STATEMENT: European Ocean Pact Sets Strong Example Ahead of UN Ocean Conference nate.shelter@wri.org Thu, 06/05/2025 - 14:47

LONDON (June 5, 2025) — Today, the European Union adopted the European Ocean Pact — a unified strategy that aims to protect the ocean, promote a thriving blue economy and support the communities and livelihoods that depend on the ocean. The Pact comes days ahead of the UN Ocean Conference, where governments will convene in Nice, France to advance ocean action.

The Pact brings existing and new ocean policies under one coordinated framework, with six priorities: restoring ocean health, boosting the sustainable blue economy, supporting coastal and outermost regions, enhancing maritime security, advancing ocean knowledge and innovation and strengthening EU ocean diplomacy and governance. The EU manages the world’s largest collective maritime area.

Following is a statement from Tom Pickerell, Global Director, Ocean Program, World Resources Institute: 

“The Pact sets a strong example for how EU countries can govern their ocean area in ways that improve coastal communities’ lives. It rightly places the ocean at the heart of Europe’s environmental, economic, and geopolitical future.

“We are encouraged by the Pact’s focus on integrated ocean policies, closer links between science and decision-making and stronger international cooperation. This aligns closely with the ambitions of the Ocean Panel, which includes 18 countries committed to sustainably managing 100% of their national ocean areas. The Pact’s push for ocean innovation, from offshore renewables and blue biotech to circular economy solutions and zero-carbon shipping, marks real progress toward a sustainable blue economy. And the Pact's attention to coastal communities and youth leadership signal that people who depend on the ocean are critical to protecting it.

“Now bold words must be backed by results. Many commitments lack clear timelines, targets and accountability. On finance, the Pact misses the mark by overlooking key tools such as blue bonds, blended finance and insurance mechanisms — essential for scaling investment and embedding ocean health into Europe’s economies. Without a clear strategy to build capacity in developing countries, its promise of inclusive global progress risks falling short.

“The EU must now deliver on commitments: support national sustainable ocean plans, unlock new funding — especially for vulnerable coastal and island states — and make sure ocean solutions are part of climate and nature action. It should also recognize the importance of blue foods for healthy diets, jobs and resilience.

“As leaders meet in Nice next week for the UN Ocean Conference, this is a vital moment for countries to restore the ocean’s health. Governments must ratify the High Seas Treaty, protect 30% of the ocean by 2030 and back efforts to manage all national waters sustainably. With real investment and global cooperation, the EU Ocean Pact can turn ambition into action — at the UN Ocean Conference, at COP30, and beyond.”

Editor’s note: WRI serves as Secretariat of the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy — a group of 18 heads of state and government from countries committed to sustainably managing 100% of their national waters by 2030 — and coordinates the 100% Alliance, a global initiative co-led by Chile and France that encourages all countries to make that commitment.

Ocean Europe Type Statement Exclude From Blog Feed? 0

The High Seas Treaty: A 20-Year Journey to Transform Ocean Governance alicia.cypress… Thu, 06/05/2025 - 07:47

The ocean makes up nearly 70 percent of the planet’s surface, bursting with rich biodiversity and natural resources that are vital for both the climate and economies. Yet, beyond national coastlines, protecting much of the ocean has long been a murky endeavor.

For nearly 20 years, governments, scientists and ocean advocates have worked toward securing a global treaty to protect marine life in the ocean areas that lie beyond countries’ individual jurisdictions. These vast, mostly unregulated waters, known as the high seas, hold huge importance to the health of the planet.

Finally, in June 2023, the 193 member states of the United Nations adopted the landmark Treaty for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ agreement), under the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).

Though the text of what is commonly known as the “High Seas Treaty,” has been agreed, the story is far from over. It’s awaiting the political will of 60 countries to ratify it, at which time it will trigger a 120-day countdown, leading to the first Conference of Parties (BBNJ COP) that will determine how it's fully implemented.

Why the High Seas Treaty Matters

The ambition of the High Seas Treaty has always been immense. Roughly two-thirds of the ocean lies outside any single country’s jurisdiction, forming a collective space teeming with life from microscopic plankton to colossal blue whales.

The high seas are also home to lucrative natural resources, which countries and companies increasingly seek to explore and exploit, such as critical minerals needed for EV batteries and other low carbon technologies and marine genetic materials that are increasingly sought after to support pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and other innovations.

Yet, without a binding treaty, the high seas are governed patchwork-style through regional fisheries agreements, shipping conventions and scattered marine protected areas. This leaves critical gaps in protecting marine biodiversity or ensuring developing countries are also benefiting from discoveries made in international water.

When ratified, the High Seas Treaty will fill critical regulatory gaps and complement national efforts. It will help to guide regional cooperation and link seamlessly to sustainable ocean plans for national waters already being delivered by member countries of the High Level Panel for Sustainable Ocean Economy (Ocean Panel) and future plans through the 100% Alliance. Together, they will weave a comprehensive net of ocean stewardship from coastlines to open ocean. 

The ocean is full of rich natural resources, like genetic material from coral, that countries and companies are looking to use for everything from pharmaceuticals to new technologies. The UN High Seas Treaty will help fill gaps needed to conserve and regulate these resources. Photo by Placebo365 / iStock. What's Included in the High Seas Treaty 

In 2023, countries compromised on four core pillars of the BBNJ agreement:

1) Area-Based Management Tools, Including Marine Protected Areas

The treaty will create a mechanism to establish marine protected areas (MPAs) and other conservation management tools on the high seas. MPAs are typically clearly defined geographical spaces, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to conserve marine biodiversity and ecosystems.

Many MPAs on the high seas already exist. For example, in 2010, six MPAs were established in the Northeast Atlantic with a total area of 286,200 square kilometers (110,502 square miles) and in 2016, the Ross Sea MPA with a total area of 1.5 million square kilometers (600,000 square miles) was established in the Southern Ocean.

The treaty will also establish a process for proposing new zones for protection via a consultation process, supported by scientific evidence.

2) Marine Genetic Resources

The treaty will also establish rules for sharing financial and non-financial benefits from the commercial application of genetic material sourced from high-seas marine organisms — such as bacteria, corals or deep-sea sponges — that can be used in medicine, cosmetics, food, and biotechnology. These innovations hold huge potential benefits for human health and wellbeing.

3) Capacity Building and Transfer of Marine Technology

The High Seas Treaty also supports sharing technology and knowledge developments, particularly to low-income countries that need and request it for conservation and sustainable use to ensure they participate fully in high seas governance.

4) Environmental Impact Assessments

The treaty will create a process for countries or companies proposing high seas activities — such as deep sea mining in areas beyond national borders — to conduct assessments and follow international standards, that can be shared transparently.

Which Countries Have Signed the High Seas Treaty?

Just ahead of the third UN Oceans Conference (UNOC), taking place in Nice, France beginning June 9, the treaty was signed by 116 countries and ratified by 32. Those ratifying the treaty include island states such as Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica and the Maldives; the European Union and some of its members including France, Portugal and Spain; and other nations such as Chile, Norway and South Korea. More countries are expected to ratify the treaty during the conference. (Track them on the UN website here.)

Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, signs the High Seas Treaty in 2023 as Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of Spain (right) watches. Photo by the European Commission. Why Is it Taking So Long for the Treaty to Ratify?

Starting in the early 2000s, the United Nations began informal discussions on how to close the regulatory gaps over how to manage the high seas, wrangling over how to share the benefits of its natural resources while ensuring necessary protections.  But the very complexity of coordinating nearly 200 countries meant progress was often incremental, alternately buoyed by breakthroughs and bogged down by competing interests.

The slow ratification progress highlights both the strengths and limitations of international diplomacy. On the one hand, global consensus ensures that the resulting High Seas Treaty creates a single set of rules for all high-seas users. On the other hand, aligning the diverse interests of small island states, distant water fishing nations and environmental non-profit organizations is inherently time-consuming. Each negotiating text must thread the needle between these interests, with every word or comma potentially sparking months of debate.

Moreover, the decision-making processes of the UN, anchored in principles of sovereign equality and consensus-building, can struggle to keep pace with the urgent, evolving threats that marine ecosystems face: like the increasing demand for deep-sea minerals, growing plastic pollution and overfishing practices. By the time a treaty is finalized, new pressures may emerge, requiring fresh rounds of technical and legal work.

Countries, operating within their own jurisdictions — also known as exclusive economic zones, which extend 200 nautical miles from a country’s coastline — can make more immediate progress on conservation and climate initiatives. For example, Ocean Panel members are sustainably managing 100% of their national waters. The process for developing these holistic sustainable ocean plans, while not simple, has been faster than multilateral processes. Ocean Panel members are now calling on all coastal and ocean states to replicate this success in their own national waters by 2030 by joining the 100% Alliance.

What’s Next for the High Seas Treaty?

At this month’s UNOC, it’s expected that many UN member states will announce either their signing or ratification of the High Seas Treaty. However, for it to be effective, it is crucial that the underlying framework and governance structures are agreed upon before coming into force. The BBNJ Preparatory Commission (BBNJ PrepCom) hopes to fill this gap: shaping the treaty operations and preparing for the first BBNJ COP.

Governments and negotiators are hoping to develop key recommendations to shape the critical elements of the treaty. This includes forming governing structures; outlining the roles and responsibilities of institutions such as those that provide data, and scientific and technical advice; creating tools and mechanisms to ensure equitable implementation of the treaty; and establishing systems to ensure funding and technical knowledge is distributed so all member states can fully participate.  

The first BBNJ COP will see these recommendations brought forward and hopefully adopted. It is critical therefore that these meetings are constructive and that a consensus is reached. Only with the relevant governing and financial mechanisms in place can this High Seas Treaty go from a landmark agreement to a fully functioning international treaty that protects the global ocean.

Management of the ocean needs to be as interconnected as the ocean itself. By weaving together national actions with a robust global treaty, the world can ensure a resilient, equitable and thriving ocean for generations to come.

high-seas-fishing-boat.jpg Ocean biodiversity Climate Climate Governance Ocean Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy

Authors Tom Pickerell Amy Swift

New Approach Leverages AI and Earth Observation to Map Rooftop Solar Access in Kenya margaret.overh… Thu, 06/05/2025 - 07:00

Energy services are fundamental to socioeconomic development and human well-being. Yet access remains scarce in many parts of the world. In Kenya, 13 million people still lack electricity access, and over 39 million continue to use unhealthy, polluting fuels for cooking.

WRI, in collaboration with over 300 partners, developed the Energy Access Explorer (EAE) to help bring electricity to unserved and underserved communities. Currently available in eight countries across Africa and Asia, EAE is an online, open-source, interactive platform that enables clean energy players to map energy access gaps, identify high priority areas for energy interventions, and expand access faster and more equitably.

In Kenya, EAE is already being used to inform the design of County Energy Plans, as mandated by the country's Energy Act of 2019. These plans require granular data on demographics and productive uses of renewable energy to assess current and potential electricity demand. They also require data on infrastructure and resource availability to map energy supply. But this is where current data comes up short: While Kenya has significantly scaled up solar power access in recent years, it does not have detailed information on where small-scale solar PV systems are located. This data is currently only available at coarse resolutions (at the sub-county level rather than building level; Figure 1), which limits inclusive planning efforts.

Simply put: If energy planners and clean energy businesses don't know which buildings are powered by solar systems, how can they effectively plan for the expansion of energy services to underserved communities?

Illuminating Kenya's Solar Landscape

To bridge this knowledge gap, WRI, in partnership with OMDENA, piloted the use of AI and Earth Observation (EO) technologies to generate high-resolution mapping of solar PV systems on building rooftops. We started with in Kilifi County, Kenya; specifically, Kilifi South, where about 1 in 5 people use solar power as their main source for lighting.

First, we collected data from various sources, including open-access satellite imagery from Sentinel-1 and Sentinel-2, high-resolution images from Google Maps Static API images, and publicly available research datasets. Once we gathered the images, we processed them to enhance their quality. This included removing blurry parts or noise and enhancing their resolution. Given the limitations of open-access data, we mainly relied on high-resolution imagery from Google Maps for higher accuracy.

After enhancing the image quality, we manually labelled the location of solar panels in the high-resolution images using Google Earth Engine to build a robust training dataset. To increase the variety of training examples, we also divided larger images into smaller sections and applied simple transformations, like rotating or flipping.

This labeled dataset was then used to train our AI object detection model, built using YOLOv81, which is designed to efficiently and accurately identify solar panels.

Once the model was trained, we first tested its performance on a separate set of images that had not been used during training. This achieved an accuracy of 94% based on common evaluation methods (precision, recall and F1 scores). To further assess its real-world applicability, we conducted cross-validation using manually labeled ground truth data from Kilifi South. This step allowed us to measure how well the model could detect solar panels in new, unseen imagery (Figure 2). High precision (the model's prediction was correct in more than 90% of cases) indicated that most detected solar panels were indeed true solar panels, while high recall suggested that the model successfully identified most solar panels present in the images.

We then applied the model to satellite images of Kilifi South sub-county to map the locations of solar panels in the area and create a georeferenced2 dataset: a digital map layer showing where solar panels are installed. The final model was fine-tuned based on misclassifications, improving its ability to detect panels under varying lighting conditions, rooftop orientations and panel sizes.

Results and Next Steps

We successfully identified 274 existing rooftop solar PV systems within Kilifi town, while also developing a scalable methodology that can provide actionable insights to national and subnational governments, clean energy businesses, civil society and financiers. The outputs of this model - when integrated into EAE and combined with other datasets, such as energy demand, socioeconomic indicators or solar irradiation - can further enhance its utility for integrated energy planning.

Map of buildings in Kilifi South. Zoomed images show rooftop solar panels detected by the AI model.

This method marks a step forward in improving data-informed, integrated and inclusive energy planning in Kenya by providing high-resolution data on rooftop solar PV systems. Thanks to our modular, open-source approach, we plan to refine and scale the model to assess current and potential applications of small-scale solar systems across Kenya and in other countries in Africa and Asia.

By illuminating where solar power is deployed today, we can chart a brighter, more inclusive energy future for tomorrow.

 

1 YOLOv8 is a cutting-edge AI model that helps detect objects in images, like spotting solar panels on rooftops. It's fast, accurate, and easy to train with your own data, making it a powerful tool for real-world mapping and planning projects.

2 "Georeferenced" means that the data is linked to specific geographic locations on the Earth's surface, allowing it to be accurately placed and viewed on a map.

rooftop-solar-kenya.jpg Energy Kenya Energy Energy Access Clean Energy data Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Energy Access Explorer

Authors Dimitris Mentis Douglas Ronoh Akansha Saklani Carol Akoth Abdelhahman Katkat

How Marine Carbon Removal Is Governed in the High Seas shannon.paton@… Wed, 06/04/2025 - 07:02

The ocean plays a key role in regulating our climate, absorbing 26% of carbon dioxide emissions and 90% of excess heat. With scientific consensus that carbon dioxide removal is needed to complement deeper emissions reductions, there’s growing interest in leveraging the ocean’s natural processes to pull more carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere.

New Blue Paper on mCDR

A new blue paper on principles for responsible marine carbon dioxide removal commissioned by Ocean Panel member countries summarizes the state of knowledge around mCDR approaches, lays out international governance considerations, and recommends ways countries can develop mCDR approaches responsibly.

This is possible through marine carbon dioxide removal (mCDR) approaches, such as seaweed cultivation and sinking, ocean alkalinity enhancement and nutrient fertilization. Estimates indicate that mCDR could remove billions of tons of carbon per year by midcentury. But this massive potential is paired with an equally large uncertainty about both the efficacy of proposed approaches and the possibility of ecological and social impacts.  

Marine CDR approaches are in early stages of development today, with all tested close to countries’ coastlines in national waters and very few tested at sea. However, as interest in mCDR grows from countries and companies looking to meet net zero and other climate commitments, at-sea testing and deployment of approaches proven safe and effective will likely move into international waters. These waters, known as the high seas, make up around two-thirds of the world’s ocean.

For any marine carbon dioxide removal activity in the high seas, clear and comprehensive governance will be needed to ensure environmental safety, scientific integrity and compliance with international law. Today, mCDR is governed by the existing international treaties and agreements that protect the ocean and marine life. But because they generally were not written with marine CDR in mind, comprehensive and proactive regulation of marine carbon removal activities may require more specific governance frameworks.

The State of mCDR Development and At-Sea Testing

Interest and investment in marine carbon removal have been growing over the past few years both in the United States and other countries, like Germany, Iceland and Singapore.

In 2023, the U.S. published the Ocean Climate Action Plan, a government-wide roadmap to leverage the ocean for climate mitigation. And in late 2024, it released a national mCDR research strategy to address the objectives in the Ocean Climate Action Plan, including building a sufficient knowledge base about the efficacy and tradeoffs of different marine CDR approaches and developing a robust regulatory framework for their use. The federal government provided an initial $24 million for mCDR research projects in 2023; whether and how this work will continue under the Trump administration is uncertain. 

In Germany, the CDRmare project, which runs through 2027, is working to assess if and how mCDR can play a role in removing CO2 from the atmosphere. In the EU, the SEAO2-CDR project, which also runs through 2027, is funded by the EU’s Horizon Europe, a research and innovation program, and includes interdisciplinary work to develop tools and guidelines to help ensure mCDR is developed responsibly and transparently.

Apart from national and supranational governments, interdisciplinary researchers have developed codes of conduct to ensure responsible research. Groups like Carbon to Sea Initiative and Ocean Visions are supporting mCDR research with funding and other resources.

Projects are also beginning to move out of the lab and into the marine environment for testing along national coastlines. One mCDR project led by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute in Massachusetts is in the process of applying for EPA permits to do ocean alkalinity enhancement testing off the state’s coast. Another project received a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to add carbon-removing alkaline sand offshore in North Carolina. In total, Ocean Visions identifies 45 research trials that are either in operation or concluded around the world, and six more than are approved to move forward.

As for projects in the high seas, a non-profit coalition of researchers has announced its intention to start research trials for ocean iron fertilization in international waters of the Pacific as early as 2026. The coalition plans to request approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which administers the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, the relevant domestic legal framework for this activity.  

Parties to the London Convention and Protocol — two international legal frameworks that govern activity on the high seas — have been meeting to discuss governance of mCDR activity. In 2023, parties released a non-binding statement recommending that OAE and biomass sinking be treated similarly to ocean iron fertilization – namely that activity outside of legitimate scientific research be deferred. A November 2024 meeting presented various ways to make this statement stronger, but none moved forward due to parties’ disagreement over the role of commercial interests in mCDR development.    

How the High Seas Are Currently Governed

The location of mCDR activity will determine how it is governed.  In the vast majority of cases, mCDR activities conducted within 200 nautical miles from the shore are within a country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and are governed by that country’s domestic laws and regulations. Beyond a country’s EEZ is the high seas, which is open access to all countries and is governed by international legal frameworks.

Several international legal frameworks govern activity in the high seas but do not explicitly regulate mCDR, as they were written before mCDR activities existed or had been proposed. As a result, they are now being interpreted and applied with varying levels of clarity.

Major international legal frameworks governing activity in the high seasAgreementYear adopted; year entered into forceNumber of partiesGeneral intent of agreementUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1982; 1994169 countries and the EUEstablishes a legal framework for all use and management activities in the ocean, including defining maritime boundaries, cooperating in transboundary waters, managing mineral exploitation and protecting freedom of scientific research.Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)1992; 1993195 countries and the EUFocuses on the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of genetic resources.London Convention (LC)1972; 197587 countriesPromotes the effective control of the deliberate disposal, or dumping, of wastes and other matter at sea. Parties must regulate dumping and prohibit dumping of certain substancesLondon Protocol (LP)1996; 200655 countriesProtects and preserves the marine environment from all sources of pollution more comprehensively than the LC (which it is intended to modernize and eventually replace) Parties must prohibit dumping of all substances except those listed. Countries can be Contracting Parties to the LC, the LC/LP or neither the LC/LP.Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ; also known as High Seas Treaty; Global Ocean Treaty)2023; not yet in force30 (60 needed to enter into force)Provides the legal framework and process under UNCLOS to protect marine life and biodiversity in the high seas.  Allows for creation of marine protected areas in international waters and requires environmental impact assessments for certain activities.

Sources: UN Law of the Sea; Convention on Biological Diversity; London Convention; London Protocol; LC/LP Status, BBNJ (as of June 4, 2025). 

Each framework addresses different, but related, aspects of ocean governance, and coordinating across multiple agreements helps address shared goals for protecting biodiversity, reducing pollution and responding to climate impacts. For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) intergovernmental scientific advisory body provides guidance on alignment with Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) for meeting biodiversity goals in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Countries rely on global organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized UN agency, and the CBD Secretariat for support coordinating policy alignment and enforcement measures.

How Does mCDR Fit into These Legal Frameworks?

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, all parties are free to conduct marine scientific research in the high seas, if it is done peacefully and following “appropriate scientific methods.” However, UNCLOS does not define what constitutes marine scientific research and fails to differentiate research conducted to expand knowledge from research that enables future commercial activity. (This is the case for other international law, too.) UNCLOS also includes general obligations for all parties to protect and preserve the marine environment — for example, by limiting marine pollution and avoiding the introduction of invasive species.

General provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity relevant to mCDR include identification and monitoring for activities likely to have a significant adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and a requirement for environmental impact assessments for certain activities. The CBD initially adopted a resolution to ban commercial application of iron fertilization in 2008, and then expanded that in 2010 to ban all climate-related geoengineering activities except for small-scale scientific research studies in a controlled setting. While the resolution is nonbinding, it’s supported by 196 countries and was reaffirmed at the UN Biodiversity Summit (COP16), an indication of the strong lack of support for projects that are not “small scale” or “in a controlled setting.”  

The London Convention and the London Protocol focus on limiting dumping or disposal of wastes or other matter into marine waters. Whether mCDR approaches that add material to the ocean for carbon removal are considered dumping is a topic of continued debate. The Convention includes a list of materials that cannot be dumped. The Protocol is stricter and includes a list of material that can be dumped (with a permit) and prohibits dumping everything else, with limited carve-outs.

Following the 2008 CBD resolution, the parties to both the London Convention and the London Protocol passed a resolution agreeing that iron fertilization is within scope for both agreements, but that only legitimate scientific research is allowed. In 2010 the parties adopted a tool to determine if an activity constitutes legitimate scientific research. And in 2013, an amendment to the Protocol officially banned iron fertilization except for legitimate scientific research, and an annex to that amendment determined that additional marine geoengineering techniques could fall under the scope of the amendment in the future. Only six of the LP’s 55 parties have ratified the amendment so far — fewer than the two-thirds needed to enforce it. This amendment is one of few examples of governance specific to certain mCDR techniques, but the Protocol’s ability to more comprehensively govern mCDR is limited by its overall aim of limiting ocean dumping.

Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction is an agreement ratified under UNCLOS that opened for signature in 2023 and has not yet entered into force. Its objective is to create a comprehensive framework under UNCLOS to address sustainable use of biodiversity and conservation in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It does this through two mechanisms: environmental impact assessment and area-based management tools, such as marine protected areas that could be used to preclude mCDR testing in areas where no other existing international body has competency.

For environmental impact assessments, BBNJ includes more specific requirements than UNCLOS, such as assessing whether the planned activity will have “more than a minor…effect” on the marine environment and determining if the effects are not well understood. If either criterion is met, a screening process would determine whether an environmental impact assessment is needed. Since most mCDR methods have not been well studied, they would likely trigger this screening. Under BBNJ, a full environmental impact assessment would include the monitoring and reporting of economic, social, cultural and human health impacts. Following public comment of potentially affected parties, it would then be up to the state party with jurisdiction over the project to decide if it could go forward.

Aside from these legal frameworks, customary international law arises from established international practices and is generally binding on all states (unlike earlier frameworks which just apply to countries that are party to each agreement). Some aspects of customary international law are also enshrined in legal frameworks. For example, the “no harm rule” is included in the CBD, so parties to that agreement must adopt measures to enact these treaties domestically. The “no harm rule” means that all countries are obligated to prevent activities under their jurisdiction from causing significant harm to the territory of other countries and areas beyond the individual jurisdiction and control of countries, such as the high seas.

These legal frameworks are primarily designed to minimize harm, and mCDR approaches are intended to provide a net benefit to the climate while minimizing local harms. However, current legal frameworks are not designed to weigh that benefit against any harms introduced by the mCDR activity. In this way, current legal frameworks are not well suited to governing mCDR activities.

Applying International Legal Frameworks to mCDR in the High Seas 

Marine CDR activities in the high seas will be governed by the country that registered the vessel performing those activities or the country where it is loaded with material for the activities. Countries that are parties to international legal frameworks are obligated to create mechanisms to enforce them domestically. And in some cases, countries that are not parties also have domestic laws implementing these frameworks. For example, the United States is not a party to the London Protocol, but the U.S. EPA’s Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act is a domestic application of the London Protocol’s anti-dumping aims. While the regulation of activities in the high seas would fall under relevant national laws, how the regulation is approached would likely be influenced by ongoing discussions among parties to each legal framework. 

International framework governance of selected mCDR approachesApproachUNCLOSLC/LPCBDBBNJAll approachesGeneral provisions around protection of the marine environment and marine scientific research.General obligation of employing a precautionary approach. mCDR activities could be permissible if deemed to be for purposes other than mere disposal, to not run contrary to the aims of the LC/LP and to constitute “legitimate scientific research.”General provisions on identification and monitoring, and environmental impact assessments.

 

If passed, all approaches will be subject to spatial regulations established through area-based management tools and could be evaluated through environmental impact assessments.

Seaweed cultivation and sinkingRegulates the introduction of new or alien species. Relevant if using non-native species.Likely permissible, provided sinking of seaweed or any added nutrients to grow seaweed are not considered dumping.Could be considered “climate geoengineering,” but ban is non-binding and excludes small-scale scientific research.Nutrient fertilizationField tests for research could be permissible, but potential downstream impacts may violate “no-harm” principle under customary international law.Small-scale research could be permitted under the LC/LP if it doesn’t risk harming the marine environment. Large-scale application would likely be prohibited under the LP.Could be considered “climate geoengineering” but the ban is non-binding and excludes small-scale scientific research; requires case-by-case assessment.Ocean alkalinity enhancementField tests would be permissible if general obligations are met.Research projects could be permitted if they don’t risk harming the marine environment. Large-scale application would likely be prohibited under the LP.Activities would be permissible if general obligations of the CBD are met.What’s Next for International Governance of Marine CDR 

Marine CDR has the potential to provide large-scale carbon removal if, along with increased funding to address scientific knowledge gaps, governance frameworks can comprehensively regulate the new sector. This potential coincides with growing demand for legal clarity on country obligations to address climate change under international law. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea released an advisory opinion in May 2024 emphasizing the responsibility of countries under UNCLOS to prevent, reduce and control greenhouse gas emissions to protect the marine environment, and the International Court of Justice is likely to clarify similar obligations under broader treaties sometime this year. These opinions will dually guide countries’ responsibility to climate action and appropriate caution in mCDR implementation.

In 2025, discussions about these issues will continue under the London Protocol and the London Convention, scientific experts under the United Nations will propose a new framework to assess projects, and global forums like the UN Ocean Conference and Our Ocean Conference will convene ocean experts on topics including mCDR. The coming years will see countries advancing interdisciplinary research, including on the evaluation of social and environmental impacts, informed by emerging data-sharing and management guidelines. And, as individual projects move forward, transparent communication within and among countries on the impacts and benefits will provide a greater shared understanding for updating the relevant international governance frameworks to consider this potential climate solution.

Editor's Note: This article was first published on Feb. 10, 2025. We updated the first sentence of this article on April 7, 2025 to say the ocean absorbs 26% of CO2 emissions and to cite the latest data. The previous figure, 30%, only accounted for fossil fuel emissions, whereas 26% reflects all anthropogenic emissions. On June 4, 2025 we updated the article again to reflect the latest news and research.

scuba-diver-ocean-kelp.jpg Ocean carbon removal Climate climate change biodiversity Equity & Governance Ocean Type Technical Perspective Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Carbon Removal

Authors Katie Lebling Carolyn Savoldelli

4 Issues to Watch at the UN Ocean Conference wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 06/03/2025 - 09:39

The ocean covers more than 70% of our planet. It provides food for over 3 billion people, regulates the climate, sustains global economies and is a source of cultural identity for communities around the world. But it’s also under intense and mounting pressure from climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss.

It’s the ocean’s criticality that brings world leaders together for the third UN Ocean Conference (UNOC) in Nice, France from June 9th-13th.

Occurring every three years, UNOC invites world leaders, civil society, businesses and scientists to mobilize partnerships, commitments and solutions to address ocean challenges. The summit plays a vital role in activating international cooperation and securing progress for ocean health and resilience.

A major outcome is the Political Declaration proposed ahead of the conference and formally adopted at its end. While not legally binding, the Political Declaration sets the tone and ambition for global ocean action. It serves as a signal to governments, investors and civil society that ocean health is a political priority, and it helps mobilize support for new initiatives.

While there are undoubtedly some gaps in a consensus-based statement like this, the ocean community has placed a great deal of expectation on UNOC to deliver significant outcomes for sustainable development, climate change and biodiversity loss. In a year filled with opportunities for the ocean, the Nice summit could help reshape how we govern and invest in our ocean, ensuring it continues to support people and the planet for generations to come.

Here are the key areas that need to be addressed for the 2025 UN Ocean Conference to serve as a turning point for the ocean:

1) Scale Up Funding for Sustainable Development Goal 14.

The ocean economy is worth an estimated $2.5 trillion annually, with an asset value of $24 trillion. Yet Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14, Life Below Water, remains the most underfunded of all the SDGs, receiving less than 0.01% of all sustainable development funding. This is not an oversight, it’s a crisis.

This funding gap is holding back critical progress on marine conservation, fisheries reform, and the blue economy, where every $1 invested yields at least $5 in global benefits by 2050. Within a  sustainable ocean economy, employment could grow by 51 million jobs by 2050, reaching 184 million people globally.

What’s more is that what little finance does flow to the ocean often misses the people who need it most. Finance tools should prioritize equitable access, channeling support to Indigenous and local communities, small-scale fishers, and women-led initiatives, who are often on the frontlines of ocean stewardship and the ocean’s most pressing challenges.

UNOC and its preceding event, the Blue Economy and Finance Forum, presents a critical opportunity to establish and strengthen pathways for concrete public and private financial commitments to support SDG 14. Expectations are for announcements of new and scaled-up funding from Multilateral Development Banks, governments and private sector institutions, as well as investments in innovative finance tools such as blue bonds, blended finance and ocean-focused impact funds.

In anticipation, the UN released its Ocean Investment Protocol, which provides a framework on how to unlock private capital for the sustainable ocean economy. The guide outlines how financial institutions, (re)insurers, ocean industries, governments and development finance institutions can mobilize and scale ocean finance.

2) Cement the Ocean’s Role in Fighting Climate Change.

The ocean is often overlooked in climate negotiations, yet it holds enormous potential to help limit global warming. Research from the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy (Ocean Panel) shows that ocean-based climate solutions — including offshore renewable energy, sustainable shipping, protection and restoration of “blue carbon” ecosystems like mangroves and seagrasses, and more — could deliver up to 35% of the emissions reductions needed by 2050 to keep global temperature rise below 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F).

 

 

Despite this, ocean-based action remains largely absent from national climate commitments. UNOC must send a clear message ahead of COP30 in Belém, Brazil: We cannot meet our climate goals without fully integrating ocean action into national and global climate strategies.

Countries should see Nice as an opportunity to commit to including ocean-based mitigation and adaptation measures in their next round of national climate plans (known as Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs), due by the end of this year. WRI published guidance on this, and there will be a series of events in Nice looking ahead to COP30.   

3) Accelerate Movement on International Goals and Treaties.

The High Seas Treaty, adopted in 2023, was a historic breakthrough for ocean governance. It provides the first-ever legal framework to protect biodiversity in the high seas — the two-thirds of the ocean that lie beyond national jurisdiction.

But for the treaty to take effect, it needs to be ratified by at least 60 countries. To date, fewer than 30 have done so.

UNOC is a strategic opportunity to drive ratification, which is also critical to achieving international goals like the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework to protect 30% of the ocean and land by 2030 (30x30). While the UNOC is not a formal deadline for achieving the 60 ratifications required for the High Seas Treaty to enter into force, the treaty is open for signature until September 20, 2025, with activities in Nice serving as one of the last opportunities for widespread movement on the issue. Without action on the high seas, the 30x30 target will be nearly impossible to meet.

A vibrant coral reef off the coast of Fiji. The nation is one of several developing a Sustainable Ocean Plan. Photo by Ernie Hounshell/Shutterstock 4) Champion 100% Sustainable Ocean Management.

Management of the ocean must be as interconnected as the ocean itself. Protecting 30% is essential — but for those protections to be effective, the other 70% must be sustainably managed. This includes bringing national waters (which make up around 40% of the ocean) under holistic sustainable management. This approach has long been championed by WRI. It was included in the proposed Nice Political Declaration,  but still must be formally adopted at the conference.

A growing number of nations, including Norway, Fiji and Indonesia, have or are in the middle of developing Sustainable Ocean Plans (SOPs) that reflect this vision. These plans serve as a unifying umbrella for ocean-related governance and a policy framework that facilitates holistic and sustainable use of the ocean. WRI’s 100% Alliance campaign calls on all coastal and ocean states to unite in the commitment to 100% sustainable ocean management and provide the technical and financial assistance needed to develop SOPs.

A Strong Outcome at the UN Ocean Conference Can Lay the Groundwork for Climate and Biodiversity Gains

Too often, global efforts on climate, biodiversity and the ocean operate in silos. But these crises and their solutions are deeply interconnected. A healthy ocean is essential for a stable climate, rich biodiversity and resilient coastal economies.

A strong outcome from the UN Ocean Conference can help lay the groundwork for climate and biodiversity gains through the UN Climate Conference (COP30) in November 2025 and the Biodiversity COP17 in 2026. Momentum at UNOC can help ensure that the ocean takes its place as a unifying force that helps overcome our planet’s greatest challenges.

To get there, leaders must bring urgency and ambition— linking ocean action to climate commitments, backing it with finance, and embedding it in a broader vision for resilience. A thriving, sustainable ocean economy is not just a “nice-to-have;” it’s essential for a more prosperous future where people and nature thrive.

madagascar-fishermen.jpg Ocean Climate biodiversity Finance Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy

Authors Tom Pickerell

RELEASE: WRI Study Finds Climate Adaptation Investments Yield Massive Returns — Over $10 for Every $1 Spent darla.vanhoorn… Tue, 06/03/2025 - 03:24

Washington, D.C. (June 3, 2025) — As climate hazards like floods and wildfires intensify — and global financial resources grow tighter — a new study by World Resources Institute (WRI) presents powerful evidence that bolstering funding for adaptation and resilience is not only urgent but also one of the smartest development investments available today. 

The study, which analyzed 320 adaptation and resilience investments across 12 countries totaling $133 billion, finds that every $1 invested in adaptation and resilience generates more than $10 in benefits over ten years. This translates to potential returns of over $1.4 trillion, with average returns of 27%. 

Some sectors record even greater returns. Health sector investments, for example, are projected to deliver returns of over 78%, driven by the high benefits of protecting lives from climate-related impacts like heat stress, malaria and dengue fever. Investments in disaster risk management, such as early warning systems, also showed exceptionally high returns derived from safeguarding lives and infrastructure. 

The study defines adaptation investments as those aimed at reducing or managing physical climate risks, such as climate-smart agriculture, expanded health services and urban flood protection. However, in many cases, the resulting development and social benefits matched or exceeded the avoided losses from climate impacts.  

“This research has pried open the lid on what resilience is truly worth — and even that first glimpse is staggering", said Sam Mugume Koojo, Co-Chair of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action from Uganda. “It's time for leaders to recognize climate adaptation is not just a safety net but a launch pad for development.” 

WRI evaluated projects based on three key types of returns (commonly referred to as the “triple dividend of resilience”): avoided losses from climate disasters; induced economic gains (e.g. job creation and increased crop yields); and broader social and environmental benefits (e.g. improved health systems, biodiversity). On average, benefits were fairly evenly distributed across all three types. Yet only 8% of investment appraisals estimated the full monetized values of these dividends — suggesting that actual rates of return are substantially underestimated in economic assessments of most adaptation investments. 

Benefits beyond avoiding climate shocks 

While adaptation investments have traditionally focused on reducing climate vulnerability and strengthening the resilience of investments, the study finds that over 50% of their documented benefits occur even if climate-related disasters do not happen.  

Infrastructure built to better manage extreme weather events may provide year-round value: irrigation systems can support diverse cropping patterns and evacuation centers may double as community hubs. Nature-based solutions — such as watershed, wetland and coastal protections — frequently provide added ecological and recreational benefits. 

These findings demonstrate that investing in adaptation is not just a protective measure — it also helps advance countries’ broader development priorities and sustainable development goals. 

“One of our most striking findings is that adaptation projects aren’t just paying off when disasters happen — they generate value every day through more jobs, better health and stronger local economies," said Carter Brandon, Senior Fellow, WRI. “That’s a major mind shift: policymakers don’t need a disaster to justify resilience — it’s simply smart development.” 

Adaptation investments also cut carbon and protect nature 

Nearly half of the analyzed adaptation investments are also expected to cut greenhouse gas emissions, showing that adaptation and mitigation often go hand in hand. This overlap could open the door to greater climate finance from investors focused on lowering emissions.  

The strongest examples of this win-win were found in energy, forestry, transport, cities and agriculture sectors. Many of these projects use nature-based solutions that sequester carbon and deliver ecological benefits, such as urban tree planting to reduce heat or stabilizing hillsides to reduce erosion. 

Recommendations for policymakers 

Based on these findings, WRI recommends that government leaders treat adaptation as an engine for economic opportunity and fully integrate resilience into national development strategies. The paper also calls for a standardized approach to measuring and reporting adaptation outcomes, which would improve investments' comparability, transparency and accountability.  

The study builds on the Adapt Now report released by WRI and the Global Commission on Adaptation in 2019 and was prompted by the G20 and the government of Brazil's interest in better evidence of economic benefits from investing in resilience.

“This evidence gives leaders and non-State actors exactly what they need heading into COP30: a clear economic case for scaling adaptation,” said Dan Ioschpe, Climate High-Level Champion for COP30.  “Belém must become a turning point – mainstreaming resilience into national and local priorities and unlocking the full potential of non-state actors' leadership.” 

About World Resources Institute 
WRI is a trusted partner for change. Using research-based approaches, we work globally and in focus countries to meet people’s essential needs; to protect and restore nature; and to stabilize the climate and build resilient communities. We aim to fundamentally transform the way the world produces and uses food and energy and designs its cities to create a better future for all.  Founded in 1982, WRI has nearly 2,000 staff around the world, with country offices in Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the United States, and regional offices in Africa and Europe. 

Climate Resilience Asia Africa Latin America North America Type Press Release Exclude From Blog Feed? 0

The Compelling Business Case for Climate Adaptation margaret.overh… Tue, 06/03/2025 - 00:01

Download

Extreme weather events like floods and droughts are becoming more frequent and intense around the globe, disrupting communities and the infrastructure they rely on. In 2024 alone, the world endured 58 disasters that wreaked over a billion dollars in damages each. Yet finance to cope with and respond to these impacts falls persistently short: The gap between funding needed to adapt to climate change and what is currently available is as high as $359 billion per year.

Part of the reason is that adaptation measures, such as strengthening early warning systems or making infrastructure more resilient, are seen only as a way to avoid potential losses — not as a broader investment opportunity. But this underestimates the true value of adaptation and the returns it can bring.

New WRI research finds that investing $1 in adaptation can yield more than $10.50 in benefits over 10 years. This reflects not only the avoided losses from climate impacts, but also a wide range of economic, social and environmental benefits that are generated even when disasters don't occur.

In other words, adaptation is not just a crucial response to the climate crisis; it is also one of the smartest investments of our time.

The 'Triple Dividend' of Adaptation Investments

In a new paper, Strengthening the Investment Case for Climate Adaptation, WRI analyzed investments in 320 adaptation and resilience projects spanning agriculture, water, health and infrastructure. These ranged from upgrading food storage facilities in Bangladesh to improving water management in Brazil.

Cumulatively, the investments we analyzed cost over $133 billion and are expected to generate $1.4 trillion in benefits over 10 years. Individual investments were estimated to generate an impressive average return of 27%.

Moreover, many of the benefits expected from these investments were neither monetized nor included in the projected returns because they are difficult to model and quantify. Researchers found that only 8% of investment appraisals estimated the full monetized values of these dividends — suggesting that the $1.4 trillion and the average rate of return are likely substantial underestimates.

So, where do these returns come from? Our research used the "triple dividend of resilience" framework to capture three key categories of returns on adaptation investments: avoided losses, induced economic development, and additional social and environmental benefits. We found that adaptation projects often have benefits evenly distributed across all three dividends — and generate higher rates of return than commonly assumed.

Consider an urban infrastructure project in Vietnam that aims to reduce flooding and improve water drainage. When estimating the return on this project, many models would consider only the avoided cost of flood damage. But investments in resilient infrastructure could also increase average land prices; decrease healthcare costs by reducing waterborne diseases; and boost workers' productivity by reducing travel time, thanks to new and improved roads. The triple dividend framework would account for all these outcomes, offering a more complete picture of the value that adaptation and resilience projects can bring.

Good Adaptation Is Good Development

Part of the challenge with funding adaptation is that it's often seen as an unaffordable, incremental cost that competes with other national development priorities. But the triple dividend framework reveals that the two often go hand in hand. In many of the investments we analyzed, adaptation efforts are key to unlocking resilient development.

Health

Adaptation investments in the health sector offer some of the highest returns of those we analyzed, averaging over 78%. This is because investing in more resilient health systems can save lives, improve public health and bolster economic productivity, especially among vulnerable populations.

For example, the Social and Economic Inclusion Project in Kenya targeted drought-prone regions, where climate shocks deepen poverty and vulnerability. Children are particularly affected: Droughts lead to increased levels of malnutrition and stunted growth, blocking them from reaching their full development potential.

Kenya's project aimed to address these issues by offering cash transfers and nutritional counseling during droughts, or by deploying community health workers to remote areas affected by climate hazards. It also looked to expand access to healthcare services more broadly, which in turn would boost productivity and learning outcomes among poor and vulnerable households. This is expected to bring significant development gains on top of avoided losses, making the project a model for health-centered adaptation.

Disaster risk management

Investments in disaster risk management also deliver high returns — nearly 36% on average — by safeguarding lives and infrastructure while minimizing economic disruption. This is particularly true of cost-effective tools like early warning systems.

A farmer in Sunamganj, Bangladesh harvests rice paddy from a flooded field after torrential rains in 2022. The Sunamganj district is included in pilot adaptation project to improve weather information services and help farmers better manage climate risks. Photo by ZUMA Press Inc/Alamy Stock Photo

In Bangladesh, the Weather and Climate Services Regional Project piloted a community-level early warning system for flash floods, thunderstorms and droughts in four districts: Netrakona, Sunamganj, Rajshahi and Naogaon. It also set up an online information portal as well as physical kiosks and display boards to provide farmers with easier access to weather and water-related information. This is expected to help farmers better manage climate risks and protect their livelihoods — not only avoiding weather-related losses but also boosting their incomes in the long-term.

Sustainable agriculture and forestry

Adaptation returns in the agriculture and forestry sector average over 29%, largely driven by developmental gains like higher yields and productivity, as well as environmental benefits.

Ethiopia's Resilient Landscapes and Livelihoods Project restored degraded landscapes in selected watersheds through measures such as hillside terraces and tree planting. At the same time, it trained communities in sustainable farming and grazing practices. Together, these measures could improve soil health, reduce erosion and enhance watersheds, making the area more resilient to floods and droughts while also improving crop and livestock production.

Resilient infrastructure

Projects focused on resilient energy, cities and transport systems offer wide-ranging benefits, with an average return on investment of close to 30%.

For example, the Sustainable Urban Development Project in Fortaleza, Brazil, restored natural wetlands in Rachel de Quieroz Park to help soak up and hold stormwater. This buffers surrounding neighborhoods from floods while enhancing biodiversity. It also created new public spaces and revitalized existing green areas, which can attract more visitors and businesses, raise property values, and improve water quality and living conditions. Crucially, the project emphasized social benefits for women, who make up most of Fortaleza's population and are overrepresented in its low-income neighborhoods.

Water

Managing water is fundamental to climate resilience. Worsening storms and floods inundate entire cities; crippling droughts parch farmland; and intensifying climate risks threaten water supplies. In our study, water-related projects saw 19% returns on average — although this does not fully capture the range of benefits from investing in the water sector, which are often difficult to measure and quantify.

The Transformative Riverine Management Project in Durban, South Africa, is leveraging nature-based solutions, such as creating and rehabilitating wetlands, to address water risks. This generates benefits across all three dividends: It reduces flood-related losses by improving water absorption. It yields economic benefits, such as creating new jobs and increasing food production and bioenergy generation. It also brings social and environmental benefits, like reducing erosion, improving local water quality, sequestering planet-warming carbon and creating spaces to enjoy the outdoors. The estimated benefits from this project are valued at nearly six times the project cost.

People cross a flooded river in Durban, South Africa in 2022. Durban is working to restore and rehabilitate its rivers; a project that will mitigate flood risks while also boosting the local economy and revitalizing crucial ecosystems. Photo by Big Red Digital Media/Shutterstock Adaptation Yields High Returns Even when Disasters Don't Strike

Although adaptation investments are primarily designed to avoid climate-related losses, their economic, social and environmental benefits accrue even when climate disasters don't strike. In fact, over 65% of the monetized benefits in our study were unrelated to expected climate shocks — from job creation and productivity gains to healthier communities and environments.

In many cases, these broader development gains matched or exceeded the value of avoided losses.

For example, China's Hubei Yichang Rural Green Development Project seeks to modernize the agricultural sector in Yichang Municipality by investing in modern agricultural practices and technology; installing treatment systems for agricultural waste and water; and improving climate-resilient rural infrastructure, such as building more efficient irrigation systems and better drainage. The projected productivity and resilience gains from these efforts surpass the amount that could be saved through avoided flood losses.

Adaptation Investments Also Curb Emissions

While our study largely focused on the triple dividend of adaptation investments, the benefits don't stop there.

Climate mitigation — efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and curb temperature rise — has historically been siloed from adaptation in international climate negotiations and policy planning. The two are often viewed as competing priorities, vying for limited climate finance.

However, nearly half of the adaptation investments we analyzed helped to lower GHG emissions, revealing untapped opportunities to align strategies and unlock more finance. This shows that investing in adaptation can be a powerful tool to help curb temperature rise while also building resilience against future risks.

The Heritage Colombia Project, for example, is working to restore forest ecosystems in degraded areas and improve land and forest management: two strategies that can increase natural carbon removal. The value of these GHG emissions reductions is estimated at $1.45 billion — topping the estimated value of avoided losses ($1.2 billion) and significantly larger than the $31 million estimated in other social and environmental benefits.

Unlocking Adaptation's Full Value

Looking at the full picture puts adaptation in a new light. Our research challenges the mindset that adaptation is a financial burden, pulling limited funds from other priorities. It proves that it is often much more profitable to adapt than not to do so — and that good adaptation is, in fact, good development.

But despite a compelling investment case, the adaptation finance gap remains.

More work is needed to build on these learnings and further demystify adaptation's contribution to development goals. Improving the data collection, monitoring and evaluation systems for adaptation investments — both before and after implementation — can deepen our understanding of their diverse benefits. More evidence on the realized impacts of adaptation investments, coupled with improved cost-benefit methodologies, could help refine our understanding of their benefits across all three dividends and attract additional finance from more diverse sources.

The adaptation finance gap isn't just a shortfall — it's a missed opportunity. Every year of delay leaves communities exposed to escalating climate risks and foregoes significant economic, social and environmental benefits from resilient development. It's time for governments and development partners to make one of the smartest investments for both people and the planet.

rice-planting Climate adaptation adaptation finance Climate Resilience development Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Climate Adaptation and Resilience
• Adaptation Finance and Investment

Authors Carter Brandon Bradley Kratzer Aarushi Aggarwal Harald Heubaum Celine Novenario

Are Countries’ New Climate Plans Ambitious Enough? What We Know So Far margaret.overh… Mon, 06/02/2025 - 08:00

2025 is a pivotal moment for climate action. Countries are submitting new climate commitments, otherwise known as "Nationally Determined Contributions" or "NDCs," that will shape the trajectory of global climate progress through 2035.

These new commitments will show how boldly countries plan to cut their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, transform their economies, and strengthen resilience to growing threats like extreme weather, wildfires and floods. Collectively, they will determine how far the world goes toward limiting global temperature rise and avoiding the worst climate impacts.

A few countries, such as the U.S., U.K. and Brazil, have already put forward new climate plans — and their ambition is a mixed bag. But it's still early: Many more countries, including major emitters like the EU and China, have yet to reveal their NDCs and are expected to do so in the coming months.

We analyzed the initial submissions for a snapshot of how countries' climate plans are shaping up so far and what they reveal about the road ahead.

Where the World Stands on Curbing Climate Change Today

A decade ago, the world was headed toward 3.7-4.8 degrees C (6.7-8.6 degrees F) of warming by 2100, threatening catastrophic weather, devastating biodiversity loss and widespread economic disruptions. In response, the Paris Agreement set a global goal: limit temperature rise to well below 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) and strive to limit it to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), thresholds scientists say can significantly lessen climate hazards. Though some impacts are inevitable — with extreme heat, storms, fires and floods already worsening — lower levels of warming dramatically reduce their severity. Every fraction of a degree matters.

To keep the Paris Agreement's temperature goals within reach, countries agreed to submit new NDCs every five years. These national plans detail how (and how much) each country will cut emissions, how they'll adapt to climate impacts like droughts and rising seas, and what support they'll need to deliver on those efforts. 

Countries have gone through two rounds of NDCs so far, in 2015 and 2020-2021, with their commitments extending through 2030. 

While the latest NDCs cut emissions more deeply than those from 2015, they still fall short of the ambition needed to hold warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees C. If fully implemented (including measures that require international support), they could bring down projected warming to 2.6-2.8 degrees C (4.7-5 degrees F). And without stronger policies to meet countries' targets, the world could be heading for a far more dangerous 3.1 degrees C (5.6 degrees F) of warming by 2100.

Now the third round is underway, with countries expected to set climate targets through 2035.

These new NDCs are expected to reflect the outcomes of the 2023 Global Stocktake, which was the first comprehensive assessment of global climate progress under the Paris Agreement. In addition to bigger emissions cuts in line with holding warming to 1.5 degrees C, the Stocktake called on countries to act swiftly in areas that matter most for addressing the climate crisis — especially fossil fuels, renewables, transport and forests — and to do more to build resilience to climate impacts.

2025 NDCs are also an opportunity to align near-term climate action with longer-term goals. Over 100 countries have already pledged to reach net-zero emissions, most by around mid-century. Their new NDCs should chart a course toward achieving this.

How Many Countries Have Submitted New NDCs? 

Under the Paris Agreement's timeline, 2025 NDCs were technically due in February. As of late May, only a small proportion of countries had submitted them, covering around a quarter of global emissions.

These early movers include a diverse mix of developed and developing nations from different regions and economic backgrounds.

Among the G20 — the world's largest GHG emitters — only five countries submitted new NDCs so far: Canada, Brazil, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom. (Since submitting its NDC, the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.)

Several smaller and highly climate-vulnerable countries have also stepped forward, including Ecuador and Uruguay in Latin America; Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe in Africa; and island states such as Singapore, the Marshall Islands and the Maldives.

That means close to 90% of countries have yet to submit their new NDCs.

There are several reasons for this. The last round of NDCs was pushed back by a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, giving countries only four years to prepare new plans. Geopolitical tensions, ongoing conflicts and security concerns have further complicated progress. Many smaller developing nations are also facing capacity constraints as they work to complete biennial climate progress reports and new national adaptation plans (NAPs), also due this year.

Most countries are now expected to present their new NDCs by the UN General Assembly in September.

How Much Have New NDCs Reduced the Emissions Gap?

Compared to previous targets, the NDCs submitted so far have made a noticeable but modest dent in the 2035 "emissions gap": the difference between where emissions need to be in 2035 to align with 1.5 degrees C and where they're expected to be under countries' new climate plans.

If fully implemented, new NDCs are projected to reduce emissions by 1.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) by 2035 when compared to 2030. Looking only at unconditional NDCs (those that don't require international support), this leaves a remaining emissions gap of 29.5 GtCO2e to hold warming to 1.5 degrees C. When conditional NDCs (those that do require international support) are included, this gap shrinks to 26.1 GtCO2e.

Much of the progress in narrowing the gap comes from major emitters that have already submitted new NDCs — most notably the U.S., Japan and Brazil. Given their large emissions profiles, their new commitments account for the majority of the reductions seen so far.

Explore the NDC Tracker

Use the NDC tracker on Climate Watch to monitor new NDC submissions as they come in and see how much they could reduce emissions if fully achieved.

While this marks progress, it's far from what's needed to keep global warming within safe limits. Getting on track to 1.5 or even 2 degrees C would require much steeper cuts than what's currently on the table.

However, this is not the full picture.

Many of the world's largest emitters have yet to submit their 2035 targets. The remaining G20 countries alone account for about two-thirds of global GHG emissions. This makes their forthcoming NDCs especially important: The scale and ambition of these commitments could meaningfully narrow the emissions gap — or, if they fall short, leave the world locked into a trajectory that puts global temperature targets out of reach.

Emissions-reduction targets put forward by major emitters so far:Country​Reference Year​Previous 2030 Emissions-Reduction Target​New 2035 Emissions-Reduction Targets​Net-Zero Target Year​Brazil​2005​53.1%​59%-67%​2050​Canada​2005​40%-45%​45%-50%​2050​Japan​2013​46%​60%​2050​United Kingdom​1990​68%​81%​2050​United States2005​50%-52%​61%-66%​2050​How Do Specific Countries' Climate Plans Stack Up?

Among the countries that have submitted new NDCs so far, the United Kingdom stands out for its ambitious climate trajectory. Following the recommendations of its Climate Change Committee, the U.K. has set a bold target to reduce emissions 81% by 2035 from 1990 levels. This rapid decline in the coming decade would put the country on track toward its net zero goal by 2050, based on realistic rates of technology deployment and ambitious but achievable shifts in consumer and business behavior.

Other countries, such as Japan and the United States, have opted for a "linear" approach toward net zero — meaning if they drew a straight line to their net-zero target (for example, 0 GtCO2e in 2050), their 2030 and 2035 targets would fall along it, reflecting a constant decline in emissions each year. Japan aims to cut emissions 60% from 2013 levels by 2035, while the United States has pledged a 61%-66% reduction from 2005 levels by 2035.

Despite the U.S. withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, undermining climate policies and attempting to dismantle key government institutions, its NDC target may still provide a framework for climate action at the state, city and local levels, as well as for future administrations. Many of these entities have already rallied around the new NDC and are committed to making progress toward its targets.

However, the linear approach Japan and the U.S. are taking to emissions reductions — as opposed to a steeper decline this decade — risks using up a larger share of the world's carbon budget earlier and compromising global temperature targets.

Brazil presented a broader range of emissions targets in its NDC, committing to a 59%-67% reduction by 2035 from 2005 levels. These two poles represent a marked difference in ambition: A 67% reduction could put Brazil on track for climate neutrality by 2050, while a 59% reduction falls short of what's needed to meet that goal. It is unclear which trajectory the government intends to pursue, leaving Brazil's true ambition in question. The NDC also omits carbon budgets for specific sectors (such as energy, transport or agriculture), which would clarify how it plans to meet its overarching emissions goals. However, Brazil committed within its NDC to develop further plans outlining how each sector will contribute to its 2035 target.

Elsewhere, Canada made only a marginal increase to its target, shifting from a 40%-45% emissions reduction by 2030 to 45%-50% by 2035 from 2005 levels. This falls short of the recommendation from Canada's own Net-Zero Advisory Body, which called for a 50%-55% reduction by 2035 — and warned that anything below 50% risks derailing progress toward the country's legislated net-zero goal by 2050. While every increase in ambition counts, such incremental changes do not match the urgent pace of progress needed among developed and wealthy economies like Canada.

Related

• What Would Ambitious Climate Commitments Look Like for the World's Top Emitters?

What Trends Are Emerging Among NDCs Submitted So Far?

Several early trends are starting to emerge among the new NDCs. While these initial submissions offer valuable insights, they don't yet reflect the full picture; deeper analysis will be needed as more NDCs come in throughout the year.

1) Nearly all new NDCs include 2035 mitigation measures, with many setting economy-wide emissions-reduction targets.

Almost all of the 22 NDCs submitted thus far include 2035 mitigation measures. The exception is Zambia, which reiterated its previous 2030 pledges in a provisional NDC (although this may still be revised to include 2035 mitigation measures).

Of the other 21 submissions, 20 countries expressed their 2035 targets as emissions-reduction goals. The exception was Cuba, which instead committed to increasing renewable electricity generation to 26% and improving energy efficiency by 2035.

Seventeen of the 20 countries with emissions-reduction goals set economy-wide reduction targets for 2035, as encouraged by the Global Stocktake, covering all sectors and greenhouse gases. The remaining few — smaller developing countries such as the Maldives and Nepal — submitted targets that cover only specific sectors or gases.

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries are required to submit economy-wide targets, while developing countries are encouraged to work toward them over time. In Nepal's case, for instance, a lack of comprehensive data limited its ability to define an economy-wide target or fully assess the impact of its policies.

2) Most countries did not strengthen their 2030 targets.

Despite clear scientific evidence and UN decisions urging stronger 2030 targets, only four countries — Saint Lucia, Nepal, Moldova and Montenegro — have strengthened their 2030 emissions pledges. For example, Montenegro revised its emissions-reduction target from 35% to 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and set a 60% emissions-reduction target by 2035. 

Notably, none of the wealthier, high-emitting and more developed countries have strengthened their 2030 targets — despite having the greatest capacity and responsibility to take the lead on slashing emissions.

3) Countries are increasingly prioritizing adaptation.

In the face of worsening climate impacts, 16 of the 22 countries that have submitted new NDCs strengthened their adaptation commitments — continuing a trend seen in previous rounds. Countries are prioritizing adaptation across sectors such as food and water systems, public health and nature-based solutions.

Canadian firefighters in 2021. After being ravaged by wildfires in recent years, Canada's new national climate plan puts an emphasis on climate adaptation and disaster resilience. Photo by nathan4847/iStock

Ecuador, which is particularly vulnerable to heavy rainfall and floods, prioritized action to build resilience of its water resources, human health and settlements, as well as its natural heritage. Some developed countries are also prioritizing adaptation action in their NDCs. Canada, which has witnessed devastating wildfires in recent years, cited its National Adaptation Strategy, which provides a framework for disaster resilience, biodiversity, public health and infrastructure.

4) Countries are recognizing the importance of subnational action.

Some countries' NDCs also recognize the critical role that subnational actors — such as cities, states and regions — play in shaping and delivering climate action.

Eleven of the newly submitted NDCs come from countries that have endorsed the Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships (CHAMP). The CHAMP initiative — launched in 2023 by the COP28 Presidency, in partnership with Bloomberg Philanthropies and with the support of WRI and other partners — aims to strengthen collaboration between national and subnational governments on climate planning and implementation. As part of this commitment, 75 countries pledged to consult with and integrate subnational priorities and needs into their NDCs. Of the 11 endorsing countries that have submitted new NDCs, four explicitly mentioned CHAMP.

Brazil's NDC in particular recognizes the critical role subnational governments play in delivering national climate goals. Referred to as "climate federalism," it highlights an instrument designed to support the integration of climate action into planning and decision-making across all levels of government: federal, state and municipal.

How Are Countries Addressing Key Areas like Energy, Forestry and Transport?

As countries submit new NDCs for the first time since the Global Stocktake in 2023, a clearer picture is emerging of how governments are embedding sector-specific action into their new climate plans. From detailed emissions-reduction targets to broader policy frameworks, most NDCs are setting out concrete steps to cut emissions across sectors that largely drive climate change, such as energy, transport and forestry.

Some countries — such as Switzerland, the UAE, Kenya and Zimbabwe — have included sector-specific emissions-reduction targets directly in their NDCs. Switzerland's targets, for instance are aligned with its Climate and Innovation Act, with plans to cut emissions by 66% in buildings, 41% in transport and 42.5% in industry by 2035 compared to 1990 levels. Kenya, on the other hand, has set an ambitious target to achieve 100% renewable electricity generation in the national grid by 2035.

Others, like the United Kingdom, Brazil, Singapore, the Marshall Islands and Canada, have focused on elaborating national policies and strategies that respond to the Global Stocktake's priority areas. The U.K.'s NDC highlighted its Clean Power 2030 Action Plan to fully decarbonize electricity by 2030; the Warm Homes Plan to boost energy efficiency in residential buildings; and reaffirmed its plans for phasing out internal combustion engine vehicles by 2030.

Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, Brazil, is car-free on Sundays to allow for more pedestrians and cyclists. Brazil has promised to submit new sectoral plans laying out what it will do in specific areas, like transport, to meet its broader climate goals. Photo by William Rodrigues dos Santos/Alamy Stock Photo

Countries such as Brazil and New Zealand have committed to developing detailed sectoral strategies as a next step to support NDC implementation. Brazil plans to update its national climate strategy by mid-2025, breaking it down into 16 sectoral adaptation plans and seven mitigation plans. New Zealand committed to publishing its emissions-reduction plan for 2031-2035 in 2029, which will set out sectoral mitigation strategies to help deliver on its NDC.

As more countries prepare to submit their new NDCs, attention will focus on whether they follow the trend of outlining sector-specific actions to meet their broader emissions targets. In particular, the spotlight will be on how countries plan to contribute to the transition away from fossil fuels — the single largest driver of the climate crisis.

Related

• Learn More About How Countries Can Incorporate Sectoral Targets into NDCs

Looking Ahead, All Eyes Are on 3 Major Emitters

We have yet to see new NDCs from many major emitters, including the European Union, China and India. All three have demonstrated climate leadership in various ways, and their actions will set the tone for future climate efforts. While these three are in the spotlight, attention will also be on other key countries — such as Indonesia, Mexico and Australia -— that are critical to reducing the global emissions gap.

European Union

The EU is still working to set a 2035 emissions target for its new NDC, which will hinge on its longer-term 2040 target. Last year, the European Commission recommended cutting emissions 90% by 2040 — a move that's seen as beneficial for enhancing industrial competitiveness in clean technologies, strengthening energy security and cutting energy costs. Some EU member states have suggested following a linear trajectory between the 2030 and 2040 targets, which would imply a 72.5% reduction by 2035 if the 90% target for 2040 gets adopted.

However, European member states have yet to adopt the 90% target. Ongoing discussions could see the EU's target weakened to address concerns from heavy industry and agriculture. The delay in finalizing the EU's 2040 target is also putting its NDC timeline at risk, raising the possibility of missing the expected September submission date.

China

As the world's largest emitter, China's NDC will be critical to keeping global temperature goals within reach. The country has already made major strides in clean energy, leading the world in solar power and electric vehicle deployment. However, a surge in coal plant approvals post-pandemic has raised concerns about its path toward net zero by 2060.

China's 2035 emission target will be the first in a post-peak emissions context. Studies aligned with 1.5 degrees C and China's net-zero pledge suggest the need for sharper cuts by 2030 and continued deep reductions through 2035. In this context, some research suggests that China could reduce CO2 emissions 30% by 2035 (compared to 2020) on the way to achieve its net zero target by 2060.

President Xi Jinping announced in April that China will submit its updated NDC ahead of the UN climate summit (COP30) this November, covering all sectors and greenhouse gases. This marks a notable shift for the country: Its previous NDCs covered only CO2, but China's non-CO2 emissions alone place it among the world's top 10 emitters.

India

Unlike other major economies, India has some of the lowest per capita emissions, and its national emissions are still growing as the country works to eradicate poverty and achieve development goals. This means its emissions are not expected to decline by 2035, though some studies suggest earlier declines are needed. Rapid advances in renewable energy and clean technology offer a significant opportunity for the country to accelerate its low-carbon transition while also ensuring energy security and economic competitiveness.

Strengthening renewable energy commitments in India's next NDC — building upon its domestic target of 500 GW by 2030 — could chart a pathway for sustainable growth, while also delivering co-benefits like cleaner air and enhanced energy security.

What's Next for NDCs?

The UN climate change body (UNFCCC) will release an NDC synthesis report ahead of this year's COP30 climate summit, assessing the collective impact of the new pledges submitted to that point. While this report will solidify where we're headed in relation to the Paris Agreement's temperature goals, the storyline is already clear: New NDCs will not put the world on track to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C.

The emissions gap is likely to remain dangerously wide, and the report will reaffirm what we already know — that much greater ambition and action are needed. Still, the findings will serve as a key input for this year's climate conference, where countries will decide on next steps to narrow that gap. They must address what comes after NDCs, grappling with how to turn ambition into action and keep a safer future within reach.

Ultimately, putting forward strong plans — and fulfilling them — are essential levers: not only for limiting warming, but for safeguarding the health, prosperity and security of current and future generations.

Editor’s note: A correction was made on June 3, 2025 to reflect an update in the underlying data. New conditional NDCs are estimated to reduce emissions by 1.4 GtCO2e by 2035 rather than 1.5 GtCO2e.

solar-installation Climate NDC climate change climate policy National Climate Action Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Next Generation NDCs
• National Climate Action
• Tracking and Strengthening Climate Action

Authors Jamal Srouji

Collaboration Among China, Europe and Africa Can Power Africa’s Energy Transition alicia.cypress… Fri, 05/30/2025 - 08:15

As the climate crisis intensifies, transitioning to sustainable energy has emerged as a pivotal focus of global efforts. Outdated and fragile energy systems impede countries and regions from increasing energy access and affordability, improving air pollution and living standards, and driving industrialization and modernization.

Since the international Paris Agreement on climate change was signed in 2015, global renewable energy investments have nearly tripled. However, these investments are predominantly concentrated in developed countries, leaving developing countries with a need of approximately $1.7 trillion annually in renewable energy investments. In 2022, foreign direct investment to developing countries only covered 32% of this need.

At the heart of the global climate agenda is Africa, a continent of immense potential with abundant renewable energy resources, a growing youth population and vast natural capital. However, it is also one of the most vulnerable regions to the negative impacts of climate change. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to nearly 80% of the world’s population without access to electricity, yet in 2022, the continent received only 1% of global renewable energy. Addressing Africa's energy challenges and accelerating its transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy are crucial for global climate action.

As Africa’s key trading and investment partners, China and the European Union can play an important role in supporting the continent’s energy transition. Since the early 21st century, both China and the EU have built upon their existing ties with Africa to establish and strengthen new forms of cooperation with energy as a critical area of focus.

Africa is embracing the energy transition and taking advantage of its abundant natural resources, such as sunlight, to install solar panels that power water pumps used for irrigation in Malawi. Photo by Joerg Boethling / Alamy Stock Photo. Charting Future Collaborative Pathways

China and Africa have engaged in extensive cooperation across trade, infrastructure, transportation and energy, contributing to sustainable development and local capacity building efforts. For the past 15 years, China has already been Africa's largest trading partner and remains the largest developing country investor in the region. At the 2024 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), both sides elevated and strengthened their partnership. Under collaborative frameworks like FOCAC, the China-Africa Union Energy Partnership and the South-South Cooperation on Climate Change, numerous projects have incorporated renewable energy objectives. The ongoing Africa Solar Belt program, for example, underscores this commitment, with China pledging at least 100 million yuan (about $14 million) in public funds from 2024 to 2027 to power 50,000 households in Africa with off-grid solar systems.

 The EU, through the Africa-EU Partnership and agreements with the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), is working to shift from a traditional “donor-recipient” relationship with Africa toward a more equal partnership. In its latest Africa strategy and external energy policy, the EU prioritizes green transition and energy access as core objectives. Under its Global Gateway Initiative, the EU launched the Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative (AEGEI), aiming for at least 50 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity in Africa by 2030 as part of a 150 billion euro (about $170 million) investment plan, helping address energy access challenges for at least 100 million people. Additionally, many European countries have established bilateral partnerships with countries in Africa.

These commitments reflect a growing recognition of Africa’s crucial role in the global energy transition. However, meeting this moment requires confronting the scale and complexity of Africa’s own energy realities.

As Africa’s population grows and industrialization accelerates, electricity demand is projected to increase tenfold between 2015 and 2065. This surge presents profound challenges for the continent's energy transition, including persistent energy access disparities, limited economic viability of power development, inadequate power grid infrastructure and substantial investment shortfalls.

China, a global leader in renewable energy supply chains, brings extensive experience in project development, technology innovation and strong financial resources. Europe, on the other hand, excels in renewable energy finance and sustainable development standards and benefits from geographic proximity to Africa. Africa, beyond being a large and fast-growing market, offers unmatched opportunities for market expansion, abundant renewable energy resources essential for the global energy transition, a dynamic and youthful workforce, and the potential for green industrialization and innovation.  

Together, China, Europe and Africa can forge a powerful trilateral cooperation in renewable energy that can unlock synergies, drive inclusive and sustainable development, and contribute meaningfully to global climate goals while advancing Africa’s own energy realities.

Solar panels cover the roof of a home in São Tomé and Príncipe, one of the African countries that has initiated solar power development plans with support from China under the Africa Solar Belt Program. Photo by Wirestock/iStock. Unlocking Impact through Technical Cooperation and Scalable Pilots

To move from ambition to impact, deepening technical cooperation and co-developing pilot projects that are scalable, replicable and locally grounded can serve as proof points for what trilateral cooperation can achieve.

Here are four project areas where this trilateral cooperation can make a difference in Africa’s energy transition:

1) Leveraging micro-grid and off-grid renewable energy technologies to address electricity access

For Africa, the majority of its population without electricity access lives in vast and sparsely populated rural areas, where traditional large power grids are usually impractical. Microgrid and off-grid renewable energy technologies, designed to adapt to local conditions and resources, are cost-effective and easy to maintain, making them well-suited to address Africa’s electricity supply challenges. European and Chinese technologies, resources and know-how can play a vital role in addressing electricity access for the hard-to-reach populations.

2) Integrating renewable energy with other sectors to boost benefits

In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a huge market for the application of distributed renewable energy in agricultural, mining, industrial and commercial sectors. Integrating renewable energy in these sectors, a concept known as Productive Use of Renewable Energy (PURE), can significantly boost the demand for renewable energy. To unlock this potential, China, the EU and Africa have the opportunity to collaborate in developing small and smart business models that prioritize cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability. Coupled with innovative financing solutions, this approach can help lower electricity costs, promote local industrialization and create jobs — delivering economic, environmental and social benefits in an integrated way.

3) Renewable energy production to create new economic opportunities

Africa’s abundant renewable resources and land offer distinct advantages in harnessing renewable energy, presenting new opportunities for Africa to boost its growth through low energy prices and even by assessing opportunities of its proximity to Europe, a key green hydrogen demand center. Through a trilateral collaboration, Europe can leverage on its market demands to facilitate an African export-oriented industry, for example in green energy, which would then boost the trade balances between these regions. Equally, China can leverage on its manufacturing and technological capacities to enable and facilitate this trilateral collaboration.  

4) Upgrading and expanding power grids to enhance energy security

The planning, investment and construction of cross-border power grids are critical for Africa to achieve energy security. The African Union (AU) launched the Africa Single Electricity Market (AfSEM) to integrate Africa's five regional power pools into a unified electricity market. This initiative, supported by the African Continental Power Systems Masterplan, aims to boost energy security, optimize resource utilization, reduce energy costs and improve electricity access for all 55 AU member states, serving over 1.3 billion people. 

The flagship AU Agenda 2063 initiative also provides a strategic solution for balancing electricity supply and demand. By improving cross-border power transmission and storage, electricity surplus and shortage across countries and regions can be balanced more effectively. However, this field requires overcoming high technical barriers and substantial funding needs, necessitating international support. The complexity and capital intensity of regional grid infrastructure present a clear opportunity for trilateral cooperation.

China, EU and African institutions can pool their complementary strengths — China’s experience in large-scale infrastructure development, the EU’s expertise in regulatory harmonization and smart grid technologies, and Africa’s political momentum and regional frameworks — to co-develop grid expansion projects. 

Additionally, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence also have the potential to greatly increase the efficiency of large, interconnected power grids. Joint investment, technical assistance and capacity building can help overcome the technical and financial barriers, while accelerating the realization of AfSEM’s goals.

Financial Support and International Exchange Are Indispensable

Turning these collaborative visions into tangible outcomes hinges on two critical enablers:

1) Mobilizing private capital to bridge funding gaps is crucial for cooperation among China, Europe and Africa

Exploring the financial mechanisms that would enable deeper uptake of renewable energy and the associated de-risking mechanisms or tools that would be required is vital. Policy-based financial institutions or public funds can mitigate financing and investment risks in renewable energy projects by offering strategic products like guarantees and insurance, thereby attracting more private capital. Moreover, promoting coordination of cross-border and regional investment criteria among financial institutions will help streamline renewable energy financing channels, facilitating efficient capital and project matching. Under a trilateral cooperation, Europe’s deep financial markets can offer the necessary seed capital and de-risking instruments while China provides supply chain finance that would enable it to leverage its manufacturing prowess. In parallel, Africa could focus on deepening its local capital markets potentially by integrating its capital markets and by bolstering the available home-grown financial capital to the renewable energy sector.

2) Strengthening the alignment of global initiatives 

Efforts can focus on enhancing benchmarking, mutual recognition and standardization in areas such as green supply chain management, product carbon footprint certification, and ESG management throughout the clean technology supply chain, including the mining and processing of upstream minerals. Establishing joint standards can reduce friction and barriers in trade and investment cooperation among China, Europe and Africa, supporting Africa’s balanced approach to energy transition and sustainable development.

As is the case with bilateral collaborations, a successful trilateral collaboration between China, Europe and Africa would need to provide mutual benefits for all players particularly as the shifting global winds of country-first engagements loom.

WRI Europe’s Stientje van Veldhoven and Angela Bekkers contributed to this article.

solar-farm-africa.jpg Energy Africa International Climate Action renewable energy climate finance Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Greening China’s Overseas Finance

Authors Yu Ma Cheng Zhang Kimathi Ikiao Meron Tesfamichael

Ethiopia Invests Big in Restoring Degraded Land sarah.brown@wri.org Thu, 05/29/2025 - 13:45

Amid global climate-action promises, many countries have pledged to restore degraded land and expand tree cover. Ethiopia has taken that commitment one step further.

In a landmark move, Ethiopia's government launched the Green Legacy and Landscape Restoration Special Fund, allocating 0.5% to 1% of its annual federal budget — about $40 to $80 million — to restoring degraded landscapes. Approved by the House of Peoples’ Representatives on Dec. 24, 2024, the fund positions Ethiopia as a pioneer in using federal resources to advance large-scale restoration, setting a powerful precedent for other nations across the world to follow. 

The fund forms part of Ethiopia’s broader Green Legacy Initiative (GLI), a national program launched in 2019 to combat environmental degradation and build a greener, more climate-resilient country. By establishing a dedicated financing mechanism, the country aims to scale up its restoration efforts with sustainable public investment.

The GLI recognizes that land restoration is more than just planting trees — it can improve food security, enhance air quality, increase water availability, boost climate resilience and create jobs. Ethiopia’s approach offers a promising model for how stable public financing can drive large-scale restoration in climate-vulnerable countries. 

A community-based tree planting initiative in Arsi Zone in southern Ethiopia. Tsion Issayas/WRI Ethiopia Builds on Its Reputation as a Restoration Leader

Ethiopia has emerged as a global leader in landscape restoration in recent years, driving change through bold action and ambitious targets. Through its GLI, the country exceeded its initial goals by planting over 25 billion trees in just four years, including a reported 350 million trees in a single day in August 2019, a feat believed to have set an unofficial new world record. 

To date, the initiative has planted more than 32 billion seedlings, with a goal of reaching 50 billion trees by 2030. It has already generated significant social benefits, including the creation of more than 767,000 jobs in areas such as nursery management, seedling production, agroforestry and sustainable land management throughout the country —  many of them for women and youth. 

Ethiopia has also made the most ambitious commitment under the African Forest Landscape Initiative AFR100, pledging to restore 22 million hectares (84,942 square miles) of degraded land. This aligns with its broader international commitments under the Bonn Challenge and the New York Declaration on Forests, both of which aim to combat deforestation and promote large-scale land restoration.

A restoration site in Ethiopia. Tsion Issayas/WRI Restoration Brings a Host of Benefits

After decades of severe deforestation, Ethiopia is beginning to reverse forest and land degradation through coordinated national efforts.  Between 2013 and 2023, the annual deforestation rate fell from 92,000 hectares (355 square miles) to 27,703 hectares (107 square miles), according to a report. Meanwhile, forest cover increased from 15.5% in 2013 to 23.6% during the same period. 

But there’s still much work to do. Between 2000 and 2013, Ethiopia lost an average of 92,000 hectares (355 square miles) of forest each year. A growing population and rising demand for land continue to fuel deforestation. Land degradation costs Ethiopia an estimated $4.3 billion per year due to reduced agricultural productivity and loss of ecosystem services such as food production and water availability. The long-term economic losses from inaction are estimated to be four times higher than the cost of restoring degraded land.

Ethiopia is among the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations. Increasingly severe droughts, floods and landslides have taken a devastating toll in the country. In 2024, landslides in the southern Gofa region caused by heavy rains were the deadliest natural disaster in the history of the country, killing at least 250 people and displacing more than 14,000.  

Degraded and deforested landscapes increase the risk of climate-related disasters. Events like the Gofa landslides underscore the urgency for Ethiopia to build climate resilience, and land restoration is increasingly recognized as part of the solution.  

But restoration is about more than just planting trees. Delivering on the country’s restoration commitments could bring widespread environmental, social and economic gains, including: 

• Food security. Restored land can help Ethiopia improve agricultural productivity, ensuring a stable food supply for its growing population, especially in rural areas.
• Water access. Restoring watersheds and forests can improve Ethiopia’s water resources, essential in a country vulnerable to droughts and seasonal variability. It helps ensure more reliable access to water for communities and agriculture.
• Climate resilience and carbon sequestration. The country's updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Long-Term Low Emission and Climate Resilient Development Strategy (LT-LEDS) recognize forest protection and landscape restoration as key pillars of its climate action.  
• Livelihoods. Programs like the GLI have already created thousands of jobs and will continue to provide sustainable employment opportunities in restoration activities and related industries.
• Economic development. Landscape restoration in Ethiopia presents an opportunity to mitigate the billions of dollars in annual economic costs of land degradation. It also helps long-term sustainable growth and reduces the need for costly disaster relief efforts.

A seedling production site in Ethiopia. Tsion Issayas/WRI

WRI provided critical scientific support in shaping Ethiopia's landscape restoration ambitions.  

In 2018, a national study using the Restoration Opportunity Assessment Methodology (ROAM) — a tool that helps nations work out where and how to restore degraded land in a way that benefits people and nature — provided essential data to inform national strategies and programs. This included, most notably, the 10-year Forest Sector Development Program, as well as helping to create the Green Legacy and Landscape Restoration Special Fund.  

The findings, published in the report National Potential and Priority Maps for Tree-based Landscape Restoration in Ethiopia, co-authored by WRI, identified 82 million hectares (316,604 square miles) of land suitable for tree-based restoration. Of this, 54 million hectares (208,495 square miles) were prioritized for integrated, cross-sectoral interventions due to the complex drivers of land degradation. These insights into the scale and severity of degradation were key to demonstrating the need for a dedicated special restoration fund.  

Stable Financing: The Next Step in Ethiopia’s Restoration

The new Green Legacy and Landscape Restoration Special Fund marks a significant step in Ethiopia’s restoration journey. Until now, the Green Legacy Initiative relied on regular federal and regional support without a dedicated budget. By institutionalizing the special fund, Ethiopia aims to ensure the long-term sustainability of its landscape restoration efforts while creating opportunities to mobilize additional resources and scale up restoration initiatives nationwide.

The government aims to leverage these resources to attract investment in restoration beyond federal contributions — including from regional governments, development partners, civil society organizations and private sector actors. This could help scale efforts even further, far beyond what public funds alone can support.

By demonstrating how national resources can be mobilized and institutionalized to support long-term landscape restoration, Ethiopia is setting a precedent that others could follow. This new model of restoration financing not only strengthens regional collaboration, but also accelerates collective progress toward land restoration and climate resilience in Africa’s most vulnerable landscapes. 

People in southern Ethiopia taking part in a tree planting initiative. Forest and Landscape Restoration Ethiopia Climate Resilience Water Security food security climate impacts climate finance Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Tsion Issayas Yigremachew Seyoum Lemma

RELEASE: World Resources Institute Welcomes New Chief Financial Officer and Chief People Officer alison.cinnamo… Wed, 05/28/2025 - 15:14

Lucy Fernie to lead human resources strategy; Kote Lomidze to oversee global financial operations

WASHINGTON, D.C. (May 28, 2025) — World Resources Institute (WRI) is pleased to announce the appointment of two new senior leaders to its Global Executive Team: Lucy Fernie as Chief People Officer and Konstantin (Kote) Lomidze as Chief Financial Officer.

Based in London, Lucy Fernie will lead WRI’s global People (HR) function, focusing on talent development, organizational culture and inclusion. She will also contribute to enhancing organizational effectiveness and managing change initiatives across the institute.

Fernie brings a wealth of international HR leadership experience across NGOs, government and consulting sectors. Most recently, she served as Director of People, Organization, and Culture at the International Planned Parenthood Federation, overseeing regional HR teams, inclusion programs and organizational capability-building initiatives across multiple continents. Her previous roles include leading HR transformation projects at Adam Smith International and the Metropolitan Police Service in London, as well as consulting positions at PA Consulting and Deloitte, where she focused on leadership development and cultural change in large organizations.

Fernie holds a Master’s degree in Occupational Psychology from Birkbeck, University of London. She is a qualified psychologist and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD).

"I've been passionate about climate change and nature for many years, so I’m humbled to join WRI and contribute to its vital mission”, said Lucy Fernie. “I’m excited to bring my global experience to the organization and to work with teams across WRI to ensure every employee can do their best work, fulfill their potential and enjoy a great employee experience."  

“Building an inclusive, resilient and empowered workforce is more critical than ever, especially for a global organization like WRI,” said Ani Dasgupta, President & CEO of WRI. “Lucy brings a valuable combination of strategic vision and global experience, and most importantly, a deep commitment to people and to cultivating a strong, supportive organizational culture. I’m confident Lucy will help take our people strategy to the next level.”  

Kote Lomidze will oversee WRI’s financial operations worldwide. Based in Washington D.C., he will lead key functions including financial planning and analysis, grants and contracts and accounting. He will also serve as Treasurer to WRI’s Global Board of Directors.

Lomidze brings over 25 years of experience in international development and nonprofit finance, with expertise in U.S. government funding regulations, audit and risk management and strategic growth. He has held senior leadership roles at global organizations including Project Concern International (PCI) and, most recently, World Learning, where he served as Chief Financial Officer and led major initiatives in financial planning, compliance, IT modernization and global operations across offices in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Lomidze is a Certified Public Accountant in Indiana and holds two bachelor’s degrees — in Law and Mathematical Economics — from Tbilisi State University, as well as an MBA from Georgetown University. He also serves on the Board of Directors of CORE Group, a global health nonprofit.  

"WRI’s mission and global impact deeply resonate with me.” said Kote Lomidze. “I’ve long admired the organization’s commitment to data-driven, systems-based solutions that advance sustainability and equity. I’m excited to join such a passionate and innovative team and to contribute to WRI’s continued growth and financial resilience."

“Kote’s depth of experience in nonprofit finance and global operations will be a tremendous asset to WRI”, said Ani Dasgupta. “His leadership will help ensure our financial systems are strong, agile and aligned with our mission as we grow and scale our impact around the world. I look forward to his partnership as we sustain and evolve WRI’s financial resilience into the future.”

About World Resources Institute (WRI) 

WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations. 

Type Press Release Exclude From Blog Feed? 0

India’s Electric Bus Revolution Isn’t Just for Megacities alicia.cypress… Wed, 05/28/2025 - 10:15

Imagine living in a country where everyone has access to clean, affordable public transportation to reach their jobs, schools and healthcare needs without relying on polluting fossil fuels. That vision isn’t too far from where India hopes to be by 2047.

With an urban population of more than 470 million, India has set an ambitious goal of becoming energy independent by its 100th year of independence. This goal is not just about becoming self-sufficient for its energy needs, but ensuring it’s done in a way that reduces climate-harming emissions and becomes increasingly reliant on clean energy sources.  

Around 60% of India’s 1.4 billion population is expected to live in its cities by 2050, and with more than one in four people using buses daily, one key way to achieve energy independence is by expanding bus networks into India’s smaller cities.

India currently faces a major shortfall in urban bus services, especially in smaller cities. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs recommends 60 buses per 100,000 people, yet many cities have fewer than 10. Nationally, only about 47,650 buses serve its urban residents. Nearly 61% of these are concentrated in just nine megacities (like Delhi and Mumbai), which represent only a quarter of India’s urban population. In contrast, cities with populations between 300,000 and 4 million remain largely underserved, with many lacking organized public bus systems. Closing this gap is critical to ensure that growing cities outside of megacities, have access to reliable, inclusive and sustainable transit.

Well-established electric bus networks, which can complement the country’s rail networks and citywide metro systems, can play a massive and cost-effective role.

Expanding electric buses to smaller cities will help India meet its goal to be energy independent by 2047. Photo by WRI India. Why Electric Buses — and Why Now

India’s government first announced financial support to cities for over 20,000 buses in 2021 as a part of its Union (national) budget. However, at the time, this support was limited to the procurement of traditional gas- or diesel-fueled buses due to lower operational costs in 2021. Among India’s transport sector, which consumes nearly 70% of India’s diesel, buses already account for nearly 10% of it.

As lower costs were realized in electric bus operations, a new strategy was adopted in August 2023 by India’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs that prioritized electric buses with equity, sustainability and efficiency of India’s bus system. The PM-eBus Sewa Scheme allocated $2.4 billion to deploy and operate 10,000 electric buses across 169 cities. This program also extends beyond the typical one-time financial assistance for bus purchases and assists with operational costs for 10 years as part of a public-private partnership model that includes bus depots and behind-the-meter power infrastructure.

India’s government then approved the scheme in September 2024, which included incentives for more than 14,000 electric buses across nine major cities with populations exceeding 4 million people.

Currently, 10,000 electric buses have been deployed in more than 50 cities and 20,000 electric buses are in various stages of procurement.  

This brings the current commitment to 30,000 electric buses, a significant step toward cleaner urban transport. To fully realize India's 2047 vision for energy independence and sustainable mobility, continued expansion and strategic deployment of an even larger electric bus fleet will be crucial, particularly in bridging service gaps in smaller cities.

Buses crowd into a Bengaluru station during morning rush hour. Sixty-one percent of India's buses serve just nine megacities. Photo by iStock.

To develop a more inclusive and effective electric bus program, emerging economies can learn from India's experience in expanding electric bus networks to smaller cities while balancing developmental and sustainability goals:

Creating Inclusive Access

Problem: In India and many developing countries, infrastructure investments tend to concentrate in the largest cities. While this may improve conditions within those metros, it can deepen disparities with smaller urban areas that receive less attention.

Solution: By targeting underserved smaller and medium-sized cities, resources can be divided more equitably. For example, the PM-eBus Sewa Scheme promotes more geographically balanced economic development and expands access to essential services.

Research shows that countries with a strong system of secondary cities tend to experience lower regional disparities — and higher national productivity — offering lessons for fast growing nations like India.  

Another way to apply an equity lens to transit investments is by looking at economic opportunities for women. Women make up 48% of the population in cities eligible under the PM-eBus Sewa Scheme yet often face limited transportation options. Electric buses offer safer, cleaner and more affordable mobility.

To reassure the safety of public buses and encourage more female ridership, operator contracts now include a minimum target of 25% female representation in the workforce. As one female electric bus driver from Mumbai noted: “If a woman is driving an e-bus, then more women passengers are encouraged to travel by the bus.”

The initial rollout of 10,000 electric buses is estimated to generate between 45,000 and 55,000 new jobs. Greater gender parity among electric bus staff can also broaden women’s employment options while improving rider confidence — especially for women who travel alone.

Extending Financial Support to Operational Expenses

Problem: Cities often struggle to cover the operational expenses required for reliable electric bus service. In fact, many public transit agencies struggle to recover full operating costs.

Solution: Extending grants to cover operating costs was a key part of the success behind the PM-eBus Sewa Scheme. It extended financial support beyond capital expenditure to include operational expenses, infrastructure upgrades such as charging stations and technological platforms for smoother operations. This resulted in more efficient and reliable bus networks, while ensuring sustainability of their long-term operations.

Reducing Financial Risks

Problem: Many bus operators are small — owning fewer than 100 vehicles — and have lower credit ratings, which translates to higher interest rates, higher costs and the potential of payment defaults. Under the current Gross Cost Contract model, operators bear the burden of upfront capital cost of electric buses for public transit agencies with monthly payments.

Solution: Extending payment security mechanisms can boost the confidence to bus operators and manufacturers that they’ll receive timely payments from public transit agencies. The PM-ebus Sewa Scheme introduced a Payment Security Fund that will make interim payments through an implementing agency in case of defaults by the public transit agencies.

Building Institutional Capacity

Problem: The nationwide rollout of electric buses is a significant undertaking requiring collaboration across departments, ministries, transportation authorities and private stakeholders. New tools, skills and capabilities, due to the nascent stage of the industry, will be needed. Meanwhile, it’s further challenged by the varying levels of knowledge and awareness throughout the government.

Solution: Capacity building and knowledge sharing focused on how to address new technologies, maintenance and infrastructure upgrades should be prioritized in the development and implementation of electric bus programs. Developing standards can help streamline this work.  WRI India collaborated with the government of India to develop the PM-ebus Sewa Scheme, establishing guidelines for deployment and a framework for demand aggregation to ensure uniform bus specifications, data standards, operational performance, procurement processes, payment guarantees, infrastructure evaluation, and safety standards. A project management unit within the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs was also created to implement and monitor the program, along with a dedicated team with specialized expertise that will facilitate smoother and more efficient roll out of the electric buses over the next two years, paving the way for expansion of the program beyond 2026.  

Electric buses are lined up at a charging station in Lucknow, India. The initial rollout of 10,000 electric buses as part of the PM-ebus Sewa Scheme is expected to generate between 45,000 and 55,000 new jobs. Photo by WRI India. Why Expanding Electric Bus Networks in Smaller Cities Matters

Cities like London, Hong Kong, Curitiba and Bogotá show how prioritizing buses can create efficient, low-carbon urban transport. For India and other countries, investing in electric buses — especially beyond major cities — is a way to meet both development and climate goals.

In India, deploying more electric buses — especially in its smaller and medium-sized cities — is poised to improve accessibility for 134 million people across 169 cities. These are cities that have historically lacked organized, affordable and clean public transit options. The adoption of electric buses will reduce dependence on fossil fuels and could reduce millions of tons of emissions over a decade, based on lifecycle estimates. Moreover, expanding the public transport network will grant better access to education, health services and jobs — outcomes that matter most in smaller urban areas where walkability and job density are lower.

However, the successful adoption of electric buses on a nationwide level requires concerted efforts that overcome challenges including financing, declining transit ridership, and grid resiliency and capacity.

In countries like India, where a majority of buses are owned by small-scale operators owning less than 100 buses, the higher cost of electric buses poses financial hurdles. Solutions could include demand aggregation to take advantage of economies of scale while purchasing electric -buses and establishing more conducive financing and lending ecosystems for small operators.

In addition, the mere deployment of more buses will not be enough. With public transit ridership remaining stagnant globally over the past decade, cities must leverage technology and data to improve planning, routing and scheduling of buses to improve reliability and encourage behavior change among passengers. Moreover, bus network expansion must be paired with improved last-mile connectivity, including safer pedestrian infrastructure and better street design — especially in smaller cities, where these supporting systems are often weakest.

Lastly, an increase in electric buses means an increase in electricity demand. However, India is still largely dependent on fossil fuels for its electricity generation, with only 25% of its electricity produced from non-fossil fuel sources. As a result, while electric buses play a critical role in reducing tail pipe emission, to ensure a reduction in total emissions, a larger part of the electric grid must be fueled by renewable sources, a transition process that is still likely to take decades.  

The Road Ahead

Over the past three years, India has laid the foundation to scale electric bus adoption. The PM-eBus Sewa Scheme advances cleaner, more inclusive mobility by focusing on underserved cities, women’s employment and long-term reforms.

To deliver on its promise, continued investment in planning, grid upgrades and local capacity is essential — ensuring electric buses support both development and climate goals. WRI India, in an effort to continue this momentum, is working to expand the scheme to 50,000 electric buses nationwide by 2027. To truly reshape India’s mobility landscape, this expansion must continue to focus on smaller cities — where the gaps are greatest and the opportunity for inclusive development is the strongest. With the right mix of policy, investment and local capacity, India’s electric bus transition can redefine public mobility — not only for megacities, but for every city on its growth journey.

WRI India’s Chintan Daftardar, Aparna Vijaykumar, and Avinash Dubedi contributed to this report.

This article is a part of WRI’s  Mobility and Accessibility Program, which enhances global mass transit via local capacity building and action. WRI country offices develop programs to improve transit quality, accessibility and utility, pushing governance boundaries for better quality of life and environmental sustainability. These projects are funded in part by a grant from FedEx.

electric-bus-kolkata-india.jpg Cities India electric mobility Urban Mobility public transit transportation Cities Urban Efficiency & Climate Featured Popular Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Electric Mobility
• Urban Mobility
• Integrated Climate Action
• Mobility and Accessibility Program

Authors Adam Davidson Meghna Ray

STATEMENT: U.S. Senate approval of resolutions to overturn California’s Clean Air Act preemption waivers throws progress into reverse alison.cinnamo… Thu, 05/22/2025 - 16:18

WASHINGTON (MAY 22, 2025) — Today, the U.S. Senate approved Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolutions to overturn the Environmental Protection Agency’s waivers of federal preemption for the Advanced Clean Cars II (ACC2), Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) and the Heavy-Duty Omnibus vehicle emissions programs. This follows the House of Representatives’ approval of CRA resolutions targeting ACT and the Heavy-Duty Omnibus vehicle emissions program on April 30th, 2025 and ACCII on May 1st, 2025. The Senate Parliamentarian had previously determined that these waivers are not subject to the Congressional Review Act.

Following is a statement from Dan Lashof, Senior Fellow at World Resources Institute:    

“Today’s votes in the Senate fly in the face of nearly 50 years of precedent. For decades, California and other states have had the authority to adopt vehicle emissions standards that exceed those at the federal level – and for good reason. These standards are vital in protecting people from the vehicle pollution which causes asthma attacks and other serious health problems.

“Moreover, the U.S. auto industry’s competitiveness in the global market depends on innovation which has historically been and continues to be driven by California standards.  

“People across the country want cleaner, more efficient cars, trucks and school buses and the cleaner air that results. Today’s unprecedented votes against these preemption waivers throw years of progress into reverse.”

 

U.S. Climate United States climate policy Type Statement Exclude From Blog Feed? 0

STATEMENT: WRI Statement on the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 darla.vanhoorn… Tue, 05/20/2025 - 22:00

PARIS, FRANCE (May 21, 2025) – Today, the International Energy Agency (IEA) released a new report warning that markets for critical minerals essential for clean energy — such as lithium, cobalt and rare earth minerals — remain heavily concentrated in just a few countries, especially when it comes to refining and processing.  

The report finds that efforts to diversify this supply chain across the globe are moving too slowly, raising concerns about future shortages, trade conflicts and the reliability of mineral supplies for clean energy technology use.  

Following is a statement from Jennifer Layke, Global Director, Energy, WRI Polsky Center for the Global Energy Transition:   

“The IEA report makes one thing clear: without an adequate and diverse supply of energy minerals, we risk slowing the speed and scale of the clean energy transition. But if these minerals aren’t responsibly sourced, nature and people will suffer. 

We need to mine responsibly — not just more. That means recognizing land rights, improving worker safety and reducing the social and environmental toll of extraction, refining and processing. It also means finding ways to mine less — by recycling minerals from end-of-life products, tapping overlooked waste streams and designing technology and public systems that rely on fewer materials to begin with.  

“It’s time to rethink where minerals come from — and who benefits. Right now, the supply chain is too concentrated, too fragile and too exclusive. Expanding responsible minerals processing to more places — especially lower-income, mineral-rich areas — can build resilience and deliver real economic opportunity where it’s needed most.” 

 

Clean Energy Type Statement Exclude From Blog Feed? 0

RELEASE: Global Forest Loss Shatters Records in 2024, Fueled by Massive Fires darla.vanhoorn… Tue, 05/20/2025 - 18:01

New data shows fires triggered unprecedented global forest loss in 2024, releasing more than four times the emissions from all air travel in 2023 — with devastating impacts on people and the climate, according to Global Forest Watch's annual analysis 

WASHINGTON D.C. (May 21, 2025) — Global forest loss surged to record highs in 2024, driven by a catastrophic rise in fires, according to new data from the University of Maryland’s GLAD Lab, made available on World Resources Institute’s Global Forest Watch platform. Loss of tropical primary forests alone reached 6.7 million hectares — nearly twice as much as in 2023 and an area nearly the size of Panama, at the rate of 18 soccer fields every minute. 

For the first time on our record, fires — not agriculture — were the leading cause of tropical primary forest loss, accounting for nearly 50% of all destruction. This marks a dramatic shift from recent years, when fires averaged just 20%. Meanwhile, tropical primary forest loss driven by other causes also jumped by 14%, the sharpest increase since 2016.  

Despite some positive developments, particularly in Southeast Asia, the overall trend is heading in a troubling direction. Leaders of over 140 countries signed the Glasgow Leaders Declaration in 2021, promising to halt and reverse forest loss by 2030. But we are alarmingly off track to meet this commitment: Of the 20 countries with the largest area of primary forest, 17 have higher primary forest loss today than when the agreement was signed. 

The consequences of forest loss in 2024 have been devastating for both people and the planet. Globally, the fires emitted 4.1 gigatons of greenhouse gas emissions — releasing more than 4 times the emissions from all air travel in 2023. The fires worsened air quality, strained water supplies and threatened the lives and livelihoods of millions. 

Elizabeth Goldman, Co-Director, WRI’s Global Forest Watch said: "This level of forest loss is unlike anything we've seen in over 20 years of data. It's a global red alert — a collective call to action for every country, every business and every person who cares about a livable planet. Our economies, our communities, our health — none of it can survive without forests.” 

While fires are natural in some ecosystems, those in tropical forests are mostly human-caused, often set on agricultural land or to prepare new areas for farming. In 2024, the hottest year on record, extreme conditions fueled by climate change and El Niño made these fires more intense and harder to control. Although forests have the ability to recover from fire, the combined pressures of land conversion and a changing climate can hinder that recovery and raise the likelihood of future fires. 

Top Countries for Forest Loss 

Brazil, the country with the largest area of tropical forest, accounted for 42% of all tropical primary forest loss in 2024. Fires, fueled by the worst drought on record, caused 66% of that loss — an over sixfold increase from 2023. Primary forest loss from other causes also rose by 13%, mostly due to large-scale farming for soy and cattle, though still lower than the peaks seen in the early 2000s and in the Bolsonaro era. The Amazon experienced its highest tree cover loss since 2016, while the Pantanal suffered the highest percentage of tree cover loss in the country. 

Mariana Oliveira, Director Forests and Land Use Program, WRI Brasil said: “Brazil has made progress under President Lula — but the threat to forests remains. Without sustained investment in community fire prevention, stronger state-level enforcement and a focus on sustainable land use, hard-won gains risk being undone. As Brazil prepares to host COP30, it has a powerful opportunity to put forest protection front and center on the global stage.” 

Bolivia's primary forest loss skyrocketed by 200% in 2024, totaling 1.5 million hectares (3.7 million acres). For the first time, it ranked second for tropical primary forest loss only to Brazil, overtaking the Democratic Republic of Congo despite having less than half its forest area. More than half the loss was due to fires, often set to clear land for soy, cattle, and sugarcane, which turned into megafires due to heavy drought. Government policies promoting agricultural expansion worsened the problem. 

Stasiek Czaplicki Cabezas, Bolivian researcher and Data Journalist for Revista Nomadas, said: “The fires that tore through Bolivia in 2024 left deep scars — not only on the land, but on the people who depend on it. The damage could take centuries to undo. Across the tropics, we need stronger fire response systems and a shift away from policies that encourage dangerous land clearing, or this pattern of destruction will only get worse."  

In Colombia, primary forest loss increased by nearly 50%. However, unlike elsewhere in Latin America, fires were not the primary cause. Instead, non-fire-related loss rose by 53%, owing to instability from the breakdown in peace talks, including illegal mining and coca production. 

Joaquin Carrizosa, Senior Advisor, WRI Colombia said: “In 2023, Colombia saw the biggest drop in primary forest loss in 20 years, proving that when government and communities work together, real change is possible. The rise in primary forest loss in 2024 is a setback, but it shouldn’t discourage us as a country. We need to keep supporting local, nature-based economies – especially in remote areas – and invest in solutions that protect the environment, create jobs and foster peace." 

In 2024, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Congo (ROC) saw the highest levels of primary forest loss on record. In the ROC, primary forest loss surged by 150% compared to the previous year, with fires causing 45% of the damage, worsened by unusually hot and dry conditions. Like the Amazon, the Congo Basin plays a crucial role as a carbon sink, but the rising fires and forest loss now threaten its vital function. In the DRC, poverty, reliance on forests for food and energy and ongoing conflict driven by rebel groups have fueled instability and led to increased land clearing, further driving forest loss. 

Teodyl Nkuintchua, Congo Basin Strategy & Engagement Lead, WRI Africa said: “The high rates of forest loss in the DRC reflect the tough realities our communities are facing — poverty, conflict and a deep reliance on forests for survival. There’s no silver bullet, but we won't change the current trajectory until people across the Congo Basin are fully empowered to lead conservation efforts that also support their rural economies.” 

Dr. Matt Hansen, Professor, University of Maryland; Co-Director, Global Land Analysis and Discovery (GLAD) Lab said: "We’re seeing unprecedented forest loss from fire in the few remaining ‘High Forest, Low Deforestation’ countries, like the Republic of Congo. This new dynamic is outside of current policy frameworks or intervention capabilities and will severely test our ability to maintain intact forests within a warming climate.” 

However, it's not all bad news. In Southeast Asia, there are signs of progress. Indonesia reduced primary forest loss by 11%, reversing a steady rise between 2021 and 2023. Efforts under former President Joko Widodo to restore land and curb fires helped keep fire rates low, even amid widespread droughts. Similarly, Malaysia saw a 13% decline and fell out of the top 10 countries for tropical primary forest loss for the first time. 

Arief Wijaya, Managing Director, WRI Indonesia said: “We're proud that Indonesia is one of the few countries in the world to reduce primary forest loss. But deforestation remains a concern due to plantations, small-scale farming and mining — even within protected areas. We hope the current administration keeps the momentum going".  

The rise in forest loss also extended beyond the tropics. The world saw a 5% increase in total tree cover loss compared to 2023, adding up to 30 million hectares — an area the size of Italy. This increase was driven in part by the intense fire seasons in Canada and Russia, marking the first time that major fires raged across both the tropics and boreal forests since GFW’s record-keeping began. 

Combatting Forest Loss 

Peter Potapov, Research Professor, University of Maryland; Co-Director, Global Land Analysis and Discovery (GLAD) Lab said: "2024 was the worst year on record for fire-driven forest loss, breaking the record set just last year. If this trend continues, it could permanently transform critical natural areas and unleash large amounts of carbon — intensifying climate change and fueling even more extreme fires. This is a dangerous feedback loop we cannot afford to trigger further." 

Rod Taylor, Director, Forests and Nature Conservation, WRI said: “Forest fires and land clearing are driving up emissions, while the climate is already changing faster than forests can adapt. This crisis is pushing countless species to the brink and forcing Indigenous Peoples and local communities from their ancestral lands. But this isn’t irreversible — if governments, businesses, and individuals act now, we can stop the assault on forests and their custodians.” 

To meet the global goal of halting forest loss by 2030, the world must reduce deforestation by 20% every year, starting immediately. In contrast, 2024 marked an 80% increase in tropical primary forest loss. To combat this loss, the world needs action on multiple fronts: stronger fire prevention, deforestation-free supply chains for commodities, better enforcement of trade regulations and increased funding for forest protection — especially Indigenous-led initiatives. 

Achieving this will require political will, national strategies tailored to local realities and greater support from wealthier nations to ensure forests remain standing — and are valued more alive than lost. 

Kelly Levin, Chief of Science, Data and Systems Change, Bezos Earth Fund said: “Countries have repeatedly pledged to halt deforestation and forest degradation. Yet the data reveal a stark gap between promises made and progress delivered — alongside the growing impacts of a warming world. These findings should jolt us out of complacency. The Bezos Earth Fund is proud to support this vital tool for showing where we stand and ensuring action is grounded in evidence.” 

About the annual Tree Cover Loss data analysis  
World Resource Institute’s Global Forest Watch provides annual tree cover loss data analysis, showing when and where forest loss occurred around the world. The data — created and updated by the GLAD (Global Land Analysis & Discovery) Lab at the University of Maryland — captures changes at approximately 30 × 30-meter resolution across all global land areas, except Antarctica and other Arctic islands.  

About World Resources Institute 
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations. 

About Global Forest Watch 
Global Forest Watch (GFW) provides data and tools for monitoring forests and insights on where and why they are changing. By harnessing cutting-edge technology, GFW allows anyone to access near real-time information about where and how forests are changing around the world. Since its launch in 2014, over 7 million people have visited Global Forest Watch from every single country in the world.  

About University of Maryland GLAD Lab 
The Global Land Analysis and Discovery (GLAD) laboratory in the Department of Geographical Sciences at the University of Maryland investigates methods, causes and impacts of global land surface change. Earth observation imagery are the primary data source and land cover extent and change the primary topic of interest. The lab is led by Drs. Matthew Hansen and Peter Potapov. The research team is diverse with representation from the following countries: USA, Indonesia, China, Pakistan, India, New Zealand, Ghana, DRCongo, Russia, Colombia, Bolivia. Full-time researchers work on a variety of land cover investigations, ranging from global forest change to national-scale crop type area mapping and estimation.   

 

Forests Asia Africa Latin America North America Europe Type Press Release Exclude From Blog Feed? 0

Adaptation Finance: 10 Key Questions, Answered sarah.parsons@… Mon, 05/19/2025 - 06:00

People around the world are feeling the effects of climate change in the form of severe floods, long-term droughts, worsening forest fires, intensifying storms, extreme heat and more. It's essential that communities invest in reducing and avoiding these impacts. For example, improved building methods can be the difference between a house withstanding a storm or crumbling to rubble.

The critical question is: How do we pay for it?

This is where adaptation finance comes in.

Particularly in low-income countries, adaptation finance is sorely needed to help make people — and the infrastructure and ecosystems they rely on — more resilient to the impacts of climate change. Yet with each passing year the gap between the adaptation finance needed and what is available grows.

Closing this gap is essential as climate change continues to escalate. But there are varying definitions about what counts as adaptation finance, as well as different means of providing and tracking funds. Here, we answer key questions:

1) What Is Adaptation Finance?

Adaptation finance is aimed at helping communities reduce the risks they face and harm they might suffer from climate hazards like storms or droughts. It pays for things like strengthening housing and infrastructure to withstand extreme weather; developing drought-tolerant crops; creating social safety nets (like cash, food or insurance to help with recovery from climate-related disasters); or improving access to climate information for better management of climate-related risks.

Adaptation finance includes funds flowing from developed to developing countries as well as finance that governments — in both developing and developed countries — invest to build resilience to climate impacts within their own borders. Adaptation finance can also come from private sources, such as philanthropies, corporations and financial institutions. Businesses are increasingly investing in adaptation to protect their operations, supply chains and markets from exposure to climate-related risks.

Adaptation finance often overlaps with development finance, as investments aimed at reducing communities' economic or social vulnerability often also enhance resilience to climate change, in addition to other benefits. However, for funding to be classified as adaptation finance, it must be explicitly intended to enhance resilience to actual or expected climate risks.

For example, funding a new road may boost a community's resilience by making it easier for people to access markets, hospitals and assistance during extreme weather. To count as adaptation finance, however, the road needs to be deliberately built with climate impacts and the needs of vulnerable people in mind. A vulnerability analysis could reveal the need for a more durable road so people living in informal settlements can safely evacuate ahead of severe storms. And the road would need to be situated where it will not be directly exposed to storm surges and erosion, or elevated so that it remains passable when flooding occurs.

A partially submerged highway in Thailand's Chiang Rai province following Typhoon Yagi in 2024. Adaptation finance pays for activities that enhance resilience to climate impacts, such as building elevated or more durable roads that can better withstand floods and storms. Photo by Boyloso/iStock 2) How Much Adaptation Finance Is Needed?

Several studies give a general sense of how much finance developing countries will need to adapt to climate change. For example, the UNEP Adaptation Finance GAP Report estimates that developing countries need between $215 and $387 billion per year by 2030. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that adaptation costs exceed 1% of GDP per year in about 50 low-income and developing economies. This rises up to 20% of GDP for small island nations exposed to acute climate hazards such as tropical cyclones and rising seas.

However, these are only broad estimates. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact amount of adaptation finance needed, as this requires assessing context-specific risks, clearly distinguishing adaptation from general development, and more accurate data collection. Uncertainties about future climate trajectories also complicate estimates, as adaptation finance needs depend in part on how successful we are at curbing global temperature rise.

3) How Much Adaptation Finance Is Available?

Even with fairly limited data, it's clear there's not enough adaptation finance available to meet countries' needs.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that $68 billion was spent around the world on adaptation on average between 2021 and 2022. Much of this was international finance: According to OECD, developed countries delivered $32.4 billion in adaptation finance to developing nations in 2022.

These funding levels are many times less than what's needed — and the gap is set to increase as climate change impacts intensify. In total, the gap between current adaptation finance and what's needed in developing countries is estimated at $187-$359 billion per year.

4) Who Is — and Is not — Receiving Adaptation Finance?

Evidence shows that available finance is not reaching those most vulnerable to climate impacts, who often have the fewest resources with which to adapt. According to OECD, low-income countries received less than 10% of all climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries between 2016 and 2022. Data from the four major multilateral climate funds — Adaptation Fund, Climate Investment Fund, Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility — also indicates that fragile and highly vulnerable countries are receiving less finance than other nations.

One potential reason for this is that accessing adaptation finance often requires significant institutional capacity. While funding requirements vary based on the type of finance involved, they are often complex, requiring the staff, data and know-how to structure bankable adaptation initiatives. Least developed countries often lack these resources, despite having the highest need for adaptation finance. High costs of capital, driven by factors like currency and political risks, further limit access to finance.

5) Why Does Climate Mitigation Receive More Funding than Adaptation?

While adaptation finance has increased in recent years, it still represents less than 10% of global climate investments. The majority goes to climate change mitigation: efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and halt rising temperatures.

There are several reasons why mitigation receives more finance than adaptation. Mitigation's focus on GHG emissions not only makes it easier to define, it also makes it easier to invest in. Activities like installing solar panels or manufacturing electric vehicles bring a more immediate and certain financial return than many adaptation initiatives, which focus on building long-term resilience to extreme events that may happen further in the future. Nations may also be more inclined to invest in mitigation internationally given the contribution to global emissions reductions.

6) Why Is Adaptation Finance Difficult to Track?

Adaptation finance can be tricky to define and track, in large part because adaptation is highly context specific. Unlike mitigation finance, which targets a narrower set of solutions to reduce GHG emissions, adaptation requires a broad array of activities tailored to particular climate risks faced by specific locations.

There are also varying methods for tracking adaptation finance. Two of the most widely used approaches — OECD DAC Rio Markers and MDB Joint Methodology for Tracking Adaptation Finance — offer guidance to financial institutions and countries providing adaptation finance. While their methodologies differ somewhat, both focus on identifying whether an investment has supported climate resilience, and if so, to what degree.

Some countries have developed their own approaches to tracking adaptation finance and budget expenditures. These often draw from the two methodologies mentioned above but make modifications to suit national circumstances. As a result, adaptation finance provided or received by countries is not always easily comparable.

Even with methodologies in place, tracking adaptation finance is complicated. It requires funding and capacity to execute, which organizations aren't always resourced for. Moreover, spending on adaptation may occur across different units of the organization, creating a cross-cutting challenge requiring additional coordination.

Adaptation finance from the private sector is even more difficult to track because, unlike public funding, governments do not maintain centralized accounting systems for private investments. As a result, virtually no country systematically monitors how much private funding is spent on adaptation within or outside its borders.

7) Are Developing Countries Receiving Financial Support for Adaptation?

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) governs the process by which countries come together to cooperate on climate action. Under the UNFCCC, developed countries committed to help developing countries — which contributed least to the climate crisis but often suffer the worst impacts — finance their adaptation efforts.

This commitment has led to the adoption of key climate funds (such as the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund) to channel international finance to developing countries. Developed countries also agreed under the UNFCCC to double adaptation finance from 2019 levels to roughly $40 billion by 2025. As of 2022 (the latest data available), they had reached $32.4 billion, putting them on track to realize this goal.

In Gambia, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) helps farmers develop methods that are more resilient to climate impacts like rising temperatures and erratic rainfall. International support is an important source of funding for developing nations to pursue climate adaptation. Photo by UNEP/Flickr

Most recently, at the 2024 UN climate summit (COP29), countries agreed to a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance. Parties committed to deliver $300 billion — with efforts to reach $1.3 trillion — for climate action in developing countries by 2035, aiming for a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance. The NCQG also acknowledges the need to improve the quality of adaptation finance, particularly the need for grant-based resources and highly concessional (affordable) finance that does not exacerbate existing debt burdens.

8) How Much Adaptation Finance Comes from the Private Sector?

While private sector finance for adaptation is especially difficult to track, the data that is available shows it's particularly limited. For example, of the climate finance that the CPI has been able to track, approximately 90% of adaptation finance was provided through public actors.

There are several reasons for this. Adaptation projects often bring broad social benefits, but clear financial returns for private investors may be difficult to discern. Many vulnerable communities are also located in areas perceived as too risky for private investment, including areas suffering from conflict or other forms of instability. Other times, private investments in resilience are not made simply due to uncertainty about which adaptation options to invest in or a lack of long-term planning, technical capacity and data.

Private investment in adaptation needs to be scaled up, as public funding alone will not be enough to close the adaptation finance gap and meet the large and growing need for climate resilience. Private companies finance, build and maintain vital infrastructure, supply chains and markets. It is essential that they integrate climate resilience into their investment decisions and explore innovative financial instruments to expand collaboration with the public sector. Governments can help by creating incentives and risk-sharing mechanisms to accelerate private investments in adaptation-related activities.

9) How Is Adaptation Finance Being Provided?

The majority — around 76% — of adaptation finance to emerging market and developing economies (excluding least developed countries) is provided in the form of non-concessional finance. Least developed countries, for their part, tend to receive a majority of their funding in the form of grants. Some countries have opted to turn down loans for climate-related activities to avoid adding further debt to their balance sheets. Any efforts to scale up adaptation finance should also aim to ensure that the right type of funding is matched with the right types of projects.

10) What Is the Relationship between Adaptation Finance and Finance for Loss and Damage?

Funding for "loss and damage" — climate impacts that go beyond what people can adapt to — is an important discussion point in climate negotiations. Finance for loss and damage and for adaptation are closely related, as both aim to help communities deal with the costs associated with climate impacts. The main difference between the two is that adaptation finance is intended to help communities prepare for and reduce potential impacts, while loss and damage finance primarily pays for losses that occur despite investments in resilience. Investing in climate adaptation can help reduce loss and damage costs down the line.

Next Steps for Scaling Adaptation Finance

Growing adaptation finance will require stronger political commitments and more institutional capacity in both the public and private sectors. Better data on the economic and social risks posed by climate change, as well as on the financial and economic returns of adaptation projects, is also essential to increasing investments. This information would help countries, donors and the private sector agree on adaptation priorities, track adaptation finance and integrate adaptation priorities into national planning.

The 2025 UN climate summit (COP30) in Belém, Brazil presents a crucial opportunity to elevate the case for adaptation finance, building on recent momentum to secure stronger commitments and bridge the global finance gap. In Belém, the current and previous COP hosts will present a roadmap for reaching the NCQG's $1.3 trillion target, which parties hope will provide clear guidance on scaling up adaptation finance. Negotiators will also decide on a set of indicators to track progress on the Paris Agreement's Global Goal on Adaptation. Including credible finance-related indicators will be essential for holding parties accountable to their adaptation goals and driving real change for those on the front lines of the climate crisis.

At COP30 and beyond, countries must scale up adaptation finance to support those already affected by climate change and prepare for the impacts yet to come. Doing so is a strategic investment that, via broad social, economic and environmental benefits, will contribute to global stability and prosperity.

bangladesh_water_pump.jpg Finance Climate Resilience Climate adaptation adaptation finance climate finance climatewatch-pinned Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Finance for Developing Country Climate Action
• Adaptation Finance and Investment
• Climate Adaptation and Resilience

Authors Gaia Larsen Carter Brandon Rebecca Carter Natalia Alayza

7 Things to Know About Carbon Capture, Utilization and Sequestration alicia.cypress… Fri, 05/16/2025 - 12:00

The past few years have seen increased global attention and investment in carbon capture technology as a way to capture the emissions causing climate change before they enter the atmosphere. Policies like the EU's Net Zero Industry Act, the 45Q tax credit in the U.S. and Denmark's CCUS Fund, as well as emerging regulation in Indonesia, are all helping to accelerate the deployment of carbon capture, utilization and sequestration (CCUS).

Yet even as the pipeline of CCUS projects grows year over year, progress remains far below what climate models indicate is needed due to stubbornly high costs, regulatory challenges, and insufficient policy and financial support.

Today CCUS captures around 0.1% of global emissions — around 50 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). Climate scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), show CCUS capturing around 1 billion metric tons of CO2 by 2030 and several billions of tons by 2050.

But not everyone sees CCUS as part of the climate solution. While certain countries are moving ahead with CCUS deployment, others are skeptical of its use. Some NGOs and other stakeholders oppose CCUS, arguing that it creates a moral hazard and that it's only a band-aid over what they see as the real problem: ending use of fossil fuels. They point to a mixed record of success, high costs, and the potential for disproportionate impacts on vulnerable communities among reasons to not rely on the technology.

This article addresses key questions around the role of CCUS, including where the technology is today, in which sectors it will be most useful, and how much of the total mitigation need it can provide to help meet global climate targets.

1) What Is Carbon Capture, Utilization and Sequestration (CCUS)?

Carbon capture technology combined with utilization (sometimes referenced as "use") or sequestration (sometimes referenced as "storage") is a way to reduce CO2 from emissions sources (such as power plants or industrial facilities) using different technologies that separate CO2 from the other gases coming out of a facility. The CO2 is thus captured before entering the atmosphere. Then it is either permanently stored underground or incorporated into certain types of products, such as concrete or chemicals.

2) Is Carbon Capture the Same as Carbon Removal?

No, CCUS is not the same as carbon removal. While CCUS captures carbon emissions at their source, carbon dioxide removal (or just "carbon removal") removes CO2 that is already in the atmosphere.

Carbon removal includes a range of approaches, from familiar things like tree restoration to newer technological approaches, like direct air capture and carbon mineralization. Another type of carbon removal is bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration, where biomass is combusted and carbon capture technology is used to capture those emissions before they enter the atmosphere. Even though this process involves carbon capture at an emissions source, it can result in carbon removal, because the captured CO2 originally came from the air via photosynthesis in the biomass that was combusted.

While CCUS and carbon removal differ on where CO2 is collected, both CCUS and some types of carbon removal require somewhere to sequester the captured CO2.

Captured CO2 — either from emission sources or from the air — can be pumped underground into certain geological formations where it is permanently sequestered. Or, or it can be used in products ranging from concrete to chemicals to synthetic fuels. If used this way, the duration of sequestration depends on the product: For example, if CO2 is used to produce synthetic fuel, it would be re-emitted when the fuel is combusted. But CO2 used in concrete would be sequestered permanently.

CCUS is one of many ways to reduce emissions and plays a different role from carbon removal in long-term and net-zero climate plans developed by countries or companies. Emissions reductions — including CCUS and many other options — should make up the vast majority of mitigation in those plans. But carbon removal can be used to counterbalance a much smaller portion of emissions (both CO2 and other greenhouse gases) that are too hard to abate with other means. In the longer term, carbon removal is also needed to achieve and sustain net-negative emissions to reduce the excess CO2 in the atmosphere that is causing harmful climate impacts.

Notably, the term "carbon management" can be used to include both CCUS and carbon removal. This can be misleading, because along with playing different roles in reaching net-zero, CCUS and carbon removal have different risks, benefits and social and environmental impacts.

3) Which Sectors Could Use CCUS? Which Sectors Need CCUS the Most to Decarbonize?

The two sectors where CCUS could be deployed are power and industry, which represent large "point sources" of emissions. Whether it makes sense to use CCUS in those sectors will depend on costs, the feasibility of other decarbonization options, and other project- and location-specific factors.

In the industrial sector, production of materials such as cement, steel and chemicals will likely need CCUS to fully decarbonize in the near term. This is because other decarbonization approaches do not exist or are in earlier stages of development. Current production methods for these industrial products include chemical reactions that inherently release CO2, leading to "process emissions," as well as fuel combustion for high temperatures that causes "thermal emissions." CCUS can be used to abate both process emissions and thermal emissions, making it a particularly impactful decarbonization option for industry if scaled.

While a number of CCUS projects are being announced in the industrial sector, the application is still nascent. Heidelberg's cement CCUS project in Brevik, Norway reached mechanical completion in late 2024 and will become the world's first commercial-scale carbon capture cement plant when commissioned.

Heidelberg's Brevik Norway CCUS cement plant. Photo by NGR Kartheek/WRI

CCUS can also be used in oil and gas refining (another part of the industrial sector) to reduce emissions associated with the production of fuels used in heavy industries, transportation and power. However, the current rates of oil and gas use are incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C, the target set by the Paris Agreement to ensure the world avoids the worst impacts of climate change — and using CCUS on refineries should not be a reason for that to continue. Lowering emissions associated with production does not reduce the emissions from these fuels when they're ultimately combusted.

Within the power sector, the IPCC and other credible modeling by IEA and BloombergNEF indicate that power plants retrofitted with CCUS are one option for the clean, firm power which can complement solar and wind that are likely to predominantly supply the grid. (Other options for clean, firm power include hydropower, geothermal, hydrogen, nuclear and long-duration storage.) The actual deployment of CCUS will depend in part on its costs when fully commercialized, along with individual country resources and circumstances.

In these sectors, it's crucial to note that the use of CCUS should not be seen as a license to perpetuate the use of fossil fuels — particularly in the power sector, where many other options are commercially available today. CCUS could play an indispensable role in the industrial sector but isn't a silver bullet. Overall, the use of CCUS will need to be accompanied by a steep decline in the production and use of fossil fuels, along with other decarbonization options to address remaining emissions.

4) How Much Carbon Dioxide Is CCUS Currently Capturing?

According to recent reports — and depending on the source — there are around 50 operational CCUS projects globally, with about 44 under construction and more than 500 in some stage of planning. Operational projects are capturing about 50 million metric tons of CO2 per year (MtCO2/yr). If all projects in development were complete, estimated total CCUS capacity would be between 416 and 520 MtCO2/yr, which is around 0.9%-1.1% of today's global greenhouse gas emissions.

Currently, North America leads in operational projects. Most of these applications are in the natural gas processing and ethanol industries, where capturing CO2 is relatively less expensive than in other subsectors. Other regions, such as Europe and the Middle East, also have a handful of operational projects. And a growing number of new projects have been announced in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Oceania/Australia.

Projects in the development pipeline are increasingly focused on blue hydrogen (where natural gas is used to produce hydrogen and then CO2 emissions are captured), as well as applications in industrial sectors like steel, cement, bioenergy, ammonia and refining.

5) How Much CCUS Is Needed to Reach Net Zero, and What Portion of the Total Mitigation Need Is This?

The IPCC, IEA and others find that CCUS can play a critical but limited role in addressing the climate crisis. Their analyses show that CCUS can be a complementary tool to reduce emissions where eliminating fossil fuel use or other emissions are not feasible.

The 2023 IEA Roadmap to Net Zero estimates that in order to reach net-zero in the energy sector by 2050, CCUS would need to contribute about 8% of the total CO2 mitigation of energy sector emissions. This includes around 1 gigaton of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2030 (out of a total of 15 GtCO2 abated by that date) and 5 GtCO2 in 2050 at net zero. Notably, this roadmap only considers energy-related CO2 emissions — total GHG emissions across all sectors are around 59 GtCO2e and need to be roughly halved by 2030 to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C. Considering this fuller picture, the role of CCUS would likely be a smaller percentage of total mitigation.

The IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report, which examined over 200 mitigation scenarios that could limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, found that there are no scenarios in which CCUS would allow continued use of fossil fuels at current levels, let alone expanded oil and gas production. IPCC scenarios show a wide range of potential deployment of carbon capture technology: CCUS applied to fossil fuels reduces CO2 emissions by 0-5 GtCO2 by 2030 with a median of 1 GtCO2. By 2050, that range is 0-13 GtCO2 with a median of 2-3 GtCO2. This means that by 2050, roughly 6% of the mitigation needed to reach net zero could come from CCUS.

The IPCC recognizes that CCUS faces "technological, economic, institutional, ecological-environmental and socio-cultural barriers" such that current rates of CCUS deployment are far below those in most scenarios that limit global warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees C. At the same time, the number of CCUS projects in the pipeline has increased by several hundred each year. If all of the announced projects come online, capture levels could increase 8 to 10 times over.

6) What Are the Risks and Concerns Associated with CCUS?

Two key concerns around scaling up CCUS technology are: (1) slow adoption of CCUS technology, and (2) a fear that using CCUS will perpetuate the use of fossil fuels and continue negative health and social impacts of emitting facilities.

Technological challenges

While carbon capture has been in use since the 1970s in the U.S. (almost entirely for natural gas processing and for using CO2 for enhanced oil recovery), its adoption has been slow. There are not many examples to date of its successful application, and several high-profile projects have been abandoned or shuttered. Unlike many other clean technologies (such as solar photovoltaic), CCUS systems can't be mass produced because they are specifically designed to match the facility that's capturing the CO2. CCUS projects are also complex to coordinate because each step of the process — capture, transport and sequestration — is often owned and operated by a different company.

Additionally, each CCUS system has high upfront costs (often upwards of $1 billion) that can be prohibitive for project developers, combined with a riskier revenue structure compared to other clean technologies. However, costs are expected to decline as more projects come online, the technology improves and financing costs fall.

Furthermore, today's carbon capture systems do not capture 100% of emissions. Most are designed to capture 90%, but reported capture rates are lower in some cases. Additional energy is also required to power the capture system — depending on the application it can be 13%-44% more. Access to suitable geologic sequestration sites may also be needed, and in some cases, these can be far from capture sites, requiring CO2 transport.

Transport and geologic sequestration of CO2 present their own risks — mainly of CO2 leakage. While CO2 in high concentrations from a pipeline leak could cause asphyxiation risk under certain circumstances, CO2 is not flammable like leaks from oil and gas pipelines. The environmental and health impacts of potential CO2 leakage are site specific and merit further research and testing to minimize them. Strong regulatory policy is also needed to set high standards for site characterization, monitoring, transparency and emergency response.

Concerns about perpetuating fossil fuel use

For some groups, a major concern associated with CCUS is its potential to lock in fossil power production and other fossil-dependent processes. Associated with this, CCUS can be seen to perpetuate the negative health and environmental impacts caused by emissions intensive facilities — and act as a band-aid over these polluting industries, which disproportionately harm vulnerable communities that have historically borne higher levels of air pollution and toxic emissions.

Recent research shows that carbon capture systems can reduce (but not eliminate) harmful pollutants. But in many cases, community-based organizations and other advocates would prefer a facility to be shut down and investment to focus instead on cleaner production processes, such as renewables in the power sector.

In the U.S., where CCUS has recently received billions of dollars in government funding, the types of facilities that could be retrofitted with CCUS are often located in communities that have already borne the negative environmental and health impacts of living near power or industrial facilities. While there is evidence that CCUS can help reduce non-CO2 pollutants along with capturing CO2, many environmental justice groups are concerned that CCUS is being pushed on them without consultation, and that CCUS will be used as a way to prolong a facility's lifetime and continue the local harms it causes.

7) What Are Some Ways to Deploy CCUS Responsibly?

Responsible deployment of CCUS technology must focus not only on ensuring that the technology is effective at reducing emissions, but also that its application minimizes harm to people and the environment and maximizes benefits to them.

Robust governance and regulatory frameworks are needed to facilitate safe and effective deployment of CCUS where it is needed to reach climate goals. Regulatory frameworks should address issues such as permitting, liability and long-term monitoring as well as supportive infrastructure, such as pipelines and pore space ownership, for geologic sequestration sites. Regulatory frameworks should also require strategies to quantify, transparently share and minimize negative environmental and social impacts, such as emission of air pollutants. Some of this work is already underway in the U.S., including guidance to promote responsible development and permitting of CCUS projects and state-level regulatory frameworks, starting with California. In Europe, the European Commission has developed a CCS Directive that establishes a legal framework for safe and effective geologic sequestration of CO2.

Any plan to implement CCUS must involve meaningful engagement with and buy-in from the local communities around existing facilities where project developers plan to add CCUS. A critical early step in any community engagement process is understanding community perspectives on the project and sharing information on expected local environmental and health impacts.

One outcome of this engagement process can be development of a legally binding community benefits agreement. These agreements lay out specific benefits the community will receive in exchange for supporting a project — such as local jobs or other types of investment. Community benefits plans, which can lead to community benefits agreements, are required in the vast majority of U.S. government funding for carbon capture and carbon removal projects.

Retrofitting a facility with CCUS does not always make sense as the first decarbonization option for technical and financial reasons. But some CO2 emission sources, particularly those in heavy industry (such as cement process emissions), have few other options. Generally, from an economic standpoint, it makes sense to focus CCUS technology on facilities that are younger, efficient, and located near suitable options for CO2 sequestration or use. The ability to acquire the relevant permits and coordinate across different owners of CO2 transport and sequestration infrastructure are also critical to consider.

Companies using or planning to use CCUS at their facilities should adhere to relevant regulatory frameworks; monitor and report the environmental impacts of the technology; engage with local communities; and commit to project agreements, including community benefits agreements. These companies should also demonstrate their commitments towards responsible decarbonization by implementing other decarbonization technologies and practices in addition to CCUS. Along with verifying carbon removal, third party auditors could also be used to evaluate the health and environmental impacts of CCUS projects to provide greater transparency and accountability.

What's Next for CCUS?

CCUS will likely need to play some role in helping meet net-zero goals. The ultimate level of scale-up required is uncertain and will depend on many factors, including how quickly other decarbonization options are developed and commercialized in different sectors, the level of policy and financial support provided, and how public perceptions shift in the coming years.

At the same time, it is important to separate the technological feasibility from the policies, regulations and incentives that drive where and how CCUS is applied. Ensuring that the needed applications of CCUS do not perpetuate fossil fuels, or local harms related to power or industrial facilities, will be critical to making it a viable option to support reaching net zero.

While there have been mixed signals about continued U.S. federal support for CCUS, other countries continue to move forward with policy support and project development. Regional hubs in the Middle East and Northern Europe are consolidating CCUS infrastructure within high emitting regions and spurring cross-border collaboration. As CCUS advances, these leaders must ensure that it is not used to avoid or slow down the process of phasing out fossil fuels, which is imperative to meeting our collective climate goals.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in November 2023. It was updated in May 2025 to reflect recent developments in CCUS policy and project development.

carbon-capture-facility-germany.jpg Climate carbon capture and storage (CCS) carbon removal industry FIGI Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
• Industrial Decarbonization

Authors Katie Lebling Ankita Gangotra Karl Hausker Zachary Byrum

To Compete in International Low-Carbon Markets, Chemical Companies Need Transparent Emissions Accounting alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/15/2025 - 15:50

The U.S. chemical industry produces over 70,000 different types of plastics, fabrics, personal care, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, rubber and other products. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that, combined with oil refining, chemical production is responsible for about 8% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product. Of that output, 28% is exported at an estimated projected value of $175 billion throughout 2025.

Chemical production’s large role in the U.S. economy and the exports that sustain it make it a vital industry. Yet, it must adapt to growing pressure internationally for goods that are produced with zero or few emissions despite expectations that both U.S. chemical demand and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are expected to grow approximately 35% in a business-as-usual scenario.

For the U.S. to remain competitive, retain access to important foreign markets and reduce its trade deficit in line with the Trump Administration’s goals, its chemical manufacturers must modernize and reduce emissions. A standardized carbon accounting framework is fundamental to maximizing investments in innovative, low-carbon technologies.

Carbon-Based Trade Policy

International action to reduce greenhouse gases is increasingly including emissions-intensive industrial products like cement, steel and chemicals. Carbon tariffs on imports are a tool that can monetize a country’s industrial innovation and carbon advantage while inducing other countries to reduce their emissions. Fundamentally, the various forms of carbon tariffs work by levying fees on imports that exceed a set emissions-intensity threshold, such as tons of CO2 per ton of steel.

The most prominent such measure is the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which would levy a fee on carbon intensive imports based on the EU’s carbon price. Other countries have carbon policies that could be expanded to include imports. Examples include China’s Emissions Trading System and Vietnam’s carbon market — which will soon cover domestic cement, steel and aluminum — and 27 additional countries that have carbon prices or taxes.

If the EU’s pioneering carbon market serves as a model for other countries, incorporating relatively simpler commodities like steel and cement open the door for chemicals’ inclusion later, given the sector’s emissions. Globally, chemical production emits 1.3 billion to 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)  per year, or up to 2.5% of all emissions; it comprises about 15% of industrial emissions, after steel and cement. As one of the largest chemical producers in the world, the U.S. share in chemical trade and emissions is substantial, as is its need to modernize.

Chemical Sector Emissions in the U.S.

A recent estimate suggests that the production life cycle of petrochemicals—chemicals derived from fossil fuels— emit 306 million to 343 million metric tons of CO2e  in the U.S. Multiple pathways have emerged to reduce emissions from petrochemicals. However, reducing emissions from chemical production is expensive and can add an estimated 55% “green premium” or additional cost for foundational precursor chemicals. To meet international pressure for low emission chemicals and maintain its prominence as the global innovation center, the U.S. must work with producers to reduce emissions.

A range of supportive policies, including grants and incentives, were passed during the Biden Administration to derisk and encourage investment in low-emission industrial technologies and processes. A keystone policy is the Industrial Demonstrations Program (IDP), which awarded seven projects up to $500 million to manufacture low-emission chemicals. For example, a project is under negotiation for $200 million to recycle CO2 from chemical production to make new chemicals.

These policies to spur innovative industry — many of which were created through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law — are also creating tens of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in investments across the country, particularly in areas that have been harmed by deindustrialization. However, their economic gains are being lost or are uncertain due to federal cutting of vital industrial programs.

Satisfying Growing Demand for Low-Emission Chemicals

Notwithstanding the demand for low-emission products from countries with current or future carbon tariffs, there is growing voluntary demand from producers to make more sustainable products and from companies to purchase those products. For example, the Science Based Targets Initiative (SBTi) enables and collects corporate commitments to reduce emissions. Over half of its 11,000 members are targeting supply chain emissions, all of which nearly guaranteed to contain chemical products.

However, these companies must understand the emission intensity of chemicals (i.e. GHG emissions per unit of product), including emissions along the value chain.  But due to the fragmented nature of the industry this foundational information is often inaccessible and makes tracing emissions of 70,000 different end-use products notoriously complex.

To assist businesses and consumers intent on purchasing less carbon-intensive chemical products and design effective policy to reduce emissions, the U.S. needs globally aligned robust frameworks to monitor, report and verify data.  This includes standardized frameworks to measure emissions across the value chain, develop industry average and low-emissions benchmarks for chemical production and report the emissions intensity of primary and end-use chemical products.

Scoping out the Problem

To reduce their products’ emission intensity, companies must know and eliminate the emissions from the facility making the product (Scope 1), the electricity they purchased (Scope 2) and all purchased goods and services up the supply chain and from use and disposal (Scope 3). And if down-stream suppliers want to sell low-emissions products, they must account for the emissions from the value chain of that product.

Current U.S. federal law only requires facilities that emit more than 25 kilotons CO2e to report their Scope 1 emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding determined that GHGs like CO2 fall under the agency’s regulatory purview, and challenges to this have been rejected by the Supreme Court several times. However, the Trump administration has ordered the EPA to reconsider this rule, which would effectively eliminate the requirement for nearly all facilities to collect and report this data. Additionally, certain public companies were required to disclose their total Scope 2 emissions in their Security and Exchange Commission filings until the Trump administration struck the rule. There are no existing or previous requirements for companies to measure and disclose Scope 3 emissions.

This does not mean Scope 2 and Scope 3 data or efforts to collect it do not exist. Accounting frameworks designed by the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHGP) and International Standards Organization (ISO) guide multi-sector efforts like the Carbon Disclosure Project and Global Reporting Initiative, through which companies can voluntarily reduce their direct (Scope 1) and indirect emissions (Scopes 2 and 3).

GHGP and ISO also underly sector-specific emission measurement frameworks and benchmarking. Together For Sustainability, a coalition of chemical companies, published carbon intensity accounting recommendations that align with the GHGP and ISO rules. Similarly, the Science Based Targets Initiative has developed draft guidance for chemical companies to set emission reduction targets.

Additionally, there are databases for product life cycle assessments (LCA) and also the Federal LCA Commons, which is a repository of LCA methodologies that includes chemicals and petrochemicals. But these data are often secondary, used when data directly provided by an emitter are unavailable and produced using unharmonized standards and methodologies.

Emissions Accounting and Complex Value Chains

Measuring and accounting for greenhouse gas emissions can be done at the company-, facility- and, ideally, the product-level. Currently, the Clean Air Act requires high emitting facilities to collect and report their emissions to the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP). Companies aggregate facility-level (Scope 1) and Scopes 2 and 3 emissions, where possible, to estimate their corporate emissions.

Companies or third parties use life cycle assessments to estimate a product’s carbon intensity by measuring emissions along its manufacturing process. For product-level data in the industrial sector this is typically “cradle-to-gate” emissions (A1 to A3 of a life cycle), which includes extracting and processing raw materials, transportation of the feedstock and fuels, and processing of the feedstock including direct or indirect emissions (from purchased electricity, for instance). 

For chemical products, carrying out LCAs often requires making difficult determinations about how to account for and attribute emissions among numerous products created through multiple manufacturing processes. In addition, life cycle assessments require establishing boundaries to determine a product’s emissions.

An even more complete picture than cradle-to-gate is cradle-to-grave (feedstock to disposal) or cradle-to-cradle (feedstock to recycling) emissions accounting approaches, which include many other emissions and accounting variables typically out of the producer’s control.

Including the disposal or recycling stages requires more considerations, some of which are heavily debated. Tracing the carbon intensity of a single product grows in difficulty with the number of processing stages, coproducts and disaggregation in the supply chain; this is further obfuscated by a lack of transparency and inconsistency in accounting methods.

Each production stage typically occurs in separate, specialized facilities that can produce a diverse number of goods depending on demand fluctuations. Ideally, each facility would use standardized measurement systems and securely transmit primary data across the supply chain. Realistically, uncertainty likely dominates as each facility could use different standards to measure Scope 1 (e.g. direct metering, mass balance, stoichiometry) and Scope 2 emissions and allocate co-products (mass, economic or energy balances).

If facilities do not publicize product-level emissions or disclose their production technologies, secondary data such as public LCAs or aggregated data can be used. However, this introduces uncertainty. Secondary data resources may vary and there is no strong incentive to use systems with greater granularity, such as ClimateTRACE and other initiatives. Emissions from feedstocks are an additional complicating factor, as fugitive methane emissions are frequently underestimated or ignored. Additionally, lower-carbon alternative feedstocks like biomass and captured CO2 have complex emissions profiles that can range from negative to positive emissions depending on many factors.   

Shorter, simpler supply chains reduce the number of Scope 3 variables. For example, one study examining carbon accounting uncertainty for primary chemicals assessed 19 different ammonia production pathways with four feedstocks. In contrast, they assessed 63 pathways for ethylene with 14 feedstocks and a larger range of carbon intensities. Ammonia requires fewer processing facilities than ethylene, reducing the number of stages where carbon intensity data must be calculated. And most ammonia goes toward a single use.

As a result, setting emission standards for ammonia is more straightforward than most primary chemicals. This shorter, more integrated supply chain is conducive to policy that relies on life cycle assessments and emission benchmarks. For example, Japan has enacted a low-carbon ammonia standard and the European Union includes ammonia as the first primary chemical included in its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

Case Study: Ammonia and Ethylene

Ammonia

Synthetic ammonia fertilizer is the foundation for the modern agricultural system. Its supply chain is relatively straightforward, as is measuring its carbon intensity. Natural gas is extracted and transported to an ammonia plant where it is processed into hydrogen and combined with nitrogen to make ammonia. That ammonia is then transported to customers to be used directly (most common) or is processed once more at the same plant or another facility into a different fertilizer. While ammonia can be used for other products like explosives, plastics or fuel (a potential decarbonization tool) in the U.S., 88% of it goes toward agriculture.

Nearly all ammonia goes toward a single use and is produced in integrated facilities meant to only produce ammonia (or possibly fertilizer derivatives), enabling consumers to more easily identify their product’s source and emissions.

Ethylene

Ethylene is the most produced primary chemical in the U.S. and is the precursor to common plastics and products such as bags, detergents and pharmaceuticals. It starts with natural gas, which is processed into ethane (among other natural gas liquids). Ethane is sent to a chemical plant where it is broken down in a steam cracker into ethylene and other primary chemicals. The ethylene is then converted into a multitude of polymers (intermediate chemicals), before being turned into thousands of different chemical end products.

Unlike ammonia, each step of ethylene’s supply chain can branch off into a multitude of different products, sometimes made in the same reactor. In turn, those products follow their own supply chains. For example, ethane, a chemical feedstock, is produced alongside other natural gas liquids like butane and propane. Ethylene is produced in the same reactor as other primary chemicals, the ratios of which depend on the facility design and daily market fluctuations. The branching paths continue through polymerization and final plastic conversion.  

Existing and Proposed Standards Frameworks

Ethylene and other primary chemicals that face similar accounting difficulties lack harmonized standards, making it difficult to set decarbonization policies. However, some organizations have worked to design harmonized approaches that could be incorporated into policy.

The “general standards” are foundational frameworks that sector-specific organizations use to develop standards for their industries. The chemical sector-specific standards propose methods to estimate, track and communicate product carbon intensity and emission reductions. Most, if not all sector-specific standards, will indicate that their proposals comply with general frameworks set by, for example, ISO and GHG Protocol.

The Industrial Transition Accelerator developed a similar summary of standards for ammonia and methanol that have broad uptake in policies across multiple countries and regions. 

Emissions Accounting Frameworks GuidanceDescriptionKey Guidance Contribution for ChemicalsGeneral Standards Frameworks (Economywide)ISO 14064 and 14067Overarching principles frameworks that guide how companies, projects and third parties manage emissions and data.ISO standards series sets the overarching frameworks for accounting and verifying GHG emissions and product carbon intensity.GHG ProtocolProvides precise measurement and calculation methodologies that comply with ISO principles.Scope measurement guidance is applicable to the chemical sector. Scope 3 guidance is particularly useful for assessing product carbon intensity.PACT Pathfinder FrameworkEstablishes a framework for companies to convey product carbon intensity data across the value chain.Framework for primary data conveyance is applicable to specific sectors.ISCC Carbon Footprint CertificationEnables the certification of product intensity for products and value chains.ISCC’s foundational certification system that is furthered tailored for specific sectors and products (see below).Chemical Sector-Specific FrameworksSBTi Chemical Sector GuidanceSets sector-specific guidance for companies to reduce their emissions to achieve global net zero by 2050.Draft guidance for the chemical companies to calculate and set emission targets for specific products. Provides calculation tools for reducing process and heat emissions using accepted reduction tools.TfS Product Carbon Footprint Guidelines for ChemicalsGuidance developed by industry to estimate product carbon intensity, aligning with ISO and GHG Protocol principles.Establishes standard, comparable accounting and reporting standards that companies can use to measure cradle-to-gate emissions, with an emphasis on Scope 3 measurements.Dow Product Carbon Footprint CalculationMethodology developed by Dow to estimate life cycle emissions through standardized carbon intensity calculations.Adds on to existing frameworks supply chain methodology that uses a consistent calculation system (mass-balance) across suppliers to estimate a chemical product’s final carbon intensity.SCSS Certification Standard for Product Carbon Intensity and Reduction for Chemicals and Co-ProductsEstablishes the requirements for producers to achieve third-party certification of a product’s estimated carbon intensity and how it has been reduced.Adds the specific requirements a chemical producer needs to achieve certification by a third party in addition to methodologies (e.g. TfS, Dow) they may have used to estimate product carbon intensity.Plastics EuropeMethodology for emission allocations in steam crackers.Establishes “Main Products” and “Co-Products” from steam crackers. Emission factors should only apply to Main Products, prioritizing Mass Basis allocation.RMI Plastics GHG Reporting GuidanceEstablishes carbon accounting guidance for the plastic processing and molding sectorFocuses on how plastic producers, rather than just chemical producers, can measure and report their own emissions to increase Scope 3 transparency and drive informed purchasing decisions.How to Improve Data Transparency

Other industrial subsectors such as cement and steel are leading the charge in setting product-level reporting standards and carbon labels to kickstart private, state , federal and international green procurement initiatives. This is partially due to the relative simplicity of their supply chains which produce far fewer different products for which emissions must be accounted than the chemical sector. This, in combination with the public sector’s outsized share of demand for cement and steel, facilitates development of emissions reporting frameworks alongside green procurement programs.

There’s an opportunity for policymakers and companies to work together to codify proposed or similarly interoperable and harmonized standards for the chemical sector. Although the Trump administration abolished the Buy Clean program, a pivotal purchasing program to drive clean cement and steel production, some states have passed their own Buy Clean programs and U.S. producers will still face international pressure to reduce emissions for exports.

Maintain and Amend Reporting Requirements

It would disadvantage U.S. competitiveness for the Trump administration to follow through on its efforts to eliminate or hamper emissions reporting. This data is the bedrock for future action and should be collected for U.S. chemical companies to innovate ahead of competitors.

Assuming the databases are maintained, some of the information that polluting facilities report to the EPA — emission volumes, process units and fuel use — are publicly available, while other data — feedstock types and volumes and amount of product — are classified as Confidential Business Information (CBI). While CBI rules protect producers by keeping vital information away from competitors, these rules also complicate attempts by third partis to calculate Scope 3 emissions or estimate product carbon intensity.

GHGRP’s public interface could add reasonable measures of transparency that enable third parties to estimate or verify production emissions while also protecting producers’ confidentiality. One simple way to do this would be to list the main products manufactured in a chemical facility.

Currently, facilities are not required to list their products, but some can be inferred. For example, chemical plants may list an ethane cracker or ethylene processing unit among its emission sources. This reveals that the plant produces ethylene, but these typically produce other chemicals as well that should also be listed — without accompanying production volumes — to improve clarity within the chemical supply chain.

Codify National Emissions Averages for Primary and Key Intermediary Chemicals and Plastics

Congress recently introduced several bills, some with bipartisan support, that would similarly address industry’s exposure to climate-based trade measures. Fundamental to these bills is the need to compare the carbon intensity of industrial commodities produced in the U.S. to that of other countries. The PROVE IT Act, most explicitly, would require the U.S. to study and publish average emission intensities for key commodities, including petrochemicals and plastics.

While averages are subject to uncertainty and could differ substantially by facility, they could provide a workable benchmark for policy that protects domestic producers and reduces emissions. U.S. chemicals have been estimated to hold a carbon advantage over many of its competitors. These national average emission intensities for primary products would serve as placeholder values to help downstream producers in estimating their products’ emissions intensities in the absence of specific product data. To reduce errors from remaining uncertainty, the benchmark could be set slightly above the estimated average.

Over time, policy could work to incorporate more specificity in their design, ideally with frameworks that align with international systems. Part of that work includes increasing transparency in how existing emissions are currently reported at facilities.

Establish a Framework for Assessing and Communicating Chemical Product Carbon Intensity for Demand-Side Policy

National averages and improving GHGRP’s reporting transparency are important first steps to developing and improving carbon intensity’s data accuracy. These should be foundational to enshrining standards for carbon accounting, tracking and reporting through product category rules (PCRs) and environmental product declarations (EPDs) for chemical products.

EPDs are akin to nutrition labels for commodities and materials, disclosing a product’s global warming potential and other environmental impacts. PCRs are the rules that producers must follow when creating an EPD, outlining methodologies, definitions and scopes for covered products. In concert, EPDs and PCRs harmonize and standardize how producers measure and disclose their emissions, which unlocks policy opportunities (e.g. public procurement, advance market commitments) that benefit compliant and high-performing manufacturers.  

The Inflation Reduction Act authorized $250 million for the EPA’s EPD Assistance Program, which sought to develop EPDs and PCRs for construction materials and to feed into the now defunct federal Buy Clean Program. A similar program could develop a Digital Product Passports for chemical products, whereby an agency works with industry or a coalition like Together for Sustainability (TfS) to adopt proposed rules on scope, methodologies and metrics. Oregon’s rule on Extended Producer Responsibility uses cradle-to-gate LCAs on packaging and could serve as a model.

An ambitious version of this could be geared toward specific products like the most highly-produced plastics. But given the heterogeneity of final products and their hundreds of minute additives, initial efforts could be more effective by defining the scope around primary chemical production — putting a carbon label on chemicals like ammonia, ethylene or benzene, toluene and xylenes (BTX) based on consistent emissions accounting principles. This reduces the number of upstream factors to incorporate while the system matures, emphasizes the production stage where the highest percentage of emissions are concentrated and involves some of the largest companies that are more likely to be able to afford, finance or incorporate emission reduction technologies in the near-term.

Downstream purchasers can cite the percentage of reduced emissions that came from their less carbon-intensive primary chemicals. Over time, more downstream facilities and products can be included in the EPD’s scope, such tools like the MiQ-Highwood index for methane emissions.

How the U.S. Can Become Global Data Champions

U.S. dominance in innovative manufacturing relies as deeply on data as it does on the people putting steel in the ground to build new, advanced facilities. Manufacturers developing cutting-edge technology to compete with new international carbon tariffs and satisfy demand for cleaner, reliable materials must be able to agree on how to measure the carbon in their supply chains. By working with industry, policymakers can champion data infrastructure, leading the charge to enact frameworks that will guide manufacturing and trade and avoid being left behind by foreign competitors.

chemical-emissions-accounting.jpg Climate United States industry U.S. Climate GHG emissions pollution fossil fuels carbon pricing FIGI U.S. Energy Topics Type Technical Perspective Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Industrial Decarbonization

Authors Zach Byrum Caroline Melo Ribeiro

Students Take the Wheel in Push for More Electric School Buses alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/15/2025 - 08:25

Upset with adults for not taking the climate crisis seriously and inspired by youth climate strikes around the globe, students in Arizona found a way to get grown-ups to listen.

In 2019, they founded the Arizona Youth Climate Coalition (AZYCC) and over the years successfully convinced the city of Tucson to adopt a climate emergency declaration and an EV Readiness Roadmap. By 2023, the city, county and state all had climate plans and were getting to work. But the team didn’t want to stop — where else could they make a change?

As they assessed their options, Ojas Sanghi, a member of the coalition, attended a national conference full of like-minded student activists. Many of them were working on school district climate action plans. A light bulb went off.  

Sanghi came back to Tucson and together with a team from the AZYCC (ages 13 to 20) worked with their school board to write and pass a comprehensive climate action resolution covering topics from a greenhouse gas inventory to plant-based meals.

“A critical component of this resolution is electric school buses,” Sanghi highlighted in a video posted to YouTube. “They’re quieter, healthier, saves districts money and release no tail pipe emissions and are proven to work everywhere from the winters in Michigan to right here in the desert heat of Arizona.”

The team in Arizona is part of a growing wave of U.S. students calling for climate action at the school district level. While they may not be old enough to vote, their voices can make a big difference.

Schools are a key site for climate action. The U.S. Department of Education found that school districts emit around 72 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from their energy use alone. School districts also own the largest public transportation fleet in the country with roughly 480,000 buses. Today 76% of those school buses run on diesel and another 19% run on gasoline.

Diesel-, gasoline-, propane- and compressed natural gas-burning school buses all produce a number of dangerous air pollutants, which contribute to respiratory and heart diseases and climate change. The good news? Electrifying the full U.S. school bus fleet would not only improve student health but also reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 9 million metric tons per year, the equivalent of taking 2 million cars off the road.

Students see that pushing for school bus electrification gives them an opportunity to make a difference in their own communities. From Arizona to Ohio, students are becoming an impactful voice in the effort to electrify fleets.

Student Advocacy Leads to More Buses

In Montgomery County, Maryland, which currently leads all U.S. school districts in electric school bus adoption, students played a key role in the county’s plan to purchase 326 electric school buses.  

More Student Voices

Across the country, students have found ways of fighting climate change through school bus electrification. Read more of their stories in the WRI's Electric School Bus Initiative’s Student Voices Series.

In collaboration with partners and communities, WRI’s Electric School Bus Initiative aims to build momentum toward an equitable transition of the entire U.S. school bus fleet to electric. 

The initiative is working to uplift student voices through actions like co-developing a teacher training program in New York, working on an electric school bus campaign with Partnership for Southern Equity's Youth Empowered Solutions (YES!) and interviewing students for key research. 

Find out more here.

Emily Lee, a junior at Montgomery Blair High School, got involved with climate advocacy through the BIPOC MOCO Green New Deal Program three years ago after dealing with anxiety around climate change and feeling powerless while sitting on fossil-fuel emitting diesel buses.

“Everybody kind of assumes, 'well it's not my problem it' s someone else's problem',” she said. “But the issue is if everybody has that same idea that ‘it's not my problem, someone else will take care of it,’ [then] nobody's ever going to take care of it, so it needs to start somewhere.”

She continued: “So what we do is we advocate for electric school buses; we advocate for clean energy. Montgomery County Public School System Board of Education committed to only buying electric school buses, and we’ve also attempted to eliminate carbon emissions by 2030. By advocating for electric school buses here in Montgomery County, it persuades and encourages other students in other places around the U.S. to want the same.” 

Even today, student advocates continue to engage the county in the critical deployment phase.

In Cincinnati, Ohio, Audrey Symon, a senior at Walnut Hill High School, is part of an advocacy group that includes students and parents. Their efforts first helped the Cincinnati Public School System (CPS) secure a $3.95 million grant from the EPA’s Clean School Bus program.

“It was because we showed the district that we cared about electrification, for the health and safety of the students and their futures,” she said. “It was because we were persistent in advocating for the future we wanted to create.”

Additional efforts by Symon and the Electrify CPS Campaign resulted in even more grant money from the EPA and deeper commitments from the school system.

“In less than a year, our campaign — a small but mighty collection of CPS parents, students and teachers — [was] able to unanimously pass our Renewable Energy and Electrification Resolution, which outlines a plan for our school district to transition away from fossil fuels, including diesel buses, into an era of sustainable energy use,” Symon said. “Now, our school district is continuing to tackle the goals outlined in our resolution, recently acquiring an additional $8.6 million from the EPA to fund electric school buses, with 35 already added to the fleet.”

Electric School Bus Benefits Go Beyond Climate

While many students got involved in advocating for electric school buses due to their climate benefits, the students who experience the impacts of dirty diesel buses every day also understand their negative impact on physical and mental health. These burdens are particularly potent for students with disabilities who experience sensory overstimulation from diesel buses, difficulty boarding the bus due to unreliable school bus ramps, and trouble breathing from extended time in and around bus exhaust.

“School buses can be super noisy, which can create overstimulation and stress for those who have sound sensitivity. Even the sheer amount of diesel fumes that are emitted from school buses can cause headaches and dizziness for students,” said Sahana Chauduri, a senior at Eleanor Roosevelt High School in Greenbelt, Md. “One of my friends who uses a trach tube especially faces trouble with breathing while on the school bus. For a system designed to be universal, there are many issues with my current public school bus system.”

Today roughly 15% of K-12 students have a disability and, for many of them, school buses are the only way they can get to school. Despite laws guaranteeing  accommodations, recent research found that school buses often remain inaccessible due to issues with designs and bus operations. Research also found that students with disabilities , low-income students and Black students, are more likely to ride on school buses than white and nondisabled students. Extended commute times not only increase the amount of time kids spend in uncomfortable riding conditions but also increases their exposure to diesel pollution that can cause asthma, cancer and other respiratory illnesses.

Students with disabilities like Chauduri are calling on school districts and policymakers to think about these disparate health impacts as they consider making the transition to electric: “Electric school buses have the opportunity to serve as a major solution for the pitfalls of diesel school buses,” she said. “They are also up to 20 decibels quieter than diesel school buses, which would be helpful for those with sound sensitivity. With the addition of a heating unit, electric school buses can also have the option to allow students to self-regulate the heating of their seats. This is something I could see myself benefiting from, since my muscles tend to cramp up and stiffen during cold temperatures.”

Electric school buses, like these in Montgomery County, Md., not only bring climate benefits from no tailpipe emissions, but also benefit the mental and physical health of students who ride the bus to school. Photo by Katherine Roboff / Electric School Bus Initiative.   Student Advocates Need Adult Allies

Despite best efforts, some students are facing challenges convincing their school districts to invest in electric school buses. In New York, three students worked on a project to create an analytical model that would help schools envision the process of decarbonizing their bus fleets but ran into challenges obtaining responses or data from the school system.

 “Working on the [electric school bus] project was disheartening at times,” said Annabella Pathania, a recent graduate from Kingston High School in Mid-Hudson Valley, New York. “New York State has a mandate requiring that all school transportation be zero-emission by 2035, but the administration in my school district didn’t seem at all interested in the work I was doing. My emails to them would often go unanswered and I would only make progress due to the intervention of a few supportive teachers.”

And school districts sometimes face challenges to electrification that students cannot overcome alone. New research surveying school districts across the country found the main barriers include cost, infrastructure, technological readiness, maintenance, route length and transition fatigue. At the same time, recent research finds that school districts, parents and students alike are excited about the health and air quality benefits that electric school buses can bring to their communities, pointing to an effective starting place for student advocacy.  

While students continue to get their districts excited about electrification, policymakers, practitioners and advocates can help schools electrify by investing in regional technical assistance such as grid infrastructure, funding and financing, and capacity building for school districts and regional practitioners. Regional technical assistance providers are also well-placed to address region-specific infrastructure barriers, local community and political perceptions of electric school buses, and community engagement and partnership approaches.

Despite the challenges, Pathania still found advocating for electric school buses rewarding. “This project revealed to me how it doesn’t matter how monumental your work is, how big of a difference you make in the short term — it matters that you are doing it.”

What Comes Next

While the past decade has seen a lot of momentum and millions of dollars of government funding become available for electric school buses, the Trump Administration is now rolling back climate initiatives. In particular, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean School Bus Program is under threat which has already funded 67% of all committed electric school buses in the U.S.  

In the absence of federal leadership, it's essential that action continue at the state and local level. Now is the time for action at the state and local level. Many states already have their own funding programs and continue to support electrification.

As examples above show, students have the power to be leaders in this transition. 

Sanghi, with the AYCC, summed it up simply: “We made this change, and you can too. Fighting the good fight will take all of us. Embody radical hope and take action.”

school-bus-students.jpg Climate United States electric school bus series U.S. Climate Policy-Electric School Buses electric mobility Clean Energy Type Vignette Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Electric School Bus Initiative

Authors Eleanor Jackson Sophie Young

STATEMENT: US Congressmembers Introduce Bipartisan Carbon Tax Legislation nate.shelter@wri.org Wed, 05/14/2025 - 16:44

WASHINGTON (May 14, 2025) — Today, Representatives Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) and Salud Carbajal (D-CA) introduced the MARKET CHOICE Act, a bipartisan proposal aiming to replace the federal gasoline tax with a broader carbon tax targeting CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and large industrial sources.

The bill also includes a border tax adjustment to tackle carbon intensity and competitiveness issues, joining efforts from both Republicans and Democrats to address trade and climate concerns.

The majority of revenue generated would be allocated to infrastructure investments, replenishing the Highway Trust Fund, which is currently funded by the federal gas tax. Additional funds will enhance U.S. resilience efforts, prioritizing flood mitigation; support for displaced energy workers; assistance to low-income households; and research, development and deployment for carbon removal, carbon capture and storage and advanced energy technologies.

Following is a statement from Christina DeConcini, Director of Government Affairs, World Resources Institute:

“This bipartisan bill recognizes that climate change is an urgent threat to U.S. communities and puts forward a pragmatic approach to address it. This legislation would harness market mechanisms to cut planet-warming emissions, benefiting Americans. As climate impacts intensify across the U.S., it is imperative that Congress adopt effective solutions like the Market Choice Act.

“We are particularly pleased to see the bipartisan support for climate solutions in this moment. The scientific consensus is unequivocal: urgent action is required to both slash emissions and help communities adapt. This legislation exemplifies how smart policy can improve Americans’ lives. We hope to see additional legislation from both Republicans and Democrats to address climate change.”

U.S. Climate United States U.S. Climate Policy-Tax Incentives GHG emissions Type Statement Exclude From Blog Feed? 0