STATEMENT: Countries Agree to Global Fee on Shipping Industry’s Emissions nate.shelter@wri.org Mon, 04/14/2025 - 09:10

LONDON (April 14, 2025) — Countries agreed on a draft deal through the International Maritime Organization to place a price on the shipping industry’s emissions. The agreement, which is set to be formally adopted in October, requires ships to pay a fee based on the carbon intensity of their fuel mix and is intended to spur the transition to lower-emission fuels.

The High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, of which WRI is the Secretariat, has previously shared a set of priority actions for the shipping industry’s sustainable transition.

Following is a statement from Tom Pickerell, Global Director, Ocean Program, World Resources Institute:

“While the agreement is a step forward, it falls short of the ambition the climate crisis demands. The agreement will likely deliver only a fraction of the emissions cuts needed for the IMO’s own 2030 climate goals, doing too little to speed the shift to zero-emission ships.

“The lack of a universal carbon levy misses a major opportunity to fund green fuels and infrastructure, especially for vulnerable coastal countries.

“Shipping drives global trade and connects communities, but decarbonizing marine transport is critical to ensuring the long-term resilience of global supply chains and the ocean’s health.

“We urge governments and the shipping industry to build on this agreement and rapidly establish national targets for decarbonizing shipping, support the development of zero-emission fuels, modernize fleets, and transform port infrastructure.”

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How Inclusive Dialogues Are Paving the Way for a Just Transition in Peru alicia.cypress… Fri, 04/11/2025 - 09:25

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As Peru prepares to submit its updated national climate plan, known as a nationally determined contribution (NDC), ahead of the annual UN climate summit (COP30) in Brazil this year, the country has a pivotal opportunity to create a climate policy that benefits Peruvian society while also protecting communities and workers employed in more traditional and carbon-intensive sectors.

This just transition approach also ensures that the benefits and consequences from climate actions are shared fairly and that vulnerable populations are supported as the country shifts to a net-zero economy.

While Peru does not currently have an official definition of just transition in its national policy framework, some local organizations have begun to shape an understanding of what it could mean for the country. For instance, organizations like the Natural Resource Governance Institute highlight that the global shift to clean energy can intensify socio-environmental conflicts associated with mineral extraction. In Peru — where minerals critical to clean energy technologies, such as copper, are abundant — this transition presents both economic opportunities and social and environmental challenges, such as increasing deforestation, loss of biodiversity and displacement of vulnerable and indigenous communities, among others.

To help Peru create a more inclusive climate policy grounded in the principles of a just transition, WRI and Peru’s Ministry of Environment (MINAM) organized inclusive dialogues in 2024 to gather perspectives from different stakeholders.

Here’s how Peru approached participatory climate planning and what resulted from these inclusive dialogues.

Citizen Participation in Planning a Just Transition

For several years now, Peru has been promoting various avenues for different groups and levels of society to participate in and promote climate action. These spaces include the National Commission on Climate Change (CNCC), the National Women’s Committee on Climate Change, the Platform for Indigenous Peoples to Confront Climate Change and the Youth Promotion Group on the CNCC.

Indigenous peoples' participation in these dialogues recognizes the value of their ancestral knowledge in caring for existing ecosystems and their traditional practices in managing climate risks. Creating spaces for women to participate provides opportunities to confront gender inequalities through a just transition process as well.

The 2024 dialogues organized by WRI and MINAM included an in-person event and a webinar. The discussions were aimed at convening people with less access to formal participation, like women’s and youth organizations and Indigenous communities, with representatives from government, unions, multilateral development banks, the private sector and various grassroots and international organizations. These dialogues contributed to constructing the national position on just transition for COP29 in Azerbaijan in 2024.

"Citizen participation is crucial in planning for a just transition in Peru because it ensures that decisions reflect the needs and priorities of affected communities, fostering inclusion and equity," said Milagros Montes, a representative of Jóvenes Peruanos frente al Cambio Climático (Peruvian Youth against Climate Change). "Youth are a key part of this process because they represent the generation that will face the greatest impacts of climate change and have the creativity, energy and vision to drive innovative solutions with global impact. Their involvement ensures that policies are resilient and aligned with a more just and sustainable future."  

Lessons Learned from Inclusive Dialogues

The dialogues provided valuable lessons on how the country can effectively integrate just transition principles into its national policies, specifically in its upcoming NDC. One key takeaway is the need to ground the concept in both national and local contexts. While the term has gained traction globally recently, it often carries perspectives shaped by narratives from wealthier nations, which may not fully align with Peru’s priorities, needs and challenges. 

During the workshop in Peru, participants discussed how to integrate just transition policies into the country's national policies. Photo by WRI.

To address this gap, it is essential that local voices and goals have a central role when deciding on specific interventions for the transition to a low-carbon future. For example, as highlighted in the discussions, ensuring access to decent, dignified and well-paid work for communities affected by the transitions is a clear goal for the community. The future and the path towards it must reflect Peruvians' lived realities, cultural values and socio-economic conditions. Local actors — especially those usually underrepresented in decision-making processes, such as Indigenous communities, workers, women and youth — should have opportunities to define what justice means for them in the context of climate action.

This kind of bottom-up governance could be more appropriate for promoting energy transitions and gaining public support. Identifying key stakeholders and creating safe spaces for dialogue are essential to guaranteeing effective citizen participation in transition policies.

Another lesson from the dialogues is the need to address diverse notions of justice when discussing just transitions. Discussions around this topic mostly focus on redistributive justice, which concerns the fair distribution of risks and opportunities resulting from climate action. However, there are other types to consider: restorative justice seeks to repair the damage generated by the traditional economy; procedural justice ensures that the transition process is inclusive, transparent and equitable for all parties involved; and intergenerational justice underlines the responsibility of current generations towards future generations.

Lastly, justice-focused climate action offers a unique opportunity to address long-standing social and economic inequalities while promoting sustainable development. A just transition must prioritize those most affected by climate change and socio-economic inequalities. Climate action initiatives should aim to reduce poverty by creating green jobs, improving access to essential services and fostering equitable economic growth.

As Peru moves forward, the country can build on its existing participatory climate infrastructure to embrace a bottom-up governance approach that allows policies to be grounded in local realities and that includes communities that have historically been excluded from decision-making. While the NDC update offers a valuable opportunity to articulate the country’s commitment to a more just and equitable climate agenda, concrete efforts and actions to fulfill that commitment is what will have an impact.

peru-just-transition-dialogues.jpg Climate Peru National Climate Action Clean Energy Indigenous Peoples & Local Communities climate policy Climate Equity Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• National Climate Action

Authors Héctor Donado Rocío García García-Naranjo Ruth Mier y Terán Celine Novenario Alex Simpkins Iryna Payosova

National Development Banks Can Do More to Help Drive Countries’ Green Transformations margaret.overh… Fri, 04/11/2025 - 08:00

We know that global efforts to rein in climate change are far off track — and we know what's needed to right the ship: Rapid and transformative action to slash emissions and build resilience to climate impacts, in a way which puts people at the heart. But who will finance and implement these changes?

According to the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, developing countries (excluding China) will need to invest $2.3-$2.5 trillion per year in nature and climate action by 2030, from both domestic and international sources. This is about 77% more than current financing levels.

Funding from international sources such as multilateral development banks (MDBs) — which are already key providers of climate finance — will play a major role in closing this gap. But additional sources will also be needed. How countries will mobilize their own domestic resources (both public and private) is therefore an increasingly important question.

National development banks (NDBs) don't often feature in these conversations. But they could play a much bigger role moving forward.

With combined assets of approximately $20 trillion, the collective firepower of NDBs far exceeds that of MDBs, whose assets amount to less than $3 trillion. And NDBs have several features that make them uniquely poised to help drive countries' transitions to greener and more sustainable economies. They're focused on national development goals, have strong local expertise, can lend in local currency, may make decisions more quickly than MDBs and more.

In fact, NDBs already provide one-fifth of climate finance globally. Yet they could be doing much more: According to a recent survey, the share of green assets in their credit portfolios is only 14% on average.

We examined a few NDBs that are supporting countries' green transformations and which barriers they need to overcome.

Why National Development Banks Are Key to Environmental Solutions

NDBs are public financial institutions typically created and owned by a single government. They use domestic public resources and leverage finance from private domestic and international capital markets to fund domestic development goals. Traditionally, NDBs have tended to support infrastructure projects (such as in energy and transport); agriculture; or micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises — all of which have a critical role to play in countries' green transitions.

The Finance in Common Summit 2025, held in Cape Town, South Africa in February 2025, gathered the community of public development banks writ large, including national development banks. Messages from this summit underscored the urgency of mobilizing the full spectrum of capabilities from NDBs to deliver on development and climate goals.

NDBs share some of the features that have made MDBs such important players in the climate sphere. Like multilateral development banks, NDBs operate under public mandates and thus — while needing to make financially sound decisions — are not purely profit-driven like private sector banks are. This allows them to provide patient long-term capital for climate projects that do not meet the risk-return profile needed for private investments. NDBs also often benefit from a public guarantee, which not only underwrites this approach to risk, but also allows them to raise money from capital markets to fund projects and significantly increases the size of their lending portfolios.

Unlike commercial banks, these institutions prioritize development over profit, and they usually have some form of concessional (affordable) financing to support policy-related goals. They are well-placed to address financing gaps at local and national levels through their strong local presence and expertise, as well as their ability to support project origination and smaller projects. Crucially, NDBs lend in local currency; this eliminates exchange rate risk, helping to bring down the overall risk of green projects and make them more viable. And they may have more streamlined decision-making or faster processes than MDBs.

Moreover, NDBs exist in nearly every country. The most comprehensive estimates are that 480 national development banks exist across 154 countries globally. Most of these nations (60%) have more than one institution.

While not all NDBs are deeply involved in climate action, several have introduced innovative approaches to green financing.

1) Providing Tailored Financial Solutions

NDBs have an intimate understanding of their domestic markets, including local policy environments and economic conditions. This expertise allows them to design and implement solutions that align with national priorities while addressing specific local challenges and lending in local currency.

Example: Supporting a just energy transition in South Africa

As South Africa looks toward a low-carbon future, it's grappling with many competing priorities: how to reduce its heavy dependence on coal while also expanding energy access, reducing poverty and helping workers in the fossil fuel sector shift to more sustainable jobs. Of the ZAR1.48 trillion (about US$98.7 billion) South Africa estimates it needs to meet its climate goals, almost half (45%) is still unmet.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) has emerged as a key player in realizing the country's plans to transition away from fossil fuels and increase investment in renewable energy.

DBSA disburses funds from international development finance institutions (including MDBs) to municipalities, private companies and NGOs, which tend to be too small for these international actors to reach.

In addition to its own direct investments, DBSA oversees project implementation as an intermediary. In September 2024, the bank matched a ZAR1.98 billion (EUR100 million/about US$104 million) loan from the European Investment Bank for its Embedded Generation Investment Programme. The program contributes subordinated debt and concessional equity — notably, in local currency with DBSA managing exchange fluctuations through hedging — to help launch small and medium-sized renewable energy projects by independent power producers.

DBSA is also incorporating labor and social concerns in its support for a just energy transition in South Africa. In November 2024, the bank secured a grant from the French Development Agency (AFD) to expand skills development, training and entrepreneurial support in Mpumalanga Nkangala District, a major region for the country's coal sector. These efforts aim to help workers navigate the transition away from coal.

Technicians install rooftop solar panels in Cape Town, South Africa. The Development Bank of South Africa is helping channel finance into workforce training programs that will assist coal workers in transitioning to more sustainable livelihoods. Photo by Suretha Rous/Alamy Stock Photo.  2) Addressing Market Gaps and Financing Public Policy-Oriented Actions

NDBs can help fill a gap by financing projects that are essential for building more sustainable economies but are not currently attractive to commercial banks. Financing climate adaptation is particularly challenging because projects can be small and fragmented and a range of investments are needed — from those that largely generate public goods and avoid losses to those that generate revenue streams.

Example: Financing adaptation projects in India

The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) is India's primary development finance institution, driving sustainable growth and resilience in the country's rural and agricultural sectors. The bank has recognized the importance of embedding climate in its funding considerations: Today, it's leading projects that address adaptation and resilience needs across economic and social strata in the country.

NABARD prepares annual plans for all districts in the country, quantifying opportunities for investments in adaptation and resilience projects. It has also developed a green taxonomy to identify and prioritize funding for climate projects.

For example, NABARD channels international finance — including from the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund — into local climate resilience projects, ensuring that underserved rural areas receive financing for critical adaptation efforts. As of March 2024, NABARD's financial report mentions that the bank had so far supported 40 climate change projects with financial assistance of ₹1971 crores (about US$237 million).

Among these projects, the bank has financed over 1,800 water harvesting structures (such as check dams and percolation tanks) in the water-scarce areas of Rajasthan. This has improved water availability, supported irrigation and created local employment opportunities. It's helping strengthen climate resilience in the region while sustaining both social and economic outcomes which rely on reliable access to water.

Women harvesting wheat in Rajasthan, India. India’s National Bank for Agriculture and Rural development has funded extensive projects to improve local livelihoods by making agriculture more resilient to climate change. Photo by David South/Alamy Stock Photo 

Another notable initiative is the bank's Tribal Development Fund, designed to support diversified livelihoods for tribal communities. The fund has supported over 600,000 families through more than 1,000 projects across the country. One such project in Telangana has transformed 500 acres into sustainable horticulture farming and brought 115 acres under irrigation. The beneficiaries saw their annual incomes increase by over 200%, on average, from around ₹30,000-₹40,000 (about US$347-$462) per year to around ₹100,000-₹168,000 (about US$1,156-$1,942) per year.

3) Mobilizing Public and Private Actors to Mitigate Risks

Green projects often face high upfront capital costs and higher perceived risks that can deter private investors, especially in developing countries.

Like MDBs, NDBs have a variety of tools at their disposal for derisking. These include co-financing with private banks and using blended finance mechanisms (such as guarantees and, in some cases, subsidized terms) to catalyze private sector participation in green investments.

Example: Mobilizing private investments for green projects in Brazil

The Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES)'s long-term strategy underscores its role in promoting a green and just transition. It's especially focused on diversifying partnerships and developing blended finance approaches to attract more private finance.

Notably, BNDES reserves a portion of the profits from its commercial loans or equity investments for seed funding to projects that support social, cultural, environmental and technological objectives. For example, its Socio-Environmental Fund matches up to R$1 in grants for every R$1 invested by the private sector in projects that support education, the environment, or job and income generation — a model the bank terms "matchfunding." By matching private sector investments with grants, BNDES shares the associated risks of these projects and stretches its public funds further by mobilizing private sector financing and partnerships.

In 2021, BNDES used matchfunding to increase the scale of ecological restoration projects using both native species and agroforestry systems across Brazil. The Floresta Viva ("Living Forest") initiative aims to invest R$693 million (about US$118 million) over seven years to restore between 25,000-35,000 hectares across the country, with up to 50% financed by BNDES's Socio-Environmental Fund and the remainder financed by private sector institutions.

Challenges Faced by National Development Banks

Despite their potential, NDBs face significant hurdles to increasing the scale of their green investments — from limited capital to a lack of technical know-how. But here, too, some NDBs are charting a way forward.

Limited capital and dependence on government support

Many NDBs' balance sheets are insufficient for addressing the magnitude of domestic challenges. As governments face ongoing budget constraints, NDBs are looking to external funding sources to bridge their financing gaps.

NDBs can seek more international funding to expand their capital base. However, since they lend in local currency, the question of who ultimately bears the exchange rate risk (international actors or NDBs) is unresolved. A 2023 survey estimates that two-thirds of NDBs are exposed to currency risks and most external financing to these banks, including from MDBs, happens in hard currency.

NDBs can also syndicate loans to share risks across a group of lenders and mobilize private finance on a subordinated basis — for example, through secondary market mechanisms or an originate-to-share model. The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has grown its investor base to over 40 institutional investors in the past decade through capital layering, offering different segments of risk capital alongside debt issuance. In 2023 alone, TDB increased its lending by 10% from the previous year (to US$19.1 billion) through syndications and acted as a lead arranger for US$4.1 billion in lending.

NDBs in stronger and larger economies will likely have an easier time implementing such solutions. For example, if their domestic capital market is strong enough, NDBs can issue bonds in local currency to avoid exchange risks. South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) recently raised over ZAR2.0 billion (about US$112 million) for its inaugural sustainability bond, which included a significant subscription by International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's private sector arm.

Scarcity of concessional financing

NDBs are well-versed in using their funds to leverage private resources. However, they can struggle to obtain the grants needed to blend with private finance for green projects where returns are — or are perceived to be — too low to mobilize private investment alone. BNDES overcame this challenge by reserving a portion of its profits for grants in projects that support social and environmental objectives, bringing about programs like the Floresta Viva initiative.

Flocks of birds in the Pantanal, the world’s largest tropical wetland. The Brazilian development bank BNDES has used a matchfunding model to raise private sector finance for restoration, biodiversity protection and other nature-based projects in the Pantanal and other critical areas. Photo by elleon/iStock

NABARD, in another instance, has been exploring alternative mechanisms to bolster its adaptation and resilience investments. The global Adaptation Fund metes out money for countries' adaptation efforts, but it's not a lot — the allocation for India is capped at approximately $20 million; too limited to adequately address the need of even any one state in India. Recognizing this, NABARD has sought to leverage separate, additional concessional finance beyond the Adaptation Fund. In 2024, NABARD signed an MoU with the Government of Goa and World Bank to set up a blended finance facility to leverage various sources of concessional finance through MDBs, bilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations for climate action. By attracting private finance through this World Bank-powered facility, NABARD can do more than it would have been able to do alone. It ensures that precious grant finance is used strategically to leverage far more investment.

Insufficient capacity and institutional barriers

Despite the lack of a project pipeline being a significant constraint in increasing climate finance — and the potential of NDBs to help with project development — NDBs often have insufficient technical capacity for developing green investments. Governments and international organizations can help build up institutional and staff capacity to improve NDBs' ability to effectively design, implement and manage green projects and portfolios.

NABARD, for example, regularly organizes training sessions to strengthen its institutional capacity to address climate needs through the Centre for Climate Change at the Bankers Institute for Rural Development (BIRD).

NDBs also work with various implementation agencies and project partners who often lack technical expertise to develop high-quality project documentation. Regular capacity building can enhance their ability to craft robust investments that integrate climate goals.

Capacity challenges in NDBs can also be more structural, applying not only to their ability to develop green projects but to build lending portfolios that generate sufficient returns. In such instances, oversight and fiduciary management training are needed. These could be provided by capacity-building units of MDBs or other institutions that support NDBs in strengthening fiduciary frameworks and green finance capacity.

Lack of robust impact measurement frameworks

NDBs are often hindered in their ability to attract public and private co-financing due to a lack of robust frameworks for measuring and reporting on the environmental and social impacts of their investments. Aligning their reporting with government-wide frameworks and global goals (such as the Sustainable Development Goals, Paris Agreement and Global Biodiversity Framework), can help to enhance NDBs' relevance and impact.

In its role as a financial intermediary, DBSA overcomes this challenge by measuring and reporting the results of executed projects directly to the national monitoring system for South Africa's Just Energy Transition Investment Plan. (This, in turn, is linked to the country's national climate plan under the Paris Agreement.) DBSA supports implementing institutions that receive funds channeled through the bank to fulfil these reporting requirements. At the same time, DBSA becomes a more attractive intermediary for international co-financing since the environmental and social impacts of its projects are both clearly reported and linked to national priorities and goals.

This demonstrates the valuable role that governments can play: working with NDBs to ensure they are maximizing support for domestic priorities and plans associated with these international agreements — and monitoring their contributions to this effect.

Accelerating Green Transformations

NDBs could be catalysts in countries' green transformations. With their combination of local expertise, public mandate and ability to de-risk investments and provide local currency lending positions, NDBs can be critical agents of change. However, their potential remains largely untapped due to structural and financial constraints.

Stronger partnerships with international institutions (such as MDBs and bilateral development finance institutions) can provide NDBs with technical assistance, knowledge sharing, and additional sources of funding or co-financing. Though the diverse landscape of NDBs can make it challenging for international actors to identify and form relationships with these institutions, many NDBs are engaging more in international forums like the Finance in Common Summit and environmental negotiations.

NDBs can play a more integrated role with other transition financiers by participating, or even leading (such as BNDES has), in country platforms. Country platforms allow NDBs to achieve far greater scale and impact by combining their strengths in project origination, local currency lending and smaller scale financing with dialogue on policy reform as well as financial instruments from MDBs and the private sector.

Moving forward, governments, international organizations and the private sector should work together to empower NDBs, ensuring they can combat environmental crises while fulfilling their sustainable development mandate, helping to support growth and jobs. Given the constraints on resources and importance of the task, making national and international, public and private finance work better as a system has never been more important. By helping NDBs make full use of their capabilities, the global financial system can accelerate countries' transitions to a safer, more sustainable future.

solar-water-pump-karnal.jpg Finance Finance climate finance adaptation finance development low carbon development Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Finance for Developing Country Climate Action
• Adaptation Finance and Investment

Authors Carolyn Neunuebel Gauri Atre Valerie Laxton

Tree Cover Is Still Declining Overall in Latin America, but New Data Shows Where It’s Coming Back shannon.paton@… Thu, 04/10/2025 - 14:13

Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have major goals to restore their degraded landscapes.

Forest loss has been a decades-long problem, with the region losing nearly 15 million hectares of trees (1.2% of the total) from 2015 to 2023. However, recognizing the importance of forests for both people and nature, 18 countries have committed to protect and restore over 50 million hectares of degraded and deforested land by 2030 as part of Initiative 20x20.

With five years left to achieve the goal, how are countries doing?

For a long time, measuring progress on restoration has been a difficult task, due to lack of consistent and credible data. But for the first time, new satellite data can “see” year to year where trees are growing, where they remain standing and where they’re disappearing.

Produced by the University of Maryland, this data enables us to determine the dynamics of tree cover change across Latin America from 2015 to 2023. While it is not a perfect proxy for measuring restoration progress — satellites can’t tell whether tree cover gain is due to planned restoration, natural regrowth or industrial plantations — we can combine it with other datasets to get some insights.

The data shows that while Latin America overall lost more tree cover than it gained from 2015 to 2023, progress is being made compared to historical trends. Among the 18 countries participating in Initiative 20x20, three countries gained tree cover from 2015 to 2023, 10 remained neutral and five experienced losses.

But looking strictly at the amount of tree cover a country had in 2023 compared to 2015 does not tell the entire story. The dynamics of yearly changes in tree cover and where those changes are happening can reveal a lot about progress on restoration and conservation. For example, in some countries, gains in tree cover were mainly from increased plantations, which don’t always benefit the environment.

Here are five key insights from the data:

1) Tree cover is very stable from year to year in some countries, but fluctuates significantly in others.

With the new data, we can see whether there is more, less or the same amount of tree cover in 2023 compared to 2015. Our analysis shows that 13 of the 18 countries studied had about the same or more tree cover in 2023 as compared to 2015.

However, this “net neutral” status could result from very different scenarios: It could mean that tree cover remained largely unchanged over the time period; or it could mean that large swaths of tree cover were lost, but then replaced by an equivalent amount of gain elsewhere.

In terms of ecosystem health, unchanged tree cover is better. It means that old-growth forests remain standing to provide habitat for plants and animals, sequester carbon, protect water supplies and offer other critical services. Once forests are cut down, it can take decades for new trees to grow large enough to provide these services.

For example, tree cover in Costa Rica and Panama was very stable from 2015 to 2023, with only minor changes from year to year. Meanwhile, in Chile and Nicaragua, tree cover fluctuated tens of thousands of hectares from year to year, even though the countries’ total amount of tree cover in 2023 was roughly the same as in 2015.

These patterns reflect different dynamics. Chile, Nicaragua and the other countries where tree cover is more dynamic have more plantations or “working” forests that are continually harvested and regrown, as well as higher instances of disturbances like fire or hurricanes that cause losses which then naturally regenerate. The stability in Costa Rica and Panama points to greater forest conservation and fewer natural or human-caused disturbances.

2) Tree cover is expanding on farms.

Proportionally, croplands experienced the highest net gains in tree cover of any other landscape — nearly 300,000 hectares, or a 24% increase relative to 2015 tree cover levels. The majority of this net gain was concentrated in seven of the 18 studied countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay.

While we can’t determine exactly what is going on in all these cases, some of this gain is from agroforestry and sustainable agriculture, including integrating trees with crops to stabilize soils and increase productivity. But most is likely due to plantation establishment, such as for timber, rubber and oil palm. For example, Uruguay saw a significant amount of gain in tree cover from 2015 to 2023, but it occurred primarily in the form of plantations.

While plantations can be beneficial when they take deforestation pressure off of natural forests or improve the productivity of formerly degraded lands, they can also be detrimental. For example, if plantations replace natural forests with monocultures or are planted in areas that do not naturally support forests, such as native grasslands, they can harm biodiversity, water availability and soil quality. These types of plantations are not usually considered restoration.

3) Many cities are becoming greener.

Two-thirds (12 of 18) of countries studied had net tree cover gain in cities and near other built infrastructure, such as along major roads and highways. Trees in urban areas provide cooling shade, clean the air by filtering out pollutants, and create inviting spaces for people to enjoy time outdoors.

Two countries — Nicaragua and Colombia — led the way on “greening” their developed areas, with net tree cover gains of 3% and 2%, respectively. For example, Cali, Colombia was recently certified by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Arbor Day Foundation as one of the “Tree Cities of the World” due to its network of urban forests and green spaces within the city, which promote biodiversity and improve the quality of life for residents.

4) Protected areas are often the best way to conserve forests — when they’re effectively managed.

Across all countries, 95% of tree cover inside protected areas was stable — meaning no gains, losses or disturbances occurred between 2015 and 2023. This indicates that establishing protected areas is often an effective way to conserve forests.

Peru, Ecuador and Chile had the most stable forests inside their protected areas, with more than 98% of the interior forest area showing no change.

However, in three countries — Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala — tree cover inside protected areas was more unstable than other areas, ranging from only 75%-80%. Net forest loss in these countries was actually higher inside protected areas than outside. While some of the observed forest loss may be due to natural disasters, policies and their enforcement deserve a closer look in these nations.

5) National policies to incentivize restoration show positive results.

El Salvador and Guatemala have implemented unique, government-led programs that both prioritize and finance restoration. Data suggests these programs are having a positive impact on tree cover gain.

El Salvador was the only one of 18 countries to experience net tree cover gain across all land types, including inside protected areas. Deforestation has been a problem in El Salvador for decades; it lost all but 6% of its native forest cover by the 1970s. Though the country started with less tree cover than others in 2015, the data clearly shows that trees are coming back everywhere. These positive trends are at least in part due to political support for restoration, such as the government’s Environmental Incentives and Disincentives Program of 2022, which rewards sustainable activities and discourages landscape degradation. Newer policies, like the 2024 Environmental Assessment System to better evaluate the impacts of human activities on the environment and the 2025 National Program for the Restoration of Ecosystems and Productive Landscapes, should further encourage restoration.

Guatemala has also seen positive results. The Guatemalan government implemented its PROBOSQUE program in 2017, providing finance to smallholder farmers to conserve, plant and maintain trees on their lands. Analysis of mapped PROBOSQUE sites established between 2017 and 2020 show that 20,600 hectares of tree cover were stable and there was net gain of 830 hectares as of 2023. Continuing the PROBOSQUE incentives program, along with its associated mapping and monitoring, could help further support farmers and trees.

Using Data to Inform Progress and Spur More Restoration

Using this data, national and local governments can better identify successful programs or where change is needed. For example, in Guatemala, while PROBOSQUE has helped improve tree cover on farmers’ lands, forests inside the country’s protected areas are still being lost. Because the data shows the bigger picture of what’s happening to trees throughout the country, it can be used to monitor and inform policies and incentives.

Improved documentation of where restoration is occurring is also essential. We now have the data to see tree cover change, but we still need more information about where to look to assess progress against restoration goals and determine whether restoration efforts are actually producing healthier and more resilient ecosystems — which is ultimately the goal. Combining this data with on-the-ground documentation will enable people to better assess where countries stand on restoring their degraded landscapes.

In the 10 years of Initiative 20x20, an important lesson learned is that it takes many actors and a coalition of projects, policies and incentives working together to build momentum for success. Improving access and availability of data to monitor change is one more tool that can help support sustainable landscapes well into the future.

tree-planting-amazon.jpg Forests Latin America data data visualization deforestation agriculture Cities conservation National Climate Action Forests Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Initiative 20x20
• Global Forest Watch

Authors Katie Reytar Victoria Rachmaninoff René Zamora Cristales Peter Potapov

The Most Impactful Things You Can Do for the Climate Aren’t What You’ve Been Told margaret.overh… Wed, 04/09/2025 - 00:01

The message is everywhere: You (alone) can save the planet.

Choose a veggie burger instead of beef. Book this flight, not that one. Buy thrift over fast fashion. Shrink your "carbon footprint."

But here's what most people don't know: The very concept of a personal carbon footprint originated with oil giant British Petroleum (BP). In 2004, BP launched a carbon calculator to persuade people to measure their personal climate impacts. The campaign worked — shifting our collective gaze from fossil fuel companies, the biggest drivers of the climate crisis, to individuals like you and me.

Two decades later and with climate disasters rapidly intensifying, we're still caught in this sleight-of-hand. Choices made by corporations and governments continue to shape the speed and scale of climate disruption, while marketing campaigns around climate action try to shift our focus to consumer decisions.

New WRI research tells a different story. Our data shows that pro-climate behavior changes, such as driving less or eating less meat, could theoretically cancel out all the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions an average person produces each year1 — specifically among high-income, high-emitting populations.

But it also reveals that efforts focused exclusively on changing behaviors, and not the overarching systems around them, only achieve about one-tenth of this emissions-reduction potential. The remaining 90% stays locked away, dependent on governments, businesses and our own collective action to make sustainable choices more accessible for everyone. (Case in point: It's much easier to go carless if your city has good public transit.)

This doesn't mean personal choices don't matter. In fact, they matter immensely — but not exactly in the ways we've been led to believe.

How Much Do Personal Choices Affect the Climate?

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), comprehensive shifts in human behavior could theoretically reduce global emissions by up to 70% by 2050. This would essentially wipe out emissions from China, the U.S., India, the EU and Russia combined.

But the key word here is "comprehensive." The IPCC is clear that these massive reductions would result from individual behavior change combined with supporting policy, industry and technological transformations that make those behaviors possible and widely accessible.

Understanding 'Average' Emissions

The 'average' person produces 6.28 tonnes of GHG emissions annually. But this number varies widely by country and income level. Wealthier, higher-consuming populations may emit up to 110 tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) per year. Among lower-income groups, emissions can be as low as 1.6 tonnes of CO2e per year. For populations living in poverty, emissions will actually need to increase to meet critical development goals, such as expanding energy access.

What slice of this can be achieved through individual behavior change alone? WRI's new research is the first to quantify the gap between projected emissions reductions (what's theoretically possible) and real-world impacts (what's proven to be feasible). We calculated how much emissions could fall if everyone adopted key climate-friendly behaviors, then compared this with actual results from programs and interventions that attempted to change these behaviors at an individual level.

We found that, in theory, shifting to 11 pro-climate behaviors we analyzed in the energy, transport and food sectors could reduce individuals' GHG emissions by about 6.53 tonnes per year. This would more than cancel out what an average person currently emits (about 6.3 tonnes per year). However, our data also shows that when people attempt these changes in the real world, without supportive systems, they typically only reduce emissions by about 0.63 tonnes yearly — just 10% of what's theoretically possible.

It's not that individual changes don't matter; when someone switches to an electric vehicle (EV) or avoids a flight, they make a real impact. The problem is that without supportive infrastructure, policies or incentives (such as public EV chargers or financial subsidies), these programs struggle to drive the broad-based change the world really needs.

Electric vehicles at a curbside charging station in Amsterdam. Policies and investments that make low-carbon choices more affordable and convenient are essential to unlocking climate-friendly behaviors. Photo by arkanto/Shutterstock How You Can Help Drive Systemic Change

Given that climate change is heavily influenced by government and corporate decisions, our votes and collective consumer power are crucially important.

Voting at both the national and local levels is key, as elections directly determine whether governments enable or hinder pro-climate behaviors. In the U.S., for example, the Trump administration has called to repeal federal tax credits that make sustainable choices, such as EVs and home solar, more financially accessible for Americans.

When national policies shift away from climate action, state and local electoral pressure becomes even more crucial. In California, vehicle emission standards have preserved consumer access to cleaner transportation options amid threats of federal rollbacks.

Likewise, collective consumer pressure can help shift large companies toward more climate- and environmentally friendly practices. This means moving beyond individual purchases toward organizing campaigns that push companies to make sustainable choices the norm. Take Nestlé's Kit Kat: When Greenpeace exposed that the company was using palm oil linked to deforestation — threatening orangutan habitats in Indonesia as well as the climate — viral campaigns and public outcry forced Nestlé to drop the supplier and commit to sustainable sourcing within five years.

Which Day-to-Day Choices Have the Biggest Climate Impact?

Systemic pressure creates enabling conditions, but individuals need to complete the loop with our daily choices. It's a two-way street — bike lanes need cyclists, plant-based options need people to consume them. When we adopt these behaviors, we send critical market signals that businesses and governments respond to with more investment.

WRI's research quantifies the individual actions that matter most. While people worldwide tend to vastly overestimate the impact of some highly visible activities, such as recycling, our analysis reveals four significant changes that deliver meaningful emissions reductions. In order of climate impact, these behaviors are:

1) Shift to sustainable ground travel

Shifting out of gas cars by opting into public or active transit dramatically reduces emissions. Our research shows that living car-free is 78 times more impactful than composting. In other words, one person giving up their car has the same climate impact as 77 people taking up composting. Giving up your car may seem extreme or infeasible, but it doesn't have to be all or nothing; changes like switching to a hybrid or electric car can also have a significant impact.

2) Shift to air travel alternatives

Whenever possible, replace flying with videoconferencing, train travel or even driving (ideally in an electric or hybrid vehicle). While air travel is not a significant factor for most of the world — 89% of the world's population has never set foot on a plane — it's one of the most carbon-intensive activities we can do. Those in higher income brackets who fly more frequently have a greater responsibility to lead in this area. (If you're an organization wondering what you can do to reduce business travel, WRI has some tools and insights.)

3) Install residential solar and increase home energy efficiency

Investing in rooftop solar and improving home energy efficiency — such as by upgrading insulation, installing heat pumps or moving to a smaller house — can significantly cut emissions. While changing light bulbs or turning off appliances has a minor effect, structural home efficiency improvements and clean energy adoption drive far more significant reductions. Due to their high upfront cost, these actions are often more feasible with supportive government programs like tax credits and incentives.

4) Eat more plant-rich meals

Reducing meat and dairy consumption, particularly beef and lamb, has a massive and underestimated impact on the climate. While shifting to organic food, buying local and reducing processed foods all have benefits, these changes pale in comparison to dietary shifts that move away from animal proteins. Full veganism can save nearly 1 ton of CO2 annually, about a sixth of the average global citizen's total emissions. But even reducing meat intake captures 40% of that impact.

How Can Governments and Industry Unlock Broader Change?

These individual actions can have a real impact on emissions. But without systemic shifts and support, they will not drive change at the speed and scale the climate crisis demands.

To help people move away from gas-powered vehicles, governments can take steps such as investing in protected bike lanes and expanding electric charging infrastructure. Improved public transit, meanwhile, can drive down car use and make commuting cheaper and more efficient — a win for the climate and for our wallets and well-being.

In Bogotá, Colombia, consistent investment in cycling infrastructure coupled with supportive initiatives (like the popular Ciclovía program, where over 100 km of streets become car-free on Sundays and national holidays) have helped make sustainable transportation both practical and appealing. The share of trips made by bicycle in Bogotá rose from just 0.58% in 1996 to 9% in 2017, showing that when governments create the right conditions, sustainable behaviors can follow.

Pedestrians and cyclists take advantage of Bogotá's Ciclovía program, which closes some roads to car traffic on Sundays and national holidays; a prime example of how government initiatives can encourage low-carbon transportation. Photo by Ivan_Sabo/iStock

In the energy sector, governments can offer financial incentives for home solar, energy-efficient renovations and more. Take the Netherlands: Once labeled a "renewable energy laggard," it has become Europe's leading per-capita user of solar panels, in part thanks to generous subsidies and a net-metering system that allows homeowners to deduct electricity they feed into the grid from their usage.

When it comes to shifting diets, institutions like governments, public organizations and schools can increase plant-based meal options in cafeterias and canteens (such as by adopting "meatless Monday," like the Los Angeles Unified School District did in 2012). And businesses can make lower-carbon choices easiest and most affordable — for instance, by highlighting plant-based options on menus and pricing them competitively.

WRI's Coolfood initiative has demonstrated that simple changes can transform dining behaviors. When Sodexo (a global food service provider operating in schools, hospitals and corporate cafeterias) adopted descriptive dish names like "Sweet and Smoky Tacos," which centered taste and flavor rather than plant-based ingredients, the probability of consumers purchasing these dishes doubled.

How to Shift Behaviors Most Effectively

Our research shows that how initiatives to change behavior are designed is important. We coded all interventions aimed at driving key pro-climate behaviors into six categories:

We found that "choice architecture" (such as putting more sustainable options front and center) and commitment devices to form longer-lasting habits (such as encouraging pledges to take public transport more often) are the most impactful tools. Meanwhile, information-based approaches (such as carbon footprint calculators) are among the least.

Importantly, sustainability initiatives in industry and policy must be aligned with evidence on effective emissions reductions, instead of adopting visible but minimal-impact measures. Offering recycling bins shows environmental awareness, but providing affordable solar solutions, plant-rich meals or electric transportation goes a longer way toward genuine climate progress.

One powerful tool for government action is countries' national climate commitments (NDCs). WRI research shows that the world's top emitters have historically overlooked behaviors with high emissions-reduction potential, such as food choices and air travel, in their NDCs. With new and updated NDCs due in 2025 under the Paris Agreement, countries have an immediate opportunity to address human behavior change in high-emitting sectors, both through deploying behavior change tools and putting supportive policies in place to make these shifts accessible.

Leveraging Our Collective Power

While our choices matter for the climate, the "carbon footprint" narrative has obscured where our true power lies. This individualistic framing fragments our collective strength, keeping us focused on isolated personal behaviors rather than the transformative power of collective action.

WRI's research suggests a more impactful path forward. Rather than calculating our carbon math, our most meaningful individual action may be expanding our collective civic footprint. This can transform not just what we consume, but what choices exist for everyone.

Our power has always been greater than we've been led to believe. It's time we reclaimed it.

 

1 Average per capita emissions based on data from WRI's Climate Watch platform. For more information, see here.

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• The Living Lab for Equitable Climate Action

Authors Mindy Hernandez

Nature Crime Threatens Our Planet. Here Are 5 Ways to Fight Back. alicia.cypress… Tue, 04/08/2025 - 09:55

The growing scourge of nature crime — which includes illegal forms of logging, mining, fishing, forest conversion and wildlife trade — is devastating ecosystems and species around the world, robbing communities and governments of valuable resources and revenues. These crimes are estimated to generate as much as $280 billion in annual criminal proceeds, according to Interpol — money that could go to communities for health, education and development initiatives.

Nature crimes are also accelerating the impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss, which have dire impacts on our planet. For example, half of all tropical deforestation is illegal, according to the World Economic Forum. From fires and floods to the destruction of critical ecosystems and the decline of iconic wild species, nature crimes are putting us at even greater risk.

The humphead wrasse has become a major illegal fishing target for Hong Kong's live reef food fish trade. Acceleration of nature crimes are contributing to biodiversity loss around the planet. Photo by Tatiana Belova /Shutterstock.

What’s more, these crimes undermine global cooperation efforts on climate change, biodiversity and other environmental threats that are already hobbled by growing political rifts, bureaucracy, funding cuts, and in some countries, an inward, populist and sometimes xenophobic political turn.

Organized criminal elements are exploiting these political currents to exploit the planet's living resources, building on the opportunities of a globalized world.  

It’s increasingly clear that we won’t be able to effectively slow the worst impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss without countering nature crime. Solutions, like emerging technologies that can trace product origins, strengthening legal frameworks and empowering Indigenous communities with tools and resources, are just some of the ways the world can fight back.  

In the Amazon basin and elsewhere in the world, illegal mining — particularly for gold — is a major cause of tropical forest destruction. Photo by Tarcisio Schnaider/Shutterstock. A Persistent Problem   

This is not a problem that’s going away. Nature crimes are on the rise, with illegal gold mining among the fastest growing. Venezuela and Ecuador, for example, have reported large increases, especially since the price of gold rose significantly following the COVID-19 pandemic. The profits generated annually from illegal gold mining are estimated to be as much as $48 billion globally, according to Interpol.

Since 2016, the value of illegal gold exports surpassed cocaine in Colombia and Peru, respectively the largest and second-largest producers of cocaine globally. Cocaine and gold are becoming inextricably linked in many regions, with cartels using gold to launder illicit drug cash.

Indeed, convergence with other crimes is a regular feature of these environmental offenses. The links between illegal mining and illegal logging, for example, are well established. As a 2024 WRI report highlighted, the impact of mining, both legal and illegal, on global deforestation is striking, with nearly 1.4 million hectares of trees lost between 2001 and 2020 as a direct result of mining. That’s an area roughly the size of Puerto Rico.

At sea, illegal fishing fleets abound with human rights abuses and other forms of serious organized crime. In November 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned individuals associated with the Gulf Cartel due to their involvement in illegal fishing, human smuggling and narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Mexico.

These are complex crimes. To address this, a new WRI report on nature crime, aims to provide greater understanding on how these crimes work, their enablers and their convergences, and offers a range of solutions to fight back.

Fishing vessels are spotted in a protected marine reserve off the coast of Asia. Illegal fishing is frequently linked to labor and human rights abuses and other forms of organized crime. Photo by Richard Whitcombe/Shutterstock.  5 Ways to Halt Nature Crime

Here are five approaches that, if executed effectively, could turn the tide on nature crime.

1) Follow the Money

Nature crimes are routinely entangled with financial crimes, with illicit profits laundered into the global banking system. While it is somewhat of a cliché, there has been proven success in following the money to prosecute environmental criminals for financial offenses. Given that many jurisdictions impose harsher sentences for financial crimes, like money laundering, than environmental offenses, focusing on the money is a key approach to taking down the perpetrators.

Yet there are challenges. The sheer complexity of the crimes, with layering of transactions to obscure illicit sources of funds, presents a major obstacle. Furthermore, the linkages between nature crime and financial crimes are often missed or not prioritized by investigators. This needs to change: Illegal forms of logging and deforestation, along with illegal mining, are the highest-value crime types linked to associated financial crimes, according to the multilateral Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog.

Progress, however, is being made. Last year saw the launch of the Amazon Region Initiative Against Illicit Finance, a partnership between Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and the U.S., to “combat the financing of nature crime and counter the transnational criminal organizations benefiting from it.”

The private sector is also stepping up, with WWF and Themis — a developer of anti-money laundering software — creating a new Environmental Crime Financial Toolkit.  Launched at the 2024 UN Biodiversity Conference (COP16), this resource helps the financial sector better understand illicit activities associated with nature crime. Elsewhere, the Private Sector Dialogue on the Disruption of Financial Crime Related to Crimes that Affect the Environment, hosted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in partnership with Interpol, the Nature Crime Alliance and United for Wildlife, bring together financial institutions, law enforcement, financial intelligence units and civil society to increase awareness of the financial fingerprints of nature crime. If banks get better at identifying financial flows linked to environmental crimes, the networks involved will face increasing disruption.

These efforts are making it harder for perpetrators to conceal their crimes — and their profits.

2) Seize the Potential of Emerging Technologies

In March 2024, Belgian authorities announced that some 260 metric tons of Russian timber had entered Belgium in violation of EU sanctions imposed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This discovery was not the result of intelligence tip-offs or vessel tracking. Rather, the timber’s origin was only established due to cutting-edge scientific techniques that leverage chemical and genetic information — one of several nascent technologies that could dramatically improve the detection of products resulting from nature crime.

Elsewhere, artificial intelligence is reshaping the fight against wildlife crime, with the development of camera traps that can differentiate between probable poachers and other individuals. This reduces false alarms while enabling rangers to know exactly what they are dealing with when receiving alerts.  

Investing in and scaling these emerging technologies — alongside established ones such as geospatial monitoring that can identify nature crimes on land and sea — will equip frontline defenders and law enforcement actors with the tools that can thwart criminals on the ground.

3) Empower People and Communities on the Frontlines

Indigenous peoples and local communities are among the most affected by nature crimes such as land grabbing and illegal mining. As a result, they are often subjected to violence and intimidation by criminal gangs. In their role as frontline defenders, Indigenous communities must be supported in protecting their homes and livelihoods, as well as the biodiversity and ecosystems upon which we all depend.

This includes forging partnerships with the private sector, such as tech companies, to provide access to innovative tools and technologies that can give frontline defenders an advantage over the criminal gangs active in their area. Training communities to use platforms such as Global Forest Watch and other monitoring systems has already seen positive results. The challenge now is to scale these activities. 

Building trusted relationships between Indigenous communities and law enforcement — bridging local intelligence with policing power and resources — is also essential. Such relationships will not only support investigations and prosecutions but can also lead to more effective protections for frontline defenders themselves, who are regularly murdered in the defense of nature.  

The remnants of cut-down Spanish cedar in the Amazon forest of Peru. Spanish cedar, a valuable commercial timber species, is widely and illegally logged across the Amazon. Photo by André Bärtschi. 4) Ramp Up Multi-Sector Approaches

Multi-sector collaboration is a common thread across many of the approaches used to combat nature crime. It is essential in tackling the complex web of vested interests that drive environmental crimes around the world.

The Amazon Conservation Association (ACA) — a civil society organization — routinely cooperates with a federation of Indigenous peoples and local communities in Peru to monitor areas under threat from illegal mining. Using its Mapping the Andean Amazon Program (MAAP), which harnesses satellite imagery, ACA shares confidential reports with the federation, which then works with affected communities to determine if legal challenges should be brought and engage relevant government departments to bring them forward. Between 2022 and 2024, this collaboration has directly led to five major law enforcement operations — a strong example of multi-sector cooperation resulting in direct action against nature crime. In one such operation in Barranco Chico, Peru, authorities discovered illegal mining camps, where they destroyed heavy machinery, including diggers and trucks. Deforestation linked to mining subsequently decreased in this region, ACA reported.

Multi-sector approaches are also championed by initiatives like the Nature Crime Alliance, a global, multi-sector network hosted by WRI. With more than 40 members across governments, law enforcement and civil society, it is a model that in its two-year existence is already bearing fruit.

This month, the Alliance published a suite of new resources, developed in consultation with members, which aim to support law enforcement investigations and deepen civil society access to the latest research and insights on nature crime issues. Many of these resources have been shaped by the Alliance’s activities, such as supporting Interpol’s work to strengthen links with civil society organizations focusing on wildlife crime. The Alliance also runs a working group with Indigenous Peoples Rights International to empower frontline defenders via trainings, provide access to technologies, and advocate at the policy level.  

Financial commitments in support of multi-sector collaborations are also emerging. In January, the German government announced a 5 million euro ($5.4 million) grant to Interpol and WWF to tackle environmental crimes in a strong example of greater collaboration between law enforcement and civil society.

If we are going to reduce nature crime, and protect global biodiversity, the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities, and our national economic and security interests, we need to break the silos and get sectors working together more closely.

5) Strengthen Legal Frameworks

Another essential step is to ensure that legal and institutional frameworks are up to the task of prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators of nature crime. Criminal activities are forever evolving and adapting. Laws and judicial processes need to keep pace.

Reforming legal practices, such as widening the threshold of evidence that is admissible in court, would make a huge difference. In many cases, evidence gathered by civil society organizations or journalists — such as remote sensor data — cannot be used in prosecutions. A shift here would significantly increase convictions. Similarly, establishing stronger land rights for Indigenous peoples and local communities, and properly enforcing these rights, will go some way in tackling offenses such as land grabbing.

At the policy level, developments to international frameworks could also bolster law enforcement efforts. The relationship between these frameworks and local laws can be seen in the UNODC’s analysis of the global criminalization of environmental crimes. This 2024 study noted that the environmental offenses which most frequently meet the definition of “serious crimes” under the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) are those that fall under well-established international frameworks; wildlife crime and waste trafficking, covered by the UN Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, respectively. However, these frameworks need to be strengthened. CITES, for example, has consistently failed to stem the trade in iconic animals such as cheetahs. Despite being accorded the highest level of protection under CITES, some 4,184 cheetahs were involved in trafficking incidents between 2010 and 2019, with cubs being traded through loopholes in the convention’s system. Today, it is thought that as few as 6,500 mature cheetahs remain in the wild.

Since 2020, there has been growing support for a new protocol to the UNTOC to cover the trafficking of wild fauna and flora in addition to its existing focus on human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearms. This would unlock a range of international collaborative tools for law enforcement agencies.

Live cheetahs are widely trafficked from Africa to the Gulf States. More than 4,000 cheetahs were involved in trafficking incidents between 2010 and 2019. Now, there are fewer than 6,500 mature cheetahs that remain in the wild. Photo by slowmotiongli/Shutterstock. Making Progress in 2025

These solutions highlight that fighting back against nature crime is possible. What we need now is the political will among governments and donors to ensure resources flow to where they are needed most. Throughout 2025, there will be meaningful opportunities for governments and international organizations to make significant progress. They include:

• The IUCN World Conservation Congress — the major international summit on protecting fauna and flora that convenes every four years, taking place this October in Abu Dhabi — presents a key opportunity to elevate political will for stronger action against nature crime. Several major civil society organizations are already coordinating on a new omnibus resolution motion on nature crime ahead of the Congress. The motion, should it be adopted, will complement ongoing efforts to integrate nature crime as a core priority in IUCN's four-year program of work (2026-2029), cementing the issue in the international conservation agenda.
• The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Conference of the States Parties will take place in December in Doha. As a legally binding treaty, the UNCAC is among the best tools to fight organized and international networks perpetrating environmental crime. The upcoming UNCAC COSP11 is therefore a major opportunity to influence policymakers and drive tangible change on this issue, with networks like the UNCAC Coalition’s Environmental Crime and Corruption working group leading the charge.
• The Conference of the Parties for CITES convenes in Uzbekistan in November. Establishing more stringent enforcement of the convention and closing loopholes to combat illegal international trade in endangered species of fauna and flora, such as the cheetah, would be a welcome development.
• Finally, the United Nations annual climate summit (COP30) will take place this year in Belem, Brazil, at the mouth of the Amazon river. Hopefully, this setting will encourage governments to highlight the threat that forest crime poses to conserving the threatened Amazon rainforests, a critical component of the global effort to limit the emissions that are driving climate change.

Bolstering these high-level frameworks can drive much-needed political will to counter nature crimes at the national or regional levels, thus supporting the strengthening of local laws and enforcement operations on the ground. They can also serve as a vehicle to promote the expansion of international sanctions for environmental crimes — a move that would make the consequences of committing these crimes in line with their devastating impacts.

In a world of contesting demands on funding and resources, nature crime has for too long been overlooked. Failure to make meaningful progress on this issue will spell the failure of global environmental goals. That is a price none of us can afford to pay.

Ivory_pyre_Kenya_-_US_Embassy_Nairobi-Flickr[1].jpeg Forest and Landscape Restoration restoration illegal logging fisheries deforestation Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Charles Victor Barber Luke Foddy

Understanding the Paris Agreement's 'Global Goal on Adaptation' margaret.overh… Fri, 03/28/2025 - 12:00

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A staggering 3.6 billion people — nearly half of the global population — are currently considered highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranging from droughts, floods and storms to heat stress and food insecurity. This number will only continue to rise as long as global temperatures keep climbing.

While the world must act swiftly to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and halt climate change, action is also needed to build the resilience of people already feeling its impacts — and those who inevitably will soon. Climate adaptation efforts must be quickly scaled up to safeguard vulnerable communities, from building sea walls for flood protection to restoring forests that maintain water supplies and planting more resilient crops.

Yet global progress on climate adaptation has been small-scale, slow and fragmented to date, coming up woefully short of the world's need.

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) aims to address this shortfall by providing a clear framework and targets for measuring progress on adaptation. A well-crafted and widely supported GGA will guide global adaptation efforts by highlighting where and how adaptation plans and policies are being implemented, and which areas are falling behind.

Although the GGA was included in the Paris Agreement in 2015, the eight years that followed saw limited progress on developing it. However, countries finally agreed to an overarching framework at the 2023 UN climate summit (COP28). The framework provides a strong foundation, laying out key areas for global adaptation action. But it still lacks quantified, measurable adaptation targets as well as measures to mobilize finance, technology and capacity building (known as "means of implementation") — all of which are critical to driving real-world outcomes.

Negotiators are tasked with resolving these issues in 2025. They'll work to enhance the GGA framework so that it truly drives action at the scale needed, and so countries will have a useful set of indicators by which to measure and track its progress.

What Is the Global Goal on Adaptation?

The Global Goal on Adaptation is a collective commitment under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement aimed at "enhancing [the world's] adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change." Proposed by the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in 2013 and established in 2015, the GGA is meant to serve as a unifying framework to drive political action and finance for adaptation on the same scale as mitigation. This means setting specific, measurable targets and guidelines for global adaptation action, as well as enhancing adaptation finance and other types of support for developing countries.

Flooded homes in Bangladesh after extreme rainfall. Many communities and countries that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts also have the fewest resources to scale up their adaptation efforts and build resilience. Photo by Muhammad Amdad Hossain/Climate Visuals

The GGA is meant to enable adaptation actions that are timely, scalable and specific. Because countries are experiencing climate change impacts to different degrees and are vulnerable to them in different ways, it is also meant to encourage solutions that consider local contexts and the particular needs of specific groups of vulnerable people.

How Can Countries Achieve the Global Goal on Adaptation and Its targets?

The needs of all countries — especially those most vulnerable to climate change — must be fully included and addressed as countries work to enhance and implement the GGA. This means ensuring that the framework and its tracking mechanisms uphold four key principles:

Driving Climate Action for Vulnerable Countries

This article was written by members of the ACT2025 consortium, a group of experts from climate-vulnerable countries working to drive greater climate ambition on the international stage. Learn more about ACT2025 and its work here.

Focus on equity and justice

Equity and justice must be core considerations when operationalizing the GGA so that adaptation measures do not worsen existing inequalities. For instance, finance mechanisms should be designed to avoid increasing debt levels for developing countries — many of which are already heavily burdened by debt, limiting their ability to pay for climate action.

Support for locally led adaptation

Individual nations, states, provinces and communities must be able to tailor adaptation strategies to their unique contexts. To this end, the GGA should ensure that local populations, especially those most susceptible to the effects of climate change, are meaningfully involved. They should have true decision-making authority — including budgetary decisions — over which adaptation interventions are implemented in their communities, by whom and in what ways.

Compared to top-down approaches, locally led adaptation strategies can encourage ownership and effectiveness, reinforce social cohesion, and allow more flexibility in adaptation responses given the dynamic nature of climate change. However, they should still be aligned with national adaptation priorities.

The Principles for Locally Led Adaptation provide a useful framework to redistribute decision-making authority to the lowest appropriate level, including marginalized and particularly vulnerable groups such as Indigenous peoples, women, youth and others.

A locally led project in Mongu, Zambia aims to update an old canal system which is vital to the area's economy but often unusable due to climate-driven flooding. Context-specific projects like this are critical for enabling climate-vulnerable countries to implement national adaptation policies at the local level. Photo by CIF Action/Flickr Inclusive, science-based decision making

Adaptation actions should be based on the best available science as well as traditional and Indigenous knowledge to ensure effective and context-relevant strategies. The GGA must recognize the importance of integrating Indigenous peoples' wisdom into adaptation strategies, respecting their rights and knowledge systems, and promoting their active involvement in decision-making and designing solutions. Facilitating technology and knowledge transfer to developing countries will also be important to enhance local capacity for advancing adaptation efforts.

Alignment with other global sustainability goals

Adaptation efforts should complement and be integrated into other national and international development initiatives. This includes, for example, aligning with the broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

What's Included in the Current GGA Framework, and What's Missing?

The GGA framework put forth at COP28, named the "UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience" (UAE FGCR), highlights key areas in which all countries need to build resilience, such as food, water and health. These globally relevant themes can help bridge the gap between national and global adaptation priorities and ensure ambitious and unified messaging and outcomes.

The framework also lays out overarching (but not yet quantified) global targets which will help guide countries in developing and implementing National Adaptation Plans and other relevant policies. These include:

• Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: By 2030, all Parties have conducted assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities, and have used the outcomes to inform their National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies. Furthermore, by 2027, all Parties have established systemic observation to gather climate data, as well as multi-hazard early warning systems and climate information services to support risk reduction.
• Planning: By 2030, all Parties have country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments and planning processes, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans.
• Implementation: By 2030, all Parties have progressed in implementing their National Adaptation Plans, policies and strategies, and have reduced the social and economic impacts of key climate hazards.
• Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL): By 2030, all Parties have designed, established and operationalized systems for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built institutional capacity to fully implement their systems.

These broad targets offer a good starting point to guide adaptation efforts. But there are important gaps in the framework, too. For example, it lacks specific, measurable indicators to track on-the-ground action and measure progress toward achieving global adaptation goals.

The GGA framework also reiterates that international climate finance for adaptation should be on par with finance for mitigation in developing countries, recognizing that current levels are far too low to respond to worsening climate change impacts. However, it is silent on how countries should mobilize this finance. Ambitious finance targets are necessary to ensure that adaptation efforts, especially in climate vulnerable countries and communities, can be implemented.

Also missing are references to "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (CBDR-RC). This concept acknowledges that different countries have different levels of responsibility in addressing climate change according to their wealth and development levels.

What Progress Has Been Made Recently, and What Comes Next?

Developing the Global Goal on Adaptation has been a complex challenge — in part because adaptation interventions are often hyper-local and context-specific, and in part because negotiators have struggled to reach agreement on key political issues (such who should pay for adaptation in developing countries, which are the least responsible for climate change but often bear its heaviest burden).

With a framework in place, negotiators are now working to resolve thorny questions about the GGA which were not answered in its initial text, such as how to track progress toward its overarching targets. They have already made some progress: At COP29 in 2024, for example, countries agreed to track means of implementation (finance, technology transfer and development, and capacity building). This will help measure how well countries are adapting to climate change and whether they are receiving the financial and technical support they need to do so.

But unanswered questions remain. Addressing the following issues will be critical to delivering adaptation action that truly meets the needs of developing countries:

• Financing adaptation action: Ensuring adequate and accessible funding for adaptation remains a formidable challenge in implementing the GGA. Closing the adaptation finance gap requires not only mobilizing highly concessional finance in a timely manner, but also developing innovative financing solutions to address current and future climate impacts. Adaptation methodologies and metrics should be set up to effectively track the quantity and quality of climate finance for adaptation to ensure these targets are not underfunded and poorly implemented. Attention must also be paid to ensuring that finance is accessible to communities and not bottlenecked in national capitals. Recent estimates indicate that only around 17% of adaptation finance ever makes it to the local level.
• Indicators and measurements: Negotiators are tasked with finalizing a set of indicators for tracking adaptation action and support. Eight groups of technical experts are now in the process of narrowing down thousands of proposed indicators to a final list of no more than 100 by COP30 in November 2025. The final set of indicators must be comprehensive, yet manageable and globally applicable. These indicators should effectively capture progress toward adaptation goals by encompassing a wide range of information, including environmental and social considerations as well as enabling factors (which was a key focus of discussion at COP29).
• Limited data and knowledge: Effective adaptation planning requires accurate and adequate data and knowledge about local climate impacts and vulnerabilities. Many countries, particularly those with limited resources, may lack the necessary scientific expertise, technical capacity and data to develop robust adaptation strategies, which can impact progress and tracking. Parties should consider measures to help develop and streamline data collection and analysis while pushing for improvements in data and knowledge sharing as part of GGA processes.
• Linking bottom-up metrics and solutions with top-down indicators: Metrics also need to be adaptable to different scales so they may be tailored to specific contexts but also aggregated at higher levels. Creating locally appropriate and context-specific indicator frameworks means defining metrics and solutions from the bottom up. However, these must be linked to national adaptation goals to ensure progress can be tracked systematically. In other words, a one-size-fits-all-approach is not an effective way to address adaptation issues, and the framework should not assume that. For countries to develop robust adaptation monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems, the GGA must help them take stock of local initiatives and systematically integrate this data into national and subnational-level MEL processes.

In addition, parties launched two processes — the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the Baku High-level Dialogue on Adaptation, meant to foster implementation of the GGA — yet how they will do so remains unclear. As the scope of the roadmap and dialogue are developed, Parties must consider how indicators will be measured and tracked in practice; how adaptation finance links to the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance; how they can catalyze and strengthen regional and international cooperation to scale up adaptation action and support; and how other stakeholders can support its implementation.

Protecting the Most Vulnerable through the GGA

The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience adopted in 2023 marked a major achievement after nearly a decade of lagging progress. COP29 also made important strides in advancing the process to refine the goal's tracking indicators and establishing new mechanisms to support implementation.

However, for communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis, these advancements must swiftly translate into tangible action on the ground.

In the months and years ahead, negotiators must work to ensure that the GGA framework accelerates action towards strengthening resilience globally — such as through stronger protections for farmers facing drought, better infrastructure for coastal communities, and funding that reaches those who need it most — providing real support for the world's most vulnerable communities. Only then can the GGA truly drive adaptation action at the pace and scale necessary to meet the climate crisis head on.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in November 2023. It was updated in February 2024 to reflect progress made on the Global Goal on Adaptation at COP28 and in March 2025 to reflect progress made at COP29.

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Authors Fatuma Hussein Mohamed Adow Chukwumerije Okereke Gboyega Olorunfemi Henry Otchwemah Chikondi Thangata Kiyomi de Zoysa

Community Benefits Frameworks: Shortcomings and Opportunities for Greater Impact alicia.cypress… Wed, 03/26/2025 - 16:35

Community benefits frameworks have a long history in the United States, helping to secure tangible benefits for local communities from proposed development projects while safeguarding against potential burdens.  

These frameworks have been used in both public and private construction for decades. Many of the earliest successful agreements were applied to large-scale urban infrastructure development projects, such as in 2001 to build the Los Angeles Staples Center. Today, community benefits frameworks are being applied to new sectors, including clean energy and transportation projects (from offshore wind to electric buses), as well as new geographies, with many renewable projects taking shape in more rural parts of the U.S.

As the deployment of clean energy projects accelerates, new projects often face local opposition which can lead to project delays and even cancellation. While not a silver bullet, community benefits frameworks can help increase public acceptance of and defuse local opposition to clean energy projects, increase a project’s chance of gaining permitting approval, cultivate trust between project developers and communities, and generate benefits for host communities.

To better understand how benefits-sharing agreements and plans can work for host communities, the World Resources Institute and Data for Progress developed a database of community benefits frameworks with detailed information on 72 publicly available benefits-sharing agreements and plans across the U.S.

Here, we give an overview of the frameworks, outline what is included in the database and offer key findings for improving these frameworks based on an analysis of the benefits-sharing agreements it contains.

What Are Community Benefits Frameworks?

Community benefits framework is an umbrella term for a wide variety of benefits-sharing agreements and plans that have been used across the U.S. (The methodology document about this database provides further details on how they were found, analyzed and categorized in the database.)

Examples of Community Benefits FrameworksType of FrameworkAcronymDescriptionCommunity Benefits AgreementCBACBAs are legally binding agreements between a developer or company and local community organizations. The agreements direct benefits from a project to local communities. The benefits are negotiated based on a community’s priorities.Host Community AgreementHCAHCAs are legally binding agreements between a developer and the municipality where a project will be sited. In some states and municipalities, HCAs are being incentivized or even required for renewable energy infrastructure projects.Project Labor AgreementPLAPLAs are pre-hire collective bargaining agreements between labor unions and developers or contractors. They set the terms and conditions of employment for specific projects, specifying wages, benefits and working conditions.Good Neighbor AgreementGNAGNAs are established on a voluntary basis and are legally binding agreements between a business or developer and a neighboring community. The parties can address specific impacts the business will have on the community and come to a mutual understanding that benefits all parties.Community Benefits PlansCBPCBPs are non-legally binding roadmaps reflecting how a developer is planning on engaging with communities across project stages. Although they often don’t include enforcement mechanisms, they can help pave the way for legally binding agreements. 

Source: Saha et al., 2024 and Gross, 2009

While agreements such as CBAs, HCAs and PLAs are typically voluntary, they have also been required by city and state law. Some states, including California, have enacted legislation requiring "legally binding and enforceable agreements" between the developer and community-based organizations for renewable energy and other projects. Detroit has a community benefits ordinance that requires developers to enter into a CBA with a neighborhood advisory council which is formed to represent local communities where projects will be sited. Community benefit plans are also established on a voluntary basis, although in some cases they are required. For instance, under the Biden administration, CBPs had to be submitted as part of developers’ applications to receive federal funding for grants and loans under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law or the Inflation Reduction Act.

What’s In the Database of Community Benefits Frameworks?

The Community Benefits Framework Database includes 72 publicly available agreements and plans signed between 2000 and 2023, but it is not comprehensive of all agreements and plans ever negotiated in the U.S. 

Inside the Community Benefits Frameworks DatabaseQuestionAnswerWhat type of information is included for each framework?Information on framework type, sector, location, parties to the agreement or plan, the year it was signed, the duration of the agreement or plan, the categories of benefits provided, the mechanisms for monitoring, reporting and enforcement, and whether the agreement includes conflict resolution mechanisms.What sectors are covered?Energy, education, entertainment, mining, construction, solar power, transmission and others. Where were frameworks negotiated?All across the U.S., with California and New York together accounting for more than half of agreements and plans included in the database.When were the agreements signed?Between 2000 and 2023.Which category of benefits is most common?Education and financial benefits are the most common across frameworks, followed by employment and workforce-related benefits.What is the most common type of community benefits framework in the database?CBAs account for about 44% of the database; HCAs make up 25%; and almost 10% are CBPs. How many agreements include language on monitoring and reporting, enforcement, and conflict resolution?79% of frameworks include language on reporting and monitoring mechanisms. Only 48% include text on enforcement mechanisms.Key Shortcomings Observed in Benefit-Sharing Agreements

The ultimate success of community benefits frameworks hinges on several factors. Although this article does not discuss all these factors, many have been explored elsewhere. With very few community benefit plans in the database, the following analysis applies to legally-binding agreements, such as CBAs, GNAs, HCAs and others, which make up about 90% of frameworks included in the database.

Here, we focus specifically on shortcomings we observed, especially in terms of how agreements are written:

1) Ambiguous, Aspirational Goals with Few Implementation Details

The level of detail in the reviewed agreements varied widely.

Some agreements are less detailed and only provide general promises, limiting opportunities for communities to seek recompense if benefits are not delivered. The agreements tend to lack clear metrics, timelines or enforcement mechanisms that give weight to provisions. For instance, an agreement that includes a benefits provision made by a developer to “strive to create local jobs” lacks a clear pathway to enact and enforce it.

Stronger agreements spell out specific benchmarks, timelines and responsibilities for implementing agreed-upon benefits. Such agreements typically include clear commitments with binding language and concrete actions. For example, a developer "shall provide 100 affordable housing units" within a specific timeframe, or a developer "will hire 30% of workers locally."

One agreement, negotiated for a mixed-use building development in Washington state, obligates developers to begin construction on 200 units of affordable housing within four years. This CBA specifies not only the number of affordable housing units, but also articulates how affordable housing is defined, and includes specific requirements to ensure the units are large enough for families.

Examples of Common Language Patterns Across Strong and Weak FrameworksStronger Agreements Weaker Agreements Characteristic Example Characteristic Example Firm, binding language around developer’s responsibilities “Will provide 1,000 new reusable bottles...” Vague, subjective language around developer’s responsibilities “Make commercially reasonable efforts to construct...”; “should secure adequate funding for...”, or “Will make good faith efforts to provide a sufficient number of reusable bottles...” Specificity of benefit “Will hire 50% of new workers from [local municipality].” Goals or objectives instead of concrete benefit “Endeavor to hire 50% of new workers from the surrounding area” or “attempt to reduce...” 

Beyond what language is included, there are also patterns in which language is absent from weaker agreements. For instance, enforceable language, with terms like “binding,” “penalty,” and “independent monitoring” are rare. Similarly, clear and measurable targets, with phrases like “specific outcomes,” “measurable benchmarks,” and “timelines” are often absent or underdeveloped.

Key Takeaway

Clear, measurable targets and timelines can help ensure that commitments are actionable and enforceable, and developers can be held accountable. In particular, it is important to include specific language about benefits, who is responsible for delivering them and by when, as well as important details that may arise in implementing benefits.

 2) Few Details on Negotiation Process and How Benefits Are Chosen

The agreements included in the database, for the most part, provide no information about the negotiation process, how the benefits were chosen, the specific criteria used to determine the benefits, who will qualify for the benefits and — perhaps more importantly — who will not. Including this information can enhance transparency, build community and developer trust and confidence in the agreement, and help with effective implementation of the agreement.

From the agreements themselves, it is not clear how benefits were chosen and which party influenced the different parts of that process. Most agreements use the term “benefits” as a catch-all phrase. Often, they are activities the developer undertakes to address a project’s negative impacts, or benefits that naturally arise from the project, such as new jobs or tax revenue. At times, compliance with existing laws, such as adherence to the Americans with Disabilities Act or to “local laws and regulations,” is also framed as a benefit, raising questions about whether the developer carried out community engagement in good faith and to what extent community groups were part of the decision making process.

Robust benefits-sharing agreements should include additional tangible benefits requested by local communities that enhance their long-term prosperity. For example, Chevron and the city of Richmond, California entered into a community investment agreement over Chevron’s plan to modernize its Richmond refinery. This agreement details a three-month timeline of the city and developer’s community engagement efforts and the process — two local community workshops organized by the developer and public hearings held by the city’s planning commission — to identify benefits prioritized by the local community.  

To boost groups’ capacity to negotiate for specific benefits, some developers have set aside funds for community groups to cover expenses during the agreement negotiation. The developer of the New Bedford HCA , for example, committed to reimbursing the city of New Bedford, Mass., up to $90,000 for costs incurred from negotiating the agreement, among other things. Another example from Philadelphia is the SugarHouse Casino CBA, in which the developer agreed to pay up to $35,000 in legal fees incurred by the authorized community signatories. Such funds can help level the playing field between the two groups by helping communities hire legal help or gain access to third-party expertise.

Although such dedicated funds can be helpful, it is important that agreements include explicit language allowing communities the independence to choose their own legal representation and third-party experts.

Key Takeaway

A well-documented process that includes details on the negotiation and community engagement process as well as how the proposed benefits were arrived at can help with accountability, public trust and effective implementation. Having sufficient time and adequate resources can help community members and organizations represent their interests and secure tangible benefits during the negotiation process. Leveraging data and tools to identify and prioritize benefits most useful to a community — something technical or legal experts can help with — is important to ensure positive outcomes.

 3) Differences in the Quality of Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms

Although about 78% of agreements featured in the database include monitoring and reporting provisions, there are differences when it comes to the quality of these mechanisms.

Monitoring and reporting responsibilities are often assigned to the developers. However, agreements typically provide little to no practical details on how to monitor, measure or report progress on implementing the agreement. In most cases, developers are only required to create annual progress reports on their compliance efforts. The agreements often lack a clear roadmap specifying what exact metrics should be reported and monitored, how frequently, and by what methods. As a result, communities struggle to independently track a plan’s implementation and hold developers accountable when necessary.

Some agreements with strong monitoring and reporting elements require progress to be monitored and reported on by independent third parties, or through oversight committees that include community representatives. For instance, one agreement between commercial fishing associations and telecommunications companies in San Luis Obispo, California requires the companies to host an independent observer on their cable installation vessels equipped with monitoring tools and technologies to verify the companies’ compliance with the agreement. The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District CBA in Missouri includes a detailed provision for the formation of an oversight committee, which meets quarterly with an independent monitoring party to report on progress and verify compliance with the CBA terms.

Key Takeaway

Creating committees that include community representation or hiring independent monitoring parties to evaluate progress on commitments are examples of strong monitoring and reporting mechanisms. These approaches can allow for independent oversight, measuring progress toward commitments as a first critical step towards enabling communities to hold developers accountable.

 4) Lack of Clear Enforcement Mechanisms

Enforcement mechanisms refer to clear processes for holding developers accountable and penalizing noncompliance with a benefits-sharing agreement. Even though most agreements in the database are legally binding and include language on monitoring and reporting mechanisms, only about half of them include language on enforcement mechanisms. The reason for this absence is unclear.

Some agreements are vague regarding what enforcement will look like, simply including provisions to “enforce findings” with few specifics. Other agreements include provisions about parties to the agreement meeting to confer and determine mutually agreeable steps to get a developer back on track.

In contrast, stronger agreements tend to include provisions about the preparation of a corrective action plan to review why a specified benefit has not been provided or a certain goal not achieved. They typically also outline how specific remedial actions will be negotiated to achieve compliance.

In some cases, monetary enforcement provisions are included, such as the accruing of interest in the case of late payments of host benefit fees or arbitration awards. For instance, the Dearborn Street CBA in Seattle, Washington, establishes that the developer will contribute $50,000 to the city’s housing funds for each housing unit that is not completed or commenced after a given timeframe.

Key Takeaway

Well-designed enforcement mechanisms like late fees, monetary penalties or other consequences for default can serve to incentivize developers to abide by agreements and result in material consequences from failure to do so. Without adequate enforcement, community benefits frameworks can be undermined, and developers may fail to meet their obligations once the initial political or public pressure fades.

 5) Lack of Provisions for Agreement Amendment and Renewal

Around 84% of agreements in the database include information on how long the agreement will last. Only a few agreements — about 14% — include provisions that detail whether an agreement can be amended or renewed. Even fewer include provisions outlining what happens to promised benefits if a project changes ownership.

Provisions that provide opportunities for renegotiation, renewal or responsibility transfer clauses can help ensure the long-term sustainability of the benefits. Without such provisions, the benefits of an agreement may not last beyond a project’s lifetime or could be threatened if the project changes ownership. For instance, agreements may include affordable housing or community center commitments but may lack provisions that ensure units stay affordable once a development is complete.

One good example of these practices is the case of the Stillwater Mining Company GNA, in which the continued operation of the Montana mine is affixed to the GNA regardless of the mine’s ownership. This ensures the GNA will be enforceable as long as the mine is operational. It also provides a good practice example of an agreement that was amended several times to keep pace with evolving circumstances.

Other agreements included in the database, such as the SunQuest Industrial CBA in Los Angeles, did not include such ownership provisions. In SunQuest Industrial’s case, the developer’s bankruptcy eventually led to the sale of the project land to a new developer who no longer wanted to honor the CBA. Some have pointed out that, for these reasons, CBAs should include language that ties the agreement to the land or property asset itself.

Key Takeaway

Agreements that include language on a procedure to renew, amend, or transfer responsibility of the agreement — in the case of project closure or ownership transfer — can help guarantee that an agreement’s provisions are sustainable, and that the community will receive the benefits that a developer agreed to provide.

 Moving Forward: Scaling and Improving Community Benefits Frameworks

Despite the Trump administration halting many federal investments in clean energy and the associated advancement of social, economic and environmental justice, the broader momentum for clean energy infrastructure will continue with or without the federal government’s support.

Community benefits frameworks will remain an important tool to ensure that all communities, especially Black, Indigenous, low-income, rural and other communities of color, can meaningfully engage in the development of clean energy projects and derive benefits from them. This community benefits frameworks database aims to showcase the variety of features used across frameworks to assist communities, developers and researchers in advancing projects that benefit communities.

Further research and analysis are needed on the outcomes and effectiveness of community benefits frameworks to yield community benefits. Such research can help inform future actions by policymakers, project developers and community organizations to ensure widespread positive community impacts from clean energy projects.

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Authors Danielle Riedl Willy Carlsen Evana Said Devashree Saha Grace Adcox Catherine Fraser

Unloading Coal Exposure: Where Are Banks Now, and What’s Next? margaret.overh… Tue, 03/25/2025 - 17:38

Banks have long funneled billions into coal, sustaining the world's biggest source of energy-related emissions well past the point when investors were aware of the impacts.

While some banks are scaling back to manage risks and tap into clean energy opportunities, progress is slow. In 2023, for every $1 of financing for wind, solar and grids, banks facilitated $1.12 into coal and other fossil fuels. In 2022, that figure stood at $1.35. The direction is right, but the pace is deficient.

Despite pledges to stop funding new coal projects, many banks, especially in Asia, where coal dependence runs deep, remain entrenched. And the challenge extends beyond power plants; banks are deeply embedded in the entire coal value chain, from mining and manufacturing to transport and auxiliary services. Cutting these ties demands faster, more decisive action — but their integration across business lines, financial products, and operations adds complexity.

To assist banks in navigating these challenges, a recent working paper from WRI assesses where banks are now and what they need to do to comprehensively unwind their coal investment.

Where Do Banks Stand on Coal Now?

The coal sector is global and complex. Mined from the ground, coal is not just burned for power ("thermal coal") but is also used to create steel ("metallurgical coal"). And the sector is massive: Today more than a third of electricity supply originates with coal.

Banks can be involved in coal in three different ways:

1. Sometimes a financier has a very clear-cut connection to expanding or sustaining coal, as in project finance to build new coal plants or equity in a coal company. They may directly invest in coal, holding debt or equity in projects or companies.
2. They can invest in companies which are reliant on coal but do not produce or burn it directly, such as companies that indirectly use coal in their energy mix.
3. Financial institutions may provide banking, capital markets underwriting, dealmaking or other services to clients involved in coal. These activities support the coal sector, too.

In addition to choosing whether they invest in or provide these services, banks may choose to ask those they work with to progressively transition away from coal. Investors have an interest in reducing the risk and enhancing the competitiveness of their investments, and they may engage with companies in ways they believe will enhance their performance — for example, by offering incentives to encourage them to avoid risks associated with coal. Increasingly, investors use the lens of "transition finance" to talk about finance or guidance dedicated to encouraging clients, with words or cash, to transition their business away from coal. This, too, is a form of coal exposure — but one with more nuanced implications.

Though some banks still need to catch up, the new standard is for banks to have robust policies to stop investing in new coal power on a definite timeline. Now leading banks are pushing beyond this, thinking more comprehensively about how to fully extricate their support for the coal economy and how to finance its transition.

Quitting new coal power is now standard

Around 70% of the world's top 100 commercial banks have made the commitment to exit coal. In practice, most banks begin quitting coal by stopping loans for new coal mines and power plants.

WRI research found that most of the world's top banks by size have committed to a coal power phaseout timeline in line with or more aggressive than the International Energy Agency's (IEA) 2040 target date for achieving net zero by 2050. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are also setting principles to exclude coal activities from new operations.

Despite some differences, the trend is clear: Direct financing for new coal projects is drying up in most parts of the world. In 2023, most countries saw no new coal power plants. Outside of China, construction began on 3.7 GW of coal capacity, significantly lower than the 16 GW annual average from 2015 to 2022. The next step will be to move from excluding coal to divesting and transitioning existing investments.

Some banks are picking up momentum

Many banks are moving into a more complex realm now, by steering clear of coal processing, heating, and industrial projects reliant on coal. About 10% of top commercial banks include financing for coal-related infrastructure in their coal exclusion and/or divestment policies. Strengthening oversight of coal-linked clients is also growing, with around 20% of major banks setting phaseout deadlines and tracking financed emissions to reduce coal exposure.

Few are moving toward the frontline

Few banks are proactively financing the low-carbon transition of existing coal power projects, leaving MDBs to lead efforts to retire coal plants early. private finance needs to play a more active role in financing coal retirement and transition. Despite new retirement plans and phaseout commitments, last year saw the lowest coal capacity retirement in over a decade. A key challenge is developing financial structures that cover transition costs while ensuring reasonable returns for private investors. But banks have the expertise and leverage to help.

Some banks are supporting the broader transition through the management of their coal and coal-related clients. With the rise of guidance on credible transition plans, banks now have more tools to assess their clients' pathways. Some banks, such as HSBC and Mizuho, have committed to helping their coal clients transition — but much more is needed to embed this support into standard practices and to ensure the credibility of these plans.

Meanwhile, those continuing coal financing have largely gone unnoticed, except by leading banks, watchful observers and analysts. Some banks continue to indirectly finance coal through subsidiaries, joint ventures, intermediaries and passive investments.

Facilitation of coal financing can also go off-the-book through bond underwriting and asset management, allowing coal financing to continue without proper oversight. Only a few banks have incorporated coal power underwriting into their coal exit policies and more accountable strategies are needed to address these risks.

Above all, ambition and innovation are needed to close action gaps and advance the frontlines.

Here to Help: Where Banks Should Start and How to Progress

Navigating the race away from coal requires careful planning, strategic execution, and continuous adaptation. Here's a three-step to guide the process:

1) Know where you are

This includes both understanding the extent of a bank's business entanglement in the coal value chain and evaluating the foundational elements needed for a successful phase-out — from top-level commitment, building internal capacity for implementation and establishing external channels for support, to communication and international cooperation. Checklists are a handy tool for banks to quickly and comprehensively scan gaps and resources.

2) Devise your priorities

While mapping highlights broad trends of banks' coal phase-out practice, it is crucial for banks to improve and update their commitment and approach based on specific contexts and realities. A prioritization framework that guides banks in systematically assessing regulatory, market, technological and societal factors is helpful. Asking a series of recommended questions on each factor, such as how coal exit aligns with or contributes to a bank's overall strategy — whether in climate, sustainability, sectoral or country-specific approaches — can help identify the most urgent, feasible and impactful actions a bank should prioritize.

3) Stay measurable

Setting clear, measurable metrics ensures actions are tangible and that progress can be reviewed effectively. We offer a metric-setting approach with corresponding examples (covering project, company and portfolio levels) to help banks set thresholds for their coal exit strategies. To drive progress in client transition, for example, our approach outlines a company-level method for assessing coal involvement and dependence using both relative and absolute values. These metrics evaluate involvement in new coal projects, economic and fuel reliance on coal, and emissions. They are applicable to coal producers, users and facilitators.

The three-step process — plan/review, decide, implement — is an ongoing, dynamic effort. Priorities should evolve, and metrics should gradually tighten. The tools provided are intended to standardize actions, ensuring they are both comparable and easily understood by a broader audience.

What's Next for Banks?

Now that the complexities of coal financing are clearer and frameworks for action are in place, it's time to tackle some challenges beyond individual banks.

Quick wins for Asian banks

Asian banks play a crucial role in driving the transition away from coal, due to their strong presence in global finance and history of funding coal-fired power projects.

While coal-investing nations like China, Japan and South Korea have pledged to halt overseas coal investments, the extent to which banks are translating these commitments into action remains uncertain. For instance, despite managing some of the world's largest assets, many Chinese banks have yet to publicly articulate clear, coal-specific financing policies compared to their global peers.

WRI's Net Zero Tracker found that China's Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of China were among the least ambitious and vocal when it came to phasing out coal power in their portfolios. To bridge this gap, Asian banks can take immediate steps: systematically assessing their coal exposure, updating financing strategies to align with transition goals and clearly communicating their coal exit plans.

The tough reality of existing coal

Tackling existing coal assets requires ambition and innovation, but it also presents opportunities. Banks' deep ties to coal projects and coal-dependent clients can become a powerful asset in driving the transition. Besides cutting exposure, banks can take an active role in financing the early retirement, replacement or repurposing of coal power plants. This is especially relevant not just for utilities but also for industries like steel and mineral processing that rely on their own captive coal plants.

Learn more about how legal protections offered to foreign investors in Asian coal plants could stymy efforts to transition off coal — and how new efforts can bring together stakeholders to overcome this challenge.

However, ensuring a credible transition requires more than intent — it demands newly engineered financing strategies, stronger oversight, and standardized transition metrics to track progress. Banks can step up by working closely with clients to understand their transition needs, designing financial products that de-risk transition and clean energy investments, and collaborating with regulators to align phaseout plans with policy shifts.

Scaling change through financial collaboration

Offloading coal assets alone doesn't guarantee a real-world phaseout. After all, another bank may step in to finance them. Moreover, banks have a clear role to play in ramping up clean energy, without which the energy transition can't occur. To make coal exit actions truly effective, banks must work together, aligning policies across financial institutions to create a level playing field, setting industry-wide standards that reduce backtracking or greenwashing, and supporting clean energy.

Stronger collaboration within the financial sector can amplify the positive impact of coal phaseout policies. When banks apply stricter coal financing criteria, not only to their own portfolios but also to co-financiers and financial intermediaries, they help prevent loopholes and reinforce broader market shifts.

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How Philanthropy Can Boost Adaptation Finance in Developing Countries alicia.cypress… Fri, 03/21/2025 - 09:10

The deadly destruction around the globe from increased floods, scorching temperatures and other extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change is setting back progress on economic development in developing nations.

These events contribute to a vicious cycle of deepening poverty and worsening vulnerability to climate change. This means that investing in adaptation and resilience — helping nations and communities not just prepare for and recover from climate impacts but have the infrastructure in place to stand up to future climate-related challenges — is crucial to boosting their development and well-being. Investing more in adaptation also generates a stream of fiscal and economic savings by avoiding future losses.

Yet investments in developing countries seriously lag behind growing adaptation needs. Among developing countries, financing for adaptation and resilience remains far below the $215 billion to $387 billion needed annually by 2030. In Africa, for example, increased spending on resilience is critical for food security, improving livelihoods, protecting supply chains and avoiding health crises from heat and drought. Also, until recently, global financing for loss and damage has received little attention despite major climate related disasters impacting communities.

The Role Foundations Play in Climate Action

The 2024 report of the Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance (IHLEG) stressed the urgency of bridging the large financing gaps that impede spending on both mitigation actions and building resilience to climate change. Beyond private finance, it particularly emphasized the need to mobilize funding that won’t contribute to a nation’s debt, including grant financing or financing at well-below market rates. Given large-scale reductions in early 2025 in the United States and much of Europe, foreseeable levels of  Official Development Assistance will help developing countries, but will not meet their growing needs. Alternative sources of concessional and grant financing will be needed to help fill the growing finance gap.

To help close financing gaps, philanthropy can and should step up. In 2023, philanthropic giving for climate change is estimated to be between $9.9 billion and $16.4 billion annually, of which only about $600 million (3.6% to 6.1% of the total) is for adaptation, according to the ClimateWorks Foundation. Philanthropic giving for climate change is only 1.1% to 1.8% of total giving, which was an estimated $885 billion in 2023 — suggesting ample scope for scaling up.

Foundations’ climate-related support to developing countries has been increasing, albeit from a low base. Their funding for Africa, for example, tripled over the last five years, reaching $112 million in 2022. Still, the overall level, at 6% of total foundation funding, is not enough. Funding has been directed mainly to climate mitigation, primarily to sustainable energy but also to cross-sectoral approaches such as low-carbon cities, methane carbon dioxide removal and climate-related capacity-building. Foundations have not publicly tracked their funding for climate adaptation but a new survey shows that foundations are paying more attention to adaptation investments. This shift is overdue.

In late 2023 at the annual United Nations climate summit (COP28), a coalition of 21 leading philanthropy organizations, including the Rockefeller Foundation, Aga Khan Development Network, Temasek Trust and the Shockwave Foundation, began calling for greater action by governments and private stakeholders toward transformational change on climate adaptation. The Adaptation and Resilience Funders Collaborative now includes 60 foundations working together to learn, coordinate, and invest in climate adaptation and resilience. Separately, the World Economic Forum’s Giving to Amplify Earth Action (GAEA) is building public and private partnerships in order to multiply financial contributions for adaptation and nature.

However, considering the rate at which the adaptation finance gap is growing, more still needs to be done to boost the scale of philanthropic resilience financing. Even if foundations increased their grant-making for climate change in Africa nine times over — by 900% — the total would still only reach $1 billion. While a significant amount, that would still be only 2% of the estimated annual adaptation finance needs in Africa up to 2030.

Key questions to ask are: “How can philanthropy dramatically increase its giving in new and different ways?” and “What are ways in which its contributions can better leverage the strengths of other development partners?” Several of the ideas presented below are tied to efforts by multilateral development banks (MDBs) to lend ever more with their limited capital. Leveraging MDB financing presents mutually beneficial results.

5 Ways Philanthropy Can Scale Climate Financing

There are many opportunities for philanthropy to increase their contributions to adaptation finance, from giving at the local level for specific community-based adaptation projects to more broad-based giving for sectoral, national or even global approaches. Common areas of foundation support for climate change include supporting financing options and access to climate finance, helping integrate adaptation planning into national and sectoral development plans, and providing finance at the community level for local investments, disaster risk management and “build back better” programs. Many foundations already have long-standing close ties and partnerships across Africa and other developing regions and countries, creating vital opportunities for direct giving. In Africa, for example, important country-specific needs include improved information for project planning and supporting governments to understand their climate risks/impacts and prioritize and sequence the most cost-effective interventions.

But foundations need new ideas for ways to invest in adaptation if they are to increase their giving. Here are five avenues for philanthropy to work proactively and innovatively with developing country governments and donors to scale up concessional climate financing. These proposals represent opportunities for expanding the quantity and improving the quality of MDB adaptation financing by crowding in, ideally, billions of dollars from large foundations seeking to achieve significantly larger impacts at a time when developing countries are facing increasing financial stress.

1) Co-Finance Projects with Multilateral Development Banks

Philanthropic organizations and each interested MDB can co-finance projects on climate adaptation, nature restoration and resilience-building, especially in low-income and climate vulnerable countries. Historically, philanthropists have contributed to numerous trust funds that MDBs manage for specific purposes, such as policy research and capacity-building. For example, at the World Bank, private non-profits are important contributors to its financial intermediary funds where partnerships combine resources to support global initiatives. But these funds have not been designed to co-finance large MDB projects with greater impacts than foundations could achieve on their own. By pooling philanthropic capital, such facilities could provide greater financing over a longer period, which many adaptation investments require.

Advocacy for this proposal is not new: It was proposed by the Center for Global Development as one argument for a large replenishment for the African Development Fund. By supporting MDBs’ country programs and projects through project-level co-financing arrangements, philanthropies can extend the scope and scale of their impact. Furthermore, in the case of adaptation, philanthropic grants are especially valuable because many adaptation actions reduce future climate risks but may not generate the financial returns required to repay MDB loans.

2) Provide Grant Financing for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage

In addition to providing grant financing for adaptation, philanthropies could support the new Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage operationalized at COP28. The fund was created to help developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Global financing of loss and damage has been largely neglected despite the major setbacks to economic growth and development caused by climate related disasters.

Even though developed countries should take the lead in financing loss and damage, there is also room for alternative sources of finance to help countries bear inevitable economic and social damages. In fact, the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage says it plans to look at non-donor and private financing, although it has yet to broadly act on those intentions. Philanthropies already played a notable role in early awareness on the need for loss and damage financing at COP26 in 2021, contributing $3 million at that time. They could also help increase public pressure on developed country governments and catalyze support for the fund and support the development of innovative ways for non-donors to contribute to the Fund.

Philanthropy organizations are well-placed to provide some urgently needed early grant financing to augment the very limited funds pledged by countries so far to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. The benefits of doing so would allow developing country governments to meet growing explicit and implicit government liabilities related to climate loss and damage without incurring greater debt. However, it is not realistic for philanthropies to cover a major portion of the total projected needs. In fact, the negotiating bodies (and governments generally) are nowhere near to an understanding of what those total needs might be, or even agreeing on a methodology for estimating them. By becoming financial partners, early philanthropic support could help inform open discussions over funding issues.

 3) Create Global Funding Mechanisms to Leverage MDB Core Capital

The G20 Triple Agenda Report has the innovative proposal for non-government investors — including philanthropy — to expand MDBs’ financing capacity by creating global funding mechanisms. Philanthropists and other stakeholders could finance a mechanism that would allow MDBs to leverage their core capital and increase the impact of their financing in two ways. First, the facility could use grant contributions to lower the cost of MDB lending by buying down the interest rate. Second, MDBs could use the grant contribution to leverage four to five times the amount of philanthropic giving. This multiplier effect is due to MDBs sharing the risk of MDB loans, thereby allowing the MDBs to lend more with a given amount of core capital. Contributions of several billion dollars by philanthropies could stimulate additional MDB lending of $10 billion to $20 billion.

In this context, the International Financing Facility for Education (IFFED) has been cited as a promising model, including by the G20 Expert Group. Through the IFFED, guarantees by willing countries enhance philanthropy’s cash contributions to create a financial base that MDBs can use to leverage up to 4 times and thus boost lending. In addition, philanthropists can provide grant contributions that lower the MDBs’ lending rates (such as down to the lower terms offered by the highly concessional International Development Agency). A climate financing facility could be designed using this model. It is estimated, for example, that a $2 billion grant from philanthropists channeled through an IFFED-like climate financing facility could increase MDBs’ concessional lending by as much as $10 billion, and by even more if it catalyzed private financing. This promises to significantly leverage philanthropic funding in the form of boosted levels of multilateral concessional climate financing.

A mechanism that either improves the terms of MDB lending or leverages their core capital in new ways will require a governance structure that provides appropriate voice and representation to philanthropy. As new mechanisms emerge to bring in significant non-government participation within the MDBs space — such as this and the previous two proposals — shaping inclusive governance arrangements will inevitably be an important issue to resolve.

4) Contribute to Disaster Risk Insurance Premiums

 Countries are increasingly seeking disaster risk insurance due to their high exposure to the economic and fiscal shocks caused by major disasters. While it is true that countries cannot insure themselves out of climate risk, the opposite is also true — that even countries with robust climate adaptation programs face unforeseeable risks with macroeconomic and fiscal impacts. Sovereign disaster risk finance increases the financial response capacity of national and subnational governments to meet post-disaster funding needs without compromising fiscal balances and development objectives. While some risk management approaches are contingent financing which defers obligations, sovereign insurance products transfer risk to others.

International financial institutions and the private sector are active in finding contingent financing adaptation insurance products. For example, the IMF’s Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust has provided direct debt relief to poorer countries hit by disasters, including climate shocks; the World Bank Treasury Disaster Risk Insurance Platform offers risk transfer solutions such as insurance, derivatives and catastrophe bonds; and private insurance companies participate in sovereign insurance, weather derivatives and macro-level risk pooling offerings.

For insurance products, philanthropies could step up to help developing countries pay for the premiums. The potential benefits to poor or climate vulnerable countries could be, on average, about 100 times the cost (although actual premiums depend, of course, on country-specific climate risks). This is not a new idea: In the past, bilateral donors have contributed that cost on behalf of low-income countries, such as when the European Union subsidized the premiums associated with parametric insurance under the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility. This idea of involving philanthropies in risk-pooling not only provides potential benefits many times greater than the cost: it would also give philanthropies leverage to help convince countries to take important climate adaptation measures before a disaster hits.

5) Develop Better Climate Adaptation Metrics

 As philanthropies scale up their partnerships with the MDBs, the need for better metrics of climate risk reduction, resilience-building and loss and damage financing needs will continue to grow. All stakeholders and financiers need better metrics on how much risk reduction can be purchased through specific actions. For example, WRI is working with the Gates Foundation and ClimateWorks on improved economic analysis and metrics of the costs of reducing climate vulnerability. In fact, a wide range of analytical approaches are being tested — everything from tracking inputs (expenditures) to outputs (project deliverables) to outcomes (net risk reduction). Some are geared to the project level and others at the national level; some support donor priorities and others try to incentivize private sector investment.

Foundations, as informed partners to donors, governments and communities, should continue supporting the research and technical assistance required for all parties to converge on commonly accepted metrics. As vested partners, philanthropy can and should play an important role in debates over how adaptation and resilience financing — and loss and damage financing — gets measured, monitored and evaluated in the years to come. In short, improved metrics would, according to the World Bank, “create incentives for countries, donors, and the private sector to engage in more and better adaptation; to more effectively report on what the MDBs and clients are doing; and to establish a global standard for financial markets and public procurement.”

Scaling Up Climate Adaptation Finance with Help from Philanthropies

Poverty is a chief driver of vulnerability, and in the absence of improved adaptation, climate change will worsen both vulnerability and poverty. Therefore, the task of building climate adaptation and resilience falls on all countries and donors alike. Every government will need to understand how to better manage climate impacts from the macroeconomic level of sovereign risk down to the local level of affected communities and impoverished households. Philanthropies can scale up their valuable work in their more traditional areas such as:

• Supporting developing country governments to build knowledge and capacity to better understand the economic and social implications of their physical climate risks, and to prioritize and sequence the most cost-effective interventions.
   
• Providing finance at the community level and/or providing support mechanisms that allow central government funding to reach the local level, whether for local adaptation investments, disaster risk management or build back better programs.
   
• Helping to cover the cost of sovereign disaster risk insurance, an important yet under-implemented option to help low-income manage unforeseeable risks with macroeconomic and fiscal impacts.

In addition, philanthropies can dramatically help step up the level of climate adaptation finance by proactively engaging with donors and governments in new ways. The first four proposals, above, represent significant changes in the role and scale of philanthropy — none of which are impossible given the growing number of large foundations in the 21st century. To the extent that foundations can join together and speak with a common voice, their voice would be stronger and facilitate progress more efficiently. The unprecedented challenge of climate change adaptation itself requires a higher level of philanthropic engagement.

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the e-Book "Pathways to Unlocking Climate Finance for Africa," published by the Climate High-Level Champions Team under the UNFCCC.

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Authors Marilou Uy Carter Brandon