Denmark’s Groundbreaking Agriculture Climate Policy Sets Strong Example for the World shannon.paton@… Tue, 11/12/2024 - 06:30

Denmark’s groundbreaking new agriculture and climate policy, which taxes greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from livestock production, restores nature and pays farmers to reduce nitrogen pollution, is the world’s most comprehensive national effort to address the environmental challenges of agriculture.

Globally, agriculture and associated land use change contribute around one quarter of GHG emissions. To keep global warming below 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) — or even under 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) — governments must take ambitious action to reduce emissions from food systems. However, so far, governments have only devoted a fraction of their efforts to reducing agricultural emissions as they have for fossil-fuel emissions.

Agricultural emissions are particularly significant in Denmark. Today, they contribute more than one quarter of Denmark’s GHG emissions, and with the country’s expected measures to decarbonize energy and transport emissions, agriculture could account for the majority of national emissions within a decade. The country has set ambitious goals to reduce overall economy-wide emissions by 70% by 2030.

Cows graze in a Denmark meadow. Denmark's new agriculture policy hopes to make the country a leader in using mitigation technologies for agriculture just as Denmark has been a leader in wind production. Photo by Frank Bach/Alamy Stock Photo.

Since 1990, Danish farmers have already made some progress by reducing excess nitrogen use — which helps mitigate harmful nitrous oxide emissions — and by increasing the efficiency of the dairy and pork sectors. But until recently, no policy existed that would achieve the country’s announced goal to reduce agricultural emissions by 55% to 65% by 2030.

In June 2024, Denmark announced a Green Tripartite Agreement between government, the environmental community and the agriculture industry, which combines regulatory teeth and largescale government funding to address emissions. The comprehensive policy will simultaneously reduce the country’s nitrogen pollution and improve biodiversity by restoring peatlands and planting new forests.

These new measures complement Denmark’s previously announced efforts to increase production of plant-based proteins and to reduce food loss and waste. The capital city of Copenhagen, which has signed WRI’s Coolfood Pledge, reduced its food procurement-related emissions by 25%, a year earlier than the original 2025 goal, by reducing its consumption of meat and shifting toward plant-based foods. Taken together, these efforts make Denmark a leader in the Produce-Protect-Reduce-Restore actions that WRI research has shown are necessary to feed a growing world population while reducing GHG emissions and restoring nature.

Here we take a closer look at why this new policy is so significant and how it should serve as inspiration for other countries to create similar policies.

What’s in Denmark’s New Agriculture and Climate Policy?

Denmark is a net exporter of agricultural products — primarily pork and dairy — and by one estimate, the country produces three times more food than it consumes. Denmark also accounts for 7% of Europe’s pork production and 4% of its milk.

This contribution to global food supply comes with environmental costs. Around half of Denmark’s agricultural greenhouse gas emissions result directly from production of meat and milk in the form of enteric methane (“cow burps”) and manure management. Other major emissions result from the application of nitrogen fertilizer and manure to soils, and from drainage and farming of peatlands, which releases much of the carbon in peatland soils. Beyond the resulting GHG emissions, the losses of nitrogen through the air from livestock farms and through leaching of water from farm fields contributes to serious pollution in coastal waters. And because Denmark has devoted so much of its land to cropping for animal feed, only a tiny percentage of land is devoted to valuable habitats, such as natural forests or wetlands.

Denmark’s Green Tripartite Agreement includes three key elements that address these environmental challenges:

1) A Livestock Emissions Tax

The agreement includes a marginal tax on livestock emissions that exceed reduction targets. Pork and dairy producers will not pay taxes on 60% of average emissions per animal, so farmers can avoid taxes if they can cut their emissions by 40% of today’s average. But farms will pay about $40 per ton of emissions (carbon dioxide equivalent) above these average levels in 2030, which will rise to around $100 in 2035. Taxes at that rate provide a powerful incentive to reduce emissions to the target level. The revenue these taxes generate will go into a fund designed to help all producers reduce emissions.

2) Incentives to Reduce Nitrogen Pollution

Denmark will pay farmers $100 per ton to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from nitrogen fertilization of farm fields, such as nitrous oxide. It intends to use funds from EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. Nitrogen use by the agricultural sector has been one of the leading causes of marine, freshwater and groundwater pollution and overall nature degradation in the EU.

3) Promote Biodiversity and Preserve and Sequester Carbon

 Denmark will restore 140,000 hectares of drained peatlands currently in agricultural use and establish 250,000 hectares of new forest by 2045. Overall, around 10% of Denmark’s land will be turned into valuable habitat in ways that either reduce carbon emissions or store it. Forest restoration will focus on native trees and those fields that leach the most nitrogen into coastal waters. To support this restoration, Denmark is establishing a new Green Area Fund with 40 billion Danish kroner ($6 billion).

Taken together, the policy is remarkably comprehensive — balancing agricultural production, emissions reductions and nature restoration — and is highly consistent with a WRI 2021 report that set a pathway for Danish agriculture to become carbon neutral and calling for precisely the type of social contract that has emerged.

Unlike some agricultural plans that exaggerate the potential to offset agricultural emissions through soil carbon sequestration on working agricultural lands, this plan focuses primarily on reducing actual agricultural emissions. And unlike a few countries that have turned grazing land into plantation forests to absorb carbon, the ambitious land area restoration will provide valuable habitat and target peatlands, which are the most carbon-valuable form of restoration.

The policy instruments are also generally structured to preserve Denmark’s climate-efficient agricultural production. The well-crafted tax on livestock gives farmers an incentive to increase the efficiency of their production rather than to reduce production.

Nitrogen pollution reductions are to be paid for by redirecting EU farm subsidies, which is a major step forward. A 2020 study by one of us found that almost no such payments have funded climate mitigation, and environment and research groups have long pushed for this kind of funding shift. The policy also includes more broadly worded commitments for necessary research and development, that seeks to create a level playing field for Danish agriculture through EU policy, and to maintain Denmark’s agricultural production.

The coastline of Bornholm in Denmark. The country's agriculture policy aims to prevent pollutants from reaching the sea, as well as restores peatlands, which is the most carbon-valuable form of restoration. Photo by CORTUUM /iStock. How Could Denmark’s Agriculture and Climate Policy Further Improve?

Given the agreement’s high ambition, pointing out any shortcomings may seem unfair, but there are a couple of areas on which policy can build further. WRI’s report on Danish agriculture found that Denmark’s vast subsidies for biogas are cost-ineffective: extending biogas facilities to all of Denmark’s manure could require subsidies equal to the value of all Danish agriculture. Biogas plants have also been adding crops to manure to generate sufficient biogas, and we found that the climate costs of devoting land to these crops can wipe out any climate benefits from the biogas.

Denmark has fortunately scaled back its financing for new biogas facilities, although it is still considering a policy that would target more. As the country commits to reforesting significant amounts of agricultural land, it is even more important to ensure that the agricultural land now used for biogas returns to producing food. To the new policy’s credit, however, it identifies several promising, potentially cheaper, manure management technologies as priorities for trials.

The agreement also says little about mitigating Denmark’s contribution to global emissions and deforestation through its large imports of feed crops, particularly soybeans from Latin America. In its 2021 report, WRI encouraged Denmark to invest in projects to boost agricultural yields sufficiently in countries it imports from to avoid contributing to the expansion of agricultural land. For example, to prevent Danish demand for imported soybeans from leading to deforestation in Brazil, Denmark could invest in projects that direct Brazilian soybean cropland expansion into low-yielding pasture while improving the productivity of other pastures enough to make up for lost food production. Even so, the agreement makes a step in this direction by committing Denmark to encourage international efforts, which it can help achieve through the European Union.

Soybeans are harvested at Fartura Farm in Brazil. While Denmark's new agriculture policy focuses on national emissions, it does little to mitigate against its global contributions through its large imports of soybean imports from Latin America. Photo by paulo fridman/Alamy Stock Photo. What’s Next for Denmark’s Agriculture and Climate Policy?

However impressive, Denmark’s Green Tripartite Agreement is just a start, and achieving its goals will be challenging. Three parts of that challenge are particularly worth following:

1) Denmark will need to choose the best practices and technologies that mitigate agricultural emissions, including the mitigation of livestock emissions or emissions from use of nitrogen on fields. Unlike energy emissions, which directly reflect the quantities and types of fossil fuels used, agricultural emissions cannot realistically be measured on each farm. Denmark therefore needs to develop sound estimates of the climate benefits of each agricultural technology or management practice and do so using farm information it can verify. This is a challenging task, and one that will evolve with new science over time. 

Making these decisions will require more science. When WRI wrote the 2021 report on Danish agriculture, for example, we found that emissions estimates from manure storage facilities varied greatly. Truly addressing these emissions requires more reliable estimates, which could cost only a few million dollars to obtain. To implement its plan well, Denmark will have to spend the money to do the necessary science.

2) Improved technologies to mitigate agricultural emissions will be needed, and the 2021 report identified many with real promise. These range from wheat varieties that reduce nitrogen losses, to feed additives for cows to reduce methane, and even bolder ways of turning grasses into high quality feeds. The agreement specifically recognizes the need for more research and development and calls for new procedures to expedite this work, including for many research priorities identified in our report. Crafting these new procedures and obtaining this funding will be critical. Globally, such agricultural mitigation research has been extremely underfunded. Denmark has properly recognized the importance of enlisting other countries in such expanded research and development efforts as well.

3) Denmark will need to achieve these climate and nature goals without shifting its agricultural production to other countries and continents. Denmark’s livestock production is among the most climate-efficient in the world. For example, while it would be more climate-efficient for people to drink soy milk than cow’s milk, global dairy consumption is rising rapidly and will almost certainly continue to do so. Therefore, it’s better for Denmark to supply daily milk than to shift that production elsewhere in the world. The agreement appropriately recognizes that Denmark should avoid “offshoring its climate footprint” by reducing its food production. Maintaining food production while restoring forests and peatlands requires boosting yields on remaining agricultural land, which should also be a major focus of work going forward.

What Lessons Can Other Countries Take from Denmark?

Denmark’s well-balanced policy shows other countries how they can take real action on agricultural emissions. As the policy explicitly recognizes, it will only be a true success if it encourages similar climate ambition for the European Union as a whole. That would also help ensure a level playing field for Danish agriculture and help prevent leakage of food production and its environmental impacts to other countries.

This policy also shows the power of setting ambitious climate targets. Denmark successfully brought together government, the agriculture industry and environmental groups into the Green Tripartite because each group recognized there would be no way to meet the country’s ambitious climate goals without strong efforts by the agriculture and land sector. As countries update their national climate commitments (known as nationally determined contributions or NDCs) in 2025, they should include agriculture-specific GHG reduction targets and incorporate additional agricultural mitigation measures.

Although the right mix of Produce-Protect-Reduce-Restore actions will vary by country and by region across the world, as the world looks to the 2026 UN climate summit (COP30) in Brazil, other countries would do well to learn from Denmark’s comprehensive policy and the solutions the country develops as it moves forward.

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STATEMENT: UK Releases Ambitious 2035 NDC, Putting Country on Path to Net Zero alison.cinnamo… Tue, 11/12/2024 - 01:06

BAKU (November 12, 2024) — The United Kingdom has announced it will cut its greenhouse gas emissions 81% by 2035 compared to 1990 levels as part of its national climate commitment under the Paris Agreement. This is consistent with the UK’s Climate Change Committee’s advice and the UK’s national Climate Act to reach net zero emissions by 2050. 

Following is a statement from Stientje van Veldhoven, World Resources Institute’s Vice President and Regional Director for Europe:

“The United Kingdom’s new emissions reduction target is a shining example of climate leadership. Let's hope it will inspire other G20 economies to follow suit. The UK’s ambitious commitment to cut emissions 81% by 2035 sets the country on a path to achieve its net zero goal by 2050. 

“Setting this target is a critical step, and the country will now need to strengthen its policies and ramp up its green investments if it is to deliver in full. We strongly encourage the UK government to complement its ambitious, economy-wide goal with bold, sector-specific goals for energy, transport, and land use and agriculture when it submits its new national climate commitment in early 2025. This would build on the recommendations from the Global Stocktake at COP28 and help deliver the country’s ambitious targets. Goals for specific sectors will offer the necessary detail to drive implementation, establish clear policies and send clear signals to the private sector both domestically and abroad. 

“To advance its goals, the UK should continue to foster new jobs in the energy industries of the future, while making electricity cheaper and cleaner and providing more efficient and advanced zero-carbon technologies such as electric vehicles. The government should also work in partnership with farmers to support them to adopt low-carbon and other environmentally-friendly practices, and with the whole of society to protect and rewet peatlands and to advance the protection and restoration of nature."
 

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Global Climate Pledges: A Progress Report shannon.paton@… Mon, 11/11/2024 - 22:15

In the last few years, coalitions of countries, businesses, governments and other actors have announced increasingly ambitious commitments to address the climate crisis. These have included plans to dramatically ramp up renewables, phase down fossil fuels, green the financial sector, halt deforestation, reform food systems and agriculture, and more. A number of new pledges are expected to be unveiled at the current climate summit in Baku, such as those under the COP29 Presidency’s Action Agenda. 

But are parties actually following through on their promises? Here, we track progress towards some of the world’s biggest collective climate commitments:

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

EnergyWhat was promised?

As part of the 2023 Global Stocktake, which took place at COP28 in Dubai, countries collectively agreed to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, accelerate the phase-down of unabated coal power, and, by 2030, triple the world’s renewable energy capacity and double global annual rates of energy efficiency improvement.

Also during COP28, Clean Energy Ministerial countries announced the launch of the Supercharging Battery Storage Initiative to enhance international cooperation, drive development and deployment of stationery battery storage, and reduce battery technology costs.

These promises built on previous commitments, such as 46 countries pledging to phase out unabated domestic coal and the Powering Past Coal Declaration, launched in 2017 to phase out existing unabated coal and place a moratorium on new coal without carbon capture and storage.

Where we stand

A recent IRENA report found that while renewable energy is the fastest-growing source of power capacity — gaining a record 473 gigawatts (GW) in 2023 — the world is at risk of missing its goal to triple renewables over the next seven years. Renewables capacity increased 14% in 2023; while unprecedented, this is lower than the 16.4% growth rate necessary for renewable energy to triple by 2030.

The IEA’s 2024 Energy Efficiency Report affirmed for both 2023 and 2024 that efficiency rates remained at a mere 1% improvement per year. When the doubling energy efficiency goal was set, rates were estimated at 2%, so hitting the doubling goal requires an annual improvement of 4% globally. 

Similarly, an October 2024 report from IRENA and the COP28 Presidency found that “across almost all metrics — excepting solar PV capacity growth — the world has fallen further behind” on goals to triple renewables and double energy efficiency. For instance, improvement in energy intensity in 2022 was around 2% — about half the rate needed by 2030 to meet the goal set at COP28.

Meanwhile, investments in energy storage are increasing rapidly, growing more than nine-fold between 2020 and 2024. The IEA finds these investments need to grow 25% each year, among other efforts to enhance storage capacity.

The latest UNEP Emissions Gap report also reveals that the shift towards renewable energy and electrification isn’t happening fast enough. Per the report, “none of the major fossil fuel-producing countries or companies have committed to … fully transition away from fossil fuel extraction or production.” According to IISD, the global oil and gas exploration licenses awarded by governments between late 2023 and late 2024 could lead to an estimated 2 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions over the lifetime of the projects.

One bright spot came in October 2024 when the United Kingdom officially closed its last coal-fired power plant, marking the end of 142 years of coal-generated electricity in the country. However, in data through 2022, coal remains responsible for more than a third of electricity generation globally; progress needs to increase seven-fold to reach near zero by 2030 and align the power system with Paris Agreement goals.

Halting Forest LossWhat was promised?

The nexus of forests and climate has garnered significant attention over the last few years. At COP26 in 2021, more than 140 countries (representing over 85% of the world’s forest) signed onto the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests, which commits to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030.

In 2022, 196 nations agreed through the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on 23 targets for 2030, including restoring 30% of all degraded ecosystems and conserving 30% of land, water and seas.

Where we stand

Deforestation continues to get worse, with few signs of slowing. According to WRI’s Global Forest Review, the rate of global forest loss today is higher than it was in 2021. The world needs to make a dramatic U-turn to achieve the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration goals by the end of the decade. 

Meanwhile, the world has taken a few steps towards the 30% restoration and conservation targets, especially when it comes to finance. A year after the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration was made, 26 countries and the EU came together to form the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership (FCLP) to help deliver its commitments. In 2023, the FCLP announced nearly $250 million in finance from public, private and civil society partners to reach conservation and restoration goals, with calls to mobilize new financial commitments post-2025 to secure forest tenure rights.

Additionally, President Lula of Brazil proposed the Tropical Forest Finance Facility (TFFF), which would provide 80 countries with annual payments for restoring and conserving tropical forests. This was backed by five countries at the recent UN biodiversity summit (COP16) in October 2024. Also at COP16, governments launched the Kunming Biodiversity Fund with a $200 million contribution from China, and several countries put forth national nature finance plans.

Yet the gap between conservation today and what’s needed to hit the 30% target remains wide:  A recent progress report found that over 17% of the world's land area and a mere 8% of marine and coastal areas are currently protected. Countries must collectively protect another 16.7 million square kilometers of land (an area nearly the size of Russia) and over 78 million square kilometers of marine and coastal areas (more than twice the size of Africa) by 2030. 

Greening the Financial SectorWhat was promised? 

In early 2021, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) formed to push the financial sector to reach net-zero emissions. More than 450 financial institutions representing $130 trillion in assets under management joined, with groups forming for insurance, asset owners, asset managers, banks and other financial sectors.

At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, countries also agreed to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, a commitment reiterated at COP28.

Where we stand

While financial institutions have made some progress in setting emissions-reduction targets, developing low-carbon transition plans and improving their climate disclosures they haven’t lived up to their stated ambitions.

A WRI study examining two dozen top banks found that none of their “net-zero plans” would actually achieve net-zero emissions. Their pledges also haven’t resulted in the massive increase in private finance needed to achieve net zero.

Additionally, increased political challenges to climate action, renewable energy and sustainable investing, particularly in the U.S., have pushed many financial actors to scale back their net-zero commitments or drop out of net-zero alliances.

In 2022, U.S.-based Vanguard — the world’s second-largest asset manager — left GFANZ’s Net-Zero Assets Managers initiative, which experts in sustainable finance attributed to political pressure. In 2023, several major insurers withdrew from the Net-Zero Insurance Alliance, reportedly due to antitrust concerns. And in 2024, the leader of the world’s biggest asset manager, BlackRock, omitted ESG from his annual letter to shareholders.

Political concerns may also cause signatories to be more reluctant in demanding specific actions and tougher requirements, which significantly blunts GFANZ’s ability to have financial institutions set and adhere to bold climate commitments. This is a worrying development, as government action is necessary to complement sustainable investing.

Meanwhile, pledges to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies have been frequently reiterated but never delivered. A WTO working group continues to meet, and G7 finance ministers brought their own commitment in line with the UNFCCC's definition of inefficiency. In December 2023, a coalition of dozens of countries formed to study their fossil fuel subsidies with the goal of getting rid of them. Nonetheless, countries generally continue to employ fossil fuel subsidies at scale; the EU, for example, spends more on such subsidies now than it did in 2015, when the bloc pledged to phase them out by 2025. Between 2020 and 2022, explicit fossil fuel subsidies more than doubled globally, reaching an all-time high of $1.3 trillion.

Transforming Food SystemsWhat was promised?

Food systems took center stage at COP28 in 2023, with a series of major announcements. Most significantly, 162 world leaders signed the COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, committing countries to integrate food systems and agriculture into their national climate plans, or NDCs – among other national plans and strategies – by COP30 in November 2025.

Additionally, the Alliance of Champions for Food Systems Transformation (ACF) was launched, with five countries – Brazil, Cambodia, Norway, Rwanda and Sierra Leone – committing to act urgently and together to close the ambition and implementation gaps on food system reform. ACF members have pledged to take a whole-government approach and  “go further and faster” by driving progress across 10 action areas in their national policies.

Where we stand

There have been encouraging signs of action in the food and land use sector in the past year, but much more is needed to turn promises into reality. 

According to the Technical Cooperation Collaborative, around 40 countries are engaging in national policy work and initiatives in line with the COP28 Declaration. Nations such as Cambodia, Norway and Sierra Leone have taken steps to integrate the ACF’s 10 priority action areas into their food and agriculture policies, with Sierra Leone securing $100 million in funding from the African Development Bank earlier this year to deliver “transformative and ambitious” action on food systems.

Meanwhile, there have been new investments made globally in improving livestock production, reducing food loss and waste, developing alternative proteins and more.

As of November 2024, over 300 entities have endorsed the Food Systems Call to Action, including farmer organizations, subnational governments and businesses. One hundred and fifty civil society and philanthropic organizations operating in all regions of the world, of which a third are headquartered in emerging and developing countries, have endorsed the Call to Action and are working to implement its recommendations.

Over the next 12 months, it's vital to strengthen national climate and biodiversity plans with integrated policies, boost investment in food systems and nature, and ensure full, effective participation of farmers, Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

Accelerating Urban Climate Action 

What was promised?

COP28 was a major moment for cities and other subnational actors. At the first Local Climate Action Summit, 70 countries committed to incorporate urban climate action into their national climate commitments through the Coalition for High Ambition Multi-Level Partnerships (CHAMP) for Climate Action.

Where we stand

Momentum has continued to build since COP28, with Finland and the United Kingdom recently endorsing CHAMP. The COP29 Presidency has expressed its commitment to emphasize subnational engagement in Baku, most notably through the forthcoming COP29 Multisectoral Actions Pathways (MAP) Declaration for Resilient and Healthy Cities. 

However, there is still a long way to go to unlock the full potential of subnational climate action. Analysis by UN Habitat concludes that only 27% of current NDCs contain strong urban initiatives. According to the Data-Driven EnviroLab, just 7% of G20 cities and regions have at least one target that aligns with the global goal to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F). Roughly 60% are failing to deliver emissions reductions at the pace required to achieve their own targets, let alone the 1.5 degree C goal.

As national governments develop their next round of NDCs in 2025, they should closely collaborate with subnational governments to boost ambition and implementation of climate action.

Shifting to Low-Carbon TransportWhat was promised?

At COP26,  more than 100 signatories (including countries, subnational governments and major businesses) agreed to advance efforts for all new cars and vans to be zero emissions globally by 2040. At COP27, 10 countries signed an agreement that they would sell only zero-emission medium- and heavy-duty vehicles by 2040. COP28 built on these commitments, with countries agreeing to accelerate the “reduction of emissions from road transport” through a variety of pathways, including infrastructure and zero- or low-emission vehicles. 

Where we stand

Estimates show that to hold global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C, electric car sales need to increase from 10% of sales in 2021 to over 85% by 2030, public buses from 4% to 60%, and two- and three-wheelers from nearly half of sales now to 85%. The good news is that sales for electric cars appear to be on track for the first time; however, the world remains off track in meeting goals for buses and freight vehicles. 

Some countries have delivered policies and finance to back up their commitments. For example, the U.S. 2022 Inflation Reduction Act included several measures to promote electric vehicles, including consumer tax credits for new and used electric light duty and freight vehicles and tax incentives for battery manufacturing. In addition, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law included funding to create a national EV charging network, while California and 12 other states have adopted regulations to require 100% zero-emission vehicle sales from 2035. There is some uncertainty on these national policies since the 2024 U.S. election, however.

On the other side of the Atlantic, The E.U. adopted ambitious goals for reducing emissions of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, requiring a 45% reduction by 2030 and 65% reduction by 2035. In addition, 26 new signatories have signed on to the global agreement on medium- and heavy-duty vehicles in 2024. Still, much progress remains to be seen, particularly for low- and middle-income countries.

Lastly, while pledges have spurred vehicle electrification, meeting the wider goals of decarbonizing the transport sector remains challenging. A quantified emissions-reduction target for the entire transportation sector and explicit inclusion in the new NDCs would be instrumental for making progress.

Curbing Methane and Other Super PollutantsWhat was promised?

Super pollutants such as methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), black carbon, nitrous oxide and ground-level ozone are responsible for about half of the global temperature rise to date due to their short-term potency in warming the atmosphere. Methane, for example, has a global warming potential 80 times greater than carbon dioxide over a 20-year period. Removing these non-CO2 GHGs and particulate matter from the atmosphere could prevent up to 0.6 degrees C of global temperature rise by 2050, as well as millions of premature deaths each year.

Since 2021, 158 countries have signed on to the Global Methane Pledge to reduce methane emissions by 30% (compared to 2020 levels) by 2030.

Meanwhile, countries agreed through the Global Stocktake to accelerate their reductions of non-CO2 emissions in their next NDCs. In 2024, 70 countries committed to include economy-wide, 1.5-degrees C-aligned emissions-reduction targets for all GHGs in their NDCs, noting that action to reduce super pollutants is one of the fastest and cheapest ways to limit global warming. 

Where we stand 

Despite strong support for the Global Methane Pledge, methane emissions from the energy sector measured at near-record highs in 2023. The atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide, the third-most significant human-caused greenhouse gas after methane and CO2, also continued to climb in 2023 — mostly due to the use of fertilizers and other agricultural practices.

More encouragingly, new grant funding totaling $1 billion for methane action has been pledged in the last year to support initiatives like the World Bank’s Global Flaring and Methane Reduction Partnership, aimed at reducing methane leaks from oil and gas supply chains, and the Enteric Fermentation Accelerator for Livestock Methane Mitigation Research. Three methane satellite detection and notification initiatives also emerged — the International Methane Emissions Observatory, MethaneSAT and CarbonMapper — which use remote-sensing to bring greater transparency and accountability to methane-emitting industries.

During COP29 in Baku, the U.S., China and Azerbaijan are slated to host a second Summit on Methane and Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases, where more announcements are expected.

Turning Pledges into Reality

In sum, while these varied pledges are strides towards addressing the climate crisis,  efforts are largely off-track to fully deliver on them. WRI research shows that such global pledges and similar cooperative initiatives need to evolve from loose knowledge-sharing networks into platforms of true accountability and action. 

With the COP29 Presidency set to launch a number of new pledges and initiatives, it is a reminder of the need to strengthen mechanisms that hold members accountable and ratchet up ambition to reflect the scale of the climate challenge. Transforming intentions into measurable, inclusive actions requires those involved to regularly prove their mettle by transparently and regularly demonstrating progress. In the global climate fight, we need coalitions to be credible forces for change.

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• Next Generation NDCs

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How Rethinking ‘What Is a Forest’ Can Result in More Effective Conservation alicia.cypress… Mon, 11/11/2024 - 08:30

Although intuitively it may seem obvious what a forest is, there are actually hundreds of definitions  used by different countries and organizations throughout the world. This can have major implications for how forests — and more importantly, changes to forests — are measured.

Without a common and standardized way to define “what is a forest?” it is impossible to consistently track global deforestation. Many countries now use satellite data for this tracking because it provides more timely, accurate and efficient information. But most existing forest definitions do not align with what satellites can actually measure. This makes it challenging for countries and organizations to use satellite data to comply with deforestation regulations or participate in carbon markets.

Monitoring forests and deforestation with satellite data is critical to accurately and consistently implementing and evaluating the success of forest conservation policies, but to do so we must rethink how forests and deforestation are defined.

Trees dot the landscape of a savanna in Tanzania, Africa. Under the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization's definition, sparsely-treed areas, like savannas, could be defined as a forest. Photo by incamerastock / Alamy Stock Photo. 3 Issues That Limit Existing Forest Definitions

A few key issues limit the ability of countries, organizations and others to monitor forest change and consistently track global deforestation:

1) Inconsistent Definitions Lead to Inconsistent Deforestation Estimates

The first issue with existing forest definitions is that there are too many of them. Nearly three decades ago, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defined forests as having a minimum of 0.5-hectare area (a hectare is equivalent to 10,000 square meters or about 2.5 acres), 10% canopy cover and 5-meter (16.4-feet) tree height. Countries were encouraged to adopt this definition, but FAO pushed for “harmonization, not standardization.” As a result, definitions can vary widely across organizations and countries and can even vary within a single country.

For example, Indonesia’s definition includes a minimum area threshold of 6.25 hectares while Côte D’Ivoire in West Africa uses 0.1 hectares, so all else being equal, an area in Indonesia must be at least 62.5 times as large as an area in Côte d’Ivoire to qualify as forest. Brazil’s official forest definition has a minimum area of 0.5 hectares, but an area doesn’t count as deforestation in their National Forest Reference Emission Level submission to the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change until it reaches twice that, or 1 hectare.

Land use is another complication. Many countries, like Canada, include timber and rubber plantations as forests, so replacing clearcut trees in natural ecosystems with a commercial plantation is not defined as deforestation because the land remains a working forest.  Areas with trees considered agricultural crops, like almonds and apples, are generally not counted as forests, but areas with trees growing alongside row crops may be, like cocoa agroforestry systems.

These inconsistencies greatly affect what counts as forest and deforestation in different corners of the world. Unlike currency, there’s no international exchange rate to convert forest area reported by one country into an equivalent area using another country’s definition. The result is a smorgasbord of different forest and deforestation estimates that aren’t comparable to each other or to a globally consistent measure like satellite data, because they depend on who’s doing the counting and which rulebook is being followed.

2) Prioritizing Measuring Forests Over Deforestation

What if all countries applied the same forest definition? Problem solved? Not quite.

Even if FAO’s definition were applied across all countries, the thresholds chosen for area, canopy cover and height have important tradeoffs that matter for forest conservation. Under FAO’s definition, sparsely-treed areas, like savannas, could be considered forests. This has allowed for these ecosystems, which are home to iconic wildlife, help prevent desertification and support local communities, to be included in forest conservation frameworks.

But the flip side of applying an overly inclusive forest definition is that it may obscure the loss of high priority tall forests with dense tree canopies. These forests store the most carbon, harbor the greatest biodiversity and play the most crucial role in global climate regulation.

For example, a 0.5-hectare patch of dense forest could lose up to 90% of its tree cover and still be counted as a forest, since it would continue to exceed FAO’s minimum 10% canopy cover threshold. This wouldn’t be much of an issue if most deforestation occurred at a larger scale. But in many places throughout the world, deforestation occurs at small scales that fall within this 0.5-hectare minimum threshold.

For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where subsistence agriculture — or the practice where people clear small patches of forest to grow food primarily to meet their own needs — is common, satellite data reveals that over 20% of the country’s 2023 primary forest loss occurred in patches smaller than 0.5 hectares. This is a significant area: The country had the second highest annual rate of primary forest loss in the world over the past two decades.

Those small patches of forest loss add up and risk being omitted from the global deforestation record when definitions prioritize the measurement of forest area over deforestation.

3) Lack of Alignment with Satellite Data

The third issue with many forest definitions is that they’re a relic from a time before satellites, when foresters went out on foot to measure forest attributes like how much timber could be sold and tree species in permanent inventory plots.

Forest inventories created through fieldwork remain essential in providing today’s forest managers with vital information that satellites can’t about how forests’ many ecological, economic and social functions are changing. Yet when it comes to monitoring deforestation — the loss of forest area — scientists have shown that it can be tracked with higher accuracy and lower costs than ever before using satellite data. Crucially, this data is free and openly accessible through platforms like Global Forest Watch.

But the definitions originally designed to monitor forests on the ground just don’t work with data collected from satellites. One reason is that satellites commonly used for operational forest monitoring capture information in different sizes that don’t perfectly align with the 0.5-hectare minimum size commonly used in many forest definitions. Further, by using a 0.5-hectare minimum size for forest mapping, the level of detail in the satellite data is reduced, effectively "blurring" the finer information. Forcing a 0.5-hectare minimum forest area threshold onto a satellite image can result in forest and deforestation measurements that are 5 to 50 times less precise than if the satellites’ original pixel size was retained.

How Do Definitions Impact Policy?

The inconsistencies in forest definitions for countries and organizations using satellite data create challenges when complying with conservation efforts that require the reporting of deforestation across many sites and countries.

For example, companies trading in products that fall under the European Union’s Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) may need to comply with the EU’s laws following one forest definition and with national environmental laws following a different definition.

Further, even though the regulation requires that companies provide geotagged evidence that certain commodities were not produced on deforested or degraded land after 2020, in reality this is difficult and inefficient to prove with satellite data because the EUDR’s forest definition isn’t designed to work with satellite data.

Another example is carbon credits, which are designed to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation.

For a carbon market to function, carbon credits must be fungible, or mutually interchangeable, such that an emission reduction credit can be used to offset an emission elsewhere. But when both the area of forests and the amount of deforestation are measured differently across different locations, the quantity of credits generated by reducing emissions from deforestation may vary depending on where they originate, potentially eroding buyers’ trust in the system. It therefore becomes impossible to evaluate consistently across jurisdictions or against global data sets whether deforestation has declined.

Toward Consistent Measurements of Forests and Deforestation

Philosophical debates about “what is a forest?” will always endure, but the urgency to conserve forests and cut carbon emissions has never been greater. Timely, accurate and efficient monitoring is key to evaluating the success of forest conservation and emissions reductions policies.

We need a pragmatic approach to deforestation monitoring that balances the ecological value of forests with technical monitoring requirements. Internationally coordinated conservation action requires internationally coordinated monitoring systems. Though absolute consistency is not necessarily the goal, nor would it be realistic, standardizing key elements of forest definitions would go a long way to achieving this:

• Definitions of forest extent and change should have standardized minimum area thresholds that align with public satellite data capabilities (10 to 30 meters or 33 to 98 feet)
• Forest definitions should distinguish between natural forests and other types of tree cover, thereby excluding plantations of wood or other agricultural products.

Reducing the minimum area threshold in forest definitions doesn’t mean that every pixel with trees will be considered a forest. Pixels can be assigned to different categories to differentiate between types of tree cover — such as trees in primary forests versus secondary forests, or trees in dense forests versus areas with sparse trees — and use that information to determine what counts as a forest in different contexts.

Likewise, not every pixel with tree loss counts as deforestation. For example, trees lost to natural disturbances like storms or landslides aren’t considered deforestation.

All these distinctions can be made either by using maps that show additional contextual information, or using sampling methodologies, where analysts can carefully look at individual pixels to determine which category they belong to.

It is time to rethink forest definitions so that forests and deforestation are quantified consistently and reliably enough to evaluate whether global forest conservation outcomes have been achieved. When the policy community asks, “is deforestation going up or down?” an acceptable answer can no longer be, “it depends."

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• Global Forest Watch
• Global Forest Watch Pro

Authors Viviana Zalles Nancy Harris Fred Stolle Matthew C. Hansen

China Is Providing Billions in Climate Finance to Developing Countries shannon.paton@… Thu, 11/07/2024 - 14:49

The climate crisis is escalating at an alarming rate, causing devastation around the world — especially in countries that contribute little to the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.

Coping with climate impacts and investing in the transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient future present special challenges for developing countries. Global climate goals can’t be reached unless developing countries are part of the effort, too — but given their reduced responsibility and resources, they need and deserve help from the global community. This is especially true for the poorest and most vulnerable countries.

Very soon, world leaders will have a chance to show their resolve to meet this need. The main agenda item for COP29 is adopting a new global climate finance target. This new collective quantified goal, or NCQG, would replace the goal set in 2009 for developed countries to mobilize $100 billion a year, from 2020 to 2025, for climate action in developing countries. A new target, with increased financial support for developing countries, should enable their ambitious investment in climate mitigation and adaptation.

The NCQG has its share of complications, however. One of the most hotly contested topics is the role that emerging economies like China should play. China remains a developing country according to UN classifications, but it has grown impressively in recent years — and its emissions have risen along with it. Many developed countries argue that such rapidly growing economies should be required to contribute to the NCQG. Developing countries have had no obligation to contribute to the $100 billion goal, but many have been doing so voluntarily — including China, a fact that has often been overlooked.

The upcoming NCQG negotiations should be founded on a clear understanding of the climate finance that’s already flowing, including from China and other non-traditional donors. However, little official reporting on developing countries’ voluntary activities is available.

To help address this challenge, new research from WRI presents a fuller picture of the climate finance China has been providing and mobilizing to support other developing countries’ climate actions. We estimate that China’s climate finance provision averaged close to $4.5 billion per year between 2013 and 2022. Our research also highlights how China’s contribution compares to existing efforts, details the channels through which its finance flows and sheds light on the pieces of the larger climate finance puzzle that are still missing.

China Is a Significant Climate Finance Provider

To date, China’s contributions have been a blind spot in the climate finance discussion. Little data is available, and unofficial disclosures often show only partial glimpses of the picture because many estimates only consider a single type of financing, like bilateral or multilateral. What’s more, those frameworks typically don’t facilitate a useful “apples-to-apples” comparison with other countries’ financing.

Our research presents one of the first analyses to allow face-value comparisons of climate finance mobilized by China and developed countries. To foster greater comparability, we adopted the most widely used framework on climate finance, borrowing the methodology that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses to assess developed countries’ progress towards the $100 billion goal. (This method counts all types of finance in the same way, regardless of its terms. For instance, grants and concessional finance, with interest rates or repayment periods that are friendlier than what is available on the open market, are valued equally with market-rate loans.)

Our estimate shows that the climate finance flowing from China to other developing countries, via four distinct channels, amounted to just below $45 billion between 2013 and 2022. That equals 6.1% of the total climate finance developed countries provided during the same period.

What do these new findings mean for China’s “fair share” contribution to global climate finance? Neither the data nor existing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreements provide unequivocal answers about who should pay what. Moral and technical choices need to be considered, and could be informed by different scenarios reflecting on countries’ historic responsibility and capacity to pay.

Estimates based on historical emissions and income offer an idea of efforts proportional to China’s role. (One analysis by Center for Global Development, for example, calculated its responsibility to be between 3.4 % to 6 % of international climate finance.) But our interest doesn’t lie in a definite answer on China’s fair share. Instead, we aim to spotlight China as a significant climate finance provider and acknowledge that China and other emerging economies’ voluntary climate finance contributions could better inform the NCQG process in the leadup to COP29 and beyond.

How China Is Funding Climate Action in Developing Countries

How does money move from China to developing countries’ climate projects? The OECD methodology we used in our analysis breaks its contributions into four categories:

• Bilateral public, provided by China’s development finance agencies and institutions
• Multilateral public, provided through multilateral development banks and climate funds
• Export credits, provided by China’s official export credit agencies like China EXIM and SINOSURE
• Private finance, mobilized by China’s development financial institutions or guarantors

Both China and conventional contributors channel over 70% of their climate finance through bilateral and multilateral public mechanisms. But whereas developed countries rarely deploy export credits in their climate finance — they make up only 3% of their contributions, on average — export credits account for more than a quarter of China’s climate finance.

The inclusion of export credits (as well as mobilized private finance) in climate and development finance is a topic of ongoing debate. Some argue that these financial instruments do not necessarily represent additional resources for climate action and can even potentially exacerbate debt burdens in developing countries. However, export credits have frequently supported large infrastructure projects, which could help fill developing countries’ funding gap in meeting climate and other development goals. Notably, some conventional contributors like Japan and Italy increased their development finance through export credits between 2009 and 2018. We need further examination and deliberation to address the role of export credits in climate finance and China should be part of these essential, collective efforts.

Missing Puzzle Pieces

Like conventional climate finance contributors, China’s climate finance flows through a complex and interwoven architecture. Governmental agencies responsible for financial decisions related to climate include environmental, economic and aid ministries as well as financial regulators; they may also rely on implementors, in and outside of China, to identify opportunities and channel the funding. Developing countries must navigate this complex web to access the climate finance China can provide. This makes it hard for participants and observers to know exactly what’s going on. 

Key government agencies in China's climate finance architectureAgencyRoleCategoryChina International Development Cooperation AgencyManages and coordinates China’s foreign aid with other ministriesBilateral publicMOFFunds China’s foreign aid and other bilateral financeBilateral publicPBC and SAFEFunds bilateral public financeBilateral publicChina EXIMProvides concessional loans and sponsors overseas investment fundsBilateral publicCDBManages special overseas lending and sponsors overseas investment fundsBilateral publicMOFFunds multilateral financeMultilateral publicPBC and SAFEFunds multilateral financeMultilateral publicChina EXIMFunds multilateral financeMultilateral publicChina EXIMProvides export creditsExport creditsSINOSUREProvides guarantee and insuranceExport creditsChina EXIMProvides loansMobilized privateCDBProvides loansMobilized privateSINOSUREProvides guarantee and insuranceMobilized private

External actors trying to count climate finance also find it hard to do so in a comprehensive way. Due to the conservative approach we took in our research, in addition to the limited publicly available information, China’s nominal climate finance contributions are likely much higher than we estimated.

For instance, since 2013, China has established several overseas investment funds and lending programs to support projects in areas including climate change, agriculture, food security and development. But since these fund managers disclose very little on how funding is allocated across these priority areas, we couldn’t identify or quantify the climate elements of that $140 billion in funding.

Our calculations also under-captured the amount of private finance China has mobilized. Using the current OECD framework, private finance can be attributed to Chinese official actors, but very little qualitative information on such arrangements is available. Estimates show that at least 10% of China’s total overseas lending was enabled through the state-owned export credit insurance corporation, SINOSURE, and we know that CDB and EXIM China are the two largest Chinese lenders on renewable energy projects abroad. But, in our research, we could only confidently attribute 15 projects as mobilized by China, which we recognize is an underestimate.

Greater transparency on China’s part would enable a more consistent and comparable evaluation of China’s role in climate finance that, in turn, would facilitate climate finance negotiations and provide greater clarity for those seeking to access climate finance. Greater transparency could also motivate required contributors to ramp up their commitments to climate finance. Finally, transparency could provide leadership to other voluntary contributors on how they can report their own climate finance, giving a clearer picture of the whole landscape.

Toward the New Global Finance Target

Acknowledging that China is already a significant, voluntary contributor to climate finance could make developed countries more comfortable increasing their own contributions, and ultimately facilitate negotiations for larger collective climate finance commitments. The discussions could also be better informed by evaluating countries’ responsibility for climate change and capacity to pay.

A robust climate finance goal agreed upon at COP29 should include a roadmap for improving the consistency and quality of climate finance reporting. The existing framework and practices governing mandatory reporting need to be reformed to provide a clearer picture of the quantity and type of finance available and to better hold countries accountable for fulfilling their climate finance commitments. China should be part of this global effort to enhance transparency and coherence — a move that will help the country overcome the siloed structure of its domestic international development governance and facilitate better communication of its efforts.

Whichever direction negotiations on climate finance take, all countries have a shared interest in the ultimate goal of ensuring sufficient finance for developing nations to achieve an inclusive, low-carbon, climate-resilient future. Cracking the code of how emerging economies — including China — should contribute will play an important role in achieving this shared outcome.

china-climate-finance.jpg Finance climate finance Climate Finance COP29 Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Shuang Liu Lihuan Zhou Chris Qihan Zou Yan Wang Ziyi Ma

RELEASE: High Ambition Coalition for Nature & People Wins 2024 Earthshot Prize darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 11/06/2024 - 13:46

CAPE TOWN, (November 6, 2024) — Today, at The Earthshot Prize Awards ceremony in Cape Town, South Africa, Prince William named the High Ambition Coalition for Nature & People (HAC for N&P) the winner of The Earthshot Prize in the “Revive our Oceans” category. During the ceremony, the HAC for N&P was one of five chosen from nearly 2,500 nominees and 15 finalists and awarded a catalytic £1 million prize to help scale its solutions and accelerate its growth and impact.  

Co-hosted by World Resources Institute (WRI) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the HAC for N&P, now comprising 120 countries, was recognized for its work on pushing governments to commit and act to protect 30% of the world’s land and oceans by 2030.

Co-chaired by Costa Rica and France, with the UK as its oceans champion, the HAC for N&P played a pivotal role in securing this agreement, also known as the 30x30 target, at COP15 (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity) in 2022. Currently, only 17% of the world’s land and 8% of its oceans are protected. HAC for N&P is now working to help governments go beyond their pledges, pushing for these commitments to be written into law, sustaining political momentum, and addressing financial and technical barriers to action.

“With ocean conservation currently lagging behind land protection, we are grateful to the Earthshot Prize for highlighting the urgency of HAC for N&P’s bold but essential mission for this decade,” said Ani Dasgupta, President and CEO, World Resources Institute. “Like our ocean, the HAC for N&P connects people and nations across continents. We thank the Earthshot Prize for recognizing the importance of coming together to build a safe, prosperous and inclusive world where the climate is stable and nature is revitalized.”

The annual Earthshot Prize, founded by Prince William and The Royal Foundation, awards inspiring and innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing environmental challenges. Each year, it awards £1 million each to five initiatives, enabling them to scale efforts that repair the planet, enhance biodiversity, and promote sustainability.  

“Receiving this award is not just an honor, it’s a call to action,” said Rita Maria El Zaghloul, Director of the HAC for N&P Secretariat. “We must now accelerate efforts to ensure governments fulfill their commitments to vastly expand and improve protected areas and conservation measures, stop illegal land grabs, prevent resource extraction, and end illegal overfishing. We’ll also engage with leaders at the highest levels to keep 30x30 a global priority.”  

About the High Ambition Coalition for Nature & People (HAC for N&P)
HAC for N&P is an intergovernmental group of 120 countries united by a shared ambition to implement the global goal of effectively conserving and managing at least 30 percent of the world’s land and ocean by 2030. The HAC for N&P is co-chaired by Costa Rica and France with the UK as Ocean Champion.  

About World Resources Institute (WRI) 
WRI is a trusted partner for change. Using research-based approaches, we work globally and in focus countries to meet people’s essential needs; to protect and restore nature; and to stabilize the climate and build resilient communities. We aim to fundamentally transform the way the world produces and uses food and energy and designs its cities to create a better future for all. Founded in 1982, WRI has nearly 2,000 staff around the world, with country offices in Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico and the United States and regional offices in Africa and Europe. 

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ADVISORY: Post-US Election Press Call Featuring Leading Global and US Climate Leaders darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 11/06/2024 - 02:05

WASHINGTON (November 6, 2024) – World Resource Institute (WRI) will host a press call featuring Gina McCarthy, Jonathan Pershing and Dan Lashof to discuss the implications of Donald Trump’s election victory for climate action, both in the United States and internationally.  

The diverse group of experts will explore how Trump’s election victory will influence the global climate agenda, including the COP29 climate summit, the Paris Agreement and national commitments of other countries. They will also address the opportunities and challenges of advancing climate action and the clean energy transition at federal, state and local levels in the U.S. You can read WRI’s Statement on the U.S. election here. 

Following brief remarks, ample time will be provided for questions from the media.  

WHAT  
Press call on the implications the U.S. presidential election on global and U.S. climate action. 

WHEN  
 November 7, 2024, at 10:00am ET / 4:00pm CET 

WHO  

• Gina McCarthy, Managing Co-Chair, America Is All In, Former White House National Climate Advisor, Former Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
• Jonathan Pershing, Program Director of Environment, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
• Dan Lashof, Director, World Resources Institute, United States
• Alison Cinnamond (moderator), Global Director for Strategic Communications, World Resources Institute

WHERE 
Please RSVP at this link for the Zoom webinar. This call is open to journalists only.

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STATEMENT: Climate Action Faces a Setback with Trump’s Second Term; Momentum for Clean Energy Transition to Continue alison.cinnamo… Wed, 11/06/2024 - 00:13

WASHINGTON (November 6, 2024) — The Associated Press has declared Donald J. Trump and JD Vance the winners of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Republicans won the majority in the U.S. Senate while control of the U.S. House of Representatives is yet to be determined.

Following is a statement by Dan Lashof, U.S. Director, World Resources Institute: 

“There is no denying that another Trump presidency will stall national efforts to tackle the climate crisis and protect the environment, but most U.S. state, local, and private sector leaders are committed to charging ahead. And you can count on a chorus of world leaders confirming that they won’t turn their back on climate and nature goals. 

“Donald Trump heading back to the White House won’t be a death knell to the clean energy transition that has rapidly picked up pace these last four years. Both Republican-led and Democratic-led states are seeing the benefits of wind, solar, and battery manufacturing and deployment thanks to the billions of dollars of investments unleashed by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act. Governors and representatives in Congress on both sides of the aisle have come to recognize that clean energy is a huge moneymaker and a job creator. President Trump will face a bipartisan wall of opposition if he attempts to rip away clean energy incentives now.

“From Appalachia to the Gulf Coast to the Mountain West, Americans are reeling from devastating climate-fueled disasters. Turning a blind eye to the climate crisis that is costing billions of dollars in damage and killing hundreds of people would be irresponsible and immoral. Polls show most Americans want the federal government to take action to address climate change and protect the air we breathe and the water we drink. President Trump has a responsibility to heed their calls with not just rhetoric, but real policies that improve Americans' lives.

“Trump has every reason to build on transformations already underway. Electrifying buildings and transportation — including school buses — benefits rural and urban communities alike by cutting costs and improving efficiency. At the same time, America’s croplands, wetlands and forests desperately need more investments to protect them from intensifying wildfires, droughts and flooding. 

“While President Trump may retreat, leaders from states, cities, businesses and elsewhere will eagerly step into the breach to take forward ambitious climate action. Thanks to the generous tax incentives and investments from the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, subnational actors have more resources than ever to cut emissions, expand clean energy and electric transportation and address environmental injustices. 

“There are important bipartisan opportunities to advance climate action that must be seized upon. For instance, leaders on both sides of the aisle support climate-smart trade policies and harnessing the power of geothermal energy. And there is bipartisan and business support for decarbonizing heavy industry and investing in international supply chains to keep the U.S. competitive and secure. These actions would be a win for U.S. manufacturing, national security and the climate. 

“Global support for addressing the climate crisis has grown significantly since Donald Trump first took office. Country leaders know that reducing emissions and supercharging clean energy growth strengthens their economies and competitiveness. That’s why China has invested heavily in wind, solar and battery manufacturing at home, and supply chains and markets abroad. If Donald Trump pulls out of the Paris Agreement again, it would simply diminish the United States’ influence and give other countries a leg up in the booming clean energy economy.

“One can only hope that Donald Trump will put conspiracy theories to the side and take the decisive action to address the climate crisis that the American people deserve. But I won’t hold my breath, and neither will the global community nor U.S. state and local leaders. We are moving forward.”

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UN Biodiversity Talks Stalled, but Protecting Nature Cannot Wait margaret.overh… Mon, 11/04/2024 - 16:48

Between Oct. 21 and Nov. 2, Cali, Colombia hosted some 23,000 people at the UN biodiversity summit. Political leaders from nearly 200 countries were joined by representatives from Indigenous communities, youth groups, business leaders, NGOs and others. All came for a shared purpose: to halt Earth's rampant biodiversity loss.

Momentum going into the summit seemed strong. At the last biodiversity conference in 2022, national leaders reached a historic agreement to protect 30% of the world's land and water by 2030 and to mobilize billions of dollars for nature conservation. This year's summit, COP16, offered a chance to put forth concrete plans for achieving those goals.

But while the "People's COP" in Cali brought diverse voices to the table and highlighted growing urgency around the biodiversity crisis, progress on its core objectives came up short. Negotiators faced gridlock over key finance decisions and many countries showed lagging ambition. The summit ultimately ended before Parties could reach agreement on a range of issues — most importantly, how to finance conservation at the scale needed.

Still, COP16 offered a pulse check on the world's biodiversity efforts to date. It revealed how far the world has come toward its collective targets and what exactly needs to be done this decade to safeguard the world's precious remaining species.

COP16 Revealed Some Progress on Conservation — but Major Financial Potholes

The first official progress report on the global "30x30 goal," which calls on countries to protect 30% of the world's land and water by 2030, was released during COP16. It found that just over 17% of the world's land area and a mere 8% of marine and coastal areas are currently protected.

This shows progress: Over 2.3 million square kilometers were added to the total since 2020, an area twice the size of Colombia. Yet, the road ahead remains steep. To meet the target, countries must collectively protect another 16.7 million square kilometers of land (an area nearly the size of Russia) and over 78 million square kilometers of marine and coastal areas (more than twice the size of Africa) by 2030.

Much of the discussion at COP16 focused on how to pay for conservation and restoration at this speed and scale — particularly in developing countries, which house much of the world's biodiversity but have the fewest resources to protect it.

In 2022, developed nations promised $20 billion per year by 2025 to support developing countries' biodiversity efforts. They delivered $15.4 billion that same year (the latest data available) and made additional pledges at COP16. But these total in the millions rather than the billions still needed. And negotiations stalled around how to mobilize the funds; specifically, whether they should be channeled through a new dedicated vehicle, as some developing countries have asked for, or through the existing Global Biodiversity Framework Fund.

Other tools to raise public and private finance for nature also proved divisive. Much talk was spent on whether companies should have to pay countries for digital genetic information (known as "DSI") used to develop vaccines, medicines and other products, if it originally came from organisms within their borders. This was seen as a potentially enormous new source of money for nature in developing countries. But while negotiators succeeded in creating a new DSI fund (the Cali Fund) at COP16, contributions were made voluntary. This means it's unlikely to deliver the amounts hoped for.

In short, countries are nowhere near closing the $700 billion annual gap in finance for nature.

The world needs to see much more clarity on how leaders plan to close these gaps in action and finance. All 190+ countries represented in Cali were expected to submit National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) by the end of the summit outlining concrete steps to meet their collective goals. Yet just 44 did so. More than 100 put forth high-level biodiversity targets, but without formal action plans to achieve them.

World leaders at the 16th UN biodiversity summit (COP16) in Cali, Colombia. While the summit made progress on some fronts, discussions around finance stalled and the summit ended with some key agenda items unresolved. Photo by Xinhua/Alamy Stock Photo What's Still Needed to Meet Biodiversity Targets on Time?

Halting biodiversity loss will require billions more in finance to protect and restore nature by 2030. But that's just one piece of the puzzle. Leaders also need to:

Boost conservation and restoration, especially in 'megadiverse' countries

While all countries should deliver ambitious, actionable biodiversity plans in line with meeting the 30x30 goal, a few are critically important. The vast majority of species inhabit a relatively small swath of the planet, from the tropical rainforests of the Amazon, Congo Basin and Southeast Asia to coral reefs in the Pacific's "Coral Triangle." Countries that house these megadiverse ecosystems have an outsized impact on species health and survival worldwide.

Some have already submitted national biodiversity strategies. Colombia's aims to expand protected land area from 24% to 34% and grow the country's bioeconomy from 0.8% to 3% of its GDP, helping ensure that healthy ecosystems go together with economic benefits. Others, such as Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have yet to put forth national strategies (though Brazil aims to do so in 2025). Many megadiverse countries are developing nations that will need increased financial support from developed countries to set and meet bold targets — a message that rang out at the summit.

Fulfil promises to support traditional land management

COP16 shined a light on the critical role that Indigenous Peoples and local communities play in protecting nature. Many areas traditionally managed by these groups are among the most biodiverse on the planet — often more so than publicly or privately managed lands. Yet, few have seen their customary land tenure rights reflected in law.

This year's summit elevated the voices of Indigenous and local communities in high-level discussions. Representation was more diverse than in the past, and countries agreed to create a new permanent body to ensure these groups' participation in the negotiations moving forward. Now, governments need to translate talk into action by ensuring that Indigenous and local communities have a say in national conservation policy (as they agreed to do under the Global Biodiversity Framework) and enshrining their traditional land rights into law. Countries should also fulfil their promise to direct at least $1.7 billion in nature finance to Indigenous groups; in a step forward at COP16, nations committed to spend 50% of money raised in the Cali Fund on activities linked to Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

Bolster biodiversity efforts with economics, policy and data

Even the best-laid plans will not succeed without policy and enforcement backing them up. To meet their goals, governments must shift toward economic models that work with rather than against nature. That starts with fulfilling their promise to reform $500 billion per year in nature-harming subsidies (such as those for unsustainable farming and fishing practices), on which almost no progress has been made so far.

Countries also need stronger measures to suppress organized nature crime — including illegal forms of logging, land clearing, mining, fishing, and wildlife exploitation and trade — as well as associated financial crimes, corruption and human rights violations. Addressing these threats is critical to enabling progress on biodiversity conservation.

Finally, biodiversity efforts and finance need to be paired with transparent monitoring and tracking to hold governments and other stakeholders accountable.

With Nature on the Brink, Leaders Can't Delay Any Longer

Formal talks at COP16 proved slower and more contentious than hoped. But outside the negotiating halls, along Cali's crowded streets, the summit took on a life of its own. From song and dance to networking and open discussions, people from around the globe gathered to celebrate biodiversity and build momentum for protecting it. A raft of new initiatives emerged from this broader engagement, including on cities, restoration, food and land use, finance for tropical forests, and more. The summit proved that a diverse array of people is already rising to the task of tackling the biodiversity crisis.

Now, the question is whether governments, companies and other leaders will harness that energy and urgency to help enable transformative action on a global scale. They know what needs to be done. Now it's time to act.

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• WRI at COP16, the UN Biodiversity Conference

Authors Crystal Davis Charles (Chip) Barber

By the Numbers: The Climate Action We Need This Decade shannon.paton@… Mon, 11/04/2024 - 12:47

The UN’s most recent Emissions Gap Report issues a clear warning: Current policies and national climate commitments fall well short of what’s needed to rein in climate change.

Here’s the science: Limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) above pre-industrial levels is essential for avoiding increasingly severe and widespread climate change impacts, but doing so requires cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 42% by 2030 and 56% by 2035, relative to 2023. Current policies alone will achieve less than a 1% reduction by 2030 and 2035.

Closing these emissions gaps means deploying action at a pace and scale that are unprecedented. Unless countries can collectively and dramatically reduce GHG emissions by 2030, it will become impossible to make up enough lost ground by 2035 to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C with no or limited overshoot.

Fortunately, the year ahead presents a prime opportunity to shift the trajectory: Countries will put forward their next set of climate commitments, or nationally determined contributions (NDCs), by early 2025, detailing their intended climate actions over the next decade. Keeping the 1.5-degree C temperature goal within reach will require these next NDCs to achieve a “quantum leap in ambition” and deliver immediate action across all sectors of the economy.

What Are NDCs?

Countries are set to announce new NDCs under the Paris Agreement by early 2025. Updated every five years, these pledges underpin national climate action, outlining the mitigation and adaptation targets countries promise to achieve, as well as specific measures they plan to pursue. NDCs form the foundation of international efforts to combat the climate crisis.

But today’s commitments — even if fully implemented — put the world on course for 2.6-2.8 degrees C (4.7 to 5 degrees F) of warming and increasingly catastrophic impacts.

In this next round of NDCs, countries should set new economy-wide GHG emissions reductions targets for 2035 and stronger targets for 2030 that collectively put the world on track to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C. Achieving these topline targets will require rapid, far-reaching changes across the economy. To help jumpstart them, countries should also include additional sector-specific targets within their NDCs. While most NDCs include pledges to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions, fewer have featured timebound, quantitative sector-specific goals.

So what exactly does that look like in terms of how we power our homes, grow our food, move people and goods, and more? Here, we break down the transformational changes needed in every sector of the economy to slash GHG emissions over the next decade.

Limiting Warming to 1.5 Degrees C: Sector-Specific Targets for 2030 and 2035

First and foremost, countries must strengthen their economy-wide GHG emissions reductions targets for 2030, as well as set new and ambitious targets for 2035, to get the world on track to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C. Going one step further to nest sector-specific targets under these topline, economy-wide targets – particularly those expressed in more concrete, real-world indicators like sales of electric vehicles or hectares of mangroves restored – can help make NDCs more actionable.

While many countries haven’t comprehensively included sector-specific targets in previous NDCs, doing so this time around can set clear benchmarks for both the public and private sectors. These targets, for example, can not only guide implementation across the whole of government, but also signal to companies and investors a country’s future direction.

To help inform this next round of NDCs, new research from Systems Change Lab translates the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees C temperature goal into global, sector-specific targets for 2035, complementing previously published targets for 2030 and 2050.

Critically, countries do not need to progress at the same pace to collectively achieve these global sectoral goals. Developed countries have a responsibility to go furthest, fastest, and while other major emitters will also need to decarbonize rapidly, some may require finance and other support to do so. Still, these targets, alongside collective sectoral goals outlined within the Global Stocktake, offer a helpful starting point for countries as they develop their NDCs by specifying the pace and scale of transformational change needed across the most emissions-intensive sectors:

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

Power

Decarbonizing the power sector to help limit warming to 1.5 degrees C will require countries to rapidly transition away from fossil fuels in electricity generation, scale up zero-carbon sources like wind and solar, modernize power grids, expand energy storage, improve efficiency and better manage demand. To ensure a just low-carbon transition, countries should pair these mitigation measures alongside those that provide affordable, reliable and sustainable electricity for all. 

Phasing out coal and unabated fossil gas is an immediate priority for the next generation of NDCs. For example, coal-fired power should see immediate and steep declines, with global shares in electricity generation falling 89% by 2030 and 97% by 2035 relative to today’s levels. The scale-up of renewables must also occur rapidly, both to replace these fossil fuels and to keep pace with growing demand. Our research shows the share of zero-carbon sources in electricity generation must increase 125%-133% by 2030 and 150% by 2035 from current levels. Wind and solar power, specifically, should account for the lion’s share of this growth.

Buildings

Rapid reductions in GHG emissions across the buildings sector will require improving energy efficiency within buildings; decarbonizing the remaining energy used for heating, cooling and appliances; retrofitting existing buildings; and ensuring all new buildings’ operations are zero-carbon.

Buildings’ current levels of energy and carbon intensity must decline by 17%-41% and 58%-66%, respectively, by 2030. At the same time, annual retrofitting rates should increase by at least 150%-250% from recent levels to meet 2030 and 2035 targets, while today’s share of new buildings that are zero-carbon should grow by more than 1,000%.

Because built environments vary across countries, the mitigation targets nations opt to include within their NDCs may also differ. Some, for example, may choose to prioritize building retrofits that increase energy efficiency and reduce emissions, while those undergoing rapid urbanization may focus on ensuring that new buildings’ operations are zero-carbon.

Industry

Lowering consumption through demand reduction and increased circularity; improving energy efficiency; electrifying industrial processes that rely on low- and medium-temperature heat; and developing new solutions like green hydrogen for those that cannot be easily electrified represent the most critical strategies for transforming the global industrial sector. Carbon capture and utilization and carbon capture and storage technologies can help mitigate remaining, harder-to-abate emissions from the sector. 

As countries prepare their next NDCs, adopting targets focused on improving energy efficiency and electrifying low- and medium-temperature-heat industrial processes represents relatively low-hanging fruit. For example, the share of power coming from electricity instead of fossil fuels should increase 21%-48% in 2030 and 48%-59% in 2035, relative to today’s levels.

At the same time, countries must lay the groundwork for reducing harder-to-abate emissions, for example, by investing in research, development and deployment of alternative cement materials or green hydrogen to produce lower-carbon steel. Such innovations are critical for lowering the carbon intensity of cement and steel production, two of the highest-emitting industrial sub-sectors. Current levels of carbon intensity for both need to decline by relatively similar magnitudes by 2030 — upwards of 45% for cement and upwards of 30% for steel.

Transport

Reducing GHG emissions from transport will require a three-pronged “avoid-shift-improve" approach. First, bringing jobs, services and goods closer to where people live can help avoid some motorized transport. The world must also shift away from vehicle trips to public transportation, walking and cycling, while simultaneously improving existing modes by replacing internal combustion engines with electric cars, buses and trucks. Scaling sustainable and zero-emission fuel alternatives for aviation and shipping is also essential.

While unique country contexts will influence the transport targets that countries adopt in their NDCs, the scale of required changes globally are substantial across all prongs. For example, today’s rapid transit networks like metro rails, light-rail trains and bus lanes must expand by 90% by 2030. Electric vehicles’ current share of light-duty vehicle sales must increase by upwards of 690% by 2030 and 730% by 2035, while shares of sustainable aviation fuels and zero-emissions fuels in maritime shipping must both grow by more than 1,000% by 2030, relative to today’s levels.

Though the scale of change required is substantial, adoption of new zero-carbon technologies can occur rapidly, particularly when governments implement supportive policies. Already, some countries around the world are deploying these innovations at the global pace needed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C.

Forests and Land Use

Loss and degradation of the world’s ecosystems — particularly forests, peatlands, coastal wetlands and grasslands — release GHGs into the atmosphere, while protecting, restoring and sustainably managing these same ecosystems can lower GHG emissions and enhance carbon sequestration and storage. If implemented appropriately, these land-based mitigation measures can help limit warming while delivering substantial benefits for sustainable development, adaptation and biodiversity. 

Among the most urgent priorities for this next round of NDCs is effectively halting deforestation and degradation of carbon-rich ecosystems. To limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, the annual rate of permanent forest loss must fall 65% by 2030 and 72% by 2035, relative to today’s levels. These declines must be even steeper for wetlands, with recent rates of peatland degradation and mangrove losses decreasing 100% and 85% by 2030, respectively. 

Restoration across all ecosystems must also scale up immediately. Current reforestation efforts must increase 77% by 2030 and 115% by 2035; for mangroves and peatlands, this figure jumps to over 1,000% by 2030, relative to recent restoration levels. Continued delays in action not only endanger the 1.5-degree C limit, but also threaten irreversible damage to ecosystems, weakening their ability to provide life-sustaining services.

Food and Agriculture

Limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C will require nothing short of transformational changes across the world’s food systems. Dramatic reductions in food loss and waste (in all countries) and over-consumption of beef, lamb and goat meat (primarily across the Americas, Europe and Oceania) can help curb GHG emissions from both agricultural production and associated land-use changes like deforestation. At the same time, shifts in on-farm practices and new technologies will be needed to sustainably produce more food on existing farmlands, thereby halting expansion into carbon-rich ecosystems like forests. Such changes to agricultural production must simultaneously lower the amount of GHGs emitted per calorie of food produced, safeguard soil and freshwater, bolster livelihoods and food security, and build resilience to climate change. Failure to deliver such holistic changes risks trading one crisis for another.

New NDCs can help bring about the transformation the agricultural sector needs by targeting major emissions cuts. For example, the amount of GHGs emitted per calorie of food produced needs to fall 28% by 2030 and 35% by 2035 relative to recent levels. Crop yields per hectare, which have remained relatively flat in recent years, must also increase 16% by 2030 and 22% by 2035 from today’s production levels to avoid spurring further deforestation and degradation, as well as feed a growing population. Demand-side shifts must occur at a similar pace and magnitude, with countries halving food loss and waste by 2030 and lowering current consumption levels of beef, lamb and goat in high-consuming regions (primarily the Americas, Europe and Oceania) by 21% by 2030 and 26% by 2035.

Technological Carbon Dioxide Removal

Alongside deep and rapid emissions cuts across all sectors, pathways that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C all rely on carbon dioxide removal. More specifically, solutions that remove carbon dioxide directly from the air will be needed to reach net-zero emissions and eventually net-negative emissions. Balancing the tradeoffs associated with different carbon removal approaches will require a diverse portfolio of technologies, like direct air capture and carbon mineralization, as well as land-based measures like reforestation.

Today’s estimates show that all technological carbon removal approaches remove and store less than 1 MtCO2 per year, or less than 1% of what will be needed in 2030. The next round of NDCs provides an opportunity for countries that have capacity and/or have already expressed interest in using carbon removal to communicate plans for developing these technologies. Nations should be transparent by considering separate targets for emissions reductions and removals, what carbon removal approaches they will deploy, and how they will establish policy, governance and financing mechanisms to nurture the growing carbon removal industry and ensure its responsible development.

Moving from Rhetoric to Reality

As the deadline to submit their new NDCs approaches, countries are grappling with how they will transform their economies to drastically cut emissions and meet development goals — and on what timeframe.

By communicating ambitious, timebound and sector-specific targets within their forthcoming national climate commitments, countries can demonstrate to the world how they will approach this fundamental challenge. Now is the time to seize the opportunities present in every sector of the economy. Time is pressing, and the stakes couldn’t be higher.

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What Is 'Loss and Damage' from Climate Change? 8 Key Questions, Answered helen.morgan@wri.org Mon, 11/04/2024 - 09:20

Read this article in Portuguese

The planet has already warmed by approximately 1.3 degrees C (2.3 degrees F) due to human-induced climate change. Millions of people today are facing the real-life consequences of higher temperatures, rising seas, fiercer storms and unpredictable rainfall.

Rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions is essential to limit temperature rise and secure a safer future for us all. So is making major investments to protect communities from severe impacts that will continue to worsen.

Yet, collective efforts to curb emissions and adapt are currently not enough to tackle the speed and scale of climate impacts — meaning that some losses and damages from climate change are inevitable. How countries handle these losses and damages has been a key issue at UN climate negotiations and beyond.

Here, we provide an explainer on the concept of “loss and damage” and what’s needed to address it.

1) What Is Loss and Damage?

“Loss and damage” is a general term used in UN climate negotiations to refer to the consequences of climate change that go beyond what people can adapt to; for example, the loss of coastal heritage sites due to rising sea levels or the loss of homes and lives during extreme floods. This also includes situations where adaptation options exist, but a community doesn’t have the resources to access or utilize them.

To date, there is no official definition of loss and damage under the UN.

Loss and damage is harming and will continue to harm vulnerable communities the most, meaning that addressing the issue is an urgent matter of climate justice. But the subject has historically been fraught with contention both inside and outside of UN climate negotiations. In particular, countries have struggled to reach agreement on how much money developed countries should supply to address loss and damage in developing nations, which have contributed the least to the climate crisis but are often hit hardest by its impacts.

2) What Counts as Loss and Damage?

Loss and damage can result from extreme weather events like cyclones, droughts and heatwaves, as well as from slow-onset changes such as sea level rise, desertification, glacial retreat, land degradation, ocean acidification and salinization. In some cases, damages may permanently alter places; for example, rising seas encroaching on low-lying islands, or drought shrinking water supplies or turning once-productive farmland into barren land.

Harko, 12 years old, walks across the land with her younger brother in search of water during a drought in Ethiopia. Photo by UNICEF Ethiopia/2016/Ayene

Damages from the effects of climate change can be further divided into two categories — economic and non-economic — though there is overlap between the two.

Economic losses and damages are those affecting resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets, such as damage to critical infrastructure and property or supply chain disruptions. This can play out at an international or national scale as well as locally, such as impacts on individual farmers or communities.

In coastal Bangladesh, for example, salt farming is a major source of employment. Yet in recent years, frequent cyclones, tidal surges and heavy rainfall have hampered salt production, eroding the country’s self-sufficiency and forcing it to import salt to manage the market shortfall.

Non-economic losses and damages can be some of the most devastating — such as the incalculable toll of losing family members, the disappearance of cultures and ways of living, or the trauma of being forced to migrate from ancestral homes.

Take the communities in Kosrae, Micronesia, who have lost burial grounds due to coastal erosion caused by sea level rise. Likewise, the loss of sea ice in the Arctic has affected the cultural identity and hunting practices among Inuit communities. While harder to quantify and monetize, non-economic losses have severe and detrimental effects on communities’ well-being.

3) What Is the Difference Between Mitigation, Adaptation and Addressing Loss and Damage?

Under the international Paris Agreement on climate change, countries recognized the importance of “averting, minimizing and addressing” loss and damage. Loss and damage can be “averted” and “minimized” by curbing greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) and by taking preemptive action to protect communities from the consequences of climate change (adaptation). Climate adaptation measures include protecting communities from sea level rise by helping them move to higher ground, preparing for extreme weather disasters by investing in early warning systems, protecting food supplies, switching to drought-resistant crops and much more.

Addressing loss and damage is the crucial third pillar of climate action: providing support to people and communities after they have experienced climate-related impacts.

Loss and damage is linked to adaptation and mitigation because it happens when efforts to reduce emissions are not ambitious enough and when adaptation efforts are unsuccessful or impossible to implement. The second installment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 6th Assessment Report, published in February 2022, acknowledges that as the magnitude of climate change increases, so does the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits. It differentiates between “soft” limits — when adaptation options exist but communities don’t have the financial resources needed to pursue them — and “hard” limits, where “there are no reasonable prospects for avoiding intolerable risks.” These limits are particularly acute in vulnerable communities that lack the resources needed to implement effective adaptation options.

Coral reefs offer a good example of where adaptation is likely to reach its limits. The IPCC found that 70% to 90% of tropical coral reefs will die by mid-century even if temperature rise is limited to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), with nearly total loss under 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) of warming. This will lead to irreversible losses of biodiversity and have a major impact on coastal communities that eat and sell fish that live along reefs.

While further research is needed to fully understand the limits of climate adaptation, it’s clear that losses and damage are already happening, and many communities lack the resources to deal with them. Climate plans and policies should account for loss and damage alongside mitigation and adaptation.

Damage to buildings caused by Hurricane Irma in Nanny Cay on the British Virgin Island of Tortola. The Caribbean island suffered widespread damage and destruction when Hurricane Irma passed over in 2017. Photo by Russell Watkins/DFID 4) What’s the History of Loss and Damage in UN Climate Negotiations?

The issue of loss and damage has been a lively one in UN climate negotiations for over three decades.

When the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was first being drafted in 1991, the island nation of Vanuatu (on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States) proposed creating an insurance scheme to provide financial resources to countries impacted by sea level rise. Under its proposal, each country would contribute funds based on their relative contribution to global emissions and their share of the global gross national product. However, the proposal was rejected, and the issue of loss and damage was not mentioned when the text of the Framework Convention was adopted in 1992.

Driving Action on Loss and Damage

ACT2025 is a consortium that aims to elevate the voices of climate-vulnerable countries on issues such as loss and damage at UN climate negotiations. Learn more about ACT2025.

Loss and damage first appeared in a negotiated outcome of the UN climate talks in 2007 as part of the Bali Action Plan. Yet it wasn’t until 2013 that the issue gained real traction in these negotiations, when parties formed the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage to avert, minimize and address loss and damage. The Warsaw Mechanism was mandated to share knowledge, strengthen dialogues among stakeholders, and mobilize expertise to enhance action and support for loss and damage. But neither the Warsaw Mechanism nor any other established mechanism delivered funding to help countries manage loss and damage.

In 2015, developing nations successfully pressed to include an article on loss and damage (Article 8) in the Paris Agreement. However, finance related to loss and damage was ignored. Not only that, but developed countries secured language in the accompanying COP decision explicitly stating that loss and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.”

A large coalition of climate-vulnerable countries advocated at COP26 in 2021 for creating a new finance facility or fund dedicated to loss and damage. But developed nations again rejected their proposal. Instead, a two-year Glasgow Dialogue was established to discuss possible arrangements for loss and damage funding. They also agreed to fund the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD), which aims to provide developing countries with technical assistance to address loss and damage. Some EU member states pledging more than €30 million ($32 million) towards the network.

At COP27, countries agreed for the first time to put loss and damage funding arrangements on the formal agenda. This culminated in a historic decision to establish a “loss and damage fund,” which governments aimed to operationalize the following year. Countries also resolved key questions around the SNLD’s governance structures, paving the way for its full operationalization in 2023.

On day one of COP28, after months of intense negotiations, countries set the loss and damage fund in motion and agreed on critical details, like selecting the World Bank as its host. Over the following two weeks, countries pledged almost $700 million to start filling the fund. The Santiago Network on Loss and Damage was also operationalized, with the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction and UN Office for Project Services as its hosts and the U.S. pledging an additional $2.5 million.

This was a landmark moment for loss and damage negotiations — but the work is far from done.

Since COP28, work is underway to operationalize the fund, which is now officially named the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD).

The Philippines was confirmed as the host country, an executive director was appointed and the World Bank successfully met the conditions required to host the FRLD.

Some of those conditions include the ability to institute firewalls to ensure the independence and integrity of the fund’s board and secretariat; allowing countries direct access to resources from the fund; and ensuring universal access to all parties of the Paris Agreement, even if they are not members of the World Bank. Countries will also be watching the Fund’s board for institutional arrangements that ensure resources are delivered at the speed and scale that’s necessary.

Meanwhile, the SNLD Advisory Board now meets twice a year, Geneva was confirmed as a host city for the SNLD, and efforts are underway to mobilize the SNLD’s first round of technical assistance which has been requested by Vanuatu.

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

At COP29 in 2024, developing countries will be looking for more progress on mobilizing finance for loss and damage, mainly through additional pledges to the FRLD and SNLD, as well as through the inclusion of loss and damage as a subgoal of the new climate finance goal, which is expected to be negotiated.

While the $700 million pledged at COP28 is a start, vulnerable countries may face as much as $580 billion in climate-related damages by 2030.

5) Is Loss and Damage an Issue of Liability and Compensation?

One reason loss and damage has been so contentious historically is due to developed countries’ concerns that compensating for losses and damages caused by adverse climate impacts may be construed as an admission of legal liability, triggering litigation and compensation claims on a major scale. As such, developed countries fought to include language in the Paris Agreement to prevent them from being legally on the hook to provide compensation.

This concern was addressed in loss and damage funding discussions at COP27 and in the final decision at COP28, which states that “funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage are based on cooperation and facilitation and do not involve liability or compensation.” This provided the assurance that developed countries were looking for to continue negotiations and set the loss and damage fund in motion.

6) What Are Some Possible Sources of Funding for Addressing Loss and Damage?

Beyond the FRLD, some developed countries point to humanitarian aid, disaster-risk management and insurance as sources of finance for loss and damage. Other, more innovative sources have also been proposed, such as levies on air travel and shipping, financial transactions taxes, taxes on windfall profits of fossil fuel companies, and other non-public sources. But these can’t function separately. To address the scale and scope of the problem, they all need to be part of the “mosaic of solutions.”

For example, in the wake of devastating floods in 2022, Pakistan needed short-term humanitarian assistance as well as long-term support for rebuilding. Meanwhile, Palau is concerned that tuna are migrating out of its fishing areas as the ocean warms. Without the ability to fish for tuna, some Pacific Island nations could lose income averaging 37% of government revenue. While humanitarian aid would not be poised nor mandated to address this problem, other forms of finance could.

Thai and migrant workers from Laos and Myanmar line up to collect donations after floods, 2011. Photo by ILO/Sai Min Zaw

This underscores the need for broader funding arrangements, including the dedicated loss and damage fund, which can coordinate and align various types of funding from both within and outside of the UNFCCC to adequately address loss and damage. The new fund could facilitate coordination with a wide variety of funding arrangements through multilateral development banks, relevant UN agencies, multilateral climate funds, the International Office of Migration, the Santiago Network and others.

Outside of the UNFCCC, there have been additional important developments for financing loss and damage. These include the Climate Vulnerable Forum and Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group’s crowd-sourced loss and damage fund and the G7 and V20’s Global Shield Against Climate Risks initiative, which aims to enhance existing financial structures on climate risk and loss and damage finance.

7) What Activities Could Finance for Loss and Damage Support?

Action to address loss and damage could span a range of activities and should be shaped by the communities experiencing climate change impacts. Examples include weather-indexed crop insurance for farmers or proactively setting aside funds to rebuild critical infrastructure when disaster strikes.

It could also entail providing immediate humanitarian assistance after an extreme weather event; offering relief and rehabilitation to victims through provision of basic amenities; enabling social protection systems to provide emergency cash transfers to the poor; and enhancing microcredit institutions to provide financing for livelihood restoration.

Loss and damage funding could also help people rebuild when their homes are destroyed. For example, while early warning systems in Bangladesh have helped radically reduce fatalities from extreme weather events, people leave the storm shelters to find their homes and livelihoods destroyed, and have thus unquestionably experienced loss and damage.

Finally, when necessary, funding for loss and damage can assist with migration and relocation of people who are permanently displaced, and/or help diversify skills if their original livelihoods are no longer available.

8) What Needs to Happen Next to Address Loss and Damage?

Climate impacts are already causing widespread disruptions and are only poised to worsen, even with ambitious action on emissions reductions and adaptation. The need for loss and damage solutions — most notably, finance to enable them — is more urgent than ever before.

With the loss and damage fund now in motion, the international community will have to work diligently to finalize the details of new funding arrangements and to mobilize finance at scale. Developing countries and communities on the front lines of climate impacts are counting on them.

This article was originally published in April 2022. It was last updated Nov. 4, 2024, to reflect the latest state of play for loss and damage in UN climate negotiations.

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STATEMENT: COP16 Biodiversity Summit Concludes with Some Progress, but Major Work Remains alison.cinnamo… Sat, 11/02/2024 - 12:38

CALI, COLOMBIA (November 2, 2024) — The COP16 summit concluded today in Cali, Colombia, with an outcome that includes a new fund for digital sequencing information and a new permanent body for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. The negotiations were suspended with numerous issues still to be resolved — including on finance and the monitoring framework —and will resume at a later date.

The COP — characterized by record levels of attendance and an inclusive approach involving Indigenous Peoples and local communities — saw major engagement on the sidelines, including on the Amazon rainforest, cities, restoration, food and land use, and finance for tropical forests. WRI convened partners and advanced numerous initiatives including the Pan-Amazon Network for the Bioeconomy launch, the Nature Crime Alliance, Cities for Forests, Global Forest Watch, LandMark and the Ocean Panel.

Following is a statement from Crystal Davis, Global Director, Food, Land and Water, World Resources Institute:

“These negotiations ended with a cautious step forward to safeguard nature and a sense of incremental progress toward the world’s biodiversity goals. Developing countries now have a new pot of money to protect biodiversity, with a fund that urges companies to contribute for the digitally stored genetic resources they use for medicines and cosmetics. While an important breakthrough, contributions to the fund are voluntary and the responsibility now lies with companies to show impact.

“The new permanent body to bring Indigenous Peoples and local communities into the negotiations is a major development. It gives a more formal voice and decision-making power to the most responsible stewards of the world’s most biodiverse ecosystems and biggest carbon sinks. Now countries need to ensure that this translates into more finance and stronger policies to enshrine Indigenous Peoples' and local communities’ land rights into law.

“Yet there are still major reasons for concern. This COP was meant to be a status check on countries’ progress toward saving nature and all indicators on that status are blinking red. The primary concern is that countries are not on track to protect 30% of the world’s land and water by 2030. Without conserving the most critical ecosystems, the consequences for all countries will be immense.

“Finance remains the key sticking point. Most of the world’s biodiversity lies in developing countries that reasonably expect billions rather than millions to support their efforts to protect and restore nature. Yet wealthier countries’ pledges at COP16 fell far short of what is needed to meet their commitments. And almost no progress has been made on repurposing nature-harming subsidies.

“While a few dozen countries submitted new national biodiversity action plans and over 100 have submitted revised national targets in line with the Global Biodiversity Framework, we urgently need all nations to come forward with robust and ambitious plans.

“After years of negotiations, the world agreed on a new shared understanding of the most important areas of the world’s ocean to conserve, through procedures for describing Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas.

“Many of the brightest spots emerged outside the official negotiations. There we saw radical collaboration and transformative ideas that gave us cause for hope. The Colombia Presidency deserves credit for making this perhaps the most inclusive COP ever, actively incorporating the voices of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

“Diverse actors came together to advance new movements on rainforests, the ocean and cities. There was increasing awareness around the need to tackle nature crime, to integrate climate and nature policies, and to shift toward economic models that work with rather than against nature. And we saw unprecedented levels of private sector engagement.

“Political leaders should now return home and start by raising nature to the top of their political priority list. All countries should start mainstreaming their biodiversity and climate goals into sectoral policies, including for agriculture, land use, infrastructure and energy. We urge countries to deliver strong finance outcomes at the upcoming G20 and COP29 meetings, where they should continue bridging nature and climate action for people and planet alike.”

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WRI is a key partner in the Nature Positive Initiative, which aims to unify efforts across diverse stakeholders to advocate for, support, and implement actions to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030. See the events hosted by WRI and partners at the Nature Positive Pavilion at COP16 here.
 

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Vietnam’s Renewable Energy Policy Is Spurring Decarbonization of Global Brands alicia.cypress… Fri, 11/01/2024 - 10:00

Take a look at the sneakers on your feet, or the gadget in your pocket. There’s a good chance they were manufactured in Vietnam, one of the world’s largest manufacturing hubs for global brands like Nike, Adidas, Apple and Samsung. As these companies make sweeping commitments to reduce their carbon footprints, successfully meeting those targets hinges on decarbonizing the businesses along the supply chains they rely on, much of which are also in Vietnam.

To illustrate, for fiscal year 2023, factories in Vietnam supplied 50% of Nike’s footwear and 29% of its apparel. As of mid-2024, Nike has 155 factories in Vietnam, 71 of which produce garments for its apparel line. There are also 13 factories making sporting equipment and another 13 that produce footwear. Across these factories, more than 530,000 Vietnamese residents are employed by supply chain partners. This large matrix of businesses is not unique to Nike, it can be seen across many large consumer product companies operating in Vietnam. 

Decarbonizing operations is now a business necessity for every sector driven by international government policies including those in Vietnam, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the U.S.’s Clean Competition Act, and increasing consumer demand for sustainable products. Vietnam's Decree No. 06/2022, following Decision No. 01/2022, mandates greenhouse gas inventories for sectors like energy, construction, waste management, manufacturing and agriculture.

In parallel, the country’s leadership set bold climate targets in 2020, including a commitment to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. This target includes milestones such as increasing the share of renewable energy in the national energy mix up to 39.2% by 2030. These twin pressures — from global standards and Vietnam’s own sustainability ambitions — have set the stage for innovative companies to help pioneer policies that can help decarbonize one of the world’s most critical manufacturing hubs.

Transitioning toward renewable energy not only aligns companies with decarbonization objectives but also promises substantial economic advantages. Since 2010, the cost of renewable energy technologies — including solar and wind — has steadily declined. Remarkably, in Vietnam, these alternative energies have already become cost-competitive, and in some cases, even more cost-effective than traditional fossil fuel-based energy sources. For example, the cost of utility-scale solar is now estimated from $0.0218/kWh to $0.0316/kWh, according to S&P Global data compiled in July 2024. For comparison, the average production and purchase cost of electricity for Vietnam Electricity (EVN) (with coal-fired and gas-fired power accounting for 55% of total electricity generation) is around $0.0882/kWh in 2023. This cost competitiveness is a crucial driver for the adoption of renewable energy in Vietnam.

Solar panel fields share land with rice fields in Vietnam's border region. Photo by Thoai Pham / Alamy Stock Photo. A New Catalyst for Accelerating Renewable Energy Adoption

Businesses in Vietnam can further accelerate their use of renewable energy thanks to a new policy framework called the Direct Power Purchase Agreement (DPPA). After more than five years of advocacy and development with 15 draft versions of the regulation since its conception, the DPPA rules (Decree 80/2020/ND-CP) were released in July 2024), allowing large electricity consumers to directly purchase renewable energy from generators. The DPPA rules represent the first break away from Vietnam’s monopoly power market, allowing consumers to bypass Vietnam Electricity (EVN), the state power purchaser, and support the revival of the struggling renewable energy market.

The DPPA mechanism could also be a solution for many renewable energy projects that have failed to enjoy the government’s Feed-in Tariff (FIT) price mechanism that provides a 20-year fixed-electricity price. DPPA is therefore unlocking groundbreaking opportunities for Vietnam’s corporate sector to transition to cleaner energy, too.

Vietnam’s final decree on DPPAs introduces two mechanisms for connecting renewable energy providers with large electricity consumers: Physical DPPA (connection through private lines) and virtual DPPA (connection through the national grid). 

• Physical DPPA: Power generators and consumers are connected through private lines, allowing them to negotiate commercial power purchase agreement terms directly set out in Decree 80, including rights and obligations, electricity price, payment, term, termination and defaults. While all types of renewable energy technologies are permitted and no limitation on generator’s capacity, the cost of private lines must be borne by the power generators and consumers without any support from EVN.
• Virtual DPPA: This mechanism connects power generators and consumers through the national grid, facilitating the development of large-scale generators with limitation to only solar and wind projects at least 10MW. Generators must comply with relevant master plans to avoid worsening grid capacity issues. In addition to a retail power agreement, consumers enter into a Contract for Difference with power generators.

Corporate Commitment to Renewable Energy Adoption

Adopting renewable energy through DPPA showcases a company’s commitment to sustainable practices and reduces its manufacturing carbon footprint. Additionally, it provides businesses with greater stability in long-term financial planning due to fixed prices over a committed period, in contrast to the fluctuating fossil-fuel pricing. Clean energy participation extends beyond sustainability to include energy security concerns that could impact production, too.

According to a survey conducted by Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade at the end of 2023, around 20 large companies wanted to purchase electricity directly, with a total demand of nearly 1,000 MW. Besides, 24 renewable energy projects with a combined capacity of 1,773 MW wanted to sell power through DPPA, while 17 others with a combined 2,836 MW said they are interested in the mechanism, the survey found. That means the total capacity of 5,609 MW has the potential to be exchanged through the DPPA mechanism, equivalent to one-quarter of Vietnam’s total renewable energy capacity in 2023 (21,664 MW).

Multinational firms in electronics, semiconductor, textile as well as consumer product sectors in Vietnam are among those already leading the demand for clean energy procurement:

• Samsung: Samsung Vietnam currently operates six manufacturing plants and one research center with a total investment of $8 billion. Samsung Vietnam’s exports account for nearly 14.8% of the country’s total export value. According to Samsung Chairman Lee Jae Yong, the group plans to significantly invest in Vietnam over the next three years, with the goal of turning its factories into the largest global module production hub. In practice, Samsung Electronics has relied on unbundled renewable energy certificates actively engaged with the Vietnamese government during the DPPA’s policy-making process and expressed its desire for the Vietnamese government to increase the proportion of renewable energy used at reasonable costs.
• Nike: Vietnamese companies remain the largest supply chain partners for Nike Inc., producing half of the company’s global output. With an aim to achieve 100% renewable electricity by 2025, Nike purchased 4,070 renewable energy certificates and generated 594 MWh from its onsite rooftop solar in 2023. The company is also actively engaging with its outsourcing manufacturers to adopt rooftop solar. For instance, in May 2023, one of its sports shoe manufacturers, Golden Victory, announced a 20-year agreement with Total Energies Eneos, a solar energy provider, to install 4.6 megawatt-peak (MWp) of rooftop PV.
• Lego: The Lego Group is investing more than $1 billion to build a new factory in Binh Duong province. The site will feature 7.4 MWp rooftop solar PV and 50 MW ground-mounted solar on adjacent land to meet its total energy demand. To ensure the factory can be declared carbon-neutral, the full implementation of the DPPA scheme will be essential. The factory is expected to become operational later this year.   

An illustration of the new Lego factory in Bihn Don, Vientam, which is scheduled to be completed in 2025, shows how solar panels will be located over its parking areas and on rooftops across the new campus. Photo by The Lego Group.   Lessons Learned from the DPPA Advocacy Process

The DPPA is a product of dedicated advocacy by organizations such as USAID Vietnam Low Emission Energy Program and the Vietnam Business Forum, which worked closely with Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade. Other organizations, such as WRI and its associated platforms like the Clean Energy Investment Accelerator  and the Asia Clean Energy Coalition, were also involved in multiple stages of this advocacy journey.

DPPA’s development provides valuable lessons that can inform renewable energy policy in other regions and sectors striving to make significant strides in energy transition. The six-year journey of the DPPA underscores the need for a patient approach in the form of long-term commitment and investment in on-the-ground engagement capacity. This includes building relationships with key stakeholders, understanding the local regulatory environment and continuously advocating for the policy through various stages of development. The DPPA’s release demonstrates that transformational change often requires persistent efforts and the ability to navigate complex political and economic landscapes.

Amplifying the Consumer Voice: The Role of Global Brands

Global brands and large energy end buyers play a vital role in policy advocacy by working together and collaborating cohesively. The collective voice of these energy consumers can significantly influence policymakers and drive the adoption of renewable energy policies. In the case of the DPPA, the involvement of multinational corporations such as Samsung, Apple, Nike, Heineken and Google — top foreign investors in Vietnam with significant contribution to the country’s economy — were instrumental in advocating for the policy. These companies actively supported the framework through public statements and direct communication with the government, persuading policymakers to move forward with this initiative.

A Nike label inside a shoe reads "Made in Vietnam." Factories in Vietnam supplied 50% of Nike’s footwear and 29% of its apparel. Photo by bincidaphoto / Alamy Stock Photo. Collaborative Approach in International Cooperation and Multilateral Alignment

International cooperation and multilateral alignment with global initiatives will remain essential in Vietnam. The approach includes being responsive to what government decision-makers and institutional bodies communicate as their needs and gaps to address.

International actors have played a vital role in Vietnam’s policy development by supporting the government with resources including technical assistance, funding and multi-stakeholder consultations, which were crucial in shaping the DPPA framework.

The Road Ahead: Sustaining Momentum for Vietnam's Renewable Energy Goals

Despite the significant progress made with the DPPA, more work is needed to allow the policy to help corporations and industries decarbonize their electricity use and contribute to Vietnam’s renewable energy transition. That includes populating a clear and detailed guideline for immediate application, monitoring DPPA charges and associated fees, aligning market operations and master plan of Power Development Plan VIII, promoting technological innovation in grid capacity and enhancing the regulatory environment to support renewable energy investments.

The DPPA’s development highlights key lessons in successful renewable energy policy advocacy. Patience and sustained engagement over the long term, amplifying the voice of large energy consumers and fostering collaboration among international actors are all critical factors in driving meaningful policy change. The same global brands that rely on Vietnam for manufacturing have now become vital players in pushing for renewable energy solutions, showcasing the growing intersection between economic and environmental goals.

As Vietnam continues its journey toward a sustainable energy future, the lessons from the DPPA will guide the road ahead. Just as Vietnam has cemented its place as a manufacturing hub for the world’s most iconic brands, it now stands poised to become a leader in the global renewable energy transition.

Editor's Note: Google, which is briefly referenced in this article, is a member of WRI's Corporate Consultative Group (CCG) and supports other parts of WRI work. The company did not influence the substance of this article.

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• Climate Solutions Partnership

Authors Thu Nguyen Marlon Joseph Apanada

Empowering Justice40: How Community-Based Organizations Are Driving Environmental Justice Forward shannon.paton@… Thu, 10/31/2024 - 14:21

Since President Joe Biden launched the Justice40 Initiative in January 2021, over $600 billion has been designated for more than 500 programs across 19 federal agencies. This funding supports climate-related infrastructure initiatives with a commitment to ensuring 40% of the benefits reach underserved communities. Through these programs and fueled by funds made available by the Inflation Reduction Act, money is directed toward clean energy and energy efficiency initiatives, improved public transit, affordable and sustainable housing, training and workforce development, remediation and reduction of legacy pollution, and the development of critical clean water and wastewater infrastructure. However, Justice40’s success hinges on the critical roles of local governments and community-based organizations that work to ensure its benefits reach those who need them most.

Community-based organizations in cities like Baltimore, Detroit, Albuquerque and Dayton, Ohio are leading diverse and impactful projects — from community solar initiatives and free public transportation campaigns to green space rehabilitation and youth workforce development — but they also face some roadblocks as they work to implement the Justice40 Initiative.

We spoke with leaders and staff from seven community-based organizations in those four cities to learn about both their successes and their challenges advancing environmental justice through the Justice40 Initiative. To encourage open dialogue and allow participants to speak freely about their work, WRI provided anonymity to the interview participants and their groups.

We highlight here some important observations that emerged from these conversations.

Community-Based Organizations Help Residents Save Energy — and Lead Healthier Lives

Community-based organizations act as liaisons, advocating for a community’s specific needs, educating residents on environmental justice issues and raising awareness about available resources. They have a deep understanding of the community’s circumstances and the organizations’ commitment to listening — through town halls, door-to-door outreach and focus groups — ensures that community members’ perspectives are heard and their concerns are addressed.

An organization in Detroit, for example, has collaborated with local municipalities to develop ‘Eco-Districts’ throughout the city. With funding from a Justice40-covered Energy Futures Grant, the organization offers residents in neighborhoods that face high energy burdens, costs and insecurity workshops on energy efficiency, energy-efficient upgrades to their appliances and in-home energy assessments and education. The community-based organization spearheading this program also educates residents on climate change and offers technical assistance in accessing rebates, securing tax credits, locating job opportunities and installing upgraded appliances and devices. The Eco-District initiative has so far proven successful: Residents’ energy bills are, on average, 14% lower, and their efforts have saved them a collective $49 million.

In Dayton, another community-based organization is responding to public health concerns stemming from indoor air pollutants. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency collaborated with the organization to address pollution from three Superfund sites in and around its community. The organization developed a door-to-door outreach program to raise awareness about, and to test homes for, trichloroethylene (TCE) gas in groundwater. TCE is a harmful, odorless and sightless carcinogen that can fill homes without residents realizing it. Homes that test positive for TCE receive free vapor intrusion mitigation systems that significantly improve indoor air quality and make it safer for families to breathe.  

Community-based organizations are also tuned into local social and psychological needs. For example, another Detroit-based group has purchased contiguous parcels in one neighborhood block to create green spaces, pollinator habitats and community gardens for conservation stewardship, social engagement and educational programs for community members. These spaces not only reconnect residents to nature but also foster intergenerational relationships and strengthen community ties. By promoting land stewardship in this way, this organization promotes mental well-being and empowers community members to take ownership of their neighborhood’s future.

Although community-based organizations conduct vital environmental justice work in their communities, much of it is not funded by Justice40 Initiative programs. The groups we spoke with shared multiple challenges, such as a lack of awareness of existing opportunities and a lack of capacity to complete grant applications, that prevent them from tapping into Justice40 funding when it is available.

Roadblocks in Advancing Environmental Justice Through Government Partnerships

Community-based organizations are working with local governments to urgently deliver the programmatic benefits to historically disinvested communities, but several systemic barriers limit the efficacy of these partnerships — or prevent them from forming in the first place.

One major challenge is the strained relationships, often rooted in long and complex histories of harm at the hands of government officials, that many organizations have with local and state entities. These relationships have not only deepened socio-economic inequities, but they have also eroded trust in government initiatives, making it difficult to form meaningful partnerships that could advance environmental justice.

In our interviews, representatives from some community-based organizations divulged that, at times, local governments have left communities feeling like their input on projects has been disregarded. An Albuquerque-based organization, for instance, shared the frustrations that resulted from the city deviating from a community’s redesign recommendations for its local park. Experiences like this erode trust and disregard community needs and can stoke fears of gentrification and displacement by placing the needs of external stakeholders above that of the community. 

Another major hurdle in getting the federal funds allocated through the Justice40 Initiative is the frequent bottlenecking at intermediary stages, such as with state governments or regional agencies. Bureaucratic procedures and inefficiencies can cause significant delays and impediments to the urgent work of community-based organizations.

One Detroit-based organization noted that the city’s permitting processes were confusing and burdensome even for their members who already understand the procedures. Similarly, a Baltimore group described a nearly four-year delay in executing a Community Development Block Grant agreement due to the city’s procurement issues. Such delays exacerbate the difficulties organizations already face in accessing these critical resources and putting them to use.

Navigating the complex grant application process to access Justice40 funds also requires substantial time and effort. The community-based organizations WRI spoke with named capacity constraints as a major challenge — not only in executing their community engagement efforts, but also in securing necessary grant funding at the outset. One Detroit-based organizational leader expressed frustration: “I have found more help outside of J40 than I found within J40. It’s a bottleneck of bureaucracy.”

One element of that bureaucracy that they, and another leader from Albuquerque, shared is that Justice40 funding often frustratingly gets tied up with local and state governments before community organizations receive it.

Another leader from Detroit expressed an additional concern that the current Justice40 technical assistance support system is disconnected from the initiative’s resources and the actual needs of community organizations. In their experience, a Justice40 technical assistance team referred them to an out-of-state grant-writing firm. The firm’s staff did not attend any of the organization’s community meetings, solidifying a lack of familiarity with the local landscape and community needs. The firm, however, still expected compensation from the program if the grant application was successful, an approach the organization found offensive. People associated with the group described it to us as "a money grab" by individuals who seem to lack experience and interest working with marginalized communities. In the end, the organization declined the technical assistance and instead partnered with a local grant writer who was familiar with the community. The complexity of the grant processes, superficial collaborations and the unclear role of intermediary entities have resulted in skepticism around the Justice40 Initiative's efficacy for many organizations.

Community-Based Organizations Offer Ways to Enhance Justice40

The groups WRI spoke with in Baltimore, Detroit, Albuquerque and Dayton identified specific local-, state- and federal-level actions to tackle the challenges they have experienced. Their recommendations include investing in capacity-building programs to equip organizations with resources to access funding and creating dedicated support teams with knowledge of, or experience with, engaging communities and intentionally working to build trust between frontline communities and government.

The organization in Albuquerque highlighted the value of the Justice40 Accelerator, which assists frontline communities in applying for federal funds. Seeing the need for enhanced support, a coalition of three environmental justice groups established the Justice40 Accelerator as a separate nonprofit organization, independent of the federal Justice40 initiative. The Accelerator empowers community-based organizations by providing essential resources, workshops and technical expertise, enabling them to navigate federal grant opportunities and, ultimately, submit successful applications. Through its work with the Justice40 Accelerator, the Albuquerque organization gained not only a grant writer, but also the confidence to approach its applications effectively.

The organization also went on to share the skills and resources it acquired via the Justice40 Accelerator with other grassroots organizations, solidifying the importance of coalition building. Scaling up the Justice40 Accelerator model would help ensure that eligible community-based organizations can access and benefit from Justice40 federal funding.

The community-based organizations we interviewed also saw a need for governments to adopt more robust community engagement standards. Effective engagement goes beyond simply meeting with the community; it requires a thoughtful approach. Key considerations should include committing to timely and accessible communication, providing information in the languages spoken by the community, scheduling meetings at times that allow for broad participation and developing ongoing relationships that empower communities to actively contribute to feedback and decision-making processes. These steps are critical for fostering genuine partnerships and ensuring that community voices are meaningfully integrated into programs or projects.

Through strong partnerships with community-based organizations, local governments can respond better to community needs, foster trust and begin to address past harms. Increasing opportunities for participatory budgeting and communicating with more transparency about how government funding is another important avenue for building trust. Demystifying the allocation of Justice40 funding can alleviate some of the skepticism around this initiative's efficacy and reduce the culture of competition that develops when resources seem limited.

Realizing the Transformative Impact of the Justice40 Initiative

Community-based organizations are vital to making the vision of the Justice40 Initiative a reality, especially as it evolves from a federal goal of climate benefits reaching historically marginalized communities into a program with meaningful and lasting local impact. These organizations are a connective tissue in the communities they call home, and they are uniquely prepared to ensure that benefits from federal investments address the core concerns of underserved communities. By working to overcome the challenges experienced so far and helping to advance impactful solutions that are driven by communities themselves, community-based organizations can strengthen the Justice40 Initiative and ensure that its transformative potential is fully realized.

Titilope Akinade was a 2024 WRI Dream Green Intern and is completing her bachelor’s degree in sustainable development and Middle Eastern and African studies at Columbia University.

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• U.S. Climate Policy Resource Center
• U.S. Climate

Authors Carla Walker Titilope Akinade

How US States Can Lead on Carbon Removal Policy shannon.paton@… Thu, 10/31/2024 - 09:52

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is increasingly showing up in United States climate policy. While actively removing CO2 from the atmosphere is not a substitute for rapidly reducing emissions, it is an important part of the country’s broader strategy to reach net zero by 2050. Carbon removal will be needed to complement emissions reductions efforts and help balance out residual emissions that can’t be eliminated through other means.

The U.S. federal government has recognized this importance through an influx of recent policy support and funding, including $5 billion offered through the Inflation Reduction Act’s Climate Pollution Reduction Grants. States are taking notice, leaning into these generous federal CDR incentives. Some are even setting the pace themselves by seizing on their unique opportunities and cultivating regulatory environments favorable to CDR development. 

What states do on CDR is important. They can pave the way for effective carbon removal by developing policies and projects that are tailored to their economic, geographic and political contexts. And they can be models for one another, inspiring collective action and cooperation to bolster responsible carbon removal approaches and reach not just state, but also federal, climate targets.

We analyzed current carbon removal policies in selected states across the country and found that they generally fall into three categories: states going beyond net zero to integrate carbon removal into comprehensive climate policies; those focused on deploying carbon management infrastructure; and those still early in the process of developing CDR policy.

Through this lens, we analyze the existing landscape of carbon removal policy in the U.S. and discuss opportunities for states to further advance and improve their strategies. While the opportunities are framed within the context of these specific types of states, the underlying principles are broadly applicable and can benefit any state pursuing carbon removal.

Note: Despite the differences between carbon removals and point-source carbon capture and storage (CCS), we consider CCS policies alongside policies specific to CDR in this exploration. Many aspects germane to CCS, like their legal and regulatory frameworks for transport and sequestration, are also relevant for CDR. States Going Beyond Net Zero Are Models

Many of the states leading on carbon removal policy are already forerunners in climate and environmental action, such as California, Washington and New York. When it comes to carbon removal, these states are going ‘beyond net zero,’ with policies that seek not only to scale up removal efforts, but to holistically integrate them into broader climate strategies. This includes measures to ensure that carbon removal doesn’t substitute for ambitious emissions reductions and to avoid potential environmental or social harms linked to carbon removal projects.

California stands out for having separate targets for emissions reductions and carbon removal. The California Climate Crisis Act (AB1279) mandates that the state reduce emissions by 85% from 1990 levels by 2045, without relying on carbon removal to meet this target (although CDR can be used to address residual emissions).  Separately, California set ambitious targets to gradually increase the amount of carbon it removes over time, starting with 7 million metric tons by 2030 and growing to 75 million by 2045. This dual-target approach is critical for ensuring that carbon removal complements emissions reductions rather than replacing them.

Other states are introducing legislation to make their CDR targets binding. New York, for example, has a proposal to start purchasing significant amounts of carbon removal from 2024, with targets doubling annually (though this is not yet enacted).

Additionally, some states are utilizing low-carbon fuel standards (LCFS) to lower emissions, particularly in transportation. California, Oregon and Washington are leading the way, with others considering similar legislation. These standards allow technologies like direct air capture to generate compliance credits, which California LCFS-regulated companies — such as fuel producers — can purchase to meet their emissions reduction targets. While carbon removal doesn't directly reduce emissions in these programs, it offers a financial incentive for companies to support the deployment of direct air capture and other carbon removal methods, helping to scale up these technologies and drive future cost reductions.

State Example: California

California, one of the states going ‘beyond net zero,’ stands out as a leader in CDR policy. Key CDR-related legislation and regulations in California include:

• California Carbon Neutrality Scoping Plan: Sets 2045 targets to reduce emissions by 85% below 1990 emissions and leverage carbon dioxide removals for the remaining 15%.
• SB905: Directs the state air board to articulate regulations and permitting requirements for CCS and CDR related to safety, monitoring, pore space ownership and liability.
• AB1305: Governs voluntary carbon offsets markets.
• SB308 (not passed): Would require the state to set and achieve interim CDR targets and a removal rate equal to at least 15% of 1990 emissions by 2045 and would govern qualifying types of CDR.

Next steps: Ensuring responsible carbon removal deployment

Many of these states are already expanding their carbon removal footprints, with projects like direct air capture and biomass carbon removal (BiCRS) underway. While this momentum is promising, it’s essential that ambitious carbon removal policies are paired with responsible project development that prioritizes equity, community engagement and safety. For states at the forefront of CDR policy and climate ambition, several actions can help enhance their efforts:

• Adopting comprehensive safety standards for CDR deployment that cover all systems, processes and infrastructure, including long-term monitoring and rigorous project approval, with state-level oversight to enforce these regulations in addition to existing federal requirements.
• To ensure the fair distribution of benefits and harms, CDR projects should mandate community engagement, equity assessments and strict monitoring to protect local air quality and environmental health. For instance, states applying for UIC Class VI well "primacy" to regulate carbon storage should demonstrate a commitment to addressing past environmental harms from the fossil industry, fostering community trust and ensuring transparent enforcement. The EPA is increasingly evaluating such applications with a focus on equity considerations, reinforcing the need for responsible and inclusive regulation.
• States should adopt measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) best practices for CDR approaches, following guidance from national labs, to ensure robust measurement of carbon removed through lifecycle accounting that captures both emissions and gross removals to assess net-negativity. Monitoring should follow measurements to track long-term carbon storage, while transparent reporting to third parties, regulators and nearby communities is essential for accountability. Verification by accredited third parties can help ensure the accuracy and reliability of data, preventing errors or fraudulent reporting.

California is leading by example with legislation such as SB905, which lays a regulatory foundation for safely deploying carbon capture, removal and storage technologies. It is also seeking to address the permanence and durability of CDR efforts through efforts like SB308.

Massachusetts is also on the leading edge with its Carbon Dioxide Removal Leadership Act, which establishes a competitive, standards-based procurement program for long-duration carbon removal, ensuring that projects are cost-effective, socially beneficial and incorporate community consultation. Similarly, Washington’s Climate Commitment Act (CCA) emphasizes environmental justice and equity by directing funds from emission allowances toward climate-resilience projects and addressing health disparities.

States have the potential to drive CDR action forward through such measures, as well as by participating in regional emissions markets and streamlining approval processes for projects that involve geologic sequestration. Cross-state collaboration on carbon removal initiatives, like the 4 Corners Carbon Coalition, can also help states share best practices, align regulations and create a more cohesive market for these technologies.

States Leading on Carbon Management Infrastructure Can Further Develop Net-negative Strategies

States like Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Wyoming are, in part, tackling decarbonization by facilitating the build out of carbon management infrastructure. These states tend to have economies dominated by heavy industry and fossil fuel production and are moving quickly to build infrastructure that will enable them to capture, transport sequester and utilize CO2. This includes, for example, CO2 pipelines, geologic sequestration wells in which to inject CO2, and enhanced oil recovery (EOR), in which CO2 is injected into depleted oil fields to extract more oil. This same infrastructure can also be used to transport and store carbon captured from the atmosphere through novel CDR technologies like direct air capture (DAC) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).

In these states, existing carbon management policy is largely focused on encouraging development of CO2 transport and sequestration projects. To hasten the permitting process, for example, North Dakota, Wyoming and Louisiana have each been granted regulatory authority over geologic CO2 sequestration wells by the EPA — also known as Class VI well primacy — with other states following similar processes. Texas, the largest oil producing state, has also applied for Class VI primacy, motivated by opportunities offered by the 45Q federal tax credit for carbon capture or removal and sequestration. Louisiana has established regulations on issues such as eminent domain for CO2 transport and liability limits for sequestration operators.

Some states are incentivizing the carbon capture for producers — such as by offering mandates and grants for carbon capture technology on power plants — and for offtakers, via tax credits for EOR using captured carbon dioxide.

With favorable geology, well-developed CO2 transport and sequestration infrastructure, regulatory certainty, permitting authority and in-state technical expertise, these states have become attractive options for technological CDR project developers. Some of the largest planned direct air capture projects in the world are sited in Oklahoma, Louisiana and Texas.

State Example: Louisiana

Louisiana, with its extensive CO2 pipeline network and its favorable geology for CO2 sequestration, is one of the states leading on the buildout of carbon management infrastructure. Key CDR-related legislation and regulations in Louisiana include:

• HB492: Gives expropriation — eminent domain, if possible — authority to CO2 pipeline developers.
• HB516: Governs emergency preparedness requirements, siting restrictions, ground water monitoring, and the recordation of notices and maps with parishes for CO2 sequestration.
• HB169: Limits compensatory civil liability damages against CCS owner/operators to $250,000 per person rather than per occurrence.
• HB966: Governs unitization of carbon sequestration sites.

Next steps: Accelerating fossil fuel phase out

For states already developing carbon management infrastructure, it will be critical to define clearer pathways toward a zero-carbon or carbon-negative future. While carbon capture, utilization and sequestration can reduce emissions in the short run, and enhanced oil recovery offers a way to compensate for some of the emissions from oil production, these states should work to emphasize policies that ultimately reduce emissions at the source. Carbon removal can complement these reduction efforts to achieve net-negative emissions.

These states also have an invaluable opportunity to leverage their existing infrastructure, technical expertise and permitting authority to continue scaling up DAC and explore scaling up BECCS, yielding valuable lessons for future projects as well as climate and economic benefits.

Moving forward, states that have already built out carbon management infrastructure can:

• Articulate robust net-zero plans. These should include specific carbon dioxide removal targets that are separate from the state’s emissions reduction targets, like in California, to avoid deterring emissions reduction efforts.
• Replace incentives for enhanced oil recovery with state-wide or regional carbon pricing mechanisms. This can preserve economic incentives to capture or remove carbon dioxide without encouraging fossil fuel extraction.
• Pursue interstate cooperation and coordination on carbon dioxide removal, transport and sequestration projects, sharing the expertise gained from existing intrastate efforts.
• Explore ways to incentivize and optimize non-technological methods of carbon removal — such as BiCRS, marine carbon dioxide removal, carbon mineralization, soil-based carbon sequestration, afforestation, reforestation and others — through state legislation and regulation.

There is momentum on these fronts, though more can be done. For example, North Dakota’s governor “challenged” the state to become carbon-neutral by 2030, but stopped short of creating an executive or statutory net-zero target. The state also provided a $3.5 million grant to develop software to track agriculture-based carbon sequestration in 2022. In Louisiana, the legislature passed a bill that would require 30% of state revenues from carbon sequestration to be directed toward the parishes hosting these projects — however, this bill was ultimately vetoed by the governor. In addition, Oklahoma and four other states founded the Ground Water Protection Council to focus on issues related to community engagement and groundwater protection stemming from carbon sequestration wells and other underground injection wells. The group has since grown to 24 member states.

A possible model for these states to embrace ambitious climate action and forward-thinking carbon removal policy can be found in Colorado. The fourth largest oil producer in the U.S., Colorado will establish a fee per ton of greenhouse gas emissions in 2024. It is also currently developing a roadmap for CDR in the state (set to be released in fall 2024 and finalized by February 2025) and has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Wyoming to pursue regional cooperation on direct air capture development.

California offers another example: The state recognizes the need for carbon management infrastructure but is seeking to create regulatory guardrails before expanding infrastructure development. SB905 was enacted to ensure the safety of CO2 transport and sequestration infrastructure and plans to address issues of liability in the case of accidents.

States Just Beginning to Explore CDR Policy Can Learn from Early Movers

There are also states that, to date, have developed little or no policy around carbon removal — their climate goals may be more moderate, or their economies are driven by industries that may not benefit from readily available captured CO2. This includes states like Alabama, Kentucky and Missouri.  However, this is starting to change as generous federal incentives supporting carbon dioxide removal and carbon capture and storage spur action.

Some states, such as Alabama and Kentucky, are now building up their CDR portfolios, having already passed legislation that regulates the jurisdiction and authority over geologic storage of carbon dioxide. Both have recently won significant federal awards: Alabama to host the Southeast DAC Hub and Kentucky to advance carbon capture and storage commerciality in its region. Other states, such as  Missouri, have included natural carbon removal projects such as forestry preservation, afforestation and land restoration in their Climate Pollution Reduction Grant proposals, indicating a consideration for CDR as part of their climate goals.

State Example: Alabama

Alabama is just beginning to develop policy related to CDR. So far, its only CDR-related legislation is HB327, which governs geologic sequestration of CO2.

Next steps: Elevating ambition on carbon removal

As these states’ technical and regulatory expertise matures, they may want to consider:

• Exploring how to attract and incentivize carbon removal projects within their borders. Nature-based CDR may be a more accessible entry point to carbon removal, without the complexities and geologic conditions around technological capture, transport and storage.
• Proactively designing CDR regulations to prevent a lock-in of fossil-reliant industries. Policies may have longer lasting power, for example, if they explicitly exclude enhanced oil recovery.

States Can Lead the Way on Carbon Removal

The approaches U.S. states are taking toward CDR policy are as diverse as the states themselves. Different geologic, geographic and economic circumstances necessitate differing approaches to CDR. However, the immediacy of the climate crisis also necessitates urgent and ambitious climate policies across the country that can effectively encourage rapid growth of carbon-negative CDR projects to complement efforts that look to avoid or reduce emissions.

There is more work that can be done in all these states to begin removing residual emissions and, eventually, legacy emissions at a scale large enough to help the U.S. reach net zero by 2050. States can design their own policy frameworks to provide regulatory certainty and streamline permitting, incentivize dramatic scaling of these CDR methods, and put safeguards in place to protect communities, workers and the environment.

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• Carbon Removal

Authors Serena Li Willy Carlsen Hannah Harasaki Caroline Ribeiro

RELEASE: Launch of Major Coalition to Drive a Locally-Led, Sustainable Bioeconomy in the Amazon darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 10/30/2024 - 08:00

The Pan-Amazon Network for Bioeconomy is a multisectoral alliance designed to conserve standing forests and flowing rivers while promoting a locally-led, sustainable new economy. 

Cali, Colombia (October 30, 2024) – Today at COP16, World Resources Institute, Conservation International and more than twenty partners launched the Pan-Amazon Network for Bioeconomy. This new alliance is dedicated to promoting a locally-led, sustainable bioeconomy across the Amazon, with a focus on economic models that prioritize the preservation of standing forests, the region’s rich biodiversity and the well-being of its local communities.

The alliance fills a critical gap in coordinating regional efforts to boost investments in the Amazon region that benefit both forests and local communities. It unites a diverse coalition of stakeholders committed to these goals, including Indigenous communities, local producers and associations, impact investors, financial institutions, research institutes and civil society.

The Network has established multiple task forces that work collaboratively to position the bioeconomy as an economic asset for the region. Key focus areas include mobilizing finance with appropriate safeguards, enhancing the value and fairness of bioeconomy markets and harmonizing public policies and incentives. The alliance also helps coordinate technical assistance for locally-led bioeconomy businesses to achieve long-term environmental and operational sustainability.

"Today marks a crucial step toward unlocking the tremendous potential of the Amazon bioeconomy. By forging innovative connections across sectors and integrating traditional knowledge with modern solutions, we can chart a new economic path. The Pan-Amazon Network for Bioeconomy envisions that by 2035, the bioeconomy will be recognized as an economic sector, with its value correctly accounted for, " said Vanessa Pérez-Cirera, Global Director for Economics at World Resources Institute.

Rachel Biderman, Senior Vice President, Americas at Conservation International adds, "By building a strong, nature-based economy, we're not only protecting the Amazon for the people who call it home and the countries it spans, but we're also taking a critical step towards harmonizing climate action, biodiversity conservation and human development. We're aiming at charting a new economic path that respects the region's unique ecosystems and cultural heritage. Conservation International is proud to be a part of this effort, working to ensure that the Network’s commitments are translated into tangible actions."

The bioeconomy refers to non-timber forest products and services that maintain the ecological integrity of the biome, are inspired by ancestral practices and respect the culture of local inhabitants. Prominent examples of successful bioeconomy initiatives include Agrosolidaria Florencia, which sells agricultural and cosmetic products made from sustainably cultivated plants in the Amazon and operates the largest processing plant in the Colombian Amazon region, and the Amazon Business Alliance, which promotes investments in Peruvian Amazon sustainable businesses, with over 15 in its direct portfolio.

"The Amazon is an irreplaceable ecosystem teetering on the brink of collapse," said Joana Oliveira, Executive Secretary of the Network. “With over 47 million inhabitants, including Indigenous, Afro-descendant and traditional communities, the fate of this biome holds profound implications for its local populations, South America and the world. The Pan-Amazon Network is committed to ensuring the region pursues a new economy rooted in conserving forests, protecting rivers and investing in quality livelihoods."  

Recent research shows that promoting a bioeconomy can be a cornerstone of sustainable development by driving local production, jobs and inclusive opportunities. The analysis, which focuses on Brazil, shows that by pursuing this approach, the country can achieve significant economic growth and job generation while limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C above pre-Industrial levels.

Estela Noteno, Indigenous representative from Andi Wayusa, commented, "We are the guardians of the Amazon, and our knowledge has been passed down through generations, rooted in reciprocity with nature and a deep understanding of our forests. This Network supports our fight to protect our land and way of life, ensuring that future generations can thrive. Indigenous practices are not only compatible with a thriving bioeconomy but essential for its success."

Partners and supporters of the Pan-Amazon Network for Bioeconomy include the Amazon Investor Coalition, NESsT, LatImpacto, Conexsus, the Inter-American Development Bank, Nature Finance, Reos Partners, Uma Concertação Pela Amazônia, Agrosolidaria Florencia, Assobio, Tucum, Fundación Pachamama, Fundación Avina, Andi Wayusa, Coica, Global Youth Biodiversity Network, IPAM, Impact Not a Bank, Instituto Igarapé, Instituto Sinchi, Instituto Clima e Sociedade, Science Panel for the Amazon, Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Amazon Sustainable Landscape Program from the World Bank Group. Conservation International, World Resources Institute, The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, and the Bezos Earth Fund. Together, these organizations bring diverse expertise and resources to the Network, enhancing its ability to effect meaningful change across the Amazon.  

About World Resources Institute (WRI)
WRI is a trusted partner for change. Using research-based approaches, we work globally and in focus countries to meet people’s essential needs; to protect and restore nature; and to stabilize the climate and build resilient communities. We aim to fundamentally transform the way the world produces and uses food and energy and designs its cities to create a better future for all. Founded in 1982, WRI has nearly 2,000 staff around the world, with country offices in Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico and the United States and regional offices in Africa and Europe.

About Conservation International
Since 1987, Conservation International has worked to spotlight and secure the critical benefits that nature provides to humanity. Combining fieldwork with innovations in science, policy and finance, we’ve helped protect more than 6 million square kilometers (2.3 million square miles) of land and sea across more than 70 countries.
 

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Will COP29 Unlock a New Era of Action? What to Watch at the 2024 Climate Summit margaret.overh… Tue, 10/29/2024 - 15:53

Amid rapidly escalating disasters and with planet-warming emissions at an all-time high, the next UN climate summit (COP29) offers an opportunity to unlock more ambitious climate action around the globe.

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

Taking place in Baku, Azerbaijan from Nov. 11-Nov. 22, 2024, the summit's primary focus will be how to deliver more and better climate finance to the countries and communities that need it most urgently. But it is also a key moment for world leaders to signal how they will strengthen their national climate commitments and make good on past pledges.

Here, we take a deep dive into the upcoming COP29 negotiations to explain what's at stake and what needs to happen in Baku to drive rapid progress in key areas:

• Climate Finance
• National Climate Commitments
• Loss and Damage
• Adaptation
• Carbon Markets
• Transparency Reporting
• Progress on Past Pledges

Delivering a New Climate Finance Goal

COP29 has been dubbed the "Finance COP," with the centerpiece of the negotiations focused on adopting a new climate finance target. For the first time in 15 years, countries will reevaluate the amount and type of finance developing countries receive to pay for climate action. This will result in a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance to replace the previous $100 billion annual target set in 2009. Setting a more ambitious goal will be essential to helping vulnerable countries adopt clean energy and other low-carbon solutions and build resilience to worsening climate impacts. Indeed, many developing countries cannot fulfil or strengthen their climate pledges without it.

For the last three years, countries have participated in a series of technical dialogues aimed at shaping the NCQG. Yet, basic questions about the goal's size and structure remain on the table. In Baku, negotiators and political leaders are tasked with finally reaching an agreement.

Webinar: scaling up climate finance in Baku

A panel of WRI and external experts discuss practical solutions for delivering an ambitious climate finance goal that truly meets developing countries' needs. 

Watch Here

One key decision is what top-line dollar figure the NCQG will aim for. Different countries and organizations have suggested annual climate finance targets ranging from the billions to the trillions. Currently, it seems likely that the goal will consist of multiple targets reflecting different types of finance flows, such as public versus private. Other key considerations include which countries will provide finance, whether certain financial instruments (such as grants or concessional loans) will be favored, and what reporting will be required to promote transparency.

The NCQG is not intended to solve all climate finance issues, but it is a crucial piece of the puzzle. COP29 will be an opportunity to adopt a robust new finance goal that allows countries to meet and increase their climate ambition in the coming years. The summit's outcome can also call for reforms by all actors in the climate finance sphere — including multilateral development banks and others — to increase climate finance overall, unlock more private finance, bring in new, innovative sources of funding, and ensure all sources of financing support a just and equitable low-carbon transition.

On a farm in Kenya, a woman waters crops using a solar-powered water pump. The new climate finance goal being negotiated at COP29 aims to direct more money for clean energy and other climate solutions to countries and communities in need. Photo by Jeffery M Walcott/IWMI Showcasing More Ambitious National Climate Commitments

Countries are due to announce new national climate commitments — known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) — in 2025. These pledges form the foundation of the world's collective efforts to tackle climate change under the Paris Agreement. Several major emitters have indicated that they will announce or release their new climate commitments by this year's COP, including Brazil (the host of next year's UN climate summit), the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. By putting forward stronger, more ambitious pledges, these countries can set a high bar for the current round of NDCs and encourage other nations to step up their own commitments.

Specifically, next-generation NDCs should include new economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions targets for 2035 and stronger targets for 2030 that collectively set the world on track to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F). These near-term benchmarks are critical. Unless the world can dramatically reduce emissions by 2030, it will become impossible to make up enough lost ground by 2035 to hold warming to 1.5 degrees C with no or limited overshoot and avert increasingly devastating climate impacts. Near-term targets should also place countries on credible paths to reach their own net-zero goals by or around mid-century.

Achieving topline emissions targets, as well as building resilience to climate risks and ensuring a just transition, will require transformational changes across every sector of the economy. To spur such far-reaching shifts, NDCs should establish sector-specific targets (such as for energy, transportation and agriculture) and prioritize related actions informed by the Global Stocktake. This can help jumpstart implementation by prompting policymakers across government to integrate climate ambitions into all plans and policies. Clear targets can also signal the direction of travel to investors, including in the private sector, to help direct more finance toward climate action.

Committing More Funding for Loss and Damage

The climate crisis has escalated to the point where some impacts already go beyond what people can adapt to, such as the loss of life and livelihoods due to extreme floods and wildfires or the disappearance of coastal heritage sites due to rising seas. In the UN climate negotiations, this is referred to as "loss and damage."

On the first day of COP28, the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was set in motion to provide financial resources to developing countries grappling with these challenges. Since then, the World Bank has confirmed arrangements as trustee, the Philippines was chosen as the host country for the Fund's board, and Senegalese-American Ibrahima Cheikh Diong was appointed as the first Executive Director. Other institutional arrangements are currently underway, including a resource mobilization plan that's expected to be in place by 2025.

The next step is filling the fund's coffers. Roughly $700 million was pledged at and since COP28; this is a start, but it pales in comparison to the $580 billion in climate-related damages that developing countries could face by 2030. At COP29, developed countries should announce new pledges so support can start flowing to countries in need. Another open question is whether the NCQG will include loss and damage and/or have a dedicated sub-goal for this purpose.

Catastrophic flooding in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, in May 2024. COP29 is an opportunity to increase funding for countries and communities dealing with unavoidable loss and damage driven by climate change. Photo by Cid Guedes/iStock Enhancing Adaptation Finance and the Global Goal on Adaptation

At COP29, countries should also work toward closing the adaptation finance gap, which is currently around $194-$366 billion per year and growing. In 2021, countries agreed to double adaptation finance by 2025 as part of the Glasgow Climate Pact. A UN committee is preparing a report to be shared by COP29 to show progress towards this goal, as urged in the Global Stocktake outcome last year. Meanwhile, negotiators can support resilience efforts in developing nations by ensuring that the NCQG puts adaptation funding on par with mitigation and recognizes the need for adaptation finance to be offered with more flexible, low-interest terms.

Another focus in Baku will be how to strengthen the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), a collective commitment aimed at accelerating all countries' adaptation efforts. At COP28, countries adopted a framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation which lays out targets to be achieved by 2030. They also initiated a two-year work program to determine how adaptation efforts will be measured. At COP29, negotiators will work to reach agreement on a manageable set of indicators for tracking progress and finance flows at both the national and local levels.

Leveraging Carbon Markets to Drive Climate Action

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows countries to trade carbon credits toward achieving their national climate goals. For example, a country rich in tropical rainforests could sell credits to generate funds for forest protection; countries purchasing the credits would count the resulting emissions reductions toward their own NDCs targets. Rules for how these carbon markets work still need to be ironed out before trading can begin, which negotiators will work on in Baku. Getting these rules right it is exceedingly important to ensure that international carbon markets under Article 6 — which are different from voluntary markets and are governed by international standards — are environmentally sound and do not risk undermining global emission cuts.

Since failing to reach full agreement on the Article 6 rules at COP28, Parties have made some progress in finding common ground. The Supervisory Body for the newly named Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), which involves carbon crediting between countries and various other entities, recently reached conclusions on two standards (methodology requirements and activities involving removals) that provide the technical underpinnings for carbon crediting. They also determined that all projects under the crediting mechanism must comply with environmental and human rights safeguards.

But several technical yet important issues still need to be hashed out in Baku, including:

• whether the Supervisory Body's approach for setting standards will go forward;
• how to address authorization of carbon credits, including whether a country can revoke authorization of credits they've previously authorized;
• whether credits will have to go through a technical review process before they can be used;
• and whether or not developing countries with limited resources can use the international trading registry for credit transactions.

A worker plants a tree as part of a reforestation initiative in West Java, Indonesia. Carbon crediting initiatives can help pay to protect and restore important ecosystems, but rules being discussed at COP29 will be critical to ensure they're effective and avoid negative side effects. Photo by Pacific Imagica/Alamy Stock Photo Boosting Transparency Around National Climate Action

COP29 will be an important milestone for operationalizing the Paris Agreement's enhanced transparency framework, as countries are required to submit their first biennial transparency reports (BTRs) by the end of the year. These reports will contain a wealth of information on how countries are addressing climate change, including their efforts to reduce GHG emissions; their adaptation projects and plans; and how much financial support they have provided, mobilized, received or need. These first reports will also detail the progress — or lack thereof — that countries are making towards their 2025 and 2030 NDC targets, offering a useful resource to inform the next round of NDCs and other decision-making.

Preparing biennial transparency reports is an extensive and complex process. In particular, developing countries with less experience reporting on their climate efforts internationally will require capacity building support. Recognizing these challenges, the Azerbaijani presidency has launched the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform to bring greater attention to the importance of reporting and value of transparency and has hosted several regional workshops to support reporting efforts.

Demonstrating Progress Toward Collective Climate Commitments

Outside of the formal negotiations, the COPs are also a space for governments, the private sector, cities and others to commit to working together collaboratively to advance climate action. Over the last few years, the number of so-called "cooperative initiatives" has grown significantly. Several have been key outcomes from recent summits, such as pledges to ramp up renewables, phase down fossil fuels, promote urban climate action, green the finance industry, halt deforestation and more.

Yet, while these pledges are a positive sign of growing ambition, WRI research shows that most lack transparency mechanisms to track whether governments and others are delivering on them.

COP29 is an opportunity for these actors to demonstrate real progress on the many commitments made to date. For existing initiatives, that means publicly communicating progress through the UNFCCC's Global Climate Action Portal or by publishing progress reports. This would help advance understanding on the role that cooperative efforts can play in supporting ambitious action. Governments signed up to various initiatives should also consider reflecting contributions to these in their NDCs. And new initiatives announced at COP29 should build in clear operational plans to enable transparency about future progress.

COP29: Unlocking Climate Action for All

COP29 presents a historic opportunity to ramp up global climate ambition. A strong finance outcome in Baku will help ensure that all nations — including the poorest and most vulnerable — have the resources they need to pursue low-carbon development, support communities and workers, and protect themselves from escalating climate threats. To succeed, this outcome must be paired with clear supportive signals from other international arenas and institutions, including the G20 and multilateral development banks. Public, private, domestic and international finance must be able to work together as a system to enable the transformational change.

At a moment when countries are reevaluating their climate commitments, COP29 also offers a chance for major emitting nations to demonstrate stronger leadership, putting forward more ambitious climate plans and recommitting to their past promises. Developed nations should set an example with new and updated NDCs that chart a clear course toward low-carbon, climate-resilient, nature-positive and inclusive economies.

In short, a strong outcome in Baku can help unlock a safer, more prosperous and more equal future for everyone.

Stay up to date on the latest COP29 news, articles and events at WRI's COP29 Resource Hub.

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• International Climate Finance
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Authors Gaia Larsen David Waskow Natalia Alayza Nathan Cogswell Sophie Boehm Jamal Srouji Taryn Fransen Rebecca Carter Gabrielle Swaby Subrata Chakrabarty Nate Warszawski

How Faith Groups Are Tackling the World’s Food Challenges margaret.overh… Mon, 10/28/2024 - 10:00

"What we eat is very intimate and very personal, yet it is [also] collective and political," Dr. Elisa Ascione, Assistant Dean of Academic Affairs at Loyola University in Rome, told WRI.

Her words cut to the root of one of the world's most pressing challenges: Changing the way people produce and consume food will be essential to fighting climate change, halting deforestation and safeguarding biodiversity. Yet, food isn't just something we eat; it's a reflection of who we are, closely tied to personal and social values. This makes shifting to more planet-friendly diets difficult.

Difficult, but not impossible. Research shows that people are more likely to follow new norms if those norms are seen as important within their social groups. Religious beliefs, in particular, can have a significant impact on food choices and food systems — from traditions that promote vegetarian diets to groups that are compelled by their faith to open community kitchens.

Faith is still an underappreciated and understudied driver of food choices. But that's beginning to change. Loyola University is just one of a growing number of organizations around the world that are leveraging this connection to help build a more food-secure and sustainable future.

How Can Faith Groups Change Food Systems?

Faith-based organizations are involved across the food value chain. They own and operate community farms, kitchens of faith-affiliated hospitals, schools, recreational facilities, food banks and houses of worship. From production and farming to distribution, consumption and waste, they have the opportunity to make a sizeable impact on the world's food systems and the planet.

For example, reducing meat consumption is a top climate priority. One study found that a 2011 announcement by the Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales encouraging 'meat-free Fridays' motivated 28% of U.K. Catholics to reduce their meat consumption. This eliminated 42 million meat meals per year and saved around 55,000 tonnes of carbon emissions annually — equivalent to avoiding over 82,000 trans-Atlantic flights. Traditions like Buddhism and Hinduism can help reduce the environmental impact of food production by promoting plant-based diets which align with their ethical and spiritual values.

Reducing food loss and waste is also essential, given that around one-third of all food produced never gets eaten while millions go hungry. Some religious organizations are starting to recognize this as a critical issue in their communities. Recent research conducted by WRI in Rwanda showed that 83% of faith organizations surveyed considered food loss and waste to be a relevant problem for their organizations and were able to identify areas for engagement, such as improving knowledge, skills, awareness and partnerships.

To explore this emerging field further, WRI spoke with three leaders working at the nexus of faith, culture and food. We learned about their successes, challenges, hopes and how faith is inspiring food systems action.

Improving Food Systems Education

Loyola University, a Jesuit school with its main campus in Chicago, has been developing pioneering projects at the intersection of food and climate for over a decade. Driven by the fundamental principle of cura personalis (care for the whole person), the school is now working to bolster awareness and education around food systems issues.

Loyola's study abroad program in Italy offers classes and experiential learning opportunities in which students learn about how food is produced, processed and consumed — not just in theory, but also in the field. Students gain firsthand experience by visiting Puglia, an agricultural region which has faced issues of illegal migrant labor exploitation. They tour fair trade businesses and learn about tomato picking and farm workers' conditions through conversations with trade union activists and groups supporting migrant workers. This deepens their understanding of the links between labor, social justice and food systems, equipping them to tackle issues like food security and equity in their future careers.

Migrant and seasonal workers harvest fruit at a farm in Italy's Puglia region. Students in Loyola's study abroad program visits farms in the region to learn about the links between food production and social justice. Photo by Photo Beto/iStock

As Dr. Ascione puts it, "Students can eat a tomato knowing that its production didn't pollute the world, and there was no exploitation behind the person who migrated from afar to do this work... Food is a powerful tool because it takes us back to experiences that we all share."

Feeding the Hungry

"Our Faith tells us that sustainable consumption, food and spirituality are inextricably linked," says Jasjit Singh, Professor in Religion and Society at the University of Leeds U.K. and an expert of Sikh Studies. "How can you be spiritual if your stomach is empty?" In a world where 1 in 11 people still lack regular access to food, it is a poignant question.

A fundamental principle in the Sikh tradition is the concept of seva, or 'selfless service', which drives Sikh believers to be active in supporting food pantries. The first Sikh community kitchens, or langar, were developed by the founder of the Sikh Religion 500 years ago. Today, they are replicated by hundreds of food banks and community kitchens managed by Sikh groups around the world.

Residents of Delhi sit together for a langar at Sis Ganj Gurdwara in June 2024. Photo by Jasjit Singh

The key point of langar is to break societal barriers and bring people together to share a meal as equals. It's also a practical manifestation of religious teaching, from giving out free burritos in the streets of Los Angeles, to opening up Gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) for hot meals in cities like Singapore, London and Toronto. The Sikh Golden Temple in Amristar, in the Punjab region of India, is famous for being the largest free kitchen in the world, serving between 50,000 and 100,000 hot meals every day.

"It's all about empowering communities to be self-sufficient, to make sure they look after themselves and also consume responsibly," says Singh. "This isn't about feeding Sikhs. It's about feeding everyone, recognizing the oneness of humanity and making sure that everybody you know has a full stomach."

Tying Food to Climate Change and Social Justice

According to Shanon Shah, Director of Faith for the Climate (an organization supporting interfaith climate action, based in London) there is a growing awareness among the Muslim community around the harmful, unsustainable nature of global food systems. And this awareness is beginning to drive tangible change.

For example, the religious concept of tayyib (pure), is increasingly being incorporated into Halal food production, leading to a more comprehensive interpretation of Halal food's certification requirements. Tayyib requirements ensure that food processes are clean, avoid contamination and are free from toxic ingredients. As such, certain food products — such as mass-produced chicken, which can pose serious threats to the environmental and human health — may no longer be a viable option for practicing Muslims.

Shah explains that the Muslim principle of mizan (balance) is often used to frame conversations around food justice and climate change:

"Whether it's in our own individual diets, or in how we treat the land, are we balanced? We hear of workers being exploited, of communities facing different levels of malnutrition, which especially affects Muslims of minoritized backgrounds. If we can make the links with these aspects of food production, I think there's a way these communities understand climate and food injustice."

An interfaith picnic in London brings together communities, art and culture over a 'climate-conscious' meal. Photo courtesy of Faith for the Climate

Reflecting on the 'interfaith climate picnics' that Faith for the Climate organizes in the U.K., Shah adds, "Food is something joyful that brings people together. I'm hoping that Muslims, and basically any other underrepresented community, will find this trick of making social justice work by hanging on to what gives us the most joy about food."

Elevating the Faith-Food Connection on the Global Agenda

These leaders and others around the world demonstrate that faith-based organizations can become powerful agents of change in creating more sustainable and equitable food systems. To realize their full potential, more attention, research and partnerships will be needed at the global level to shed light on how faith can inspire environmental behaviors, elevate success stories and inspire action within communities.

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• Faith and Sustainability
• Climate-Friendly Diets
• Fighting Food Loss and Waste

Authors Sophia Sanniti Alberto Pallecchi

3 Emerging Trends in the US Electric Vehicle Workforce alicia.cypress… Thu, 10/24/2024 - 10:59

Across the country, workers are seeing manufacturing industries drastically transform: Where jobs are located, what employment opportunities are available, which skills are needed and how workers gain those skills are all in flux. 

As this transformation takes place it is imperative to consider how these changes are impacting individual workers, families, and communities across industries and regions. Workers are finding their existing skills are not compatible with new job opportunities. Sometimes, they don’t have access to training or education programs to help them develop those skills. Other times, there are opportunities to pivot and grow their skills. Stories like these are becoming more common as industries revolutionize with new technologies and adapt to cleaner energy.

These issues are especially crucial in the auto sector as it experiences a rapid transformation brought about by the adoption of electric vehicles. As auto companies, parts manufacturers and others along the auto supply chain shift to meet the new EV demands, new jobs are created and existing roles are transforming.

A worker builds an electric charging station. As EV demand grows, more jobs will be needed across the U.S. Photo by Jim West / Alamy Stock Photo.

To understand how EV jobs are shifting, the kinds of jobs that will be in demand and the training and education that will be necessary so that employers have a pipeline of workers, here are three key themes coming from the current auto-industry landscape.

1) EV-Related Manufacturing Jobs are Moving Beyond Traditional Auto Manufacturing States

Well before the rise of EVs, auto manufacturing jobs across the country were heavily concentrated in five states — Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky and Alabama — which between 2010 and 2015 made up 62% to 68% of U.S. motor vehicle manufacturing employment.

Now, after historic levels of private investments spurred by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, EV and battery manufacturing facilities are opening in different parts of the country, with 84% of announced private investments now located in 10 states: Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Nevada, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio and Illinois.

While states with a strong auto-manufacturing presence are receiving significant EV-related investments, other states like Georgia, Nevada and Arizona, which have not historically been heavily associated with auto manufacturing, are now entering the EV-related manufacturing industry.

Georgia for instance, accounts for nearly 16% of recent EV-related manufacturing job announcements in the U.S. based on data from the U.S. Department of Energy, with a heavy presence of both vehicle and battery manufacturing facilities. Arizona and Nevada are becoming more involved in battery manufacturing where at least $17 billion in investments have been announced for facilities operating in different parts of the battery supply chain.

Such trends indicate that EV and battery manufacturing may become more dispersed across a wider range of states compared to existing auto industry facilities and employers.

While provisions included in the Inflation Reduction Act, such as tax credits and  grants like the Domestic Manufacturing Auto Conversion Grants are driving national investment in the EV industry, U.S. states are also competing with each other to attract those investments.

There are several factors that influence a company’s decision to locate in one state versus another, but the availability of a skilled workforce is a key factor. Offering worker training support, including funding for training programs and dedicated training centers, is one way states are using incentives to attract companies. These employer-specific incentives can significantly reduce costs related to hiring and training workers. Georgia’s Quick Start and South Carolina’s Ready SC are two examples of worker training programs offered to large employers as part of the incentive package to lure them to those states. Ready SC is creating customized training for AESC, the battery cell maker that will provide all the batteries for BMW’s EV production line in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The program is  also building a new training center near AESC’s manufacturing site.

Other factors that could influence company location calculus include availability of state-level tax incentives, existing supply chain infrastructure and manufacturers and associated suppliers deciding to be in proximity to one another. For example, Hyundai’s EV and battery manufacturing facility in Savannah, Georgia, which commenced construction in 2022, has helped attract more than 17 suppliers of vehicle components and metal parts into the state. Other regulatory aspects like “Right-to-Work” laws in different states may also influence decision-making. The concentration of EV investments in such states can make it harder for workers to collectively bargain for better pay and working conditions.   

While existing investment and facility announcement patterns help identify states where EV manufacturing is becoming prominent across the country and where workers will be needed, it is important to note that some occupations, such as auto maintenance and repair technicians with training to work on EVs, will be needed across the country as EV ownership rises in different states. Similarly, although private investments for charger manufacturing are mainly occurring in a few states like Ohio, Texas, and California, electricians and technicians who are trained to install and maintain chargers will also be in demand throughout the country as charging deployment increases.

2) The EV Industry Needs a Diverse Group of Educated and Trained Workers 

The rapidly growing EV industry will need workers with a diverse set of skills and specialties making the industry accessible to a wide group of individuals with different educational and training backgrounds. They will be engaged in five key areas:

1. Scientific research to improve EV technology.
2. Design and development of EV technology.
3. EV and battery manufacturing.
4. EV maintenance and repair.
5. Charging infrastructure development.

While a doctoral degree is required for scientists who are conducting original research in improving battery technology and power electronics, for instance, other scientific workers in EV-related scientific research require only bachelor’s or master’s degree. Workers in design and development of EV technology are more likely to require bachelor’s degree, though there are occupations that require an associate’s degree.

Engineers — chemical, electrical, industrial, materials and mechanical — are one of the most sought-after workers and will typically enter the EV industry with a bachelor’s degree. Certifications in specific systems and technologies and licensure as a professional engineer are also sought by employers for more senior level positions. Working closely with engineers are engineering technicians and drafters with an associate’s degree or certification from a community college or a technical school.  

EV manufacturing includes workers with a wide variety of skills. Many occupations only require a high school diploma but must be supplemented with on-the-job training or apprenticeship programs to familiarize workers with production processes and equipment they will use. Even though EVs and internal combustion engine vehicles have some important differences, many of the workers previously employed in traditional vehicle manufacturing can move on to EV manufacturing with appropriate retraining and reskilling. Care will have to be taken so that the high labor standards of traditional vehicle manufacturing, won through decades of union efforts, continue in the transition to new jobs in EV manufacturing.  

Automotive technicians and mechanics will require formal training to deal with high-voltage electricity, high-tech software and mechanical parts within an EV. Training begins in high school or post-secondary vocational school and community college. Certifications from the National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence (ASE), a nonprofit organization that tests and certifies auto mechanics and technicians, is typically required to work at large repair shops or dealerships.   

Electrical workers set up EV charging stations in Detroit, Michigan, before an event announcing more fast charging stations between the U.S. and Canada. More trained workers will be needed as EV charging infrastructure is set up across the U.S. Photo by Jim West / Alamy Stock Photo.

Finally, charging infrastructure roll-out will require increasing numbers of electrical power-line installers and repairers who will install and maintain the electric grid to move electricity from generating plants to customers, as well as electricians who will install charging stations and related equipment for EVs. Both these occupations require a high school diploma with on-the-job training, and in the case of electricians, certifications and apprenticeship programs specializing in charger installations are emerging. The Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Training Program, for instance, develops curriculum to train and certify electricians to perform installation and maintenance of charging stations.  

3) Public-Private Partnerships Are Key to Training the Workforce

There is no comprehensive review yet of types and locations of post-secondary EV-related training programs that are emerging across the country, who those programs are serving and the extent to which these programs are meeting the goals of developing a diverse and inclusive workforce. One analysis by the National Association of State Energy Officials, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials and Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment and Sustainability has identified 17 colleges and universities offering EV manufacturing training programs, 28 offering EV maintenance/service training programs and 14 offering EV-specific electrician and charging infrastructure training programs across 10 southeastern states. This analysis does not include training provided by employers or other stakeholders such as the Clean Cities Coalition.

However, we were able to document several educational and training programs that target workers interested in the EV industry and have three observations:

• A diverse range of EV training programs, including degree programs, certifications in specific systems and technologies, and apprenticeships, are emerging to build this workforce. 
  
  A growing number of universities are expanding EV-related research and education, including the Electric Vehicle Center at the University of Michigan and University of Georgia’s Electric Mobility Initiative. Community colleges such as Illinois’ Heartland Community College and Tennessee’s Chattanooga State Community College are adding EV instruction to their existing associate degree program focused on automotive technology.
  
  Beyond degree programs, technical or vocational schools, community colleges and professional organizations are developing certification programs, that last anywhere between a few months to two years and aim to prepare students to enter the EV industry as quickly as possible. Certifications are awarded after a student has passed the proper assessments administered by a recognized credentialing institution. North Carolina’s Wake Tech community college offers an Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) Field Technician Certificate course that spans six weeks and provides online and hands-on instruction. Students successfully completing the course will receive a Wake Tech Certificate and be prepared to sit for EVSE Technician credentialing through the Society of Automotive Engineers. 
  
  Apprenticeship programs also create a diverse pipeline of workers for the EV industry. These industry- or union-led training programs help individuals learn a trade or profession through a combination of classroom instruction and paid on-the-job experience. The training can vary in length from one to six years, depending on the complexity of the profession. Rivian, for example, launched an apprenticeship program in 2023 to train staff for its future manufacturing plant in Georgia. Participants will attend Georgia community colleges for the first six months before completing another 12 to 18 months of on-the-job training at Rivian’s existing plant in Illinois. Tuition will be covered by Georgia’s HOPE career grant program and participants will be paid as maintenance technicians by Rivian while in the program.
   
• Two-year community colleges and four-year universities have a significant foundation of education and training programs that can be built upon to meet the needs of the EV industry. 
  
  Many universities offer engineering and computer science degree programs, which will be in demand as the EV industry grows. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that software developers and chemical engineers, two of the key in-demand EV-related occupations, will grow by 17% and 10% respectively from 2023 to 2033, much faster than the average for all occupations. The same projections estimate 140,000 openings for software developers, quality assurance analysts and testers each year, on average, over the decade. The EV industry will increasingly look to universities, especially in states where they have research and development and manufacturing facilities, for access to both cutting edge research to stay competitive and a workforce equipped with specialized skills and knowledge. Wayne State University in Michigan was ahead of the game when it became the first university in 2010 to launch an electric vehicle engineering curriculum.
  
  Similarly, community colleges have a substantial knowledge base in automotive, welding, electrical and manufacturing technologies. These are versatile institutions that can provide transfer pathways to four-year universities, work certifications and career education programs. Because community colleges also disproportionately serve students of color and low-income students, they offer significant opportunity to build a diverse workforce. The EV industry is already forging strategic partnerships with community colleges (see Tesla Start Program) but community colleges need more public funding and support to offer EV-related training programs. 
   
• Many EV-related training programs have an industry partner. 
  
  While the private sector knows best the skills it requires in its workforce, it will need to partner with universities and community colleges, through internships, joint research initiatives and apprenticeship programs, to train the EV workforce. Some of that is already happening. Tesla and Panasonic have teamed up with the American Association of Community Colleges to create an apprenticeship program to meet the demand for workers in charging infrastructure. This national initiative is funded by an $8 million grant from the Department of Labor. However, more coordinated effort between companies and the training providers in balancing the supply and demand for workforce-ready students is needed, especially since research has found that a disconnect exists between the skills companies need their workers to have and the skills taught by community colleges, for instance.

More Research and Collaboration Can Create a Diverse EV Workforce

The U.S. automotive industry is undergoing a profound transformation in the transition to EVs that will require training providers to adapt and keep up with industry changes. Technological changes within the battery industry, such as manufacturers shifting to novel battery chemistries and designs, will also impact training needs. How quickly EV adoption increases and how prominent different vehicle types, such as hybrids, become in the future are some other factors which will impact how and when training needs evolve.

One thing is very clear though: Successfully navigating the training needs of this dynamic industry landscape will require more research to better understand how the industry is evolving. For example:  How are employers defining their workforce needs?  How well are available training programs matching industry needs in different locations? What extents are training programs creating a diverse workforce?  

Close collaboration between different stakeholders like training providers, employers, policymakers and labor and community organizations will also be critical to ensure suitable training programs are available and accessible in different locations across the country.

ev-workforce-tesla-factory.jpg Electric Mobility United States U.S. Climate Policy-Electric Vehicles electric mobility U.S. Climate Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• U.S. Climate Policy Resource Center

Authors Devashree Saha Rajat Shrestha Evana Said Grace Flynn Jenna Schulman Nate Hunt Sophia Chryssanthacopoulos

Mining Is Increasingly Pushing into Critical Rainforests and Protected Areas shannon.paton@… Wed, 10/23/2024 - 00:00

Since the turn of the century, mining has increased by 52% due to surging demand for coal, iron, industrial minerals and other metals. In some cases, this extraction has come at the expense of forests, along with burdens to the communities who rely on them.

We analyzed tree cover loss data from the University of Maryland and a combination of studies on global mining extent and found that mining has increasingly pushed into forests around the world — especially tropical primary rainforests and protected areas. From 2001 to 2020, the world lost nearly 1.4 million hectares of trees from mining and related activities, an area of land roughly the size of Montenegro.

Felling these trees also released 36 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) per year into the atmosphere, an amount similar to Finland’s fossil fuel emissions in 2022.

Although mining’s role in global tree cover loss is small compared to the main drivers (for example, 130 million hectares were lost due to forestry and 90 million hectares from wildfire between 2001 and 2020), it can have outsized impacts regionally. This includes in tropical primary rainforests, some of the world’s most important ecosystems where mining is a growing driver of loss, and in Indigenous and local community territories, where people depend on forests for their livelihoods. Mining often involves extensive removal of vegetation and soil, making it difficult if not impossible to achieve full ecological recovery of cleared lands. It can also result in air and water pollution that affect human health and surrounding ecosystems.

Here, we examine tree cover loss linked to mining as well as what’s needed to lessen its impact in the future.

How Much Forest Loss Is Linked to Mining?

Of the 1.4 million hectares of mining-related tree cover loss from 2001 to 2020, 450,000 hectares were in tropical primary rainforests, 150,000 hectares were in protected areas, and 260,000 hectares were in Indigenous Peoples’ and local community lands. Mining-related loss in tropical primary rainforests is especially concerning because these are some of the most carbon-rich and biodiverse areas of the world. They also help regulate local and regional climate effects like rainfall and temperatures.

Moreover, these figures are likely conservative. They do not account for indirect tree cover loss caused by mining activities, such as building access roads for heavy machinery, storage facilities and other infrastructure. Evidence also shows that mining sites often expand, leading to in-migration and the establishment of nearby settlements that further degrade forests through agriculture and logging.

What’s Driving Mining-related Forest Loss?

Gold and coal have historically been the biggest drivers of tree cover loss related to mining. According to a WWF study, gold and coal extraction resulted in over 71% of all mining-related deforestation from 2001 to 2019. The current gold mining boom started shortly after the 2008 global financial crisis when the price of gold took off. And while coal use is declining, it still dominates the global energy mix, generating approximately 36% of electricity in 2022.

Critical minerals for things like smartphones and renewable energy are also becoming a growing driver of mining. This demand is expected to increase in coming years.

Two types of mining are common in forested areas:

• Large-scale mining is a regulated, landscape-transforming, industrial-scale extraction. It can include mountaintop removal for coal or the opening of large pits for metals such as copper or lithium. This type of mining is common in the United States and Australia.
• Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is a largely informal sector that, despite its name, can lead to widespread superficial landscape impacts that are oftentimes more difficult to monitor relative to large-scale mining. ASM is sometimes illegal, when done without the appropriate land rights and mining licenses and permits. Informal and illegal mining is rife in the Amazon, Ghana and Myanmar for materials like gold and rare earth elements. While this type of mining can have negative impacts for both nature and human health, it can also provide economic support for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. A few grams of gold, for example, can amount to a month’s or year’s minimum wage in some rural communities in exporting countries.

Where Is Mining Affecting Forests?

Mining-related forest loss between 2001 and 2020 is quite concentrated, with 87% of tree cover loss and 89% of related emissions in the past two decades occurring in just 11 countries: Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, United States, Canada, Peru, Ghana, Suriname, Myanmar, Australia and Guyana.

Indonesia has the highest tree cover loss linked to mining (370,000 hectares) followed by Brazil (170,000 hectares), mostly due to coal mining and small-scale gold mining, respectively. Both countries are home to extensive swaths of tropical primary rainforests.

Impacts to forests from mining can be seen around the globe. Since different natural resources are found in different locations, the drivers of mining vary by geography, as do the specific ways mining affects forests.

According to a WWF study, 57% of tree cover loss linked to coal extraction from 2000 to 2019 happened in Indonesia alone. What’s more, Indonesian coal production has accelerated over the last 10 years, making the country one of the largest exporters of coal in the world. Mining in this region has taken a toll on people and landscapes. Mining denudes the topsoil across hilly landscapes; when torrential rains occur, water runs rapidly into nearby waterways, causing flooding and landslides that cause further tree cover and habitat loss.

But deforestation for coal production is not only a tropical problem. A WWF study showed that 20% of global coal-related tree cover loss happened in the United States between 2001 and 2019. From 2001 to 2020, 120,000 hectares of forest loss was related to mining, much of it linked to surface coal mining that deforested the Appalachian mountaintops in Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia and Tennessee. The ecological impact is long-term: Restoring these areas to the endemic mature red spruce forests of the past can take at least 50 years.

Cobalt, three-quarters of which is produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has been an important mineral for lithium-ion batteries, such as those found in electric vehicles and smartphones. Although mining remains a relatively small driver of tree cover loss in the DRC, it has led to the loss of 13,000 hectares of forests from 2001 to 2020. The demand for cobalt has risen by 70% since 2017 and is projected to increase 20-fold by 2040. In addition to causing deforestation, mining for cobalt exposes miners and the densely populated settlements nearby to toxic dust and particulates in the air and water.

Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) has a large footprint in Ghana, one of Africa’s leading gold-producing countries. Ghana lost 60,000 hectares of forest linked to mining from 2001 to 2020, most of which has been attributed to artisanal and small-scale gold mining. About 2,500 hectares of the total tree cover loss linked to mining happened in tropical primary rainforests, threatening endemic species like the green-tailed bristlebill and the Tai Forest treefrog. While ASGM provides economic benefits for about 4.5 million people in Ghana, it takes a significant toll on forests and workers, who are often subject to poor working conditions and toxic pollutants.

initFlourishScrolly( { trigger_point: "0%", offset_top: "50px" } ); @media screen and (max-width: 767px) { .fl-scrolly-step { width: 80vw !important; font-size: .95rem !important; text-align: left !important; } } @media screen and (min-width:768px) and (max-width: 1023px) { #my-wrapper { margin-left: 45vw; width: 55vw; } .fl-scrolly-step { text-align: left !important; margin-left: -42vw !important; width: 35vw !important; box-shadow: none !important; } } @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) { #my-wrapper { margin-left: 35vw; width: 65vw; } .fl-scrolly-step { text-align: left !important; margin-left: -30vw !important; width: 25vw !important; box-shadow: none !important; } } Mining Disproportionately Affects Forest-dependent Indigenous and Local Communities

Indigenous Peoples and local communities who live in and near forests often rely on them for food, water, fuelwood, medicine and cultural benefits. Indigenous-held forests are also some of the world’s most important carbon sinks. Local communities, such as Afrodescendants in Central and South America, have a cultural connection to the land in the same way that Indigenous Peoples do, but they do not identify as indigenous.

Despite treacherous conditions rife with human rights violations, artisanal mining is often the only means of income for some rural communities. Further, while mining can bring economic benefits to Indigenous and local communities, it also often happens without their consent. Most local communities lack secure rights to the resources beneath their lands. They’re often excluded from decisions to grant licenses and are not adequately compensated for loss of the forests, water and other natural resources on which they depend.

From 2001 to 2020, 260,000 hectares of forest, including 90,000 hectares of tropical primary rainforests, were lost globally related to mining activity on lands Indigenous Peoples and local communities occupy or use. About 19% of all tree cover loss linked to mining since the turn of the century has happened within Indigenous and community lands, likely due to their proximity to mineral and metal reserves.

For example, in the Amazon basin, where we have the most robust data on Indigenous and local community-held forests,  64% or more of the tree cover loss linked to mining in Suriname, Venezuela and Ecuador occurred on land occupied and used by Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

Because the Indigenous and community land maps used in this analysis cover approximately 13% of the world’s land out of an estimated 50% or more that is held by Indigenous Peoples and communities globally, it underestimates the impacts of mining on Indigenous territories.

CountryAll tree cover loss linked to mining 2001-2020 (hectares)Tree cover loss linked to mining in Indigenous and community forests (hectares)Percent loss linked to mining that occurred in Indigenous and community forestsSuriname56,00048,00084%Venezuela23,00019,00083%Ecuador1,8001,00064%Peru69,00013,00019%Brazil170,00018,00011%Guyana43,0004,0009%Bolivia1,7001308%Colombia9,900460%

A WRI report found that as of 2020, mining concessions and illegal mining covered more than 20% of Indigenous lands in the Amazon, endangering hundreds of communities and critical ecosystems across an area the size of Morocco. According to RAISG, the Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information, there were 4,472 localities that experienced illegal mining in 2020, affecting 10% of the Indigenous territories of Amazonia. For example, for years, the A’i Cofán community of Sinangoe in the Ecuadorian Amazon have been resisting and monitoring illegal gold miners deforesting and polluting their territories.

Illegal gold mining, dubbed by The Washington Post as "the scourge of the Amazon," strips the land of trees and pollutes rivers with mercury, a substance used in artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM). In fact, ASGM is the largest source of mercury pollution not only in the Amazon, but in the world, impacting people, plants and animals everywhere.

Government Action and Responsible Practices Can Help Reduce Forest Loss from Mining 

While demand for mined materials is still booming, the landscape is beginning to shift. For example, increased uptake of renewable energy and electric vehicles will require phasing out coal while also quadrupling the demand for critical minerals by 2040. This transition opens an opportunity to move away from past practices and minimize environmental damage from mining, including by following the “forest-smart mining” framework developed by the World Bank. This framework allows for a consultative process for reducing the impact of mining on forests.

We also identified additional opportunities to empower forest defenders and to manage demand for mined materials.

Protecting Forests and People

Reducing forest loss from mining while protecting the rights and economic benefits of vulnerable communities is a complex task, and current laws often offer poor protections for Indigenous Peoples and their livelihoods. To protect forests and people:

• Governments need to recognize land and resource rights for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. At a bare minimum, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) should be required by governments granting mining concessions on Indigenous and community lands.
• Stakeholders should have access to near real-time deforestation alerts, which enable timely on-the-ground enforcement. For example, the Brazilian Federal Police uses satellite data to bust illegal mining operations. Another example is of Indigenous Peoples and local community-led territorial control and monitoring, including the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) technology.

Demand Management

Reducing demand through resource efficiency measures can relieve the burden on the primary mineral supply, thereby limiting some of the negative impacts of mining. Demand management can include:

• Designing systems and products that have lower demand for critical minerals. For example, battery innovation has already reduced cobalt demand projections by 50%.
• Extending the use life of products and components, such as through durable product design, maintenance and repair, and reducing the need for new products.
• Recycling materials. The Energy Transition Commission expects recycling will meet over half of the demand of some minerals by 2050.

Responsible Mining

While there are many voluntary standards to support responsible mining, there is little evidence that the mining sector has improved as a result. But governments and the private sector can promote responsible mining in several ways:

• Governments can enact stringent regulatory policies to create stronger regulations for demand-side markets. For example, the recent EU deforestation regulation requires that a list of commodities sold in the region are free from deforestation in their supply chains. Similarly, the EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the U.S. Minerals Security Partnership intend to require a sustainable supply of mined materials, though they do not explicitly call for traceability or for deforestation-free supply chains.
• Governments in countries where mining is occurring can ensure they have the capacity to develop and enforce relevant laws (for example, in Argentina, Australia, Chile and the U.S.).
• Downstream purchasers like car companies or battery manufacturers can influence supply chains by requiring proof of responsible mining practices, such as through independent assurance against mining standards like IRMA, TSM, ICMM Mining Principles and CopperMark. This requires enhancing traceability, accountability and audits for mineral supply chain actors through policy enforcement.

Demand for minerals will inevitably continue to increase in the coming years, but deforestation doesn’t have to follow it.  

About The Data

For this analysis, we combined three different global mining datasets into a single layer based on a union — Maus et al. (2022), Tang et al. (2023) and Dethier et al. (2023). Maus et al. (2022) included mining sites up to and including 2019; Tang et al. (2023) and Detheir et al. (2023) included mining sites up to and including 2020. It is possible that some of the mining-related deforestation that occurred before 2017 remains unrecorded.

Mining activities swiftly shift from one location to another, and vegetation typically returns in 2 to 3 years, making it difficult to identify mining that happened earlier in the time series. In addition, regions and countries with minimal reporting of mining activities are likely underrepresented in the data.

Our analysis includes only inactive and active mining sites, excluding mining sites under concession or future projected mining sites. Therefore, our estimates of the impacts of mining on Indigenous Peoples and local communities, for example, are likely conservative. Although in this article we distinguish between large-scale and small-scale artisanal mining, our data analysis does not differentiate between the two due to input data limitations.

This analysis also shows the association between tree cover loss and mining activity (not causation). We did not algorithmically attribute drivers of tree cover loss annually. Alternatively, we assigned tree cover loss and emissions to mining based on an intersection between the combined map of global mining and tree cover loss maps from Hansen et al. 2013, accessed via Global Forest Watch, and emissions maps from Harris et al. 2021, updated through 2020.

Forests are defined as having greater than 30% canopy cover in 2000 based on Hansen et al. 2013. Humid tropical primary forest locations are from Turubanova et al. 2018 and defined as “mature natural humid tropical forest cover that has not been completely cleared and regrown in recent history.”

Maps of Indigenous Peoples’ and local community lands are from LandMark, and maps of protected areas are from the World Database of Protected Areas (WDPA). From WDPA we include only “strictly protected” areas (IUCN Categories Ia, Ib, or II) and areas with “some form of legal protection” (IUCN Categories III, IV, V, VI, Not Reported, Not Assigned, Not Applicable).

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• Global Forest Watch
• Energy Minerals and Circularity

Authors Radost Stanimirova Nancy Harris Katie Reytar Ke Wang Melissa Barbanell