25, 2024, and EPA expects to announce grant awards by the end of the year. The 2024 Clean Heavy-Duty Vehicles Grant Program is comprised of two distinct sub-programs, the School Bus Sub-Program and the Vocational Vehicles Sub-Program. The School Bus Sub-Program is specifically for applicants replacing school buses, while the Vocational Vehicles Sub-Program provides funding for the replacement of non-school bus Class 6 and 7 vehicles, such as dump trucks, utility trucks, refuse haulers and street sweepers. EPA expects to award between 40 to 160 grants, split among the EPA regions. EPA also anticipates awarding at least 15 grant awards to eligible applicants from Tribes and territories. To apply, visit the EPA website.

Funding from this program can be used to cover the cost difference between replacing an existing heavy-duty vehicle with a zero-emission model and replacing it with a diesel-burning one. Funds can also be used to cover charging infrastructure, workforce development, and training and other administrative costs.

With a variety of zero-emission Class 6 and 7 vehicles available today, cities, states, territories, Tribes, school districts and other eligible entities can save thousands of dollars in operating costs. Additionally, the program will help reduce toxic emissions from diesel-burning school buses and other heavy-duty vehicles that are dangerous for children, drivers, and others and increase the risk of asthma and other respiratory illnesses.
 

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Industry Must Decarbonize: Cross-Sector Initiative Shows the Way in New Blueprint shannon.paton@… Wed, 04/24/2024 - 09:39

Industry is the backbone of modern daily life and the country’s economy, from manufacturing clothes, cars, phones and toothbrushes to the materials that make American buildings, roads and bridges — such as chemicals, steel, cement, paper and other essential goods that people and businesses use. The industrial sector is also a critical source of jobs in many small and medium-sized communities.

The International Energy Agency has stated that to give the world a chance to be on track for meeting our global climate goals, global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions must reach net zero by 2050. However, as global emissions continue to rise, industry — along with other sectors of the U.S. economy— face a critical, challenging task: decarbonization. In the U.S., industry accounts for 30% of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including emissions from purchasing electricity. All in all, industry is the U.S.’s third highest-emitting sector.

Industrial Decarbonization Can Benefit Everyone

Decarbonization of the industrial sector can positively impact individuals, households, communities and the economy, in addition to the planet. Policy and regulatory steps that promote decarbonization will help ensure that American industry can continue to compete internationally. For example, the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is scheduled to take effect in 2026, creating additional incentives for American industry to reduce the intensity of its products’ emissions.

Industrial decarbonization can improve Americans’ health. Curtailing greenhouse gas emissions can reduce other types of industrial pollution, especially particulate matter, providing health benefits to communities. Particulate matter, also called particulate pollution or soot, is associated with increased mortality from all causes, including cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease and lung cancer, and is linked with asthma, COPD, heart attacks, strokes and neurological effects and more.

Retooling industrial facilities to curb emissions can also create new jobs. Supportive policies have the potential to develop durable markets in new, green technologies that can stimulate the American economy, resulting in substantial job growth. Supporting domestic industries also protects existing high-wage jobs.

Rising to the Challenge

At the same time, there are several reasons why decarbonizing industry is a daunting task. First, the industrial sector consists of a wide range of subsectors with their own unique challenges that can make decarbonization difficult. For example, in cement production, some CO2 emissions are a byproduct of chemical reactions required to create the final product. These are known as process emissions and cannot be avoided with renewables or other low-carbon energy. Another challenge is in the chemical sector, which produces thousands of different products through diverse supply chains, each requiring unique decarbonization approaches.

Second, many facilities run 24 hours a day, every day of the year, without interruption. This can create obstacles when drawing from intermittent energy sources such as solar or wind.

Additionally, many new low-carbon products are more costly than conventional versions and emerging decarbonization technologies (like carbon capture, utilization and sequestration) are expensive, making it challenging for lower-carbon products and industrial facilities to be cost-competitive on the market.

Also, there is a lack of common standards for emissions reporting and benchmarking across industrial subsectors and products. This makes it difficult to compare metrics like carbon intensity of products manufactured at different facilities, and introduce policies that would decrease emissions.

Lastly, certain industrial sectors are also trade exposed. This means that they face high competition combined with low profit margins on an international scale. If these industries face sudden changes in regulation or costs, they may move their operations to countries with lower operating costs and fewer emission regulations. This leads to emissions leakage, where emissions move from one country to the next but do not decrease globally.

These are only some of the barriers to curbing industrial emissions.

Taking Action

Despite these challenges, the U.S. has already taken steps to clean up the industrial sector. More than 70% of American steel is manufactured using electric arc furnaces, which have significantly lower emissions than traditional manufacturing methods. Additionally, 2021 and 2022 saw unprecedented investments and federal policy support to address emissions from this sector through the passage of the federal Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The implementation of these policies is still in its earliest stages and will help support the build-out of the necessary markets and infrastructure to realize their full potential.

What We’re Doing About It

Setting U.S. industry on a path to net zero by 2050 while protecting and creating high-wage jobs, maintaining competitiveness and advancing technology leadership requires collaboration. That’s why the Industrial Innovation Initiative (I3) released its 2024 Federal Policy Blueprint — jointly developed by a coalition of NGOs, industry and labor groups — to recommend a suite of policies to Congress, the administration and the broader policymaking landscape to help achieve these goals. The Blueprint builds upon the momentum from the passage of BIL and IRA by the federal government and identifies additional policies that will make the most of the investments made in these landmark pieces of legislation.

• Supportive infrastructure, including transportation and storage of CO2 and hydrogen, is needed for industry to transition to a low-carbon future. The Blueprint includes recommendations that aim to improve the design and siting of this critical infrastructure on a national scale. This includes prioritizing the safety of communities and ensuring the availability of a trained workforce, which will build trust and operational expertise for new and existing infrastructure.
• Decarbonizing industrial energy demand will be critical for reducing emissions. For low- and medium-temperature heat applications, electrification is a core strategy. To address process heat, innovative technologies will need to be deployed widely. The Blueprint makes several recommendations intended to ensure reliable, affordable and clean electricity and heat supply.
• The Blueprint also provides recommendations to improve standards and data for low-carbon products. Standardizing methods and carbon labeling programs for low-carbon products will allow manufacturers to report their emissions consistently and will give governments, corporations and other large purchasers confidence that their purchases are helping reduce industrial emissions.
• Finally, the Blueprint recognizes the need for market innovation. It recommends several strategies for nurturing transformational technologies required to slash industrial emissions. Technological innovation will be essential to ensuring that the industrial sector can maintain its competitiveness as it pursues midcentury climate goals.

Achieving net-zero industrial emissions by midcentury is an ambitious but achievable goal. The last few years have seen a ramp-up in momentum toward industrial decarbonization in the U.S. The passage of the BIL, IRA and other policies has created a strong foundation for greater future action toward decarbonizing our industries. Nonetheless, accelerating industrial decarbonization requires continued work. The 2024 Federal Policy Blueprint from I3 highlights many key next steps needed to make the vision of a more efficient and cleaner industrial sector a reality.

Key Takeaways:

• Industry plays a significant role in creating materials used in daily life. However, it is the third-highest greenhouse gas emitting sector in the U.S.
• Decarbonizing this critical sector can provide climate benefits, support American jobs and economic competitiveness, and reduce air pollution.
• Industry has been daunting to decarbonize, given the variety of sectors, types of emissions and the trade-exposed nature of specific sectors.
• There have been substantial changes to the federal policy landscape supporting industrial decarbonization in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act.
• The new Federal Policy Blueprint from the Industrial Innovation Initiative lays a path for how to best capitalize on recent investments and deploy the technology and policies needed to decarbonize industry. It focuses on supportive infrastructure for carbon management and hydrogen, industrial energy demand, data and standards for low-carbon products and market innovation.

Get Involved with Industrial Decarbonization

The Industrial Innovation Initiative (I3) is co-convened by the Great Plains Institute and World Resources Institute. To learn more about industrial decarbonization and I3’s policy advocacy work, visit the initiative’s website at industrialinnovation.org.

Find out more information about the recommendations listed above in the 2024 Federal Policy Blueprint and the summary fact sheet on the Blueprint.

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• Industrial Innovation & Decarbonization
• U.S. Climate

Authors Diana Leane Kate Sullivan Ankita Gangotra Carrie Dellesky

In a Clean Energy Future, What Happens to California’s Thousands of Oil Refinery Workers? shannon.paton@… Tue, 04/23/2024 - 13:50

California is often considered the United States’ greenest state — a first-mover on climate policy, renewable energy, electric vehicles and more. But at the same time, the state is still a fossil-fuel production powerhouse.

This is especially true for its petroleum refineries, which turn crude oil into transportation fuels (like gasoline) and feedstocks for making chemicals. Despite declining oil production in the state, California still has the third-largest crude oil refining capacity in the country, just after Texas and Louisiana. About 83% of its refined petroleum is used for transportation, a sector that produces half of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions. California is also the country’s largest consumer of jet fuel and second-largest user of motor gasoline, fuels that are processed and refined at petroleum refineries.  

At the same time, California has a legal requirement to cut 85% of its emissions by 2045. Phasing down petroleum refineries, along with petroleum-based transportation fuels, are crucial steps in meeting that goal. Which begs the question: What happens to the thousands of workers, families and communities who rely on the state’s oil refineries for jobs and tax revenues?

While California is developing a detailed roadmap on how it will reduce its emissions, it doesn’t yet include a plan for addressing the impact of refinery closures — specifically, loss of jobs, incomes and the critical tax revenues that support communities’ schools, healthcare systems and more. California therefore has an opportunity to not only lead on phasing down America’s refineries, but to also make the transition a just one.

An oil refinery in Wilmington, CA. California has the third-largest crude oil refining capacity in the United States. Photo by Emmett Institute/Flickr The Current State of California’s Oil Refineries

While around 50 oil refineries were in operation across California a few decades ago, 11 refineries operate in California today, concentrated in three areas: Los Angeles County, Contra Costa County and Kern County in the San Joaquin Valley.

In-state consumption of gasoline has been declining since 2017, a trend projected to continue. While Californians consumed around 13.8 billion gallons of gasoline in 2021, this is expected to drop to 8 billion by 2030 and to less than 2 billion gallons by the 2040s.

Already, California has been importing and processing heavy crude oil against a backdrop of a steady decline in its crude oil production. In 2022, about 25.8% of oil used at California’s refineries was extracted within the state, while the rest was imported (59% from outside of the U.S. and 15.2% from Alaska).

California also supplies other states’ fuel demands. About 12% of the state’s total refined products are exported to Nevada and Arizona, as well as abroad.

It’s unclear whether and to what extent California will ramp up its fuel exports in the future in the face of decreasing petroleum demand within the state. However, recent policies will likely further squeeze out the state’s oil refinery industry and contribute to the phasedown and potential closures of more refineries.

The state’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard requires petroleum refiners and other fuel providers to reduce the carbon intensity of transportation fuels used in California. The policy has helped reduce emissions from the transportation sector while driving the production of lower carbon fuels. Some of California’s recently closed petroleum refineries, including Marathon Martinez and Phillips 66 Rodeo, have already retrofitted their operations to process animal fats, soybean and used cooking oils into renewable diesel, the production of which has already grown from 325 to 531 million gallons between 2011 and 2023. However, a growing demand for renewable fuels would unlikely be met by used cooking oils alone, and shifting toward producing more crop-based biofuels would not be a wise move from a climate, health or economic perspective.

The recent Advanced Clean Cars II regulation is also expected to reduce passenger vehicle emissions by 50% in 2040 through increased zero-emission vehicle sales, which will further reduce demand for gasoline in the state.

And California’s own Scoping Plan on how it will reach its goal of carbon neutrality by 2045 assumes a phasedown of fossil-based refined products in line with policy-driven demand reductions. The plan expects some fuel demand will persist through 2045 for interstate locomotives, marine and aviation transportation, as well as some remaining demand for combustion fuels for road transport due to the long fleet turnover time. 

Who Will Be Impacted by California’s Oil Refinery Transition?

Although the refinery phasedown in California has already begun to some extent, many questions about the fate of the facilities, their workers, and the communities that live around them are yet to be addressed.

More than 100,000 workers are directly employed in California’s oil and gas industry, out of which petroleum refineries directly employ close to 8,700 workers. More than half of the direct jobs are in Los Angeles County, and a third in Contra Costa County. Since the workforce is so geographically concentrated, abrupt changes can create an outsized impact on specific communities.

While the 8,700 workers may seem like a tiny fraction — about 0.06% of the state’s private sector workforce in 2022 — the picture changes when considering the 126,000 indirect and induced jobs supported by the refinery industry, which make up 0.9% of the state’s private sector workforce. Petroleum refineries have one of the largest employment multipliers among all industries due to the large amount of investment in equipment and maintenance, materials and other inputs. The Economic Policy Institute estimates this number to be 14.5, meaning the addition of one direct job in oil refineries creates at least 14.5 jobs in the rest of the economy.

Most refinery jobs are high quality, union jobs — with good wages and benefits that have been negotiated over many decades as a result of the industry’s long history of striking for better working conditions. Oil refinery workers, including management positions, make over $190,000 per year on average, compared to $84,500 for all private sector jobs in California. The state’s petroleum pump system operators, refinery operators and gaugers, one of the key occupations in the industry, earn $97,030 per year on average.

Workers have been advocating to improve job quality within the new clean energy economy, as labor unions are concerned that the clean energy transition will erode job quality, wages and benefits. Making sure that labor is well represented in planning discussions will therefore be critical for ensuring the state has a “just transition.”

And the potential impacts of a refinery phasedown extend far beyond refinery workers and their families. Refineries provide tax revenues that support funding for adjacent communities’ public schools, healthcare, and infrastructure like roads and parks. Lack of quality data on refinery tax revenue hinders our understanding of their contribution to the local economy, but available evidence suggests it is significant. According to one analysis, the closure of seven refineries across the U.S. between 2019 and 2022 cost the communities hosting them a collective $21 million in local property tax revenue annually. Similarly, St. James Parish in Louisiana estimated it would lose $24 million annually in property, inventory and sales tax when Shell decided to close its refinery in 2020.

There’s also an environmental justice component to refinery phasedowns. Black Americans are 75% more likely than other Americans to live in neighborhoods adjacent to refineries. More than 50% of residents in Los Angeles County, where many of California’s refineries are located, live in disadvantaged communities that suffer from a combination of economic, health and environmental burdens. While the closure of refineries could bring a much-needed reduction in air pollution in these communities, left-behind compounds like lead and benzene can continue to pollute soil and water long into the future, raising questions about environmental remediation and who pays for it. For instance, Marathon’s Gallup refinery in New Mexico “idled indefinitely” instead of officially closing, avoiding the expensive task of cleaning up the polluted site.

What's Needed to Ensure California’s Oil Refinery Phasedown Doesn’t Come at the Expense of Workers and Communities?

California needs to develop a transition roadmap that holistically considers refinery workers’ and communities’ needs.

Los Angeles  County is leading the way through its Just Transition Strategy, meant to support workers and communities impacted by the phase-out of oil drilling and extraction (though it omits refineries). At the state level, however, there is no simultaneous effort to develop a just transition roadmap for the entire oil industry, including its refineries. California is currently producing a fossil fuel phasedown plan, devised by a multi-agency task force and incorporating the results of a transportation fuels assessment. It’s essential that this plan look beyond just how to reduce emissions and include how to protect the workers and communities reliant on the fossil fuel industry.

We’ve already seen what an unplanned transition looks like in other states, with severe labor market shocks and community-level impacts. Take coal mining in Appalachia: 87% of U.S. coal-related job loss has occurred in Appalachia due to declining coal production and closure of coal-fired plants.

California therefore needs a state-level plan for a well-managed and just transition. A few considerations will be essential as policymakers create a roadmap:

1) A better understanding of workers’ needs

Any policies to support refinery workers in the low-carbon transition need to be informed by workers themselves.

A recent UC Berkeley Labor Center study is one of few that places refinery workers’ experiences and recommendations at the forefront. It focuses on workers that were laid off during California’s Marathon Martinez refinery closure in 2020, specifically their recommendations on job search assistance, job training programs, financial planning and retirement preparation assistance. More recently, the Steelworkers Charitable and Educational Organization (SCEO), a non-profit connected to the United Steelworkers union, was one of several groups to win a grant from the Displaced Oil and Gas Workers Fund to craft training programs and job placement services to help prepare displaced workers. These insights can inform policymakers and help place workers’ needs at the forefront of future policies.

A better understanding of refinery workers’ current occupations, educational backgrounds and skills is also crucial. Refineries include a variety of roles, requiring all levels of education and training. Some skills are industry-specific, and some are readily transferrable to other industries. While some jobs usually require a high school diploma and a few months of training, others require a four-year bachelor’s degree. A UK oil and gas workforce analysis found that over 90% of its workers have medium to high skills transferability, putting them in a strong position to work within other clean energy-related sectors, though such jobs might not always be located in the same region where refinery workers are being displaced.

2) Data to help proactive planning

Decreases in demand will likely lead to the closure of many of today’s 11 petroleum refineries in California. Obtaining refinery-specific data will be crucial to prepare and understand how different refineries would be impacted by the phasedown of refined petroleum products — including which will close quickly, and which are more likely to remain around longer and/or be converted to alternate uses, such as renewable fuel production. But it’s currently difficult to access this data. Much of it is proprietary or doesn’t exist in the form of accessible datasets. 

California’s Marathon refinery was closed in August of 2020, shortly after being idled due to decreasing demand linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. The abrupt closure left its workers feeling blindsided and unprepared for the mass layoff. The PES refinery in Philadelphia also closed within the same timeframe, after it declared bankruptcy following a significant explosion. These examples underscore the importance of tracking the economic and operational health of refineries to allow for better planning around their closures. This is crucial to ensure that workers and communities receive the necessary transition support, and that taxpayers don’t end up paying for a bankrupted facility’s clean-up and remediation. 

Publicly accessible data on the local government revenue generated by refineries is also needed, as it supports cities’ general budgets and funds education, health and public services. Some studies explore how the overall oil and gas transition would impact local governments’ finances, yet more revenue data is needed at the local level to fully understand future impacts and what’s needed to replace refinery revenue.

3) Comprehensive modelling to understand likely impacts

California has already funded two modelling studies on enhancing equity and reducing emissions of its transportation fuels. They examine different pathways for reducing California’s transportation fuel demand and supply to achieve carbon-neutral transportation by 2045, while also considering labor and health impacts. The state’s latest Scoping Plan points to these studies, and their results will also likely be considered within the fossil-fuel phasedown plan being developed by the state’s multi-agency task force.

While the studies provide foundational modelling, the state needs to consider a wider range of future scenarios for petroleum demand, which will impact its refinery phasedown planning. For example, scenarios should account for the demand of renewable fuels and consider the potential use of clean hydrogen and/or point-source carbon capture and sequestration.

The state should also better map out the impact of different export scenarios that consider California’s competitiveness in other domestic and international markets. The demand for oil in other states and countries (which are also electrifying, although at different rates) will have impacts on California’s refineries. While not enough is known about whether California refineries are positioned to increase exports, some environmental groups have raised concerns about the state increasing its fuel exports, prolonging the life of its petroleum refineries.

More comprehensive modelling must also consider air pollution, health, jobs and tax revenue impacts on surrounding communities from either refinery closures or conversions to other uses. The workforce and long-term tax implications of switching to produce renewable fuels, in particular, need to be better studied. In 2020, the Cheyenne refinery in Wyoming announced it would lay off the majority of its workers as it transitioned into a renewable diesel plant. Any state-level plan needs to carefully consider biofuel-related economic impacts when moving toward the ultimate goal of electrification.

4) Inclusive planning

There are lots of stakeholders with varying perspectives on just transition policies, from environmental NGOs and environmental justice groups to labor unions and industry representatives. It will be crucial for the state to engage with each of them.

Environmental justice and conservation groups have long advocated for more stringent safety regulations and the decommissioning of refineries. They’re now raising concerns over the state’s interest and policies around the use of biofuels, hydrogen, and carbon capture and sequestration as part of the low-carbon transition. One group recently sued the City of Paramount over the approval of a biofuel refinery expansion without adequate environmental review, citing health and safety concerns.

Oil industry trade groups like Western States Petroleum Association, on the other hand, have a strong influence on California policymaking and have regularly opposed policy proposals focused on phasing out oil production and other transition-focused bills. While some labor unions have at times shared the association’s resistance due to concerns about losing well-paying union jobs, other labor groups are more welcoming of the low-carbon transition.

The United Steelworkers Local 675 launched a coalition of labor unions in 2023 to advocate for a worker-led just transition, one of several labor groups that endorsed a 2021 report outlining a roadmap towards a clean and equitable energy transition in California. Labor unions have also been central to the design and implementation of two initiatives focused on worker transitions: the state’s Displaced Oil and Gas Workers Fund, set up to provide help to displaced oil and gas sector workers to transition into sectors that match their skills and offer comparable wages, and the Oil Well Capping Pilot Program to train displaced oil workers to participate in capping abandoned oil wells. Closely engaging with labor groups will be crucial for the transition to be successful both for people and the climate.  

Multi-stakeholder coalitions can play an important role in bringing these different perspectives to the same negotiating table. This is already happening in the context of Northern California refineries, where the Contra Costa Refinery Transition Partnership, a labor environmental justice partnership led by the BlueGreen Alliance Foundation, is developing strategies to prepare for the refinery transition. This partnership brings together oil refinery workers, community organizations, industry representatives and other key stakeholders.

California Can Create a Model for a National Just Transition

There are already numerous examples within the energy industry that illustrate the harm of an unplanned low-carbon transition. As policymakers in California consider their plan to phase down refined petroleum products, it’s essential they also develop a transition roadmap that holistically considers workers’ and communities’ needs.

California’s ambitious policies signal that the state’s refineries could be the first in the country to undergo a significant transition and shift away from fossil fuels. The state therefore faces an unprecedented opportunity: demonstrating what a just and clean refinery transition can look like — not only in California, but for other states also grappling with the unintended consequences of a clean energy future.

Rajat Shrestha also contributed data analysis to this article. 

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• U.S. Climate
• U.S. Climate Policy Resource Center
• Just Transition and Equitable Climate Action Resource Center

Authors Danielle Riedl Devashree Saha

RELEASE: World Resources Institute to Host New Secretariat for Our Ocean Conference casey.skeens@wri.org Wed, 04/17/2024 - 16:27

ATHENS (April 17, 2024) — The United States Department of State and the Advisory Committee of the annual Our Ocean Conference announced the formation of a new permanent Secretariat for the Conference, which will be hosted by World Resources Institute’s (WRI) Ocean Program. The Secretariat will be funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Bloomberg Ocean Initiative and Oceans5.

Launched in 2014 by the U.S. Department of State and former Secretary of State, John Kerry, the Our Ocean Conference is an annual event where governments, private sector representatives, NGOs and the academic community collaborate to protect the ocean. The Conference is a crucial moment for the ocean community year-after-year, championing diverse voices and generating commitments towards protecting and improving the ocean. In the past decade the conference has seen over 2,100 announcements worth nearly $128 billion.

WRI has extensive experience in acting as Secretariat or Co-Secretariat for major international groups, including the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy (Ocean Panel), NDC Partnership, Champions 12.3 (food loss and waste reduction), High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People (30x30 conservation), Global Commission on Adaptation and more. WRI’s Ocean Program is uniquely suitable as the Our Ocean Conference Secretariat given its role supporting the Ocean Panel, with significant experience developing and hosting international events, running global communications and tracking and analyzing commitments. 
    
“The Our Ocean Conferences provide a world stage for ocean leadership and impact,” said Dr. Tom Pickerell, Global Director, WRI Ocean Program. “Ten years of conferences so far has built up a strong legacy for the event, which has given rise to thousands of commitments toward sustainable and equitable management of the ocean. As the new Secretariat, we look forward to working with successive hosts, and supporting governments and partners to take ambitious action for the ocean and the people that rely on it.”

“We welcome the establishment of the Our Ocean Conference Secretariat,” said Jennifer R. Littlejohn, Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. State Department. “We look forward to working with the Secretariat to ensure that OOC continues to mobilize concrete, ambitious, and meaningful action to protect and preserve our ocean."

The Our Ocean Conference is held in a different country each year with the hosts setting forth priority action areas. As the Conference prepares for its next iteration in 2025 in Busan, South Korea, the Secretariat will support capacity building and knowledge sharing through technical assistance and tracking to improve upon ‘institutional memory’ of the event from year to year.

Bloomberg Philanthropies’ funding for the Secretariat builds on its longtime partnership with the Our Ocean Conference. The Bloomberg Ocean Initiative has provided support to host governments since 2019 to ensure successful conferences while championing initiatives and outcomes to restore and protect critical ocean ecosystems in support of the global goal of protecting 30% of the world’s ocean by 2030. 

"Ensuring the success of the Our Ocean Conference is no small feat. It demands the collaboration of governments, businesses, and civil society to drive tangible action for ocean conservation,” said Melissa Wright, who leads the Bloomberg Ocean Initiative at Bloomberg Philanthropies. "That's why Bloomberg Philanthropies is pleased to support the World Resources Institute in hosting the Secretariat for the Our Ocean Conference. This provides a crucial platform for host countries to continue building on the incredible work underway, and with our support, they can achieve even greater strides in ocean protection."

The ocean acts as humanity’s life support — responsible for around 50% of the oxygen produced on earth and protects us by absorbing more than 90% of global excess heat caused by human activity and around 25% of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. It is a source of protein for 3 billion people and provides millions of jobs worldwide. The ocean is also a critical solution to fighting climate change, with the potential to deliver up to 35% of the annual greenhouse gas emission cuts needed in 2050 to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.

However, today the ocean’s health is off track. It’s under intense pressure from pollution, harmful fishing practices, habitat loss and climate change. 2023 saw the hottest temperatures ever recorded in the ocean, its oxygen levels are decreasing and it is now at its most acidic in at least 26,000 years as it absorbs and reacts with more CO2 in the atmosphere.

About World Resources Institute

WRI is a trusted partner for change. Using research-based approaches, we work globally and in focus countries to meet people’s essential needs; to protect and restore nature; and to stabilize the climate and build resilient communities. We aim to fundamentally transform the way the world produces and uses food and energy and designs its cities to create a better future for all. Founded in 1982, WRI has nearly 2,000 staff around the world, with country offices in Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico and the United States and regional offices in Africa and Europe. 

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ADVISORY: Embargoed WRI Press Call on Cities Climate Hazards Analysis casey.skeens@wri.org Wed, 04/17/2024 - 15:23

Registration is for members of the media only.

Register here.

WASHINGTON (April 17, 2024) – Join the World Resources Institute (WRI) team on April 23, 2024 at 8:30 AM EDT / 14:30  CEST, for a preview of new analysis highlighting climate hazards under different warming scenarios – including heatwaves, cooling demand, and disease – for the world’s cities.  

The speakers will present findings on potential climate hazards for nearly 1,000 cities across the world – currently home to 2.1 billion people representing 26 percent of the global population. The data analysis and projections show the shifts, patterns and links between climate hazards, underscoring the need for city and national governments to inform their investments and policies with city-level data. This work was supported by Bloomberg Philanthropies.

The 2024 Cities Climate Hazards data set and analysis is strictly embargoed until April 30 at 5:01 AM EDT / 11:01 AM CEST. By registering for this press call, you agree to respect the embargo date and time.

To receive a Dropbox folder of embargoed data and graphics, email Hannah Lassiter or Alison Cinnamond.  

WHAT 
Embargoed Press Call to preview 2024 Cities Climate Hazards Analysis 

WHEN 
Tuesday, April 23 at 8:30AM EDT / 14:30 CEST  

WHO 
Speakers:

•    Rogier van den Berg, Global Director, WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities
•    Anjali Mahendra, Director of Global Research, WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities
•    Eric Mackres, Senior Manager, Data and Tools, WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities
•    Jaya Dhindaw, Executive Program Director, Sustainable Cities and Director, WRI India Ross Center
•    Aklilu Fikresilassie, Director, Thriving Resilient Cities, WRI Africa
•    Luis Antonio Lindau, Director, Brazil, WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities  
•    Antha Williams, Global Head, Environment Program, Bloomberg Philanthropies

Moderator: Alison Cinnamond, Global Director, Strategic Communications, WRI

WHERE 
To RSVP, please register here.   

For any questions or to request embargoed content, please reach out to Hannah Lassiter or Alison Cinnamond.  

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Development Banks Are Starting to Spark Climate Action. Will They Complete the Task? shannon.paton@… Wed, 04/17/2024 - 09:14

The World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) are on the cusp of evolution. Their transformation is fundamental to the world’s ability to simultaneously tackle the climate crisis and poverty.

Ten years ago, having had no substantial policies for climate change, development banks began to gather climate data and increase attention to the impacts of climate change. This process gradually led to where we are today, with the MDBs recently releasing principles on how to align all their investments with the international Paris Agreement on climate change. The World Bank also committed to combat climate change as part of its mission, with other MDBs likely to follow suit.

These advancements are important, but there is much more to do.

As climate-related impacts, whether slow-moving or sudden, become increasingly obvious, they exacerbate vulnerability and pre-existing fragilities. Developing countries, the MDBs’ main clients, face the complex task of achieving sustainable economic development in the face of growing droughts, floods, extreme storms and other threats. They want to grow their economies, but they also must follow a different pathway than countries that developed by producing high amounts of greenhouse gas emissions.

The World Bank and its peers are uniquely placed to partner with countries as they take on these challenges. They have the capacity to provide finance, mobilize it from other sources, and match various types of technical and financial support to different countries’ needs. They are already a major conduit through which wealthy countries direct climate finance to their low-income counterparts — $66 billion in 2022.

But to be effective over the next 10 years, MDBs will need to become something else: an enabling force for economic development that’s good for people, nature and the climate.

The Past: A Gradual Acknowledgement of the Climate Challenge  

MDBs have come a long way on climate over the last decade, with notable developments including:

• Initial introduction of climate metrics: Around 10 years ago, the MDBs began to require the collection of climate-related data. In 2012, the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance standards introduced GHG accounting for certain investments, and others soon followed suit. In 2016, the World Bank ’s Environmental and Social Framework similarly required GHG accounting for potentially high-emitting investment projects, along with assessments of physical climate risks like drought, wildfires and sea-level rise. Regular collection of GHG emissions data and similar information was an important step for MDBs to track the relationship between their investments the climate, but the exercises remained largely educational, without a significant impact on project design and investment decisions.
• Setting climate finance targets. In late 2015, the World Bank committed to doubling its climate finance contributions to around $20 billion per year by 2020, its first official climate finance target. Other MDBs made similar commitments. In 2018, this was increased to 30% (35% for IFC) and, in 2021 to 35% by 2025.These World Bank targets added some teeth to the Bank’s efforts to integrate climate change into its operations. As a result, annual climate finance reporting became an important element of benchmarking progress on climate action, for both the World Bank and other MDBs.
• Enter the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement came into being at the end of 2015, with a goal to “make financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” In 2017, the World Bank and other MDBs agreed to become “Paris-aligned” by July 1, 2023 (2025 for IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which are part of the World Bank Group). This stated commitment opened the door to a potentially significant shift in how the World Bank and other MDBs embraced climate action. As a result of capital increase negotiations in 2018, the World Bank committed to screen all projects for climate risks and incorporate a shadow price for carbon into economic analysis of projects in emissions-producing sectors.
• Moving beyond a project focus. Finance tracking, while important, tells you little about its impact on outcomes, and it risks excluding from the picture finance not labeled as climate that might lock in reliance on fossil fuels — such as investments in coal plants or factories. Without a strategic overview of countries’ priorities, taking account of both climate and development needs, there is a risk of incoherence and skewed incentives. In 2021, the World Bank introduced a new approach to conducting country diagnoses, the Climate Change and Development Reports (CCDRs). These seek to combine analysis of climate and development under one umbrella. Ultimately, these diagnostic tools are used to gain a holistic view and to shape and prioritize investment and technical assistance to countries.

It took nearly six years from the announcement of a commitment to Paris alignment for MDBs to reach agreement on a set of joint principles on how to define such alignment. Now the task of robust implementation is here.

The Present: A Potentially Pivotal Moment

Today, there is growing pressure on MDBs to act on climate change in the context of other layered crises and support countries to develop in a climate-resilient, low-emission, nature-positive and inclusive way. The context isn’t easy: debt, capacity limitations, and conflicts burden countries and constrain their ability to pay for climate action. Meanwhile global poverty rates rose during the COVID-19 pandemic, making some developing countries anxious that increasing spending on climate action could be in competition, rather than complementary to, increasing funds to tackle poverty. Wider geopolitical tensions, including around trade and supply chains, add another challenge.

Facing this complex landscape, the World Bank Group released an Evolution Roadmap in October 2023. Other MDBs are working on similar plans: the Inter-American Development Bank announced its changes in March 2024. The Roadmap, among other things, underscores the importance of climate change in the World Bank’s mission statement and increases its climate finance target to 45% of total finance by 2025 (up from 35%). It also introduced Climate-Resilient Debt Clauses for lending, a step forward that could inspire others in tackling both development and climate challenges together.

The MDBs now have several tools in place, from Paris alignment methodologies to new macro-level assessment methodologies. Going forward, full implementation of these tools will be vital. But it will still not be enough. MDBs need to take bolder steps to successfully change the way they operate and implement their expanded mission to help address the multiple, overlapping challenges and opportunities of our time.

The Future: Take Bold Action to Revolutionize Development Finance

Going forward there is much opportunity to take ambitious action on climate and much risk in not doing so. In the next decade, every country in the world will have to transition from their current development pathway to one that is climate-resilient, low-emission, nature-positive and inclusive. Climate and development action need to go hand in hand: advancing development objectives like increased access to healthcare or effective transportation also requires ensuring that, for example, healthcare services are resilient to extreme weather and that transport options are low-emission and can withstand shocks like floods or blistering heatwaves.

The World Bank Group and fellow MDBs can embrace five steps to support both sustainability and prosperity, becoming radically different organizations in 10 years’ time to the ones they are today:

1) Integrate climate and development finance, in support of country plans.

The world needs to radically grow the amount of funds flowing toward climate action, from domestic, international, public and private sources. The World Bank and fellow MDBs have a central role to play.

Holistic country planning

First, as called for by the G20 Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, MDBs can help countries set clear, integrated goals and long-term strategies for achieving their climate, nature and development ambitions, bringing together what are too often disparate and disjointed planning tools. In the context of these integrated strategies, MDBs can support developing nations in identifying priority areas for investment, shifting domestic policy and finance to support them, tackling distributional impacts, and establishing the institutional capability to develop a pipeline of investible projects. They can enable countries to implement country and sector platforms that bring together donors, international finance institutions, the private sector, and philanthropic organizations in support of country-led just transitions and investment strategies.

This builds on, but goes beyond, implementing tools like the new Paris alignment methodologies, the new country diagnostic approach, and other information-gathering and risk-management activities. It will take a cohesive and collaborative approach, signaling a virtuous cycle in which climate and development outcomes are mutually supportive, as well as building genuine partnerships to ensure adequate resourcing and support new capacity.

Concessionality

A refreshed approach to concessionality — or the degree to which financing is provided at below market rates — will also help ensure the most effective allocation of available funds to achieve both development and climate goals.

Currently, countries can access concessional financing primarily based on their poverty level, institutional framework, creditworthiness and performance implementing investments. Going forward, a country’s level of climate vulnerability could be added to the assessment of poverty, since climate change has been shown to affect the poorest most and is intrinsically linked to a country’s ability to achieve development and climate goals. Whilst this would allow the most concessional resources to be concentrated on countries that are both poor and vulnerable, it would also allow the vulnerability of nations like small island states — who are classified as middle income, but face potentially catastrophic climate impacts — to be taken into account.

To allow public finance to be used most efficiently, the banks will need to use appropriate degrees of concessionality and instruments based not only on a country’s poverty (and vulnerability), but also on the investment in question, including potential revenue streams. For example, investments that are likely to attract private capital more easily (such as a solar farm in an emerging economy) will need less use of concessional instruments than those that are unlikely to receive private funding (such as an early warning system in a least developed country). This will allow highly concessional finance to remain available for where it is needed most and has a proportionally larger effect.

2) Access and mobilize additional funds for climate action.

Beyond shifting currently available funds, the World Bank and other MDBs need to make maximum use of their ability to help grow the pie of available resources. This needs to be done both by making better use of the resources available to the banks themselves and encouraging a shift of funds held by others, including the private sector.

Capital Adequacy Framework

The G20 recommended changes to the MDBs’ capital adequacy frameworks. These will expand the resources available for climate and development and should be implemented swiftly. These frameworks outline how much money development banks must hold in reserve, versus how much they can lend out. While MDBs’ historically conservative stance has ensured financial soundness and creditworthiness, advocates have increasingly argued that the banks can lend more of their capital without endangering the institutions.

In particular, proposals call for banks to reduce the minimum equity-to-loan ratio, implement a portfolio guarantee mechanism and enhance recognition of the value of callable capital. Several MDBs have started to implement elements of these recommendations. These changes are allowing institutions like the Asian Development Bank to extend their lending capabilities and take on additional climate-related operations.

Private Finance Mobilization

MDBs can also improve how they mobilize private finance toward climate action, including by developing tools and instruments that crowd in more private finance. A positive example is the World Bank’s recent announcement of major changes to its provision of guarantees, which will take effect in July 2024. Guarantees protect investors from a borrowers’ failure to repay, and thereby improve a project’s risk-reward profile and the likelihood that a private institution will invest. MDBs should continue to expand other forms of risk mitigation, including co-financing and insurance, as well as create a securitized asset class into which institutional investors and financial institutions can invest.

3) Increase funds available for MDBs.

The Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance has suggested that MDB and development finance institutions’ investments in climate need to triple overall between now and 2030.  Whilst many of the measures above will be important drivers, MDBs will also need more resources from their shareholders between now and 2030.

If MDBs can show they are committed to stretching their own balance sheets, mobilizing more private finance and aligning their business models behind sustainable development, shareholder countries should provide them with substantial capital increases. Given their importance for increasing precious concessional finance, shareholders should also generously replenish concessional windows like IDA, the World Bank’s arm focused on low-income countries. This would supercharge the next decade of investments by the MDB community.  

4) Invest in adaptation and resilience.

Most MDB client countries are not high emitters, but are highly vulnerable to climate change impacts. While investments in mitigation can be helpful to support energy access and industrial growth, investments in adaptation and resilience are fundamental to safeguarding past and future development gains and protecting vulnerable communities. Food systems, water, industry, housing, and existing transportation and energy infrastructure all stand to be impacted. Yet adaptation finance made up only 43% of the World Bank’s $13.6 billion in climate funding in 2022, and around 37% of total MDB climate funds. 

Investing in adaptation can be challenging. It is often less a question of making a standalone investment and more about making virtually all investments more climate resilient. All sectoral planning and infrastructure investments need to be done with future climate risks in mind. Also, many adaptation investments go beyond reducing the risk of climate-related damages — they are highly interconnected with development and nature investments, bringing significant benefits in terms of biodiversity, health and livelihoods.

The MDBs have begun to support developing country governments’ ability to assess climate-related risks facing their economies – including through analytical tools like the CCDRs. But they have a potentially much stronger role to play in better quantifying and showcasing the long-term benefits of investing in climate-resilient development. This would include estimating the total resilience, economic, and non-market social and environmental benefits (often called the “triple dividends”) of adaptation investments, and where the highest returns can be achieved. The MDBs can also help estimate the cost of inaction.

Given the current pace of climate damages, countries’ needs are growing far faster than the supply of finance. MDB efforts to increase the scale and, as required, concessionality of funding available for adaptation is critical. Such support should be integrated with the holistic country plans and financing platforms outlined above. 

5) Advance transparency, accountability and innovation. 

Transparency and accountability are necessary for helping to ensure that funding is implemented with equity and justice in mind. The MDBs can continue to champion transparency around financial flows, to help clarify where funds are flowing and to whom, for example. WRI is currently partnering with the World Bank’s Global Partnership for Social Accountability to provide small grants so local organizations can track and monitor climate finance. Similar innovations to support community involvement in the use and monitoring of climate finance will help ensure that funds are flowing to those who need them most. This must be done in a way that balances accountability for where and how climate funds are delivered.

Transparency can also help attract investments — especially investments in climate solutions, which by their nature are often novel and therefore lack the data or track record investors need. MDBs can help provide clear and transparent market signals for competitive climate projects. For example, providing more granular access to the Global Emerging Markets (GEMS) risk database (under specific conditions that also respect confidentiality) would provide valuable information on investment risks to potential investors who are currently hesitant to finance projects in emerging markets and developing economies.

A New Mode of Operation for the MDBs

Over the past 10 years, the World Bank and its fellow MDBs have gone from scant integration of climate into investment decisions, to a more whole-hearted recognition of the threats and opportunities climate change poses to people’s lives and livelihoods. 

Over the next 10 years, the World Bank and other MDBs can play a vital role in the low-carbon, resilient and inclusive transition. While the MDBs are only one part of a much broader landscape of finance that must shift toward sustainability, they are essential, given their ability to leverage funds, match instruments to needs, deliver technical assistance and analysis, and support country-driven just transitions. They can also play a role in supporting a paradigm shift in how climate is integrated into international development objectives. For this to happen, they must maximize their efforts to work openly, collaboratively and creatively to embrace a new mode of operation.  

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Fossil Fuels Are in Everything from Plastics to Makeup, but Cleaner Alternatives Are Emerging margaret.overh… Wed, 04/17/2024 - 09:00

Fossil fuels aren’t just used to power cars, heat buildings and keep the lights on. They are, quite literally, woven into almost every facet of our lives.

From crayons, cosmetics and carpeting to fabrics, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals, around 70,000 everyday products are made with “petrochemicals” produced from fossil fuels. These products are so ubiquitous that many oil and gas companies are betting on chemical production to stay in business even as fossil fuel use in energy, heating and transport declines.

This comes with serious consequences for people and the planet. In the United States alone, chemical production directly emits 180 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (MTCO2e) per year — equivalent to the annual emissions from nearly 49 million gas-powered vehicles. The U.S. chemical sector also released 176,000 tonnes of toxic pollutants in 2021, exposing communities to water and air pollution as well as health risks like acute respiratory symptoms, skin and eye irritation and cancer.

One of the most important steps the industry can take to reduce these impacts is to replace fossil fuels used as ingredients in chemical products with non-fossil alternatives. This is known as “defossilization.”

While promising, defossilization technologies are rarely used at scale and face complicated hurdles. Some alternative materials are currently only available in small quantities. Others can risk increasing emissions if not used carefully. New analysis from WRI explores how and where U.S. chemical companies can use both existing and on-the-horizon technologies to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, lower emissions and improve lives in nearby communities.

How Are Fossil Fuels Used in Everyday Products?

“Petrochemicals” — chemicals derived from fossil fuels like petroleum, natural gas and coal — are present in just about every material that is not 100% organic, mineral or metallic. This includes plastics, electronics, textiles, cleaning products, rubber, paints and thousands of other synthetic products that most people use every day.

The process to make these products starts with processing fossil fuels into chemical “feedstocks” (or raw materials). Chemical feedstocks are turned into primary chemicals before being converted into intermediary chemicals and polymers. These are then manufactured into materials such as plastics and fibers and finally put to use in end products.

One of the most common chemical processing chains in the U.S. distills ethane from natural gas (a chemical feedstock), which is then “cracked” into ethylene (a primary chemical) and eventually turned into plastics and other materials.

Production of primary chemicals — including ethylene, propylene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia and methanol — emits the most greenhouse gases along the chemical supply chain. These “process emissions” come from burning additional fossil fuels to generate the high temperatures (up to 1,000 degrees C) needed to turn fossil fuels into primary chemicals.

Ammonia, for example, is one of the most common chemicals globally due to its use in synthetic fertilizer. Producing it requires hydrogen, which is typically made by reforming natural gas into a mixture of hydrogen, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. The resulting CO2 is usually emitted into the atmosphere. Extracting and transporting natural gas to an ammonia plant also emits greenhouse gases and risks methane leakages. (Methane is a highly potent greenhouse gas with 80 times the warming power of CO2 over a 20-year period.)

Because this small handful of chemicals are the precursors to thousands of end products and drive most emissions in the product lifecycle, they offer a strategic emission reduction opportunity.

How Could Fossil Fuels Be Replaced in Chemical Production?

The modern chemical industry is built on fossil fuels because they are dense in energy as well as carbon and hydrogen (the two key molecules in most chemical products). This makes them an economical feedstock option. But, technically, anything containing many carbon and hydrogen atoms can be used to replace fossil fuels in chemical production.

WRI’s analysis considered the following alternative feedstocks that are either abundant today or are projected to be in the coming years:

• Electrolytic hydrogen: Pure hydrogen can be obtained by using electricity to split water (H2O) into hydrogen and oxygen through a process called electrolysis. This should be done using clean power to avoid adding greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fueled electricity.
• Captured CO2: Carbon that is captured from industrial sources (such as cement manufacturers), or from the atmosphere (via direct air capture and other methods) could be used in chemical production.
• Waste biomass: This includes unused plant parts and other organic material collected in agriculture, forestry and municipal waste. Waste biomass can be a substitute for fossil fuels because, technically, fossil fuels are just biomass and animal matter subjected to heat and pressure underground for millions of years; both contain the same carbon and hydrogen molecules. It is important that biomass truly comes from waste and is not purpose-grown for the chemical industry, as converting carbon-rich natural ecosystems to cropland can drive enormous land-use-change emissions.
• Ethanol: Ethanol, which is currently widely produced in the U.S. by fermenting corn, can be used in place of fossil fuels to produce the chemical ethylene. While there is an opportunity cost of using prime farmland for corn ethanol, using ethanol as a chemical feedstock is more productive than blending it with gasoline as a “renewable” fuel. Capturing the CO2 emitted during ethanol production would reduce emissions from existing facilities.

Consider ammonia once more. Rather than deriving hydrogen from natural gas, an ammonia plant can defossilize by using electrolysis to split water into its component hydrogen and oxygen molecules. Electrolysis does not emit greenhouse gases if the electricity comes from zero-carbon sources like wind or solar and does not displace clean energy used elsewhere on the electricity grid. Because most of the emissions caused by ammonia production derive from reforming natural gas, replacing it with clean hydrogen makes the process nearly zero-carbon.

Opportunities to Defossilize Chemical Production in the U.S.

New WRI analysis looks at defossilization opportunities in the U.S. for four primary chemicals: ethylene, propylene, ammonia and methanol. It assesses total demand for each, identifies today’s most promising defossilization technologies and estimates the volume of these feedstocks needed to meet demand. It also maps out where alternative feedstocks are or could be located effectively in relation to existing chemical plants and infrastructure.

We found that, nationally, the estimated demand for alternative feedstocks is currently greater than available feedstock supplies. In some cases, the difference is relatively small: The U.S. currently produces around 315 million tonnes of waste biomass per year, and the estimated demand for chemical production is around 375 million tonnes. In other cases, demand massively outstrips supply. For example, as much as 29-41 million tonnes of electrolytic (clean) hydrogen would be needed as a chemical feedstock. The U.S. currently produces almost none, although this is expected to change thanks to recent production incentives. While the U.S. produces 10-11 million tonnes of conventional (dirty) hydrogen, this would not be a low-carbon feedstock.

The outlook is different from a regional perspective, however. In certain areas with a small amount of chemical production, demand could be easily met by a large supply of potential resources.

Using renewable energy to make ammonia in the Midwest

The Midwest is home to 127 million acres of farmland, much of which produces corn used for ethanol and for feeding livestock (45% and 40% of corn crop, respectively) as well as soybeans and other food crops. This immense agricultural output relies on millions of tons of ammonia-based fertilizer made with natural gas feedstock. To meet this demand, most U.S. ammonia plants are sprinkled throughout the region, with additional demand met by shipments produced in the Gulf Coast.

Reducing Chemical Sector Emissions is Complicated

No single solution will eliminate emissions from the chemical sector on its own. Defossilization is one piece of a bigger puzzle. It can work in concert with strategies like reducing demand, electrifying chemical plants with clean electricity, making them more energy efficient and capturing process CO2 emissions (either for use as a feedstock or to be sequestered permanently). Learn about more approaches that can contribute to a net-zero chemical sector in WRI’s new working paper.

We estimate that the Midcontinent, Great Lakes and Upper Midwest regions combined — which make up most of the country’s “corn belt” — produce about half the country’s ammonia (6.9 million tons annually). Replacing natural gas feedstocks in this process with clean, electrolytic hydrogen would require about 1.2 million tons of hydrogen per year. Fortunately, the Midwest also has some of the United States’ best wind energy potential and respectable solar potential. Depending on the electrolyzers’ efficiency, creating 1.2 million tons of electrolytic hydrogen would require 42-62 thousand gigawatt hours (GWh) of clean electricity. This is about 7%-11% of the total renewable energy the Midwest could generate in 2050 with a 95% decarbonized energy grid.

Defossilizing ammonia in the Midwest may need both demand and supply side solutions. To avoid using up to 11% of the region’s renewable energy, one option would be to transition just half of the Midwest’s ammonia production to hydrogen made with renewable electricity. This would reduce around 7.5 MT of CO2 emissions annually, equal to taking about 1.5 million gas-powered cars off the road for a year. It is also possible that this ammonia demand could fall if corn crops grown for ethanol fuel production decrease as ground transportation electrifies, lowering the size of the challenge.

Defossilizing chemical production in the Gulf Coast

The largest regional hurdle is defossilizing the Gulf Coast, which produces over half of the United States’ primary chemicals. Still, it has significant feedstock resource potential, with the highest CO2 process emissions, second highest projected renewable generation in 2050, and fifth highest volume of waste biomass of any region in the U.S. There are also existing ethanol transport networks linking the Midwest to the Gulf Coast. In other words, companies would have some flexibility in selecting which pathways they would use to defossilize their production rather than all competing for one feedstock.

What Will It Take to Defossilize U.S. Chemical Production?

Defossilizing all U.S. chemical production will be a multi-decade undertaking. It will require massive effort and investment from both the government and private sector as well as measures to uplift communities impacted by chemical plants.

Overcoming technology hurdles

While some defossilization methods are already commercially viable, sustainable supplies of feedstocks like waste biomass and clean hydrogen are limited. Carbon capture technology needs more private investment and deployment. Renewable energy generation, required for clean hydrogen, is already pacing behind what’s needed in a net-zero economy. And competition for resources like clean electricity would put the chemical sector at odds with other sectors seeking to reduce emissions.

Other technologies, like direct air capture, have not yet been demonstrated at a sufficient scale but are poised to be within the decade.

Retrofitting existing chemical plants and building new plants and infrastructure would also require extraordinary effort. Financing new technologies, re-engineering existing facilities to accommodate new equipment, and permitting and building clean energy and energy infrastructure — such as transmission lines, CO2 and hydrogen pipelines — would likely be the largest obstacles.

However, existing policy opportunities can help clear these hurdles. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) made billions of dollars of government funding available for industrial decarbonization. Several of the programs these laws established could be used to defossilize chemicals, including tax credits for clean hydrogen, carbon utilization and energy storage; grants for first-of-a-kind low-emission commercial and demonstration facilities; and research and development funding.

Making sure benefits flow to affected communities

Defossilization can also provide some social and health benefits by reducing local pollution. Communities located near chemical production facilities have long been affected by air and water pollution, leading to above average rates of cancer, respiratory illness, infertility and natal issues, among other health problems. “Sacrifice zones” with persistent structural inequality due to environmental damage and poor economic investments, like Louisiana’s “Cancer Alley,” also see pervasive poverty.

A petrochemical plant on the banks of the Mississippi River in Hahnville, Louisiana. Industrial plants like this one have contributed to harmful water and air pollution in a stretch of Louisiana known as "Cancer Alley." Photo by 

For some in those communities, shutting down chemical facilities might be the only acceptable solution. But others might view plants as a source of jobs that would not exist if facilities shut down. Defossilization could provide a middle ground here. For example, electrifying some chemical processes with renewable energy could keep facilities operating and local people employed while eliminating processes that burn fossil fuels and cause local air pollution.

Recent equity-focused policies in the U.S. — such as the Biden Administration’s Justice40 initiative — can help ensure that benefits like new jobs reach community members. In many cases, projects funded by the IRA or BIL must submit community benefit plans outlining how the investments will benefit nearby communities from an economic, health and/or environmental standpoint. While initiatives like this are a step in the right direction, they should be only the foundation for further action.

Strengthening policy support at the federal and local levels

Strong federal and state policy can help defossilize chemical production. Policymakers will need to maintain or expand existing incentives like tax credits, loans and grants for decarbonization that can help finance fuel switching and new technologies. Other policies can help stimulate demand for clean chemicals, including procurement programs and contracts for differences. Emissions caps and carbon taxes are ways to compel companies to change and would provide greater certainty for the environment and the market. Paired with carbon trading markets, these policies can also provide financing for the transition.

Finally, policy shifts such as clean energy permitting reform and increased support for research and development are critical to maximize the potential of decarbonization incentives. While some of these policies are more politically challenging to pass than others, a combination of them will be needed to get defossilization off the ground.

It’s Time to Stop Ignoring the Chemical Industry

The chemical sector has received relatively little attention in climate discussions to date. Yet, its large emission impacts and ubiquitous presence mean the sector urgently needs to change. Chemical producers have many available and near-term tools to reduce emissions and clean up their manufacturing processes, and defossilization will be key among them.

Removing fossil fuels from chemical production to the greatest extent possible, just as in other sectors, will be pivotal to both meeting U.S. climate goals and advancing the health and well-being of communities.

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• Industrial Innovation & Decarbonization
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Authors Zach Byrum

RELEASE: World Resources Institute Welcomes Saurabh Gupta as General Counsel casey.skeens@wri.org Wed, 04/17/2024 - 08:00

WASHINGTON (April 17, 2024) — World Resources Institute (WRI) is pleased to announce that Saurabh Gupta has joined as WRI’s new General Counsel. In this role, Gupta will lead the organization’s legal function, manage institutional risks, and provide legal expertise and guidance to support WRI's country offices and programs.  

Gupta will work closely with the Board of Directors, serving as Secretary to the Board, in addition to the Chief Financial Officer and the Audit and Risk Management Committee. As a member of WRI’s Global Executive Team, he will also provide legal counsel to the organization’s senior leaders.  

“Saurabh’s decades of legal experience will add enormous value to WRI’s global operations, while advancing WRI’s ambitious strategy,” said Ani Dasgupta, President & CEO. “He has an impressive track record working with large international nonprofits and I look forward to working alongside him for a better future for people, nature and climate.”  

Gupta has nearly 20 years of experience as a distinguished legal professional and most recently served as the Chief Legal Counsel and Compliance Officer at Arabella Advisors, a consultancy that supports nonprofit organizations and clients across the philanthropic sector. He is a passionate problem-solver and has a broad depth of expertise, including on corporate governance, risk assessment, compliance and regulations.

“WRI is addressing some of the world’s biggest challenges, fighting climate change and protecting nature in a way that benefits people,” said Saurabh Gupta. “I want to ensure my children and grandchildren can enjoy clean air and appreciate the world’s forests as much as I do. I look forward to working with WRI’s global teams to advance pragmatic solutions that meet both legal requirements and organizational needs.”

Prior to his time at Arabella Advisors, Gupta worked in the public education sector for Massachusetts Teachers Association, the Maryland State Education Association and for the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) — as well as public-sector labor organizations. Gupta graduated from Thomas Jefferson School of Law and holds a Bachelor of Arts from Ohio Wesleyan University.

“Saurabh’s depth of legal expertise will be crucial to strengthening WRI’s global network,” said Adriana Lobo, Managing Director, Global Presence and National Action. “It is vital that our teams around the world are well equipped to operate within their local contexts as effectively as possible to deliver maximum impact. With a trusted legal advisor like Saurabh on our team, WRI’s global operations will be more cohesive and responsive to the world’s most pressing challenges.”  

About World Resources Institute

WRI is a trusted partner for change. Using research-based approaches, we work globally and in focus countries to meet people’s essential needs; to protect and restore nature; and to stabilize the climate and build resilient communities. We aim to fundamentally transform the way the world produces and uses food and energy and designs its cities to create a better future for all. Founded in 1982, WRI has nearly 2,000 staff around the world, with country offices in Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico and the United States and regional offices in Africa and Europe. 

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RELEASE: Sourcing “Better” Meat Entails Significant Tradeoffs, WRI Analysis Finds casey.skeens@wri.org Tue, 04/16/2024 - 14:30

New report outlines a six-step approach that food providers can use to design sourcing strategies that achieve climate, social, ethical,and economic goals

WASHINGTON – World Resources Institute (WRI) today released a report finding important trade-offs when shifting from conventional animal agriculture systems to alternative systems such as organic and grass-fed. While these systems can be better for goals like improving animal welfare or reducing antibiotic usage, the report finds alternative systems led to greater climate, land, and/or water impacts in 75% of the examined cases.

Animal agriculture is responsible for up to 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions. For food companies based in Europe or North America, emissions from meat and dairy production can easily account for the majority of their food-related “scope 3” GHG emissions.

While much focus has been on ways to reduce the climate effects of beef and dairy, animal agriculture also impacts water use and pollution, health, animal welfare and more. This has policymakers and businesses asking how different protein options stack up against these factors.While the authors stress that the best strategy for overcoming competing tradeoffs is by shifting to more plant-based foods, the report also provides a six-step approach that food providers can use to design meat sourcing strategies to achieve climate, social, ethical, and economic goals. 

“Shifting to diets that are higher in plants, while reducing the amount of meat and dairy we eat, is a triple-win for climate, nature, and animal welfare in high-income countries,” said Richard Waite, Acting Director of Agriculture Initiatives at WRI. “That said, because meat and dairy are a part of many people’s diets, an important question is, what ways of producing meat have the lowest impact? This research shows that there is no single best meat production system or product label–there are often trade-offs. Food companies need to understand these dynamics to successfully work with their meat suppliers to achieve their climate and other commitments,” said Waite. 

Using nearly 300 data points from life cycle assessments from production systems in Europe and North America conducted from 2000 to 2022, the authors aimed to understand what counts as “better meat”— an often-nebulous term used for meat with better performance against different environmental, social, ethical, or economic attributes or that’s produced using alternative agricultural production systems such as organic, grass-fed,or free-range.

“I often hear people talk about a sustainable menu as being either entirely plant-based or including meat that’s produced with alternative methods many assume to be environmentally friendly,” said Clara Cho, Data Analyst at WRI and one of the report’s authors. “Unfortunately, sourcing meat that is better for the environment and delivers a range of other co-benefits is not that straightforward.”

“Companies that shift to sourcing ‘better meat’ from systems with higher environmental impacts will need to shift from sourcing ‘less meat’ to sourcing ‘even less meat’ if they want to also meet their sustainability goals,” said Cho. 

Alternative production systems typically require more land to produce the same amount of protein as conventional methods do. Land use per gram of protein was higher in alternative systems in more than 90% of cases assessed. Higher land use ultimately means more emissions released into the atmosphere as agriculture globally continues to expand into forested areas and other natural ecosystems that store carbon. 

The report shows that a number of strategies do exist to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from meat within any type of production system. For example, companies can work with their meat suppliers to promote improvements in feeds, animal breeds, veterinary care, manure management, and other aspects of animal agriculture that contribute to emissions. 

“There are many ways for meat producers to cut emissions. Food companies should encourage those and work with their suppliers to track improvements over time,”said Waite. “Also, while alternative production systems can lead to greater greenhouse gas emissions,these systems can offer other benefits that make them worth pursuing.”

The report comes as farmers across Europe push back against climate and trade policies they say hurt their livelihoods and are overbearing. Two recent EU directives–the proposed European Commission target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040 compared to 1990 levels, and the EU Nature Restoration Law, aiming to restore at least 20% of the EU’s land and sea by 2030 — have led to intense political debates about how to broadly address the agriculture sector’s emissions and environmental footprint.

“What we choose to eat and how we produce that food has very real climate and environmental consequences,”said Stientje van Veldhoven, WRI’s Vice-President and Regional Director for Europe. “We need to look at all the evidence to find a win-win solution for Europe. That must include reducing our emissions from meat and dairy consumption, notably beef, while listening to farmers’ legitimate concerns regarding fair prices, income and red tape.”

In the United States, the new report contributes to the ever-growing discussion around sustainable farming practices,as the U.S. Department of Agriculture decides how to allocate $19.5billionin Inflation Reduction Act funds for climate-smart agriculture. 

Further detail on the report and its recommended6-part sourcing strategy can be found at: https://www.wri.org/research/better-meat-sourcing-climate-sustainability-goals.
 

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